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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the phenomenon known as Melayu is not a 
solidary unit, but rather, in its very nature, a hierarchical 
gradation of being. In this study, I explore the implications and 
consequences of such hierarchisation. I argue that in Riau the basis 
of hierarchy is the sultanate. Even without the existence of the 
sultanate as an institutional reality, an ideology of statehood seems 
to suffice. Such an ideology derives from the mythologised past when 
the sultanate did exist institutionally. 
Such mythologising is not value-free: it is a means of expressing 
vested interests in motivated forms. I will draw out contrary views 
and examine the perspectives of the specific informants concerned. 
Such differences are not just interpersonal but also intercommunal. I 
explicitly acknowledge the active role of an ethnographer in putting 
together the different bits of information into one coherent picture. 
In this respect, Bateson's information theory has been of relevance to 
me. (See Bateson 1973, 1980.) 
Of primary concern to me is the hierarchy of contexts 
encapsulating infinite levels of text-context relationships. Adopting 
a reflexive principle, the writing of this thesis is also 
hierarchically organised. I begin with the discussion of the larger 
context in space and time; I move on to the mythologised past that is 
contextualised in the present; I then discuss the realisation of this 
mythologised past in the everyday present. I end by re-
contextualising the ethnographic reality in Riau in the worldwide 
pattern of change that I shall refer to as 'the civilising process'. 
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PART ONE 
PEOPLE, PLACE AND TIME: 
'MALAY I ' RIAU AND ZAMAN 
GIAPI'ER ONE 
WHERE OOES ONE BEGIN? 
1 • 1 Preconceptions 
1.2 Explorations 
1.3 Preliminaries 
1.4 Inter-contextual Transformations 
1.5 Textual Organisation 
1.6 Argumentation 
1.7 The Intertextuality of Alternative Constructions 
1.1 Preconceptions 
••• It is the recipient of the message who creates the 
context. This power to create context is the recipient's 
skill •••• The recipient must be, in some sense, ready for 
the appropriate discovery when it comes •••• Readiness can 
serve to select components of the random which thereby 
become new information. 
(Bateson 1980:56-57). 
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The preconceptions I had prior to fieldwork may be regarded as my 
readiness for information, which enabled me to contextualise and 
thereby understand as new information what I learnt from my 
informants. One preconception was the idea of a 'Malay people' with a 
'Malay culture'. Another was the idea of typicality that is, of 
people who could be typed as representative 'Malays' and from whom one 
could discover 'Malay culture'. Let me explain these two 
preconceptions. 
As a Singaporean, I was aware that many of those called 'Malays' 
in Singapore and Malaysia were actually people of migrant descent 
Javanese, Baweanese/Boyanese, Arab, Indian, and others. The 
identification of such migrants and their descendants as 'Malay' 
implies a process of assimilation to a host culture that is 'ur-
Malay' .1 Yet the presence of such large numbers of migrant recruits 
would, presumably, distort the character of any 'ur-Malay' host 
culture. My reading of the literature reinforced this awareness of 
the migrant presence among the 'Malays' of these two countries. For 
example, many ethnographies of 'the Malays' are of migrant recruits, 
2 
such as Javanese, Batak, and Minangkabau. 
This situation made me curious about what 'ur-Malayness' might be 
without the intrusion of migrant recruits. Since the overwhelming 
majority of these migrant recruits had come during the era of British 
3 
Malaya, I inferred that whatever 'ur-Malayness' might be, it should be 
sought in the context of the pre-colonial era. Looking into the 
histories of the area, my attention was drawn to a succession of 
polities that various historians have identified as 'Malay' -- namely, 
Srivijaya, Melaka, and Johor. (See Wolters 1970, Sandhu and Wheatley 
1983, and Andaya 1975.) These three chronologically successive 
polities seem to have occupied much the same territory that is, 
parts of the Malayan coasts including the island known as 
Temasik/Singapore, the Riau and Lingga islands, and parts of the east 
Sumatran coast. This territory is now divided among three different 
nation-states -- namely, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Since I 
was then looking for a place where I could do original fieldwork, I 
became interested in that part of 'Malay' territory that now belongs 
to Indonesia, hoping thereby to provide a counterpoint to 'Malay' 
studies done in Singapore and Malaysia. 
I decided to work in Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' in Indonesia 
for two reasons. First of all, the territory of that province 
includes parts that may be identified as 'Malay' -- that is, parts 
that had belonged to the 'Malay' polities of the pre-colonial era. 
The second reason for my choice was the sparseness of the population 
in Riau Province. The 1971 census indicated a density of only 17 
persons per km2. (See Auda Murad 1977:6.) I inferred from this 
sparseness in population that the area had not been attracting much 
immigration. Therefore, it seemed possible that unlike the situation 
in Singapore and Malaysia where there have been large numbers of 
migrant recruits to 'Malayness', 'ur-Malayness' might perhaps persist 
in Riau Province in a form relatively undistorted by migrant 
intrusion. Indeed, Auda Murad (personal communication) and Mochtar 
Nairn (personal communication) subsequently informed me that this 
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province was losing so much population to Malaysia through emigration 
that it was beginning to worry the central government in Jakarta. 
So I went into the field with a preconception of 'ur-Malayness', 
a phenomenon that I associated with the pre-colonial polities of 
Srivijaya, Melaka, and Johar, and that I hoped to find in Riau 
Province in a form undistorted by migrant intrusion. With such a 
preconception, I was ready, in Bateson's sense, for information about 
'Malayness' since that was what I had set out to find. However, 
neither Srivijaya nor any other such kingdom is extant in the Republic 
of Indonesia. Therefore, even though I associated 'ur-Malayness' with 
these earlier polities, I could not expect to find it unchanged 
through time. Nevertheless, I had the expectation of finding 
historical continuity, of discovering a persisting if not immutable 
'Malay' culture. The way I intended to discover this was to ensconce 
myself in a typical 'Malay' village in traditional ethnographic 
fashion. 
This brings me to the second preconception I started with --
typicality. I had the notion that I could study a single community as 
a representative microcosm from which I could generalise about the 
macrocosm of 'Malay' culture. Thus in my preconception, 'Malayness' 
was a phenomenon that persisted through time and that was shared by 
many people in many different places. The corollary of this is that 
by studying one typical 'Malay' village I could tap 'Malayness' in its 
larger temporal and spatial context. Consequently, when I first began 
fieldwork in 1979, my attention was focussed upon the problem of 
finding the typical village where I would derive my information. 
5 
1.2 Explorations 
My very first informants in Riau Province were people in 
Pekanbaru, the provincial capital where I had to go to obtain visa 
clearance. At that time I did not yet know in which community I would 
conduct my field research. So while I was in Pekanbaru, I tried to 
get advice on this matter from academics in Universitas Riau, from the 
military officers who interviewed me about my intended research, 
indeed from anyone I happened to talk to. I explained that I was 
interested in 'Malay history and culture' (sejarah dan kebudayaan 
Melayu); so I asked my informants which places in Riau Province would 
be considered as 'Malay places' (tempat Melayu). 
To this line of questioning, they responded by advising me to 
visit certain 'historical places' (tempat sejarah); the places they 
mentioned were mostly the capitals of former sultanates in the area 
Siak Sriindrapura, Rengat, Daik, Penyengat, and a few others (see Maps 
2 and 3). While this response seemed to confirm my association of 
'Malayness' with the pre-colonial polities, I was nevertheless 
surprised when my informants told me that the 'historical places' are 
considered Melayu 'Malay' because these are the sites of 'palace 
ruins' (bekas istana) and 'royal graves' (makam raja-raja). Instead I 
had expected them to say that a place was Melayu because the people 
there were Melayu. But when I asked whether the present inhabitants 
of these 'historical places' were Melayu, I was even more surprised 
when my Pekanbaru informants could not give definite answers. They 
were not sure whether some of these 'historical places' were still 
inhabited, and if so, whether the inhabitants were Melayu. This was 
new information indeed -- that it should be considered possible to 
have Melayu places without Melayu inhabitants. 
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I was, however, left with the problem of finding a community to 
study. So I stressed to my Pekanbaru informants that my intention was 
not just to view the material remains of the former sultanates, but to 
do research in a living Melayu community. To clarify my point, I said 
that I was particularly interested in the 'true Malays' -- that is, 
those who were not of migrant descent. The term I used for 'true 
Malays' was orang Melayu jati, a term used in Singapore and Malaysia 
to differentiate indigenous 'Malays' from those of migrant origins. 
However, my Pekanbaru informants understood the term orang Melayu 
jati as a synonym for suku Melayu asli 'original Malay divisions', 
under which rubric they listed several ethnonyms, divided into 'land 
people' (orang darat) and 'sea people' (orang laut). The following is 
a composite list derived from several informants: 
the 'land people' mentioned were 
the 
the Talang Mamak in Rengat3. 
the Sakai in Duri and Bengkalis4 
the Akit in Bengkalis, Rupat, Tebingtinggi, 
and Pulau Padangs 
the orang asli, orang dalam, or orang hutan 
in Rempang6 
the orang Ungar in the Riau islands;7 
'sea people' mentioned were 
the Air Jong8 
the Mantang 
the Tambus9 all in the Riau-Lingga islands 
the Bintan10 
the Penaungan11 
the orang laut12 in Indragiri 
7 
This was again surprising new information, because in Malaysia 
such ethnonyms would refer not to 'Malays' at all, but to various 
indigenous communities who are constitutionally defined as (non-Malay) 
13 
'Aborigines'. But as indicated by Major Williams-Hunt (1952), the 
former Colonial Adviser on Aborigines, the difference between 'Malays' 
and 'Aborigines' was by no means definite or rigid in British 
Malaya.1·4 In contemporary Malaysia, however, 'Malays 1 and 
'Aborigines' are legally differentiated into two distinct categories 
in the amended Federal Constitution of 1981, Article 160(2). This 
indicates that the view of my Pekanbaru informants is comparable not 
to that found in contemporary Malaysia, but to an earlier period in 
Malaya when 'Malays' and 'Aborigines' were not yet clearly 
differentiated into mutually exclusive categories. 
As we shall see further below, it is clear that 'Malayness' in 
Indonesia is indeed different from 'Malayness' in Singapore and 
Malaysia. This difference is directly related to the perceptions of 
the respective governments. The Singapore government regards 'Malays' 
as a 'race', a genetically engendered category in the state-imposed 
system of ethnicity. (See Benjamin 1976a.) In Singapore, a Christian 
English-speaking 'Malay' is still legally considered 'Malay'. Indeed 
there is apparently a sufficient number of Christian 'Malays', that 
they are considering setting up a Malay Christian Association. (See 
Nurliza Yusuf forthcoming.) 
In Malaysia, however, 'Malayness' is constitutionally tied to 
Islam, such that a 'Malay' convert to Christianity would no longer be 
legally considered 'Malay'. This was stated to me categorically by 
Anwar Ibrahim, a Minister in the Malaysian Cabinet. But not all 
Malaysian Muslims qualify as 'Malays': the constitutional category 
'Malay' includes only Muslims who speak Malay, conform to Malay 
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custom, and who were born in Malaysia or born of Malaysian parents. 
(See Siddique 1981.) 
In contrast to the governments of Singapore and Malaysia, the 
Indonesian government evidently has no interest in giving a legal 
definition of 'Malayness'. In Indonesia, 'Malay' or Melayu is just 
one label in the loose array of regional identities that people may 
profess. In other words, from the Indonesian government's point of 
view, anyone who wants to identify herself/himself as Melayu may do 
so; conversely, if she/he does not want to do so, then she/he may 
choose practically any other regional identity. The Indonesian 
government's laissez-faire attitude towards the ethnic labelling of 
the population is evident in the identity cards issued to all 
citizens. Whereas the identity cards issued by the Singapore and 
Malaysia governments stipulate the respective ethnic labels of their 
citrzens, the Indonesian identity card does not include any ethnic 
labelling.IS So in Indonesia, 'Malayness' is a matter of subjective 
self-identification, rather than an objective category belonging to a 
legally imposed set. 
Such a comparison is, however, the benefit of hindsight. At the 
time I began my fieldwork, I was merely aware of the difference 
between my Pekanbaru informants' perception of Melayu and the current 
view of 'Malayness' in Malaysia which specifically excludes the 
'Aborigines' (Orang Asli). My efforts simply to find a Melayu 
. 
community to study was already making me realise that whatever Melayu 
may mean in Riau Province, it was different from 'Malayness' in 
Singapore and Malaysia. My Pekanbaru informants' talk of palace 
ruins, royal graves, and aboriginal people was new information to me. 
However, I was not sure whether this was a general attitude or just 
one peculiar to those Pekanbaru informants I had happened to meet. 
Moreover, I was still anxious to find a Melayu community I could 
study; I was hesitant about accepting my informants' suggestion of 
studying the orang Melayu jati/suku Melayu asli they had named, 
because I was not convinced that these were the only 'Malays' around. 
I wanted to find a community that could be considered 'Malay' even 
from a Singaporean or a Malaysian perspective. 
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So I tried another line of questioning: I asked where I could 
find a kampung Melayu 'Malay village' where I could stay. My 
informants responded by advising me to go to Penyengat in the Riau 
archipelago and to Daik in the Lingga archipelago. (See Map 3.) 
Significantly, both these places are the former capitals of the Riau-
Lingga sultanate, which was the polity that succeeded the Johor 
sultanate.16 Even at the time, I thought it strange that when I asked 
for the location of a 'Malay village', my Pekanbaru informants named 
me two former capitals. Having been to Penyengat many years before as 
a tourist, I knew that there were many aristocrats on the island. An 
aristocratic community did not fit in with my preconception of 
typicality. So I stressed to my Pekanbaru informants that I wanted to 
do research among ordinary Melayu people, not aristocrats. But no, I 
received no other suggestion from them. 
So at the end of my brief stay of about two weeks in Pekanbaru, I 
received the impression that there are mainly two kinds of Melayu 
people in Riau Province -- the tribal suku Melayu asli at one extreme 
and the aristocrats of former sultanates at the other. But who are 
the people in the middle? To this question I did not receive an 
adequate answer in Pekanbaru. In this context, it is significant that 
none of my informants there ever suggested that I should stay in 
Pekanbaru to do my research. Instead, when we talked about things 
Melayu, it was as if we were talking about some phenomenon located out 
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there in the not quite modern world, in the world of the bygone past, 
of palace ruins, royal graves, and aboriginal people. Pekanbaru 
itself does not seem to produce Melayu people; its inhabitants seem to 
identify themselves either as orang Indonesia 'Indonesians', orang 
Riau 'Riau people', or as orang Pekanbaru 'Pekanbaru people'. 
Geographically, Pekanbaru lies within the territory of the former 
Siak sultanate, which was centred along the Siak river. Pekanbaru 
itself is sited upstream of this river, while the former capital of 
the Siak sultanate, Siak Sriindrapura, is sited a little downstream. 
(See Map 2.) However, my Pekanbaru informants could not or would not 
tell me whether there were any Melayu people in the vicinity of Siak 
Sriindrapura, which was mentioned to me only as a 'historical place', 
and not as a 'Malay village'. Since I eventually did not go there, to 
this day I still do not know whether there are any Melayu inhabitants 
there. But supposing there are, and I now think that likely, it is 
significant that my Pekanbaru informants chose to present the place to 
me as Melayu only in terms of its historical association, and not in 
terms of an ongoing Melayu settlement. The significance probably lies 
in the geographical proximity between Pekanbaru and Siak Sriindrapura: 
the Indonesian-ness of Pekanbaru is perhaps not sufficiently secure 
for its citizens to feel unswayed by the pull of an alternative, 
albeit bygone, capital. 
But who were my Pekanbaru informants? They included a Javanese, 
a Sundanese, three Minangkabau, and seven others who identified 
themselves as Melayu. These Melayu informants were from different 
areas -- Palembang, Kampar, Indragiri, Siak, and Pulau Tujuh.17 (See 
Maps 1 and 2.) Despite this self-identification they nevertheless 
seemed to downplay their own Melayu-ness, while highlighting their 
Indonesian-ness. For example, not one of them suggested that I should 
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go to study his or her home-village. Their attitude is, I think, 
related to their social position. Because of the brief period of time 
I spent in Pekanbaru, I could only interview a very small sample of 
informants, most of whom were known to each other. These informants I 
would consider as belonging to the elite of Pekanbaru society; they 
included two university students, four university lecturers, a school-
teacher, a provincial military commander, a medical doctor, and three 
civil servants. Even those among them who identified themselves as 
Melayu, seemed to owe their social position not to their Melayu-ness, 
but to their Indonesian-ness. Since these Melayu informants were 
themselves neither tribal nor aristocratic, they would seem to belong 
to the middle. Yet they were the ones who tried to draw my attention 
away from themselves, towards the tribal and the aristocratic Melayu. 
Such being the case, I could only go to those 'Malay villages' they 
had suggested, since I did not know of any other. So I started with 
Penyengat because it is nearer to Pekanbaru than is Daik. 
During the voyage, I tried to sight from the boat, villages that 
I could possibly study, apart from aristocratic Penyengat. I was 
quite taken by house-clusters I saw along both banks of Selat Tiung 
(Tiung Strait), on the islands of Rempang and Galang Senyantung. (See 
Map 4.) When I arrived in Tanjungpinang, I went to meet a man whose 
name and address had been given to me by my Pekanbaru informants. 
After I had explained my purpose to him, I asked him about the 
feasibility of studying one of the villages located along Selat Tiung. 
He responded by saying: 
Kampung itu tak boleh mewakili penghidupan masyarakat 
Melayu; penduduknya orang laut yang mendarat. 
(Those villages cannot represent Melayu social life; their 
inhabitants are sea people who have come to land.) 
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So I encountered this perception of 'representative' versus 
'unrepresentative' Melayu. In the view of this informant, the 'sea 
people' are 'unrepresentative', even after they have settled on land. 
I asked him which communities he considered 'representative'. He 
named Penyengat. This informant is himself an aristocrat bearing the 
title of raja, and an inhabitant of Penyengat. I explained that I 
knew Penyengat to be largely inhabited by aristocrats, and that I was 
perhaps more interested in ordinary commoners. After some 
consideration, he named four communities of commoners that he regarded 
as 'representative' -- Pangkil, Pengujan, Kampung Melayu, and Tanjung 
Unggat. (See Maps 4 and 5.) He then kindly spent two days bringing 
me to these four 'representative' communities, so that I could choose 
one from among them. At the end of our tour, he advised me to choose 
Pangkil because its 'headman' (penghulu), Raja M, was his kinsman. 
Since at that time I had not yet secured a social footing in the area, 
and was dependent on this informant, Raja H, to introduce me to the 
various communities, I could not afford to ignore his opinion. And so 
I picked Pangkil as the Melayu community I would study. 
Even though I did finally find my one Melayu community for the 
purpose of ethnographic fieldwork, the preconceptions I had started 
with were already severely shaken. I was beginning to doubt the 
existence of a homogeneous 'Malay people' with a 'Malay culture' at 
least in Riau Province; and the typical community from which I wanted 
to generalise about 'Malayness' was evidently so rare a phenomenon 
that I did not even know what it was supposed to be 'representative' 
of. If in Raja H's opinion, the villages of Selat Tiung cannot 
'represent' Melayu social life as exemplified by Penyengat and 
Pangkil, then surely the reverse is also implied. Whatever it is that 
Penyengat and Pangkil 'represent', that does not include the villages 
of Selat Tiung. Since Raja H could name the grand total of only five 
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'representative' communities, then what is it that the other hundreds 
of villages in the Riau archipelago are supposed to 'represent'? 
The final blow to my preconceptions came in Pangkil. My 
informants there started to tell me voluntarily that they were Melayu 
yang totok 'pure Melayu', as 'pure' as the people of Penyengat, unlike 
their neighbours on the island of Karas who were Melayu yang tidak 
totok 'impure Melayu'. Previous to this, I did not even know that 
Karas was inhabited. Nor were the Penyengat and Karas communities the 
only two that my Pangkil informants measured themselves against; 
others were mentioned and evaluated as being 'pure' or 'impure', and 
to what degree. 
It gradually became clear to me that my Pangkil informants 
perceived a continuum of Melayu-ness that was not some dislocated 
abstraction, but rather, a social interpretation of specific people in 
specific places. My informants saw themselves as occupants of a 
particular position on that continuum with other people occupying 
other such positions. When I realised that this was the self-
perception of my Pangkil informants, I could hardly go on pretending 
blithely that they were typical 'Malays', when they quite plainly 
thought of themselves as exemplifying only one particular type --
namely, 'pure' Melayu of the commoner variety. This put paid to my 
original intention to study a single typical 'Malay' community, and on 
that basis, to make statements about 'the Malays doing this' or 'the 
Malays believing that'. From the perspective of my Pangkil 
informants, it seems that there is no such phenomenon as 'the Malays'; 
instead there are only types of Melayu, various degrees of Melayu-
ness. 
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So I decided to turn my attention towards the larger social 
context in which my informants located themselves. As a result, the 
focus of my research shifted away from the internal doings of a single 
community towards the perceptions and cross-perceptions of Self and 
Other in a cluster of communities. Consequently, the present study is 
not a village ethnography in the traditional sense of the word; it is, 
rather, a discussion of the patterning of Melayu-ness in a relatively 
larger geographical area. 
1.3 Preliminaries 
What I discovered through my field experience was that Melayu-
~ is not a timeless, placeless, automatically persistent tradition, 
existing in some abstract form, dislocated from actual people, places, 
and events. On the contrary, my informants saw themselves and others 
as named individuals located in particular places in particular frames 
of time. They related to each other in terms of these social, 
spatial, and temporal specifics. Whatever Melayu may mean to them, 
that meaning is to be found in the patterning of these specifics. So 
the questions that are asked in this study and, I hope, answered are: 
How do my informants perceive Melayu-ness? What different points of 
view are there on the matter? Why do they differ? What is the 
significance of these perceptions? In this light, Melayu-ness may be 
considered as a field of discourse within which different individuals 
communicate with each other about certain topics of mutual concern. 
Such being the case, the term Melay4 must be treated not as a 
presumed given, but as a problematic to be analysed. Therefore, in 
the rest of this study, I will leave the term untranslated. To use 
the English gloss 'Malays' would only obscure the issue, especially 
since that word is variously used in quite other ways. For example, 
it is used by some to refer to all Muslim indigenes in Southeast 
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Asia. Or for example, in the context of Malaysia, it is used to 
refer to those citizens who are constitutionally so defined. Most 
ethnographers working in Malaysia seem to have accepted this 
constitutional definition implicitly. Whether there is indeed any 
connection between my informants' usages of the word Melayu and the 
various usages of the word 'Malays' is another problematic to be 
analysed, and not a given that may be arbitrarily presumed. So in 
this study I will not speak of 'the Malays' but only of 'my 
informants' and their usages of the term Melayu. 
Even Wilkinson's (1959:755) dictionary explanation of the word 
Melayu indicates several distinct shades of meaning: 
Malayan; Malay; (occasionally) Moslem, e.g. masok Melayu (to 
turn Mohammedan). In early times the word did not cover the 
whole Malay world; and even Abdullah draws a distinction 
between anak Melaka [Melaka native] and Orang Melayu 
(Hikayat Abdullah 183). It would seem from one passage 
(Hang Tuah 200) that the word, limited geographically to one 
area, became associated with a standard of language and was 
extended to all who spoke 'Malay'. The Malay Annals speak 
of a sungai Melayu [Melayu river]; I-tsing speaks of Sri 
Vijaya conquering the 'Moloyu' country; Minangkabau has a 
'Malayu' clan (suku); Rajendracola's conquests (A.D. 1012 to 
1042) covered Melayu and Sri Vijaya as separate countries; 
the Siamese records claim Malacca and Melayu as separate 
entities. Rouffaer identifies Melayu with Jambi. 
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It would appear from Wilkinson's explanation that in historical usage, 
the word Melayu was alternatively associated with Islam, with a 
specific category of people (namely, the orang Melayq), with a 
particular standard of language and with the speakers of that standard 
language, with a river, with a country, with a Minangkabau clan, and 
with Jambi. As we shall see below, in my informants' usage, the first 
three of these associations are still relevant -- that is, the 
associations with Islam, with a specific category of people, with a 
particular standard of language and the speakers of that standard 
language. 
16 
However, because of this association with a particular standard 
of language and not with a whole language, I will keep the word 
'Malay' for referring to the Malay linguistic domain as a whole. My 
informants do talk of a bahasa Melayu 'Melayu language' but this 
refers specifically to the formal and standardised variety which is 
used in writing. Other informal varieties are also used, but these 
are referred to not as bahasa but as cakap 'talk'. These informal 
varieties are toponymically labelled -- cakap Galang 'Galang talk', 
cakap Gelam 'Gelam talk', cakap Bintan 'Bintan talk', cakap Mantang 
'Mantang talk', and so on. These various 'talks' differ somewhat in 
pronunciation and vocabulary, and may be considered as inter-related 
dialects. 
Therefore, following Benjamin (1984:9), I shall use the word 
'Malay' to refer to an Austronesian dialect-continuum that is 'wide 
enough to include such varieties as Orang Hulu, Minangkabau, Iban and 
the language of the 7th-century Srivijayan inscriptions, but narrow 
enough to e~clude such languages as Javanese, Batak and Acehnese'. 
Such a dialect-continuum parallels to some extent the continuum of 
Melayu-ness on which my informants locate themselves. But while they 
do use a particular term namely, Melayu -- to refer to this 
continuum of being, they do not use any one term to refer to what is 
recognisably a continuum of dialects. For this reason, it is 
necessary to introduce the foreign term 'Malay' as a label for such a 
dialect-continuum, ranging from informal local varieties of 
toponymically labelled cakap to the formal standardised bahasa Melayu. 
To complicate the linguistic situation, the national languages 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei are all recognisably 
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dialects that may be located on this same continuum. That is to say, 
they are all varieties of Malay. So the population of Malay-language 
speakers should number some two hundred million, including not only 
the Malay-speaking peoples of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Brunei, but also the relatively small pocket of Malay-speakers in 
South Thailand. The Malay language has such a wide geographical 
spread, because it has been a regional lingua franca for several 
centuries, used first for trade, then for classical literature, then 
for colonial administration, and finally for nationalist politics. 19 
Thus to generalise about the culture of the Malay-language speakers is 
as futile a task as it would be to generalise about the culture of all 
speakers of the English language. Indeed, in this sense, Malay is as 
international a language as English, being one of the official 
languages of the United Nations. My few informants in Riau can in no 
wise represent the other two hundred million Malay-speakers: they can 
only represent themselves. Therefore, whatever is said in this study 
with regards to the Malay language or dialect-continuum must be 
understood as pertaining specifically to my informants' usages. 
However, references to other usages elsewhere will be made where 
relevant. 
The Malay words that appear in this study are primarily 
transcribed in the Penyengat-Pangkil pronunciation. This is because I 
did most of my fieldwork in these two communities. However, I also 
did fieldwork in Bintan, Karas, Sembur Laut, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah, 
where different dialects are spoken. For ease of comparison, I will 
transcribe words derived from these latter communities also in the 
Penyengat-Pangkil pronunciation. Because I spent more time in 
Penyengat and Pangkil, that is the dialect of Malay I speak myself. 
Consequently, my informants speaking other dialects tended to adjust 
to my dialect, so that I could understand them. As a result, certain 
""'--. "-.· 
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words derived from these other informants may also be in the 
Penyenyat-Pangkil pronunciation, because they were so pronounced in an 
adjusted form for my benefit. I will transcribe my informants' 
statements in the syntax they actually used, even if that syntax does 
not agree with conventional grammar. 
As it happens, the Penyengat-Pangkil dialect is a standardised 
lingua franca among all my informants, because of its historical 
association with the former court at Penyengat, and because it is the 
basis of the written form. Significantly, I have found quite a close 
correspondence between certain Penyengat-Pangkil usages and those 
explicated by Wilkinson (1959) in his dictionary. I will therefore 
refer to these dictionary explications where relevant.20 As Wilkinson 
(ibid.:ii) explains in his preface, one method he used for the 
compilation of his dictionary was to submit 'bare lists of words 
(without meanings) ••• to a committee of three Malays from Singapore, 
Johore, and Riau respectively'. Since the resulting explications were 
jointly agreed upon by all three committee members, this suggests that 
a certain common dialect prevailed in Riau, Singapore, and Johar. The 
correspondences I have found between these dictionary explications and 
certain Penyengat-Pangkil usages thus suggest that the Penyengat-
Pangkil dialect is found not only in Riau, but also in Singapore and 
Johar. 
It is indeed this particular dialect that my informants refer to 
as bahasa Melayu 'Melayu standard speech'. Its existence does not, 
however, obviate the co-existence of other dialects such as cakap 
Bintan 'Bintan talk' which is used by my Bintan informants, cakap 
Galang 'Galang talk' which is used by my informants in Karas, Sembur 
Laut, and Nanga, and cakaE Barak 'Barak talk' which is used by my 
informants in Teluk Nipah. Because the Penyengat-Pangkil dialect is a 
standardised lingua franca, I am transcribing it in the standard 
orthography that is currently used for the national languages of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. 
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Where Arabic words are concerned, I am adhering to the romanised 
transcriptions given in Wehr (1976). Words and phrases in non-English 
languages other than Malay will be specified. These include Arabic, 
Dutch, and Chinese. As for the romanised transcription of Muslim 
names from the Arabic original, I shall follow Matheson and Andaya 
(1982) for those historical personages mentioned in the text Tuhfat 
al-Nafis. However, some later historical personages did have their 
names romanised; in such cases I shall follow their own usages. If an 
historical personage's name has not been romanised by Matheson and 
Andaya (1982), nor romanised by himself or herself, I shall adhere to 
the transcription given in the relevant text where it is mentioned. 
There will thus be some inconsistencies in the spelling of the same 
Muslim names. Where my informants' names are concerned, I will adhere 
to their own romanised forms. Where such a form is not available -
for example, in the .case of a non-literate informant, I will provide 
my transcription of his or her name. 
As mentioned above, I had started my fieldwork on Pangkil, and it 
~as only later that I decided to expand my field of vision to include 
the other communities. Since the Penyengat community was regarded by 
my Pangkil informants as representing a standard of 'pure' Melayu-
ness, against whom others were to measure themselves, it was to 
Penyengat I went after Pangkil. The greater proportion of my 
fieldwork time -- the whole of 1979 -- was thus spent between 
Penyengat and Pangkil. In 1980, for further comparisons, I went to 
Bintan, Karas, Sembur Laut, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah, in that order. My 
first phase of fieldwork in Riau ended in the middle of 1980. 
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My choice of these other communities was very much guided by the 
perceptions of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants. From their 
everyday conversation, it was quite clear that they regarded the 
people of Bintan and Karas as significantly different others -- that 
is, as people who were Melayu but different. As for Sembur Laut, 
Nanga, and Teluk Nipah, that choice was guided by the perceptions of 
my Karas informants who, in their turn, regarded these people also as 
Melayu but different. In addition, I also made brief visits to 
various places in the company of my informants. These places included 
Hulu Sungai Riau, Kampung Melayu, Tanjung Unggat, Senggarang, Sebauk, 
Tembeling, Pengujan, and Pulau Panjang. (See Maps 4 and S.) 
Beyond Riau itself, I also visited Medan where I interviewed a 
few informants; that came about rather fortuitously because I had to 
go there on matters regarding my research visa. The views of one 
Medan informant, Tengku Lockman Sinar, were particularly relevant and 
are therefore cited in this study. My Pangkil informants also drew my 
attention to the island of Seking, which is within the political 
territory of Singapore, as a place where the inhabitants have 
particularly close ties with the people of Pangkil, several inter-
marriages having taken place between the two populations. (See Map 
3.) So after my return to Singapore from Riau, I continued with my 
research there; prior to what my Pangkil informants told me, I had not 
known anything about Seking. 
In addition to fieldwork, I also spent a few weeks in July 1983 
reading the Factory Records held at the India Office in London. In 
December 1983 and January 1984, I made a field trip to Tanjungbalai in 
Karimun, Dabo in Singkep, Daik in Lingga, all of which I had not 
previously visited; I also re-visited Penyengat. (See Map 3.) This 
trip was made together with Virginia Matheson of the Australian 
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National University, with whom I currently have a joint project on the 
ethno-bibliography of Riau-Lingga. This project grew out of my first 
field trip, when I learnt that some of my informants have extensive 
private collections of manuscripts including old letters, diaries, 
photographs, land-grants, genealogies, religious texts, and histories. 
I thus invited Virginia Matheson to work with me in compiling an 
ethno-bibliography of these texts. On our initial trip in 1983/84, we 
filmed 1,512 exposures of documents or two full reels of microfilm. A 
copy of the microfilm is kept at Menzies Library, Australian National 
Library. These documents await our analysis. (See Wee and Matheson 
forthcoming.) In the present study, I will be referring to some of 
these texts, particularly those written by my informants. For a 
description of our trip, see Matheson (1985). And for the historical 
analysis of one of the texts we collected, see Matheson (1984). 
Finally, shortly before I finished writing this present study, I 
visited Penyengat in April 1985 to check a few details. 
The time taken for this study is thus not neatly bifurcated into 
two distinct periods -- 'fieldwork' and 'writing'. Instead, I have 
actively sought to maintain a feedback relationship between both 
activities. Not only have I checked my informants' statements in 
relation to one another, but I have also obtained some of their 
responses to my writing. In September 1979, I presented a preliminary 
report of my field research in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia at the 
'International Conference of Malay Studies' (Persidangan Antarabangsa 
Pengajian Melayu). (See Wee 1979 in backpocket.) On my return to the 
field after this conference, I showed my paper to two informants who 
could read English. Their comments and criticisms helped to clarify 
my understanding of the situation. In August 1984, I presented 
another paper on my research at a conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
(See Wee 1984 in backpocket.) 
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1.4 Inter-contextual Transformations 
If my perceptions about 'Malayness' made me ready for what I 
learnt from my informants, then conversely, my informants' 
preconceptions of the categories into which they fitted me, readied 
them for interaction with me. I was identified primarily as an orang 
Singapore 'Singapore person', as a mahasiswa 'university student', and 
only secondarily as an orang Tionghoa 'Chinese person'. The reason 
for such an identification was that my interaction with my informants 
did not follow the usual pattern of their dealings with the local 
Chinese, such dealings being mostly of a commercial nature. I was 
regarded as a different type of 'Chinese person', with this difference 
described in terms of my being a Singaporean and a university student, 
and one affiliated to an Australian university at that. 
Consequently, it was my non-Indonesian-ness that was highlighted; 
I believe it was this perception that enabled my informants to make 
certain comments about Indonesia to me. If they had been interacting 
with an Indonesian academic, it is very likely that they would not 
have uttered these comments. I found my informants more than willing 
to talk to me and to help me in my research. In a large part, their 
enthusiasm was motivated by a .sense of wanting to tell their story to 
the outside world; indeed such a motive was explicitly stated by some 
of them. I was thus dealing not with any unconscious structure, if 
such is even possible. On the contrary, what I apprehended was a 
consciously structurated rhetoric that was very much audience-
orientated. My informants seem to have considered a non-Indonesian 
person as an appropriate audience, for the story itself is quite 
evidently non-Indonesian in both form and content. In form it is 
relevant only to Riau and not to Indonesia as a whole; and in content 
it derives from a pre-Indonesian era, from zaman sultan 'the era of 
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the sultan'. This story, if I may term it such, constitutes the 
central theme of my study. 
I use the word 'story' in Bateson's (1980:22) sense: 
A story is a little knot or complex of that species of 
connectedness which we call relevance. • •• Any A is relevant 
to any B if both A and B are parts or components of the same 
'story'. 
Although I have spoken of my informants as having a story to tell, 
that story is by no means an unchanging, standardised tale. The 
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story-tellers are not mere transmitters of information, but are indeed 
protagonists in their own story. Thus, they have different 
perspectives on the same events. However, I do not promise to treat 
each perspective in equal detail, because I did not spend an equal 
amount of time with each and every informant. As mentioned above, I 
did most of my fieldwork in Penyengat and Pangkil. Therefore, in this 
study I am presenting as primary the perspectives of my Penyengat and 
Pangkil informants, to which I add as secondary the perspectives of my 
other informants. Even so, I did not interview each and every 
inhabitant of Penyengat and Pangkil; therefore the views discussed 
pertain only to those who did act as my informants. 
Such a bias does not, however, imply that the Penyengat-Pangkil 
view is the right and normal view, in contrast to which we have other 
wrong and deviant views. Contrary to any such positivistic claim, 
what the bias indicates is that there is no single reality that one 
may term 'Malay culture' or 'the Malay worldview' which one can tap in 
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one's capacity as a 'pure visitor'. In my opinion, there are and 
can only be multiple constructions of reality; there is no 
construction that can transcend the multitude, as it were, and be 
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isomorphic with reality as such. This applies reflexively to this 
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study which is and can merely be a description of my understanding of 
some informants' ideas in the context of my relationship with them. 
The general value of such a relativist understanding is to be found 
not in any sweeping pronouncements about 'Malay culture' or 'the Malay 
worldview', but in the resonances of other related situations 
occurring at other times, in other places. 
As stated in the opening epigraph of this chapter, 'it is the 
recipient of the message who creates the context' (Bateson 1980:56-
57). The story, the 'little knot of connectedness' (to use Bateson's 
phrase), is thus based essentially on my understanding of what my 
informants told me. It is I who have knotted together the various 
threads of their narratives. Since one person cannot become another, 
one cannot speak as another; one can merely speak of one's own 
understanding of others. In this sense, therefore, the story is as 
much a creation of the listener as it is that of the teller. So if 
what my informants told me may be considered as consciously 
structurated rhetoric that is audience-orientated, then my telling of 
what I understand of their tale may also be similarly considered. 
Following Perelman (1982:5), I regard rhetoric as 'discourse addressed 
to any sort of audience' .23 In this approach, truth is not regarded 
as self-evident and therefore cannot be disengaged from argumentation. 
(See ibid.:5-8.) 
As in any other case of communication, the relationship between 
text and context is crucial to this study. If my informants' story 
may be considered a text to be understood in the context of their 
interaction with me, then this written study itself is, quite 
literally, a text to be understood in the context of the interaction 
between writer and reader. As Bateson (1980:4) has stated, 'without 
context, words and actions have no meaning at all'. There is no text 
without context.24 The regularities within the text and the 
complementary regularities outside the text proper, together 
constitute a meta-message -- namely, the context. 
It is important to see the particular utterance or action as 
part of the ecological sub-system called context and not as 
the product or effect of what remains of the context after 
the piece which we want to explain has been cut from it. 
(Bateson 1973:309). 
This study mediates between two contexts of discourse -- the 
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first context being my informants' discourse with me as audience, and 
the second being my discourse with the reader as audience. What 
integrates both contexts is a meta-context, or what Bateson (1980:128-
129) terms 'metacommunication'. It is within this meta-context that 
we may discern the significant differences between the two contexts of 
discourse. The first context -- which we may term 'field 
communication' -- is temporally transient because it is situated in 
the flow of everyday life. The second context -- which we may term 
'text communication' ~ is temporally permanent because it is situated 
out of the flow of everyday life. 
'Field communication' is oral; 'text communication' is written. 
As Goody (1977) has argued, two different modes of consciousness are 
generated by speech and by writing. As he has noted (ibid.:11), 
'writing arrests the flow of oral converse'. Writing thus lends 
itself to atemporal syllogism, while oral converse necessarily occurs 
as a temporal event that is, to use Goody's phrase (ibid.:13-14), 'now 
or never•. 25 
Although some of my informants are literate, the fact remains 
that their discourse with me was oral and not written. The difference 
between 'field communication' and 'text communication' is evident in 
the objectification of the latter as this written text, whereas the 
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former remains as intangible fragments embedded in the flow of 
everyday life. Because of this fundamental difference between the two 
contexts of discourse, the relationship between them cannot be that of 
a one-to-one isomorphic correspondence. Atemporal art can neither 
duplicate nor reproduce temporal life. 
The relationship between the two contexts can only be that of 
'transformation', to use Bateson's term (1973:102-106; 1980:122-126). 
The integrative meta-context is thus one where such transformations 
between contexts are possible. Bateson argues that inter-contextual 
transformation is posited upon code -- that is, the rules which give 
meaning to the transformation itself. It is this code that 
constitutes the meta-context. 
One rule of the code is that although this written text derives 
from the unique field experience of the author, it must nevertheless 
be considered not only in its own terms, but also as part of the 
literature of other written texts derived from other sources. This 
rule presumes mutual comparability in 'text communication', over and 
above the uniqueness of the 'field communication'. The effect of this 
rule upon inter-contextual transformation is that the particular 
events of 'field communication' are transformed in 'text 
communication' into general types of events, which can be compared 
with other such types found in other texts. 
This rule of textual comparability is related to another rule 
which says, as it were, that in life nothing happens in isolation, or 
at least is not supposed to. According to this rule, everything must 
be linked to something else. Based on this premise, the task is to 
trace what is linked to what, and to discover the nature of that 
linkage. It is this rule of linkage that enables the grouping of 
particular events into organised patterns. The effect of this rule 
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upon inter-contextual transformation is that particular events in 
'field communication' that had occurred at different times and in 
different places are transformed into groups of linked events that are 
discussed on the same page at the same moment within the written text. 
Despite such a rule, however, linkage is not immanent within the 
particular events themselves. Linkage is logical, and hence has to be 
argued. 
The rule of linkage is in turn related to the rule of 
argumentation which proposes that it is possible to persuade another 
person to see what one sees. According to this rule, even if a person 
cannot directly apprehend the object of vision, she/he can indirectly 
apprehend it through argumentation -- that is, a logical construction 
of another person's perception of the object in question. The effect 
of this rule upon inter-contextual transformation is that one's 
description of perception must be so logically ordered as to be enable 
another person to construct a mental image of what she/he does not 
directly perceive. 
There are many other discernible rules in the code of inter-
contextual transformation from 'field communication' to 'text 
communication'. The three mentioned above seem to me to be the most 
significant. The reading of this text would perhaps be facilitated by 
the reader bearing in mind these three rules of coding -- that is, 
intertextual comparability, logical linkage, and interpersonal 
argumentation. 
1.5 Textual Organisation 
It is, I believe, of prime importance to have a conceptual 
system which will force us to see the 'message' ••• as both 
itself internally patterned and itself a part of a larger 
patterned universe •••• 
(Bateson 1973:105). 
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I have organised this text with the aim of presenting my 
informants' story both as an internally patterned 'message' and as a 
part of a larger patterned universe. In the rest of Part One, I will 
discuss the larger universe of which my informants' story is a part. 
The telling of their story occurs within configurations of space and 
time, space which extends beyond the location of the story-teller, and 
time which extends beyond the actual moment of utterance. They are 
themselves conscious of this larger context, for it is the context 
that gives meaning to their tale. So I will discuss these 
configurations of space and time in terms of what my informants 
themselves perceive as significant. 
The significant spatial configurations are those that are 
referred to as 'Indonesia', 'alam Melayu', 'Riau'. Apart from these 
politically defined configurations, the island world of sea and land 
is an ecologically significant configuration of its own. The 
significant temporal configurations are also politically defined 
that is, in terms of the governing authority. So following my 
informants' usage, I will discuss five zamans 'eras', each defined in 
political terms -- namely, the era of the local chief, the era of the 
religiously legitimated king, the era of Dutch colonisation, the era 
of Japanese conquest, and the era of Indonesian nationalism. 
In Parts Two and Three of this study, I shall present my 
informants' story as an internally patterned 'message'. In Part Two, 
I will use the metaphor of a rear-view mirror to describe my 
informants' perception of their past. Like the image in a rear-view 
mirror, a rear-view image of the past is a partial imaging of the 
scene behind one, that is yet located in front of one's vision. The 
resulting image depends on the angle of the mirror, as well as the 
angle from which one views it: what one sees depends on ohe's 
perspective. 
From the Penyengat-Pangkil perspective, the relevant past is 
zaman sultan 'the era of the sultan', when derajat 'rank' and 
keturunan 'descent' figured importantly. I will discuss how my 
informants express a vision of a hierarchy which prevails from 
generation to generation, and in which everyone is to be ascribed a 
rank. Within this hierarchy, there are interactions of domination, 
submission, and resistance. So basically, what I try to describe in 
this part of the study are my informants' representations of power 
relations in their rear-view image of zaman sultan. 
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In their perceptions, the past is relevant not for its own sake, 
but for its effect upon the present. In Part Three, I will show how 
they relate their rear-view image of the past to their view of the 
present in such a way that they perceive a particular figure in the 
ground of their everyday present. The metaphor of the rear-view 
mirror is again useful in this context. When one drives a vehicle on 
the road, one glances now and again at the rear-view mirror so as to 
orientate the moving vehicle in the desired direction. What appears 
in the rear-view mirror is part of the total view before one's eyes, 
such that one perceives a figure comprising both front and rear. What 
happens in front is thus to be evaluated in terms of its relation to 
what is happening behind. So to apply this metaphor to my informants' 
integration of past and present, what is happening in their everyday 
present is not taken simply as it is; instead the present is 
transfigured in terms of certain events of the past. 
The bygone past, being past, cannot change; one can therefore 
regard one's image of it as being equally constant and unchanging. 
The everyday present, however, is in an unpredictable flux, from hour 
to hour, day to day. While one may try to control this unsettling 
flux by such means as planning and routine, the best-laid plans and 
the most regular routines can be all too easily disrupted by 
unexpected events. 
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There seem to be at least two possible responses to this 
situation. One can abandon oneself to the flux and, as is 
colloquially described in English, take each day as it comes. Such a 
strategy is, however, not suitable if one is concerned with 
maintaining the image of a past-in-the-present. To focus on an 
unchanging past in a changing present requires a differentiation of 
everyday experience into figure and ground. In this context, a more 
suitable strategy would be to stabilise the flux of the present, by 
treating time as place and place as time. We move, time flows, the 
weather changes, but the ground stands still. It is possible that 
such a proposition would not be plausible in an area where there are 
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In Riau, however, there is no 
such violent disruption of the ground. Instead, the contrast between 
the tidal sea and the unmoving islands would lend plausibility to the 
proposition that the ground is terra firma. 
But human beings themselves also constitute part of the flux of 
everyday experience. Our moods, behaviour, and social interactions 
with one another can be quite unreliable. Our perceptions and 
opinions of ourselves and of others can be quite changeable. To 
stabilise this inter-personal flux, concepts of 'indigeny' and 
'purity' are used as important means to typologise people -- that is, 
to fix people to specific social definitions. 
However, the transfiguration of the everyday present in terms of 
the bygone past is plausible only if it seems real -- and thus 
inevitable -- to enough people. The quality of reality that is 
generated by this process of transfiguration may be understood as a 
'social phantasy system' -- that is, a phantasy that is communicated 
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and shared among many different people. For those who do share the 
phantasy, this is likely to give a feeling of inward-looking cosiness. 
However, it is also likely to make them highly suspicious of others 
who do not share the phantasy, and who therefore pose a cognitive 
threat. The opposite tendencies of centripetalism and centrifugalism 
are thus generated in Self-Other relations. 
But both these tendencies presuppose a larger context wherein 
exist centre and periphery. Such a context transcends the immediacy 
of the local community, encapsulating it in a supralocal imagined 
community. Willingness to belong to this supralocal community is 
expressed through Islamisation -- that is, a process of joining a 
worldwide congregation of believers. Those who have joined regard 
others who are unwilling to do so, as apostates capable of witchcraft. 
The shift in orientation from local immediacy to supralocal 
transcendance may be understood in terms of a worldwide historical 
pattern -- namely, the civilising process, whereby local self-
sufficiency is increasingly replaced by supralocal other-dependence. 
In this context, the strength of the rear-view image derives from 
precisely this -- that it focusses attention away from the everyday 
present towards what is not present. It is thus the pervasiveness of 
the civilising process that gives plausibility to such a mode of 
orientation. 
1.6 Argumentation 
The underlying argumentation of this text concerns relations of 
power. I use the word 'power' in Foucault's (1980a:92-95) sense of 
the term, as referring to the 'force relations' immanent in the 
divisions, inequalities and disequilibriums that take shape and come 
. ~ into play in any society. Such relations are basically mobile, 
local, and unstable. Any pattern of power that appears to be 
'permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-producing, is simply the 
over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the 
concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest 
their movement' (ibid.:93). 
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The play of power thus arises from difference; it begins with at 
least two opposing forces. So as Foucault has pointed out, power is 
inherently dynamic, and any appearance of permanence derives from the 
alignment of multiple oppositions through time. Such a process may be 
described as 'stochastic' -- that is, 'a sequence of events [that] 
combines a random component with a selective process so that only 
certain outcomes of the random are allowed to endure' (Bateson 
1980:245). In this sense, therefore, the various spatial and temporal 
configurations that constitute the context of my informants' story, 
are stochastic patterns of power, emerging and fading through space 
and time. 
If my informants' text is part of such a context, then it should 
manifest the same kind of regularities. This indeed is the case. The 
contextual fabric of power relations runs through their text, such 
that without this context, the text would have no meaning at all. My 
informants' tale has to be understood, therefore, in the larger 
universe of the spatial and temporal configurations mentioned above. 
Of these, the configuration referred to as Indonesia/zaman Indonesia 
is perhaps the most relevant, since the stochastic pattern of power it 
represents is currently the most systemic, the most institutionalised, 
and the most hegemonic. My informants are all willy-nilly 
participants in this pattern of power: they are all citizens of the 
Republic of Indonesia and subject to its law. Nevertheless, in their 
discourse, they prefer to draw the contents of their story from three 
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other configurations, particularly alam Melayu, Riau, and ~ 
sultan. So the contents of my informants' discourse on power do not 
concern the sovereignty of the Indonesian republic, the form of 
Indonesian law, or the over-all unity imposed by the Jakarta 
government. Instead, they talk about power in a local context, in the 
context of unequal relations in their own hierarchy of ranks as 
derived from a bygone sultanate. Their focus upon a past-in-the-
present is thus a means of bypassing the current present. 
Yet ontologically, the Indonesian reality is a reality, even if 
epistemologically, one does not talk about it as such. The old 
philosophical debate about epistemology and ontology, about knowledge 
and the knowable reality, is of relevance to our discussion. As 
Bateson (1980:37; 1973:429) has pointed out: 
The map is not the territory, and the name is not the thing 
named. 
What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in 
the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and 
as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite 
regress, an infinite series of maps. The territory never 
gets in at all. The territory is Ding an sich and you can't 
do anything with it. 
In other words, talking about the ontological reality is itself an 
epistemological activity; it is not the ontological reality as such. 
In this sense, therefore, to talk of my informants' ontological 
reality is really to talk about the epistemologies of other people, 
such as politicians, academics, and businesspeople. 
Following Foucault (1980b), I would argue that knowledge and 
power are so dialectically and inextricably related, that there exists 
no power relation which does not imply a particular field of 
knowledge, and vice-versa. So certain people's epistemologies can be 
raised to the status of ontology, depending on whose epistemology it 
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is. Or to put it another way, ontology is the epistemology of the 
relatively more powerful. 
So if Indonesia is an ontological reality because it exists in 
the epistemologies of the relatively more powerful, then my 
informants' focus on a non-Indonesian story in which Indonesia is 
irrelevant, may be considered as the epistemology of the relatively 
less powerful. They thus live in two epistemological realities, an 
other-imposed one that derives from a particular patterning of power, 
and a self-constructed one that eludes the other-imposed reality and 
therefore the domination of certain significant others. 
As I have mentioned above, the contents of my informants' story 
are derived from a pre-Indonesian past which is, however, talked about 
not as the there-and-then, but as the here-and-now. The present is 
transfigured as the past-in-the-present, or alternatively, as the 
present-in-the-past. The self-constructed reality thus manifests 
itself as other-derived, in that it derives from the actions and 
circumstances of dead people in a given past. Such an other-
derivation in temporal terms is a counterpoint to the other-imposition 
of the Indonesian present. The other-imposed reality of the present 
is eluded, therefore, by means of escaping into a self-constructed 
past. 
Such a strategy may indeed be understood as 'elusion', a term I 
have borrowed from Laing (1969:47-48): 
Elusion is a way of getting round conflict without direct 
confrontation, or its resolution. It eludes conflict by 
playing off one modality of experience against another. To 
live in the past or in the future may be less satisfying 
than it is to live in the present, but it can never be as 
disillusioning. The present will never be what has been or 
what could be •••• To be sustained, elusion requires 
virtuosity: it can lead to enchanting nostalgia. It must 
never break down. If explicit, it becomes ugly •••• It is 
an attempt to live outside time by living in a part of time, 
to live timelessly in the past, or in the future. 
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1.7 The Intertextuality of Alternative Constructions 
The past is precisely that which is not present. Though one may 
project one's consciousness into the past, one cannot physically live 
there. One can merely construct a past-in-the-present. Such a 
construction of the past may be described as nostalgic, rather than 
historical. An historical construction may perhaps be regarded as one 
that is concerned with the past as such, whereas a nostalgic 
construction is one that is concerned with the past-in-the-present. 
Both modes of construction may draw from the same stock of events, yet 
because of their different concerns, the respective past that is 
constructed would differ. 
We are dealing here with the modality of imagination. It is 
possible to imagine what you know, as it is to imagine what you do not 
know. Knowledge is objective, imagination subjective. In knowing 
something, we extend our consciousness outwards towards the object of 
knowledge. In imagining something, we draw our consciousness inwards 
to absorb the phenomenon of not-self into self, the imagining subject. 
This implies the following oppositions: 
objective knowledge 
history 
knowledge 
fact 
subjective feeling 
nostalgia 
imagination 
artefact 
It is my argument in this study that my informants' construction 
of their past is nostalgic, rather than historical, since they are 
interested in the past for its relevance to their present situation.27 
So I will not attempt to give an historical reconstruction of the past 
as such; I will discuss only what is relevant to an understanding of 
their constructed past-in-the-present. 
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However, in order to appreciate the quality of their nostalgic 
constructions, it is necessary to refer to alternative constructions. 
I will refer, in particular, to two indigenous texts. One is the 
Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja 'The Genealogy of Kings', which is also 
known as Sulalatus Salatin and as Sejarah Melayu.28 The other text is 
the Tuhfat al-Nafis 'The Precious Gift'. These are the two texts most 
relevant to the present study, because they contain the same topics of 
discourse as those discussed by my informants. Since these two texts 
date from different periods, they will provide different temporal 
perspectives from that of my informants. 
The Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja -- henceforth referred to as the 
Penurunan -- exists in several versions. According to Roolvinck 
(1970), the earliest of these versions dates from 1612; this consists 
of two manuscripts known as Raffles 18 of the Royal Asiatic Society}~ 
Roolvinck (ibid.:xxvi-xxvii) describes the relationship between 
Raffles 18 and the later versions thus: 
The Raffles 18 text is dated 1612, i.e. the beginning of the 
seventeenth century •••• In the course of the eighteenth 
century this text was edited in Riau at the court of the 
Buginese Viceroys, who had brought it with them from Goa in 
Celebes. The result has come down to us in two versions, a 
longer version and a shorter version, which are closely 
related. Both the shorter version ••• and the longer version 
(and this includes the Shellabear text) are late texts. The 
most plausible inference is that they date from the second 
half of the eighteenth century, when the Buginese Viceroys' 
court had firmly established itself in the Malay world. · 
The Tuhfat al-Nafis -- henceforth ref erred to as the Tuhfat 
also exists in several versions. I am relying primarily on the 
critical edition translated into English by Matheson and Andaya 
(1982).~0 
Both the Penurunan and the Tuhfat are intimately connected with 
Riau. In the case of the Penurunan, two later versions of the 1612 
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manuscript were edited at the Riau court. In the case of the Tuhfat, 
the entire text, from beginning to end, was written in Riau. What is 
particularly significant to my study is that the Tuhfat's authors, 
Raja Haji Ahmad and his son Raja Ali Haji, were Penyengat rajas, from 
whom some of my informants can trace direct descent. Raja Haji Ahmad 
probably drew up the first drafts of the work, while Raja Ali Haji 
completed it. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:5-6.) 
It is thus no mere coincidence that these two texts should 
contain the same topics of discourse that are discussed by my 
informants. There is a common denominator -- Riau -- which is, in 
this sense, not just a place on the map, but a field of discourse 
wherein alternative constructions of the same topics may be found. 
The scattering of these alternative constructions over a temporal 
range of some 370 years that is, from 1612 to 1985 indicates the 
relative stability of this field of discourse through time. 
By the word 'stability', however, I do not mean 'stasis'. 
Following Bateson (1980:114), I use the word to mean the active 
maintenance of the status quo ante through constant adjustment to 
changes.31 My informants' focus on the past-in-the-present may be 
understood precisely as an active effort to maintain the stability of 
the field of discourse under the impact of the winds of change. 
The Penurunan and the Tuhfat belong to the genre of Malay writing 
known as hikayat. As Errington (1979:38) has pointed out, 
••• The hikayat does not so much record the past as bring it 
into being or perpetuate it. The fleeting, one might almost 
say random, events of individual lives and kingdoms are 
transformed by ordered sounds into what, it is true, is not 
permanent, but is the only perpetuity which this world 
offers. One begins to feel in reading hikayat, that the 
idea that the world is real and words or language 
artificial, is reversed in traditional Malaya where, if 
anything, bahasa [language] was real, solid, present and 
almost palpable, while the world was something which would 
not endure.32 
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It would thus seem that my informants have inherited a tradition 
of re-constructing the past into an always contemporary form. Even 
though they no longer write hikayats, they do nevertheless express in 
their oral accounts, the impulse that informs the hikayat. Such a 
cultural continuity cannot, however, be understood as mechanical 
historicism: after all, that which has been need not always be. On 
the contrary, any such continuity has to be understood in the context 
of present relevance. In other words, what has been remains, only 
because it is actively maintained by the inhabitants of the present. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1. See Tunku Shamsul Bahrin (1967a, 1967b, and 1970) on the 
assimilation of 'Indonesian immigrants' to 'Malays' in Peninsular 
Malaysia. 
2. I shall cite as examples three ethnographies of 'Malays' in 
Malaysia, which are indeed about immigrant populations. These 
are Wilson (1967), Provencher (1971), and McKinley (1975). 
Wilson's ethnography, A Malay Village and Malaysia, is about the 
village of Jendram Hilir which, he admits, has a high proportion 
of immigrants from Sumatra, including the Mandailing, Ramba, 
Kepunohan, and Minangkabau. Provencher's ethnography, Two Malay 
Worlds: Interaction in Urban and Rural Settings, is about two 
communities, one in Kuang and the other in Kampong Bahru. He 
notes (ibid.:44) that the members of both these communities, like 
'most West Coast Malays[,] were either born in Indonesia or have 
some Indonesian ancestors.' Thus the Kuang community consists of 
Minangkabau, Korinchi and Javanese, while the Kampong Bahru 
community consists of Javanese and Minangkabau, with, however, 
the inclusion of some Melaka Malays. Indeed, Provencher 
(ibid.:21) mentions that it was not until 1935 that the Javanese 
immigrants were 'brought within the official definition of the 
term "Malay".' McKinley's ethnography, A Knife Cutting Water: 
Child Transfers and SiblingshiQ among Urban Malaw, is also about 
Kampong Bahru. Although he does not mention it in his study, he 
has, through personal communication, told me that most of his 
informants are either Javanese immigrants or the children and 
grandchildren of such immigrants, who have maintained ongoing 
links with kinsfolk in Java. 
3. I have not been able to find much written about the Talang Mamak, 
apart from Wilkinson's (1959:732) comment that the 'Orang Mamak' 
(as he refers to them) are 
a Protomalayan community in Sumatra. Its culture is high 
compared with that of the Kubu or Akit. 
Elsewhere, Wilkinson (1959:1154) says that Talang is a name 
'given to a number of Proto-Malayan communities on the East Coast 
of Sumatra'. This would seem to confirm the location of the 
Talang Mamak in Rengat, as mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants, 
since Rengat is indeed near the east Sumatran coast. Geoffrey 
Benjamin (personal communication) says that the name Talang Mamak 
may be translated as 'people of the mother's brother'. He 
further suggests that there may be some historical connection 
between these people and the Minangkabau, since mamak is itself a 
Minangkabau word. 
4. Tideman (1935) mentions that a group of forest people in the 
interior of the island Bengkalis are known by outsiders as orang 
sakai, but call themselves orang batin. However, he does not 
name Duri as another location for them, Duri being the other 
sakai habitat that my informants mentioned. The word sakai 
itself means 
subject; dependent. Of subject people in contrast to the 
ruling race; therefore somewhat contemptuous and usually 
replaced by terms like rayat and biduanda except in the 
Riau-Lingga archipelago where the sakai rank above the 
rayat. 
(Wilkinson 1959:1002). 
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The word batin, on the other hand, means 'Protomalayan headman' 
who is subject to the sultan (Wilkinson 1959:91). Therefore the 
implication is that the orang sakai or orang batin were subjects 
of the sultan. The terms sakai and batin will be further 
discussed below. 
5. Newbold (1839) referred to a group of people called the 'Orang 
Akkye', a name which does not seem to appear elsewhere in the 
literature, but which Skeat and Blagden (1906(1):87) have 
interpreted as 'Akik', a form sufficiently close to the name 
Akit. Newbold names three places on the Sumatran coast where the 
'Akkye' may be found: 'Akit' (?), 'Murabu' (the island of Merbau, 
off the east coast of Sumatra), and 'Ratas' (?), all evidently in 
the Siak area. The Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie (vol. 
3:175-6) mentions the orang Akit as a small group living on the 
Mandan (now the Mandau), a left-bank tributary of the Siak River, 
near Panasa (now Penasa); these people were described as 
inhabitants of floating houses called rakit 'raft', from which it 
appears they got their name. Tideman (1935:797) mentions other 
groups of raft-dwelling people at the mouth of the Siak river 
where it enters Selat Panjang, and along Selat Morong between 
Pulau Rupat and Pulau Medang. Kahler (1960:16), on the basis of 
research conducted in 1939, wrote that the orang akit -- that is, 
the 'raft people' -- are to be found in the village of 'Utan 
Haiya' in Selat Morang on te island of Rupat off the east coast 
of Sumatra. He said that they are divided into two 'sibs' 
(Sippen) -- namely, the 'akit' and the 'xatas' ('x' denoting a 
voiceless velar fricative). These two names are identical to 
Newbold's place-names, 'Akit' and 'Ratas', the only difference 
being that of phonetic transcription. The documentary evidence 
thus appears to cooroborate my informants' list of place-names 
for the Akit people. Three Akit habitats named by them are 
Bengkalis, Pulau Padang, and Tebingtinggi, which are islands 
located immediately off the Siak coast. Newbold's 'Murabu' (if 
interpreted as Merbau) and the confluence of the Siak River and 
Selat Panjang named by Tideman as Akit habitats are both located 
within this same general area. My informants' mention of Rupat 
as an Akit habitat is directly corroborated by Tideman and 
Kahler. 
6. Schot (1882) mentioned the suku orang dalam as one of the high-
status sukus in the Riau-Lingga islands. However, he did not 
name a specific location for them; nor did he use the term orang 
asli and orang hutan as alternative names for them, as did my 
informants. Schot wrote also that the suku orang dalam were 
believed to be latecomers to Riau-Lingga, being of noble Johor 
descent. If this was so, it would explain why Schot did not use 
the two alternative names my informants mentioned, since the term 
orang asli literally means 'original people', and the term orang 
hutan literally means 'forest people'. The term orang dalam 
literally means 'people of the interior'. From my research it 
appears that there are two distinct interiors being referred to 
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-- the interior of the forest and the interior of the palace. 
The interior ref erred to by my Pekanbaru informants was the 
former, whereas the interior referred to by Schot appears to be 
the latter. In my subsequent fieldwork in the Riau archipelago, 
I came across no existing group called the orang dalam, in either 
sense of the word dalam. When I asked a Penyengat informant 
about this term, he said that the only orang dalam he could think 
of were the serving people who were privileged to enter the 
sultan's palace. But since there is no longer a sultan in Riau, 
there are also no more orang dalam. This informant's 
understanding of the term orang dalam seems to agree with the 
information presented by Schot. But these orang dalam are 
evidently not the same orang dalam that my Pekanbaru informants 
were referring to. The former seem to have been palace 
retainers, whereas the latter were apparently forest-dwellers. 
According to a Pekanbaru informant, it is more polite to address 
the orang hutan 'forest people' as orang dalam; however, they are 
usually referred to simply as orang hutan. Used as a synonym for 
orang hutan, the term orang dalam thus appears to be a non-
pejorative label, probably because of its association with palace 
retainers. 
In the course of my fieldwork in the Riau islands, I did come 
across mention of the orang hutan in Rempang, although I did not 
have the opportunity to visit them. These people seem to be the 
same as those that Kahler had studied in Rempang in 1939. He 
described them (1960:3) as nomads who are referred to by 
outsiders as orang darat 'land people' or orang benua 'people of 
the landmass'. These may perhaps be regarded as classificatory 
labels which identify people as belonging to one category and not 
another. Therefore, the term orang darat identifies the orang 
hutan as people of the darat 'land' and not of the laut 'sea'. 
The term orang benua identifies them as people of the benua 
'landmass' and not of the pulau 'small island'. The term orang 
dalam identifies them as people of the dalam 'interior 
hinterland' and not of the pantai 'coast'. And the term orang 
hutan identifies them as people of the hutan 'forest' and not of 
the kampung 'village' or bandar 'town'. In each case, there are 
people identified as belonging to the opposite category: Thus 
there are indeed people referred to as orang laut 'sea people', 
orang pulau 'people of small islands', orang pantai 'people of 
the coast', orang kampung 'people of the village' and orang 
bandar 'people of the town'. 
The term orang asli 'original people' appears to be a relatively 
recent coinage. It is not mentioned by any of the nineteenth-
century ethnographers and it is identical to the term invented by 
the Malaysian Government to label the aborigines of the Malay 
Peninsula, the majority of whom are forest-dwellers. Many Riau 
people are well-informed about events in Malaysia through 
receiving Malaysian radio and television broadcasts, and visiting 
Malaysia. Therefore it is not improbable that they should have 
borrowed the term orang asli from Malaysia to use for labelling 
their own forest-dwellers. 
Apparently, the orang hutan are also to be found in Batam. 
K~hler (1960) considered the Rempang and Batam orang hutan to be 
culturally similar; this too was what I heard from my informants. 
Another community of orang hutan I came across in my fieldwork in 
Riau are the orang Bintan asli 'original Bintan people', who will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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7. According to my Riau informants, the orang Ungar are the people 
of the island known as Ungar or Onggar, off the southeastern 
coast of Kundur. Whereas my Pekanbaru informants had listed the 
orang Ungar as orang darat 'land people', my informants in the 
Riau islands consider them orang laut 'sea people'. The word 
ungar appears to be the name of a fish. So it may be possible 
that there is a connection between the fish-name and the name of 
this people. But there has been no previous mention of them in 
the literature. (See Map 3.) 
8. Although the Air Jong mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants are 
supposed to be found in the Riau-Lingga islands, this name is not 
known to my informants in the Riau islands. Nor have I come 
across any such reference in the literature. The words Air Jong 
literally mean 'Junk Water'; this suggests the intriguing 
possibility that these people were perhaps the carriers of fresh 
water to the junks sailing through the Riau-Lingga islands. 
9. Of the orang laut groups named, the Mantang and the Tambus are 
perhaps the best known; indeed they are so well-known that their 
names are often used, both by nineteenth-century and present-day 
natives, as generic terms for all orang laut. 
The Mantang were apparently named after Mantang Island to 
the south of Bintan, but had spread far beyond this. 
(Sopher 1977:94). 
According to Schot (1884), there was a 'Kampong Tambus' in the 
southern part of one of the Galang islands, where the Tambus were 
said to have originated. 
10. Of all the groups named above, the only one I had any direct 
experience of was the Bintan. However, contrary to my Pekanbaru 
informants' classification, I found the Bintan not to be nomadic 
sea people in any sense of the word, but to be cultivators well-
settled on land. Nor did I ever hear my informant in the Riau 
islands mention any other nomadic boat-dwelling Bintan people. 
My research on the Bintan people will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters. 
11. I have concluded that the Penuangan mentioned by my Pekanbaru 
informants are the same as the orang penaung mentioned by my 
informants in the Riau islands. The former version I heard used 
only in Pekanbaru, whereas the usage in the Riau islands in the 
latter version. These are supposed to be migrants from Palembang 
in southern Sumatra who had settled in Bintan a long time ago. 
They will thus be discussed together with the Bintan people in 
the subsequent chapters. 
12. The orang laut in Indragiri mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants 
seem to include more than one distinct group. According to what 
documentary evidence I have been able to discover, these are the 
suku Nam (Newbold 1839 and Schot 1882), the orang laut Bugis 
(Schot 1882), the orang kuala (Tobias 1861), and the 'Orang , 
Lahut' (Adam 1928). It seems that the suku Nam are to be found 
inhabiting the strand stretching from the Kampar river mouth 
southwards to Tanjung Datuk in the Amphitrite Bay. The orang 
laut Bugis seem to be a boat-dwelling people located near the 
mouth of the Kateman river, on Burung island, and along the delta 
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of the Indragiri river, particularly around Tanjung Basu. The 
orang kuala apparently are also boat-dwellers, who are to be 
found in the tidal channels and distributaries -- that is, kuala 
-- of the Indragiri and neighbouring rivers. The 'Orang Lahut' 
(that is, orang laut) mentioned by Adam seem to be nomadic boat-
dwellers who were nevertheless in contact with river-mouth 
settlements such as Kuala Tungkal. I have not yet been to 
Indragiri and so cannot say whether these groups still exist or 
whether they are still to be found at these locations. 
13. Of the ethnonyms mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants three are 
used in Malaysia -- namely, sakai, orang asli, and orang laut. 
(See, for example, Williams-Hunt 1952 and Benjamin 1980.) 
14. What Major Williams-Hunt (1952:10) has to say about the 
difference between 'Malay' and 'Aborigine' is relevant to our 
understanding of the situation, because as the then British 
Colonial Adviser on Aborigines in the Federation of Malaya, he 
was in a position of some authority: 
There are thousands of Chinese children adopted by Malays 
who are regarded as Malays, there are Malays from Java, 
from Sumatra, from the Celebes and a hundred other places 
all differing slightly in their customs but all placed 
under the heading Malay. The term is thus a social or 
religious distinction and not a racial one. Many Malays 
are of direct Aboriginal descent and from the earliest 
stock in the country. The problem then is which of the 
Aboriginal Malays who are converts to Islam are to be 
regarded as Malays and which are Aborigines. No one 
seems to agree on this point and in the 1947 Census some 
local authorities recorded them as Malays including 
Aboriginal Malays who were not Muslims whilst other local 
authorities recorded them as Aborigines. My own view is 
that any community of Aboriginal descent which is 
converted but which retain any elements of Aboriginal 
social organisation should be regarded as Aboriginal 
until all traces of its Aboriginal origin has 
disappeared. 
15. An exception to this may be the case of Indonesian citizens of 
Chinese ethnicity. Leo Suryadinata (personal communication) has 
told me that in Jakarta, a special coding system is used on the 
identity cards of the ethnic Chinese to differentiate them from 
other Indonesians: this is indicated by the digit 0 at the 
beginning of the registration number. But it is not clear 
whether this coding system is used elsewhere in Indonesia. 
16. Following indigenous convention, the name of the sultanate 
depends on the location of its capital. So when the capital of 
the sultanate was located on the Johar river, it was known as the 
kerajaan Johar 'kingdom of Johar'. When the capital was located 
on the Riau river, it was known as kerajaan Riau 'the kingdom of 
Riau'. When the capital was moved to Lingga, it was known as 
kerajaan Lingga-Riau 'the kingdom of Lingga-Riau'. In the last 
days of the sultanate, the capital of sultan was shifted back to 
Riau; so it ended as kerajaan Riau-Lingga 'the kingdom of Riau-
Lingga'. Since that was the last name of the sultanate, that is 
what I will use in this study. See Wee and Matheson 
(forthcoming) for the usages of these names in the documentary 
sources. 
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17. Palembang, Kampar, Indragiri, and Siak were all former 
sultanates. (See, for example, Raja Ali Haji 1982.) Pulau Tujuh 
--·which includes the Anambas, Natuna, and other islands in the 
South China Sea -- was part of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. (See 
ibid. and Map 2.) 
18. See, for example, Johns (1980:163) who states: 
The 'Malay' world of Southeast Asia represents one of the 
most remarkable extensions of the domain of Islam. 
In this 'Malay' world, he includes all the Muslims of Malaysia 
and Indonesia, a population he estimates at approximately 150 
million. 
19. See Teeuw (1959), Anderson (1966), and Hoffman (1979) on the 
history of the Malay language. 
20. I will be referring to Wilkinson's dictionary rather than to more 
recent ones, because the latter tend to explain only usages 
within the standardised national languages of Malaysia and 
Indonesia. In these standardised forms of the language, many of 
the older connotations are lost, but these connotations are still 
relevant to my informants. 
21. See Gellner (1964:105-110) on the philosophical concept of the 
'pure visitor'. 
22. Coming from a polytheistic background myself, I find no 
difficulty with the idea that truth, like a deity, can be 
refracted in diverse manifestations and still be one. 
23. Such an audience would include 
a crowd in a public square or a gathering of specialists, 
a single being or all humanity. [This mode of 
analysis] ••• even examines arguments addressed to oneself 
in private deliberation, or in what i.s now commonly 
referred to as 1 intrapersonal communication' •••• The 
theory of argumentation, conceived as a new rhetoric or 
dialectic, covers the whole range of discourse that alms 
at persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience 
addressed and whatever the subject matter. 
(Perelman 1982:5). 
24. Bateson (1980:5) explains the relationship between text and 
context thus: 
The messages cease to be messages when nobody can read 
them. Without a Rosetta stone, we would know nothing of 
all that was written in Egyptian hieroglyphs. They would 
be only elegant ornaments on papyrus or rock. To be 
meaningful -- even to be recognised as pattern -- every 
regularity must meet with complementary regularities •••• 
25. Goody (1977:3) states: 
••• The absence of writing means that it is difficult to 
isolate a segment of human discourse ••• and subject it to 
the same highly individual, highly intense, highly 
abstract, highly critical analysis that we can give to a 
written statement. 
26. Foucault (1980a:92-93) argues: 
The sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the 
over-all unity of a domination ••• are only the terminal 
forms power takes •••• Power must be understood in the 
first instance as the multiplicity of force relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organisation; as the process which, 
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, 
transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support 
which these force relations find in one another, thus 
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from 
one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they 
take effect, whose general design or institutional 
crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in 
the formulation of the law, in the various social 
hegemonies. 
27. Wang's (1979:1) modification of Marx's dictum seems relevant in 
this context: 
The historians have only perceived the past in different 
ways: the point is to use it. 
Regarding this use of the past, Wang (1979:4) states: 
••• The most obvious feature that emerges is that there 
was in the Southeast Asian tradition no interest in the 
past for itself. What was encouraged was what Oliver 
Wolters calls a 'forward lookingness', or at least as 
James Fox puts it, the past 'perceived for its relevance 
to the present'. And in more recent times, there has 
been a recalling of the past, conscious efforts at 
reconstruction, which has clearly been made to influence 
the present if not the future as well. 
The difference between the nostalgic and the historic modes of 
constructing the past may indeed be interpreted in Wang's terms 
as the difference between using the past in the context of the 
present and perceiving the past for its own sake. 
28. Regarding the title of the work, Brown (1970:x) has pointed out 
that 'Sejarah Melayu' is a misnomer, which is found neither in 
Raffles 18 nor in the later Riau versions. The origins of this 
title are obscure, though it is used for the editions by 
Shellabear (first published 1896), Winstedt (1938), and Brown 
(first published 1953). Brown (1970:x) explains the title 
Sejarah Melayu thus: 
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The work is generally known as the Sejarah Melayu, but 
this description is not found either in this or the 
Shellabear text: and 'Malay Annals' is a popular 
mistranslation. For Sejarah means 'genealogical tree' 
and the royal command to the author was ••• 'to write a 
story (setting out) the descent of Malay Rajas with their 
customary ceremonial'. 
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My interpretation is that this particular text is regarded by 
those concerned with Melayu-ness as an articulation of Melayu 
historicity. Hence it is generally known as Sejarah Melayu, even 
though this term is not found in the various manuscript versions 
of the text. However, this does not necessarily mean that this 
text is therefore the one and only objectification of Melayu 
historicity; it is merely one manifestation of it. Matheson 
(1984:6) also notes that the term sejarah Melayu may not 
necessarily refer to just one particular text 'but could equally 
mean "Malay history".' 
In contrast the title 'Sulalatus Salatin' is indeed found in both 
Raffles 18 and the Riau versions of the text. But this is an 
Arabic title which is translated into Malay within the text as 
Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja, which Brown (1970:2) translates as 
'The Genealogy of Kings'. I have chosen to use the Malay title 
rather than the Arabic one. The reason is that there is another 
edition of the text by A. Samad Ahmad (1979) published under the 
Arabic title. This Samad Ahmad recension is also a hybrid 
redaction based on yet another three manuscripts found in Dewan 
Bahasa dan Pustaka. So to make it clear that I am referring to 
the overall text in its various versions, I shall use the title 
Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja which, as Roolvinck (ibid.:xviii) 
points out, is borne by all the known versions without exception. 
Roolvinck (ibid.:xviii-xix) also notes: 
••• Instead of penurunan segala raja2 we find peraturan 
segala raja2, an error of a copyist who misunderstood an 
original pertuturan segala raja2 still found in several 
manuscripts. In Raffles 18, too, the transcription 
peraturan is wrong, the manuscript clearly reading 
pertuturan. The word tutur, not found in Malay any 
longer, still has here the same meaning as in present-day 
Toba-Batak: relative, family relation. 
29. Winstedt (1938) edited a romanised version of Raffles 18, which 
Brown (1953; 1970) subsequently translated into English. In my 
study I will refer to Raffles 18 in these two published editions. 
Another important published edition is the one known as the 
Shellabear recension (first published in 1896; latest edition 
1967). According to Roolvinck (1970:xxiii), this is a hybrid 
redaction derived from a long version and a short version, which 
are both late texts. 
30. This critical edition is a hybrid redaction based on four 
manuscripts dating perhaps from 1890 to 1930. (See Matheson and 
Andaya 1982:9.) I have also used the Malay recension by Matheson 
(1982), which is based mostly on the shortest of the four 
manuscripts mentioned above -- namely, the van Hasselt MS dating 
from 1896. (See ibid.:xix-xxv). 
31. Bateson (1980:74) explains this through the following example: 
The acrobat on the high wire maintains his stability by 
continual correction of his [or her] imbalance •••• The 
statement 'The acrobat is on the high wire' continues to 
be true under impact of small breezes and vibrations of 
the wire. This 'stability' is the result of continual 
changes in descriptions of the acrobat's posture and the 
position of his or her balancing pole. 
32. Errington (1979:26) also notes: 
Some of the most distinguished and enlightening works by 
Western commentators concerning Southeast Asian culture 
and thought have addressed the question of the relation 
between the events of the past (generally termed 
'history') and the numerous writings from Southeast Asia 
dating from before the nineteenth century. Much of the 
commentary has assumed that the impulse which brought 
forth these texts was to write history, and the failure 
of these texts as history is therefore at first glance 
inexplicable •••• It seems to me that the consciousness 
which informs historical writing and that informs 
Classical Malay hikayat ••• are profoundly alien to one 
another, in impulse as well as in artifact. 
47 
GIAPTER 1WO 
SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS 
2. 1 Indonesia 
2.2 Alam Melayu 
2.3 Riau 
2.4 The Island World of Sea and Land 
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2.1 Indonesia 
The area in which I did my fieldwork is part of a spatial 
configuration known as 'Indonesia'. This particular configuration is 
derived from Dutch colonisation, which by 1911 had conquered the whole 
territory, thereby unifying it under one government. Prior to 
unification under Dutch rule, there were diverse indigenous kingdoms, 
the Riau-Lingga sultanate being one of these. The territory of the 
Riau-Lingga sultanate was one of the last areas to come under direct 
Dutch administration. The spatial configuration known as 'Indonesia' 
is thus not just a geographically inherent phenomenon, but rather, the 
historical result of certain temporal events. In other words, there 
would not even be such a spatial configuration, if the Dutch had not 
colonised the territory as they did. So as a spatial configuration, 
Indonesia is almost identical to the Netherlands East Indies of post-
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1911. The difference is in the governing personnel. 
On the morning of 17 August 1945, Sukarno read the declaration of 
2 
independence before a relatively small group outside his own house. 
As news spread of the declaration of independence, many 
Indonesians far from Jakarta disbelieved it •••• It was well 
into September 1945 before the fact that independence had 
been declared was known in remoter regions. 
(Ricklefs 1981:202). 
The people of Riau-Lingga were among those in the remoter regions to 
whom news of the declaration slowly spread. They were thus not among 
the initiators of independence in Jakarta. 
It was, however, easier to declare independence than to realise 
it, for the Dutch came back and tried to resurrect their pre-War 
empire. Five years of bloody struggle ensued, during which the Riau-
Lingga area was under Dutch control. It was not until 1950 when the 
Indonesian nationalists achieved their final victory over the Dutch 
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colonialists, that the Riau-Lingga area finally came under direct 
Indonesian administration. 
So twice in history, once in 1911 and again in 1950, Riau-Lingga 
was one of the last areas to become officially part of the spatial 
configuration. This is no mere coincidence but a direct indication of 
the peripheral status of this area in relation to the configuration as 
a whole. Batavia/Jakarta is the centre of both the Netherlands East 
Indies and Indonesia. Similarly, in both the Netherlands East Indies 
and Indonesia, Riau-Lingga is peripheral. As we shall see below, my 
informants are very much aware of the Java-centricity of the spatial 
configuration in which they are located. 
Within the bureaucratic structure of Indonesia, the area in which 
I did my fieldwork is located at the very lowest administrative 
levels, far removed from the political centre in Jakarta. Most of my 
time was spent in four particular kepenghuluan 'headman-doms' --
namely, Kepenghuluan Penyengat, Kepenghuluan Pangkil, Kepenghuluan 
Bintan, and Kepenghuluan Karas. (See Map 4.) These 'headman-doms' 
are part of a higher-level administrative unit known as Kecamatan 
Bintan Selatan 'Sub-district of Southern Bintan', the administrative 
centre of which is located in Tanjungpinang. This kecamatan 'sub-
district' is, in turn, part of a higher-level administrative unit 
known as Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau 'District of the Riau Archipelago', 
the administrative centre of which is located also in Tanjungpinang. 
The area included in this kabupaten 'district' more or less comprises 
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the former territory of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. This kabupaten 
is, in turn, part of a higher-level administrative unit known as 
Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province', the capital of which is located in 
Pekanbaru on Sumatra. (See Map 2.) The province is, in turn, 
subordinate to the national capital, Jakarta, located in Java. There 
are thus four intervening administrative levels between Jakarta and my 
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fieldwork area, which is thereby politically very peripheral in the 
context of Indonesia. My informants are themselves very aware of 
these administrative levels. Indeed to illustrate how far away from 
Jakarta they are, they often enumerate these levels one by one, as I 
have done so above. 
According to the 1977 Population Registration figures issued by 
the Bureau of Statistics in Tanjungpinang for the Sub-district of 
Southern Bintan, the four 'headman-doms' which constitute my main 
fieldwork area have the following population: 
Kepenghuluan Penyengat 1,643 persons in an 
area of 23.3 km2 
Kepenghuluan Pangkil 1,021 persons in an 
area of 150 km2 
Kepenghuluan Bintan 1,160 persons in an 
area of 75 km2 
Kepenghuluan Karas 3,311 persons in an 
area of 787 km2 
The total of 7,135 is about 10% of a population of 71,205 in the 
Sub-district of Southern Bintan. (See Appendix 11.) According to 
Penduduk Indonesia 1980 'the 1980 Population Census of Indonesia' 
(Seri: L no.2), the District of the Riau Archipelago has a population 
of 422,712, and Riau Province as a whole has a population of 2,168,535 
in an area of 94,562 km2. This means that whereas Riau Province 
constitutes 4.93% of the total land area of Indonesia, its population 
constitutes only 1.47% of the total population of 147,490,298. 
Indeed, although Riau Province now has the ninth fastest growing 
population in Indonesia, with a growth rate of 3.11%, its population 
density rate of 23 persons per square kilometre is still the lowest in 
Sumatra and seventh lowest among the twenty-seven provinces in 
Indonesia. 
As noted by Kato (1984:10): 
Partly related to low population density is the lack of 
notable urban centres. Riau's only substantial city is 
Pekanbaru, the provincial capital, which is comparatively 
newly urbanised ..•• Other than Pekanbaru, noticeable cities 
are ••• Tanjung Pinang, Tembilahan, Rengat, Dumai, Duri, and 
Bangkinang. 
Of these cities, Tanjungpinang is the only one located in the Riau 
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archipelago. It is thus the main local centre for the people living 
in that district. 
The discussion above points to an important characteristic of the 
relationship between centre and periphery in this spatial 
configuration: the centres were historically founded upon foreign 
interest. Batavia was the centre of the Dutch empire. Pekanbaru 
became an important port town under the Dutch, particularly after 
4 
Caltex discovered oil in the vicinity. It subsequently became the 
provincial capital. Tanjungpinang was the site where the Dutch 
garrison was stationed in the late eighteenth century, which later 
became the capital of the Dutch Residentie Riouw en Onderhoorgheden 
'the Residency of Riau and its dependencies'. Nor are the days of 
Dutch rule so distant from the present that nobody can remember any of 
it. For example, in Tanjungpinang many of the offices of the 
Indonesian bureaucrats are located in buildings dating from the Dutch 
era, including, for example, the mansion of the former Dutch Resident, 
which is still remembered as such. 
The lack of urbanisation in Riau Province, as noted by Kato (see 
above), is thus due, at least in part, to the relatively late date of 
Dutch colonisation. The association of foreign-ness with the urban 
centres seems to continue to the present. Most of the migrants to 
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Riau Province are attracted to the towns and cities where they can 
find ready cash employment. In the District of the Riau Archipelago, 
the towns attracting migration would include Tanjungpinang, 
Tanjunguban, Tanjungbalai, and Sekupang. (See Map. 3.) 
Speare (1975:67) noted that based on the 1971 census, the 
lifetime migration rate in Riau Province was only 9.9%, which was much 
lower than the corresponding rates for other Sumatran provinces such 
as Lampung (with 35%) and Jambi (with 12.9%). This low migration rate 
may perhaps be taken as an indication that Indonesians in the other 
provinces view Riau Province as peripheral and hence not worth 
migrating to. Despite this relatively low-migration rate, there is 
nevertheless continuing in-migration by people from elsewhere. My 
informants differentiate between penduduk asli 'native inhabitants' 
and orang dari luar 'people from outside'. They generally put 
themselves in the former category, although as we shall see in the 
subsequent chapters, who is native and who is from outside is by no 
means a clear-cut issue. Nevertheless, for first-generation migrants 
at least, it is possible to differentiate between who was born in Riau 
Province and who was not. The blurring of the issue begins from the 
second generation onwards. 
Auda Murad (1977:18) mentions three kinds of migrants in Riau 
5 
Province -- Minangkabau men who merantau 'emigrate to seek a living', 
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transmigrants from East Java, and seasonal migrants from 
7 
Sulawesi. It seems to me, however, that the migration from Sulawesi 
is more than just seasonal. In the Sub-district of Southern Bintan, 
for example, there is a Kampung Bugis 'Bugis Village' situated near 
Tanjungpinang where newcomers from Sulawesi congregate. (See Map 4.) 
My informants divide the Sulawesi migrants into two distinct 
categories the Bugis people and the Buton people. In addition to 
all these, I also came across a number of migrants from Flores. 
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These first-generation migrants in Riau consist almost entirely 
of Indonesian citizens from other provinces. There are hardly any 
migrants from foreign countries. In the course of my fieldwork, I met 
with only one or two such cases of the latter. For example, one was a 
Chinese man from Singapore, who had gone to Riau during the Second 
World War, in order to escape from the Japanese. He never returned to 
Singapore. Most of the Chinese in Riau Province were, however, born 
8 
and bred there. My informants do not consider these local-born 
Chinese as orang dari luar 'people from outside'; instead they are 
referred to as bangsa lain 'other stock'. They are regarded not as 
outsiders, but rather, as familiar strangers or perhaps as strange 
familiars. According to my informants, there were formerly many 
Chinese residents even on the smaller, more remote islands of the Riau 
Archipelago; but after 1959, no Chinese person was allowed to reside 
outside certain designated administrative centres such as 
9 
Tanjungpinang. Consequently, the number of Chinese residents on the 
other islands decreased dramatically, and the urban centres became 
correspondingly more Sinicised. 
This has further polarised the duality of kampung 'village' and 
kota 'town'. The villages are inhabited by the indigenes of the Riau 
Archipelago, whereas the towns are inhabited by the non-indigenes, 
including both 'people from outside', as well as those of 'other 
stock'. However, this duality is not politically symmetrical. A town 
is an administrative centre for either a district or a sub-district, 
whereas a village is not even an administrative unit in itself, but 
merely part of a 'headman-dam', which is in turn part of a sub-
district. The consequent pattern is that the indigenous villagers are 
administered by non-indigenous townspeople. The awareness of this 
duality is clearly indicated by language usage. In town, one speaks 
Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian national language; in the villages, 
however, one speaks the linguistically unstandardised and officially 
unrecognised dialect of the place. 
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Because all the district and sub-district off ices are located in 
the towns, commercial activities also tend to be concentrated there. 
As a result of the cash employment that these generate, the population 
density in the towns tends to be much higher than that in the 
villages. If we look at the Sub-district of Southern Bintan, of which 
Tanjungpinang is the administrative centre, we find a cline in 
population density such that the nearer a village is to Tanjungpinang, 
the more densely populated it is likely to be, and the farther away it 
is, the more sparsely populated it is likely to be. Tanjungpinang is 
itself so densely populated that it is sub-divided into several 
kepenghuluan 'headman-dams' -- that is, into so many different wards. 
(See Appendix 11.) 
With regards to the four 'headman-doms' where I did my fieldwork, 
it is quite clear that the one closest to Tanjungpinang is the most 
densely populated, whereas the one farthest is the most sparsely 
populated. Thus Kepenghuluan Penyengat is the most densely populated, 
being close enough to Tanjungpinang to serve as a suburb of the town. 
Kepenghuluan Bintan is the next most densely populated, being farther 
away, though with the advantage of being connected by road to 
Tanjungpinang. Kepenghuluan Pangkil is still more sparsely populated, 
being separated from Tanjungpinang by a good two hours' ride in a 
motor-boat, longer if propelled only by wind and oar. Kepenghuluan 
Karas is the most sparsely populated, being located at the very limits 
of the Sub-district of Southern Bintan. The same geographical cline 
in population density is discernible in the other 'headman-doms' as 
well. So it would be possible to draw a series of concentric circles, 
radiating outwards from Tanjungpinang as the most densely populated 
area, to the periphery of the sub-district as the most sparsely 
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populated area. 
The duality of centre and periphery is thus a recurrent motif in 
the spatial configuration known as 'Indonesia'. It is found at 
different administrative levels at the national, provincial, 
district, sub-district, and even 'headman-dom' level. What Gottman 
(1980:15-16) says about centre and periphery is of relevance to our 
discussion: 
Centrality must be perceived by the people using the 
'central place' as such. That perception is not the simple 
result of physical design apparent in the field; it is 
influenced by historical knowledge, political organisation, 
economic functions, and so on .••• The peripheral position 
seems easier to recognise because it is more diffuse, more 
widely distributed. It would seem that any area or location 
depending on a centre outside it for services or decisions 
affecting the life of its population feels itself to be on 
the periphery. In geographical terms the periphery is what 
surrounds the centre, a geometrical relationship; the 
farther away a point is from the centre, the more peripheral 
it would be. But the political relationship is different: 
peripheral location means subordination to the centre. In a 
stable, orderly situation the subordination is accepted even 
if somewhat deplored and resented. A lack of resignation to 
such subordination would obviously lead to conflict and 
instability. 
It is my argument that this tension between centre and periphery 
is one of the contextual regularities informing the text of my 
informants. As shown above, they are located in the periphery of 
Indonesia, indeed on the very edge of the national boundaries, next to 
the nation-states of Singapore and Malaysia. Provincially, they are 
also peripheral, being located far from the provincial capital at 
Pekanbaru. (See Map 2.) Even on district and sub-district levels, 
they are peripheral, being located outside Tanjungpinang, the local 
administrative centre. 
My informants' discourse on Melayu-ness seems to express a 
recognition of their peripherality in Indonesia. To begin with, 
Melayu-ness is perceived as a phenomenon that pertains not to the 
towns, but to the villages. There are thus kampung Melayu 'Melayu 
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villages' but no kota Melayu 'Melayu towns'. The patterning of 
Melayu-ness is seen as stopping short of Tanjungpinang, which is 
clearly identified by everyone not as a tempat Melayu 'Melayu place', 
but as an Indonesian ibukota 'capital city'. So taking Tanjungpinang 
as the centre in relation to which every other place in the sub-
district is peripheral, what I found was a spread of Melayu-ness that 
extended from the inner edge of the periphery to the outer peripheral 
limits. Kepenghuluan Penyengat is thus located on the inner edge, 
whereas Kepenghuluan Karas is located at the outer peripheral limits. 
Kepenghuluan Bintan and Kepenghuluan Pangkil are in-between. 
As noted by Gattman (see above), peripherality is not merely 
geographical distance but also political subordination, which may be 
either accepted or resisted. So if my informants' discourse on 
Melayu-ness expresses a recognition of their peripherality in 
Indonesia, then by implication, it would also express their acceptance 
or non-acceptance of their peripheral and hence politically 
subordinate position. In this light, it is highly significant that 
their discourse on Melayu-ness is framed not in the here-and-now of 
Indonesia, but in the there-and-then of a bygone sultanate. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, this strategy may be understood as elusion, 
whereby one modality of experience is played off against another, such 
that conflict between two opposing parties is eluded. This further 
implies that my informants' discourse on Melayu-ness expresses covert 
resistance to their political peripherality in Indonesia. To push the 
argument one more step, Melayu-ness seems to be a phenomenon that is 
identified as not just peripheral but also non-Indonesian. 
The identification of Melayu-ness as such a phenomenon was 
articulated not only by my peripherally located informants in the 
'headman-dams' of island Riau. Even the relatively more Indonesia-
oriented bureaucrats of Pekanbaru share this perception. As I have 
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noted in Chapter One above, the latter talked about things Melayu as 
though ref erring to some phenomenon located out there in the not quite 
modern world, in the world of the bygone past, of palace ruins, royal 
graves, and aboriginal people. The insider's perspective thus seems 
to dovetail nicely with the outsider's perspective. From the 
perspective of the Pekanbaru bureaucrats, Melayu-ness is perceived as 
non-Indonesian and hence peripheral. From the perspective of the 
villagers of island Riau, however, Indonesia is seen as non-Melayu and 
is thus considered peripheral. It depends on one's perspective, 
whether it is Melayu-ness that is construed as peripheral, or whether 
it is Indonesian-ness that is so considered. To put this another way, 
one person's centre may be another person's periphery. Indeed, in my 
informants' discourse on Melayu-ness, there is a symbolic reversal of 
political reality. Penyengat island is perceived as the Melayu centre 
of the area, not Tanjungpinang, nor Pekanbaru, and certainly not 
Jakarta. Peripherality is thus reversed into centrality. 
Perhaps ironically, this vision of Melayu centrality is not 
incompatible with Indonesian national ideology. The national motto 
bhinneka tunggal ika is officially translated into English as 'unity 
in diversity'. The official view from Jakarta is that while Indonesia 
is a single polity, it is nevertheless a country peopled by diverse 
sukus 'divisions', such as Suku Jawa, Suku Minangkabau, Suku Batak, 
Suku Bugis, and indeed, Suku Melayu. Ethnic diversity is thus 
officially recognised as a historical given, over and above which 
10 
political unity is supposed to transcend. Such a recognition would 
seem to be historically valid since, as shown above, 'Indonesia' 
itself is a spatial configuration derived, not from the territory of 
any pre-existing nation, but from the Netherlands East Indies of the 
Dutch colonialists. 
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The basis of Indonesian unity is supposed to be non-ethnic. No 
suku of the Indonesian population is, in theory, supposed to be more 
important than any other suku. Instead, an abstract creed known as 
the Pancasila 'Five Principles' is supposed to be the means whereby a 
11 
supra-ethnic unity is to be achieved. 
The ethnic situation in Indonesia may be usefully compared to 
that of Malaysia. Siddique and Suryadinata (1982) have shown that 
both in Malaysia and Indonesia, there is a legal differentiation 
between indigene and non-indigene, such a differentiation being based 
on the government's wish to compensate for the perceived economic 
deprivation of the former. Thus there are special rights and 
privileges instituted in favour of the indigenes of both these 
countries. However, whereas there is a strong identification of the 
Malaysian bumiputra 'indigene' as 'Malay', there is no clear 
12 
definition of the Indonesian pribumi 'indigene'. 
So unlike the Malaysian situation where the 'Malays' are the 
dominant category of indigenes, in Indonesia the category Suku Melayu 
is merely one of the many categories of indigenous people. Such being 
the case, the Indonesian government has no special interest in 
defining Melayu-ness as such, so long as it does not develop into 
secessionist separatism. Within the political limits of national 
unity, Melayu-ness in Indonesia remains very much a local matter to be 
understood in local terms. 
2.2 Alam Melayu 
Apart from these local terms, however, we must also consider an 
alternative spatial configuration, other than that known as 
'Indonesia', within which Melayu-ness may be perceived as meaningful. 
This alternative is generally referred to by my informants as alam 
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~elayu 'the Melayu world', by which they refer to the territory of a 
network of genealogically related kingdoms, located in the Malay 
Peninsula including Singapore, the east coast of Sumatra, the coast of 
Borneo from Brunei westwards to Banjarmasin, and of course the Riau-
Lingga archipelago itself. These kingdoms, some extinct and others 
extant, are currently divided into five nation-states namely, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand. The 'Melayu 
world' thus transcends the boundaries of these nation-states. So 
apart from a nationally bounded spatial configuration, there is also a 
cosmopolitan alam Melayu that transcends the boundaries of Indonesia. 
Of the nation-states mentioned above, perhaps the one most 
relevant in the context of alam Melayu is Malaysia, because it 
incorporates the greatest number of extant sultanates in the area. In 
the order of their genealogical proximity to the Riau-Lingga 
sultanate, these are Johor, Selangor, Pahang, Trengganu, Perak, Kedah, 
Kelantan, and Perlis. Although Melaka and Penang are Malaysian 
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states, they are not extant sultanates. 
As I have shown above, the spatial configuration known as 
'Indonesia' is not just a geographically inherent phenomenon, but 
rather, the historical result of certain temporal events --
specifically, Dutch colonisation and Indonesian nationalisation. 
Similarly, the spatial configuration referred to as alam Melayu is 
also historically engendered. My informants are themselves very much 
aware of this historicity, for which the term sejaraq is used. When 
my informants first talked about sejarah Melayu, I initially thought 
that they were referring to the text, the Penurunan, that has been 
published in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur under the title Sejarah 
Melayu. (See Chapter One.) Later, I realised that what they were 
ref erring to extended beyond this particular text and could perhaps be 
understood as a sense of Melayu historicity, which manifests itself in 
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different forms, including both the textual and the oral. 
I have discovered that my informants' sense of Melayu historicity 
is very much bound up with a particular genealogical tree -- to be 
14 
specific, a particular genealogy of kingship. In their oral 
tradition, this genealogy began in Palembang with Seri Teri Buana, a 
ruler whose title is interpreted as meaning Raja Tiga Benua 'King of 
Three Lands' -- namely, Palembang, Bintan, and Temasik/Singapore. 
These 'three lands' are so connected through a myth which relates that 
Seri Teri Buana first reigned in Palembang, then in Bintan, and 
finally in Temasik/Singapore. According to the myth, it was a 
descendant of this founding ruler that eventually established and 
·ruled Melaka. Branches of this genealogical tree then spread to other 
places, such as Perak, Pahang, and Indragiri. After Melaka fell to 
the Portuguese, the main ruling branch in Melaka moved southward to 
Johor and Riau, eventually establishing close connections with yet 
other places such as Trengganu and Selangor. 
These places are thus genealogically related to each other 
through this myth. The places mentioned above are just some key 
examples; there are many other places related in this way. As the 
names that can be included on a genealogy are limited only by one's 
knowledge and memory, so the list of places that can be genealogically 
related is also theoretically unlimited. Alam Melayu is thus not a 
bounded territory but rather, an expandable network of genealogically 
related places. All that is needed to add a place-name to the list is 
to demonstrate that the rulers of that place were related by kinship 
to what is literally sejarah Melayu 'the Melayu genealogy' of 
kingship. This may explain why my literate informants have such a 
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keen interest in collecting and drawing up genealogies. 
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What is particularly striking is that these places are 
genealogically related only through their rulers, and not through 
their common subjects. The implication is that those places that did 
not have kingly rulers cannot possibly be related in this way. Only 
rulers can be related to rulers; and only states can be related to 
states. As an informant noted: 
Raja baru ada sejarah, rakyat mana ada sejarah. 
(Only the rulers have genealogies/histories; 
the subjects have no genealogies/histories.) 
Therefore to claim that a particular place is part of alam Melayu 
is to imply that it was the site of a Melayu kingdom. It is perhaps 
clearer at this point how it is possible for my informants to perceive 
Penyengat as central and not peripheral, for that was indeed the last 
capital of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. Thus to continue to perceive 
Penyengat as a Melayu centre is to continue to perceive the existence 
of that sultanate. It is indeed the aim of this study to show how 
this perception is sustained. 
Spatially, alam Melayu does not coincide with Indonesia. On the 
one hand, it expands beyond the Indonesian national boundaries to 
include such places as Singapore, Johor, Selangor, Perak, Pahang, and 
Trengganu. And on the other hand, it does not include within 
Indonesia such places as Java, Bali, and the other more easterly 
islands. At it widest extent, alam Melayu spans the area that is 
unified by the body of water formed by the Melaka Strait, the South 
China Sea, and the numerous straits extending as far south as Bangka 
and Billiton. The various places mentioned above as comprising alam 
Melayu may perhaps be described as being situated on the rim of a bowl 
of water, with the west coast of the Malay Peninsula and the east 
16 
coast of Sumatra making a double rim. 
As noted by Benjamin (1980:48): 
••• Malay states did not arise solely within the Malay 
Peninsula: the same processes were occurring simultaneously 
in Borneo, the Sumatran mainland and in the Riau-Lingga 
archipelago. Their marine interconnections were such that 
the consciousness of a Malay world (alam Melayu) has been 
shared by them all for several hundred years. 
It is precisely this 'consciousness of a Malay world' that my 
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informants still sustain. As pointed out by Benjamin, the formation 
of such a 'world' resulted from the rise of a certain type of state. 
Genealogical connections posited between such states may thus be 
understood as an expression of their structural relations to each 
other. 
So the myth that links Palembang, Bintan, Temasik/Singapore, 
Melaka, and other places in genealogical terms, may be interpreted as 
a statement of historicity. The implication would be that a certain 
type of state was established in these places, in the order given in 
the myth. Wolters (1970:ix) has indeed taken this myth seriously as 
'a rendering of Malay history originally seen from a Palembang and 
Malacca point of view and subsequently assimilated to Malay historical 
tradition.' From a Riau perspective, a myth that recounts the 
genealogical connections of kingdoms within alam Melayu would identify 
Riau-Lingga itself as one such kingdom, and hence heir to a political 
tradition going all the way back to Palembang, the ancestral state. 
Following Geertz (1963:39-41), I shall use the term pasisir 
'coastal' to label the type of state that arose in alam Melayu. What 
appears to have been the most distinctive characteristic of the 
pasisir state was 'an orientation to marketing activities' (ibid.:39). 
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Apart from this, the economy was evidently quite unspecialised. It 
was trade that served as the unifying economic principle of an 
otherwise ecologically diverse area. Geertz (ibid.) characterises the 
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pasisir state as a 'general, quite distinctive type of political and 
social system', wherein the population was divided into 'a supralocal 
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ruling class, a commoner class, and a dependent group of slaves.' 
However, her description (ibid.) of the pasisir area is much 
wider than alam Melayu, including not only 
the entire eastern half of Sumatra, ••• the Malayan Peninsula 
itself, ••• the islands between Sumatra and Borneo (e.g. 
Riouw, Lingga, Banka, Billiton), and ••• the coasts and river 
valleys of Borneo, but also Atjeh, South Celebes, Gorontolo 
in North Celebes, Ternate, Tidore, the Batjan islands, the 
Goram islands, West Java, Madura, Sumbawa, and small pockets 
on the other lesser Sunda Islands. 
Alam Melayu thus constitutes only one part of Geertz's pasisir area. 
If we accept her geographical definition as valid, then we may ask: 
what is it that differentiated alam Melayu from the rest of the 
pasisir area? It is perhaps in this context that we can appreciate 
the full significance of my informants' concern with genealogy: alam 
Melayu was unified by sejarah Melayu -- that is, a particular 
genealogical tree of kingship. The other, non-Melayu, pasisir areas 
would thus be those where the rulers did not claim to belong to this 
particular genealogical tree. For example, Aceh is located on the 
northern tip of the Sumatran mainland, yet the rulers evidently did 
not claim to belong to the Melayu genealogical tree. And indeed Aceh 
is generally not regarded as part of alam Melayu. On the contrary, 
both the indigenous and foreign texts indicate that Aceh was an 
historical enemy of alam Melayu. (See, for example, Andaya 1975.) 
So the implication is that alam Melayu was a geographical network 
of kin-related allies. In other words, what differentiated alam 
Melayu from the rest of the pasisir area was politics, rather than any 
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geographical or ecological factor. Indeed, in those cases where two 
potential allies were not already related, the alliance was usually 
sealed by a marriage. What the genealogical tree known as sejarah 
Melayu portrayed was thus a serial patterning of political alliances 
based on kinship. Alam Melayu was the spatial configuration that 
resulted from this political patterning. Hence to locate oneself 
within ~lam Melayu is to claim membership in a specific network of 
political alliances. 
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From this perspective, both Indonesia and alam Melayu may be 
understood as stochastic patterns of power taking shape in space, such 
that particular spatial configurations are formed. As I have shown 
above, the patterning of power that created Indonesia is quite 
different from the patterning of power that created alam Melayu. 
There is thus an inherent tension in my informants' situation, for 
they live in Indonesia as Indonesian citizens, yet project their 
consciousness beyond to an alam Melayu wherein the existence of an 
Indonesia as such is irrelevant. In so doing, they distance 
themselves from the present by focussing their attention on the not-
present. This results in the implicit question: so what is reality 
after all, the present or the not-present? This leads in turn to 
fuzziness in one's perceptions. Indeed, even so basic a question as 
'where is Riau?' can elicit a range of semantic complexity. After 
all, where Riau is would depend on the spatial configuration in which 
one locates it. Riau in Indonesia would thus be very different from 
Riau in alam Melayu. 
2.3 Riau 
In official Indonesian terminology, the name 'Riau' is used in 
two different senses -- Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' and Kabupaten 
Kepulauan Riau 'District of the Riau Archipelago'. As noted by Kato 
(1984: 9) t 
It is conventional to divide the Province of Riau into two 
regions: inland Riau (Riau daratan), the land mass belonging 
to Sumatra including its offshore islands, and island Riau 
(Riau kepulauan), the sea area with its innumerable islands. 
My informants are indeed aware of these Indonesian usages, both the 
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official and conventional ones. However, in their own everyday usage, 
the name 'Riau' has more precise referents. 
The most precise referent is the river known as Sungai Riau. My 
informants in the 'headman-dam' of Karas say, aku nak ke Riau 'I am 
going to Riau', when they mean that they are going to Tanjungpinang. 
They call Tanjungpinang 'Riau' because it is located on Sungai Riau. 
So by this reckoning. they are themselves not even in Riau. Indeed, 
most of these informants would rather say that they are in Galang. So 
in this usage, the name 'Riau' refers to a place that is perhaps 
equivalent to the status of Galang. What the name 'Galang' itself 
refers to will be explained below. 
Apart from my Galang informants, the other informants also 
emphasise the importance of Sungai Riau, without, however, restricting 
the usage of the name 'Riau' to that river alone. In their usage, 
'Riau' refers to the islands extending as far west as Karimun and 
Kundur, as far east as Bintan, and as far south as the Abang islands. 
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The Lingga archipelago and the Tujuh islands are excluded from 
this labelling. So although this latter usage is wider than the 
Galang usage, the area it refers to is nevertheless still smaller than 
the Indonesian 'District of the Riau Archipelago' which does include 
the Lingga and Tujuh islands. (See Map 2.) 
At first sight, it may seem somewhat paradoxical that my 
informants should regard Riau as central and not peripheral, and yet 
include a smaller area under that name than does the Indonesian 
Government. However, this paradox is easily resolved when one 
realises that it is not territorial size that matters, but rather. 
geographical location. To understand this, let us consider the most 
precise referent of the name 'Riau' -- that is, Sungai Riau. 
According to some of my informants, the name 'Riau' was derived from 
the Portuguese word for river -- rio. The suggestion is that the 
river Sungai Riau was called rio by the Portuguese, hence its Malay 
name. 
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Interestingly, there is another name for this river -- Sungai 
Carang 'Branching River'. Indeed the river is actually a confluence 
of two separate streams. (See Map 5.) The more northerly stream is 
historically the more important; this is known as Hulu Sungai Riau 
'Headwaters of the Riau River'. The more southerly stream which seems 
to have played no historical role is called Hulu Sungai Carang 
'Headwaters of Carang River'. This implies that the Portuguese word 
rio was associated only with the more northerly stream. 
Another opinion among my informants is that the name 'Riau' 
derived from the Malay word riuh 'clamour, hubbub, noise, festivity'. 
The story is that when Opu Daeng Cellak got married, there was such a 
festive celebration that the noise could be heard from miles away. 
People from all around commented to one another -- sana riuh 'it's 
noisy there'. Consequently, the place that was riuh became known as 
Riau. 
Although there is no linguistic evidence that such a sound shift 
did occur, this folk etymology has certain significant aspects. First 
of all, this story dates the usage of the name as occurring after the 
marriage of Opu Daeng Cellak. According to the Tuhfat, this marriage 
occurred immediately after Opu Daeng Cellak's elder brother, Opu Daeng 
Marewah, was installed as Yang Dipertuan Muda 'Underking'. (See Raja 
Ali Haji 1982:64.) Netscher (1870:59) gives the installation date as 
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4 October 1722. The dating implied in my informants' story is 
significant because it associates 'Riau' with the Bugis rulers of the 
area, of whom Opu Daeng Marewah was the very first. Moreover, it is 
significant that the event taken as the landmark is Opu Daeng Cellak's 
wedding and not Opu Daeng Marewah's installation, for in this famous 
wedding, the woman that the former married was Sultan Sulaiman's 
sister, Tengku Mandak. In other words, what this wedding symbolises 
is the political alliance that was forged between Sultan Sulaiman, the 
Melayu ruler on the one hand, and Opu Daeng Cellak, the Bugis 
adventurer on the other. The Bugis rulers thus married into sejarah 
Melayu. 
Another significant aspect is that the palaces of Opu Daeng 
Marewah and Opu Daeng Cellak were located in Hulu Sungai Riau 
'Headwaters of the Riau River'. Their graves are still to be found 
there. Hence it is debatable whether the river became known as Riau 
because the Bugis rulers made it riuh, or whether the name 'Riau' came 
to be used for the whole archipelago because the rulers of the area 
had their political centre on the banks of the Riau river. 
The textual evidence indicates that the latter explanation is the 
more likely. In at least three of the indigenous histories, the name 
'Riau' is first mentioned in connection with the establishment of a 
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political centre shortly before 1677/8. Significantly, 1678 was the 
year when the Dutch Governor of Melaka, Balthasar Bort, first 
mentioned 'Riau' as a competitor of Melaka: 
Songujongh and Calangh produce yearly about 400 bhaers of 
tin, whereof Malacca gets a very small share, since most of 
it is taken to Aatchin and Bencalis, also to Pahangh and 
Riouw. 
(Quoted from Winstedt 1979:46). 
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Winstedt (ibid.) also remarks that from 1678 onwards, 'the Dagh-
Register ••• begins to record a small trade between the Dutch and Riau.' 
So the textual evidence indicates quite strongly that the name 
'Riau' was known before 1722 when the Bugis adventurers established 
themselves as rulers of the kingdom, and that a political and trading 
centre had already been established there some forty-four years 
earlier, about 1678. The textual evidence further suggests that the 
Bugis rulers were not the first ones to make Riau riuh. In 1687, the 
Dutch Governor of Melaka, Thomas Slicher, reported to Batavia the 
following news: 
The number of ships going to Riau is so great that the river 
is scarcely navigable as a result of the many trading 
vessels in it ••• traders are attracted to Riau because of its 
menagierse aequipage. Here the tin traders are paid half in 
contant [specie] and half in cloth; whereas, in Malacca they 
are given whatever cloth available and not the newest styles 
as in Riau. 
(Quoted from Andaya 1975:38). 
Such an atmosphere of vigorous trade could aptly be described as riuh. 
We must thus question why it is that my informants choose to 
identify Opu Daeng Cellak as the man who made Riau riuh, and that too 
as the result of his wedding. This question may be answered in terms 
of the identity of my informants themselves. Many of them claim 
descent from the Bugis rulers who had established themselves as a 
force in the kingdom in 1722. So it is not surprising that they 
should date the very origins of the name 'Riau' from the coming of one 
of their ancestors. As pointed out above, the particular significance 
of Opu Daeng Cellak is that he was the first of the Bugis adventurers 
to marry into the Melayu genealogy of kingship. 
In contrast to this Bugis-biased view, in a book written by an 
informant who is himself not of Bugis descent -- Tengku Ahmad bin 
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Tengku Abubakar (1972) -- Opu Daeng Cellak is not mentioned at all in 
23 
connection with the supposedly !1!!h. atmospher~ of Riau. So it would 
seem that in the view of this non-Bugis informant, the Riau that was 
riuh does not necessarily date only from the Bugis period. This 
informant, however, lives in Lingga, and as we shall see below, there 
is a significant difference between the perspectives of Riau and 
Lingga. 
The point is, the name 'Riau' seems to be used to refer not only 
to a geographical site but to a certain political reality. For my 
informants of Bugis descent, it refers to the political reality that 
began with the coming of the Bugis rulers. For others, it may refer 
to an earlier political reality. Therefore, one must ask not only 
'where is Riau?', but also 'whose Riau is it we speak of?' 
Furthermore, even if it is the case that the name 'Riau' refers 
specifically to the Riau river, and if it is the case that this river 
was the site of a political and trading centre from the seventeenth 
century onwards, the question nevertheless remains: how did the name 
come to be attached to the archipelago as a whole? The answers to 
these questions may perhaps be couched in terms of the historical 
development of political territoriality. 
From 1677 to 1804, there seem to have been six distinct 'Riaus', 
each ref erring to a different political reality: 
Sultan Ibrahim's 'Riau' (1677-1683) referred to the 
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then ruling Melaka-derived dynasty. 
Sultan Abd al-Jalil's 'Riau' (1708-1716) referred 
25 
to his promotion from bendahara to sultan. 
Raja Kecik's 'Riau' (1719-1722) referred to his 
pretensions to the throne as the alleged descendant 
of the Melaka dynasty founded by Sultan Abd 
26 
al-Jalil. 
The 'Riau' of 1722-1787 referred to the coalition 
established between the Bugis conquerors and the 
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descendants of the bendahara dynasty. 
The 'Riau' of 1787-1795 referred to Dutch 
28 
colonisation. 
Finally, the 'Riau' of 1795-1804 referred to the 
rivalry that developed between certain members of the 
Bugis faction and certain members of the bendahara 
29 
dynasty. 
One similarity shared by these different political realities is that 
they were all located along the Riau river. So until 1804, the name 
evidently did refer to settlements built on the banks of that river. 
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Such an usage changed in 1804 when the name 'Riau' came to be 
applied to a wider area beyond the immediate reaches of the river. 
What seemed to have precipitated this generalised usage was Sultan 
Mahmud's gift of 'Riau' to the Bugis. The name 'Riau' then seemed to 
refer not just to the Riau river, but to the territorial extent from 
which the Bugis rulers at Penyengat derived their revenue. This was a 
clearly demarcated territory, differentiated from Bulang to the west, 
and Lingga to the south. Bulang was the fief of the temenggung's 
faction led by Engku Muda, the contender of the Bugis. (See Trocki 
1979:4.) Lingga remained under the sultan. (See Raja Ali Haji 
1982:212.) So it would seem that from 1804 to 1911, the name 'Riau' 
came to refer to an internal division of the kingdom in a political 
reality which was divided into three zones of domination -- 'Riau' 
under the Bugis yamtuan muda, 'Lingga' under the sultan, and 'Bulang' 
under the temenggung. 
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The next significant event occurred in 1824 when the British and 
the Dutch governments signed between themselves a treaty which divided 
Southeast Asia into their respective spheres of influence. The 
dividing line was the Main Strait flowing between Singapore and 
30 
Batara. (See Map 3.) This cut right through the temenggung's 
dominion. The Dutch decided to bestow that part of his dominion that 
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fell under their influence to the Bugis yamtuan muda instead. After 
a short civil war between the Bugis faction and the ~emenggung'§ 
faction, which ended in October 1827, the yamtuan muda consolidated 
his control over the post-1824 'Riau sphere' which had been newly 
expanded by courtesy of the Dutch. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:252-
255,394.) The western and southern extent of this post-1824 'Riau 
sphere' included Karimun, Buru, and Kundur in the west, and Pintu and 
Duyung in the south. The northern extent of the 'Riau sphere' was 
marked by the Main Strait. 
An eastern boundary seems to have been instituted sometime during 
Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali's reign (1845-1857). According to the 
Tuhfat, 
One of the achievements of the Yang Dipertuan Muda's reign 
was that princes were forbidden to take deliveries to the 
Tujuh Islands and to question people engaged in trade. 
Instead he instituted a system of tribute from the sea-
people of the Tujuh Islands. 
(Ibid.:286). 
My reading of the passage above is that he decided to legislate the 
Tujuh island-groups out of the 'Riau sphere' directly under his 
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control, by making them into a separate tributary area instead. 
The result is a post-1824 'Riau sphere' bounded on four sides. 
(See Map 3.) As we have seen above, the four boundaries in question 
are the consequences of political action; they are not the result of 
geographical circumstances, pure and simple. Even though there are 
indeed navigational difficulties in travelling to the Tujuh island-
groups, the yamtuan muda nevertheless had to legislate to take these 
island-groups out of his 'Riau sphere'. 
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This situation apparently continued until 1911 when the Dutch 
forced the last sultan into abdication and established Residentie 
Riouw en Onderhoorgheden with its capital at Tanjungpinang. This 
comprised afdeeling Riouw Archipel and afdeeling Inderagiri, with the 
island territory of the former Riau-Lingga sultanate included in the 
former. In 1938, afdeeling Bengkalis was added to this Residentie; 
and in 1942 more areas of the Sumatran east coast were included 
that is, all the former territories of the kingdoms there, such as 
Siak, Pelalawan, and Rokan. (See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:380-386.) 
In this period the name 'Riau' referred to a political reality which 
encompassed an area much wider than the Riau-Lingga kingdom ever 
controlled, an area unified through Dutch colonisation. 
From 1942 to 1945 Residentie Riouw was replaced by the Riau Syu 
of Japanese colonisation, which included only the Sumatran part of 
Residentie Riouw, together with its immediate off-shore islands. The 
island territory of afdeeling Riouw, which had formerly belonged to 
the Riau-Lingga kingdom, now came under the military administration 
centred on Syonanto (Singapore). (See ibid.:407.) So in this period 
the name 'Riau' became totally detached from the Riau-Lingga islands, 
and became attached instead to a part of Sumatra. 
After the Second World War, 1945 to 1950 was a period of 
conflicting interests. The Dutch wanted to reclaim their former 
colonies including Residentie Riouw. But some aristocrats wanted to 
exploit the power vacuum to re-institute the former Riau-Lingga 
kingdom. And the nationalists wanted to form a new nation-state 
Indonesia -- comprising all the former Dutch colonies in the area. In 
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this period it was unclear what the name 'Riau' referred to. 
Eventually, the conflict was resolved in favour of the nationalists, 
who then decided to form provinces that were even larger than the 
Dutch residencies. (See ibid.:625.) So Residentie Riouw was 
incorporated into the province of 'Central Sumatra' (Sumatra Tengah), 
with the name 'Riau' used only for Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau. This 
district was based on the island territory of the former Riau-Lingga 
kingdom. In 1958, the name 'Riau' was once again applied to a wider 
area, when a Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' was formed with the same 
territorial shape as the former Residentie Riouw. (See ibid.:667-
672.) This is still the situation at present. 
Such being the semantic complexity implied by the name 'Riau', 
which 'Riau', whose 'Riau' is it that constitutes the field of this 
study? To answer this, let us consider the view of my informants in 
the Galang area who say, aku nak ke Riau 'I am going to Riau', when 
they mean that they are going to Tanjungpinang. Such an usage reverts 
to a pre-1804 frame of reference when the name 'Riau' was used 
specifically for the capitals that were actually located on the Riau 
river. Significantly, the Galang area was part of the temenggung's 
dominion centred on Bulang; it did not become part of the Bugis-
dominated 'Riau' sphere until after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. 
According to my informants, the Galang people refused to submit to the 
Bugis yamtuan muda, and became 'political pirates' (perompak politik) 
who sought to make trouble for the Bugis rulers. With such a 
tradition of rebellion, it is perhaps not surprising that my Galang 
informants are still using the name 'Riau' in a pre-1804 frame of 
reference. Such an usage may be understood as an attempt to de-
recognise the post-1804 'Riau' that was the sphere of Bugis 
domination. 
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But such is not the view of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants. 
Their usage of 'Riau' may be understood in a 1824-1911 frame of 
reference -- that is, including the islands as far west as Karimun and 
Kundur, but excluding the Lingga archipelago in the south and the 
Tujuh islands in the north. That was the maximum extent of the Bugis 
yamtuan muda's dominion, and significantly, many of these informants 
are themselves of Bugis descent. 
This is not to say that they are not aware of the present 
situation. Indeed, they are; but they regard the post-1911 'Riaus' as 
exogenous forms imposed, in turn, by the Dutch, the Japanese, and the 
Indonesian governments. Following my Penyengat and Pangkil 
informants, I have chosen the 'Riau' of 1824-1911 as the field of this 
study. The pre-1804 'Riau' of my Galang informants is not quite 
suitable as it does not even include Galang. As for the post-1911 
'Riaus', while my informants are aware of their existence, they do not 
seem to refer to them as frames within which they may define their own 
Melayu-ness. And that indeed is the issue. When my Galang informants 
refer to a pre-1804 'Riau', they are referring to a certain political 
reality, to a certain patterning of Melayu-ness. And when my 
Penyengat and Pangkil informants refer to a 1824-1903 'Riau', they too 
are referring to a certain, though different, political reality, as 
well as a different patterning of Melayu-ness. 
In the rest of this study, when I use the name 'Riau' without any 
other qualification, I am referring to the 1824-1911 'Riau', which is 
sometimes referred to by my informants also as Kepulauan Riau 'Riau 
Archipelago'. To refer to the other usages of 'Riau', I shall qualify 
with such terms as propinsi 'province' and kabupaten 'regency'. I 
shall use the phrase 'the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands' to refer to the 
entire spatial configuration so designated. 
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There is thus a distinct contrast between Indonesian 
administrative usage and my informants' usage. As mentioned above, in 
Indonesian administrative usage, the names 'Penyengat', 'Pangkil', 
'Karas', and 'Bintan' refer to four kepenghuluan 'headman-dams'. The 
first three of these kepenghuluan each includes several islands in its 
territory. In my informants' usage, however, the names 'Penyengat', 
'Pangkil', and 'Karas' each refers to only one pulau 'small island'. 
The respective territory covered by my informants' usage is thus much 
smaller than that included in the kepenghuluan by the same name. 
So Kepenghuluan Penyengat includes Penyengat and the Soreh Reefs, 
whereas Pulau Penyengat refers only to the island itself. 
Kepenghuluan Pangkil includes Pangkil, Soreh, and half of Tapai, 
whereas Pulau Pangkil refers only to the island itself. Kepenghuluan 
Karas includes Karas and a host of other islands -- namely, Karas 
Kecil, Mubut Darat, Mubut Laut, Galang Senyantung, Semukit, Panjang, 
Sembur Darat, Sembur Laut, Nanga, Batu Belobang, Tanjung Dahan, half 
of Galang Baru/Galang Kandap, and several other smaller islands. In 
contrast, Pulau Karas refers only to the island itself. (See Map 4.) 
Unless otherwise specified, I will follow my informants' usage with 
regards to the three place-names 'Penyengat', 'Pangkil', and 'Karas' 
-- that is, I will use these names to refer to the specific island in 
question. 
The closest correspondence between Indonesian administrative 
usage and my informants' usage occurs in the case of Kepenghuluan 
Bintan. The area included in this 'headman-dam' is approximately the 
same as that referred to by my informants as 'Bintan' -- that is the 
area located on the banks of the Bintan river, in the shadow of Gunung 
Bintan 'Mount Bintan'. It is this area that I shall refer to in all 
subsequent mention of the name 'Bintan'. For referring to the island 
as a whole, I shall use the phrase 'Bintan island'. (See Map 6.) 
In my informants' usage, there is a term that has no equivalent 
in Indonesian administrative usage -- that is, the name 'Galang'. 
When they say 'Galang', they refer not only to the islands known as 
33 
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'Galang Senyantung' and 'Galang Baru/Galang Kandap'. They refer to 
a much larger area that includes the entire island-cluster ranging 
from Tanjungsau in the north to the Abang islands in the south, from 
Karas in the east to Petong on the west. This is the habitat of the 
people known as the suku Galang 'Galang division'; all my informants 
from Kepenghuluan Karas belong to the population of this area. 
Following their usage, I will use the word 'Galang' to refer to the 
area described above. 
2.4 The Island World of Sea and Land 
Varied as the political usages of the name 'Riau' may be, they do 
not change the fundamental environmental conditions to which they 
refer -- that is, the island world of sea and land. The Riau islands 
are so numerous that my informants describe them as 'a measure of 
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black peppercorns' (segantang lada hitam). The Indonesia Pilot 
(1975:I,116) confirms that in this area there are indeed 'a great 
number of islands and islets with numerous reefs among and around 
them'. For Riau Province as a whole, the figure of 3,214 islands has 
been mentioned. (See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:29.) Perhaps more than 
half of these are located in the Riau archipelago. 
The small islands and islets of the Riau archipelago greatly 
outnumber the larger islands. In my informants' perceptions, island 
size is regarded as important. Such a differentiation is ecologically 
significant indeed, because large islands and small islands provide 
different kinds of habitat. This ecological difference is evident in 
the semantics of my informants' word-usage. 
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Some of them seem to have difficulty understanding the geography 
of the Malay Peninsula. For example, they wonder why it is that Mecca 
is so far away when they have heard that Mecca and Malaysia are 
'conjoined by land' (setanah). In their own everyday experience, even 
the biggest islands can be traversed in a matter of days. In another 
case, a Pangkil couple showed me a letter that they had received from 
their nephew who had gone to Malaysia to work. This nephew told them 
that he had recently moved from Johor to Selangor. My informants did 
not know where Selangor was, whether it was 'conjoined by land' to 
Johor. When I told them it was, they said with relief: 
Itulah, macam sini ke Budos -- dekat. 
(Indeed, it's like going from here to Budos -- very near.) 
I tried to explain that although Johor and Selangor were 'conjoined by 
land', the distance between them was much greater than that between 
Tajur Kait (the 'here' of my informants) and Budos. As Map 4 
indicates, Tajur Kait and Budos are parts of Pangkil island and are 
perhaps less than a mile apart. It takes only half an hour or forty-
five minutes to walk from the one place to the other. But my attempt 
to explain to my informants the greater distance between Johor and 
Selangor was not successful. 
This is not to say that my informants have no idea of distance. 
Most of them are fishermen or petty traders who undertake long sea 
voyages, sometimes spanning several weeks. But in their experience, 
it is the sea that is large and 'free' (terlepas, bebas); land, on the 
other hand, is always bounded. Every piece of land they have 
experience of is surrounded by water: ergo, all land is island. Such 
a perception is perhaps the diametrical opposite of that held by 
people who live far inland and who have only seen pools and rivers, 
but never the wide open sea. Most of my informants are people who 
have no experience of a continental land-mass. 
Such being the case, it does not make sense for them to 
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differentiate between island and continent. The important 
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difference is between small island and big island, between that which 
is small enough to be directly experienced as an island and that which 
is too large to be directly experienced as such. The former is 
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referred to by the word pulau, the latter by the word tanah 'land' 
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or bahagian 'parts'. The distinction is between land that is 
perceived as bounded and land that is perceived as spreading out. 
Although the Malay word pulau is generally translated into 
English as 'island', in my informants' usage it refers only to a small 
patch of land bounded by the sea, small enough to be experienced as 
such, either visually from a hilltop, or behaviourally by walking 
around it in a short space of time -- say, a few hours. Islands that 
are bigger than this do not seem to be ref erred to as pulau -- that 
is, as self-contained pieces of land. Instead, they are known only in 
terms of their particular parts. To give a specific example, when my 
informants use the place-name 'Bintan', they are not referring to the 
whole island, but more specifically, only to the area through which 
the Bintan river flows. The use of the name 'Bintan' to refer to the 
whole island seems to be an European-derived usage. In my informants' 
usage, 'Bintan' is not a higher-level term; it is only of the same 
order as, say, 'Senggarang', 'Tanjungpinang', 'Tanjunguban', and the 
names of other parts of the island. But for the island as a whole, 
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there seems to be no indigenous name. 
This usage of pulau is concordant with Wilkinson's (1959:919) 
explanation of the word: 
Isolated patch; island •••• Of patches of land in the sea 
(waterless rocks are tokons); islands in rivers; dry land 
surrounded by swamp; patches of forest ( ulau hutan) 
surrounded by ricefields. Very large islands such as Bali 
or larger) are tanah. 
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When one is on a pulau, what one sees is a piece of land bounded by 
water all around. One's attention is thus focussed on the coast-line, 
the line where two different substances --land and sea -- meet, yet 
remain separate. Wilkinson (see above) says that the word pulau is 
also used in the term pulau hutan, which refers to a patch of forest 
surrounded by ricefields. I did not come across this usage in Riau, 
but then my informants are not rice-farmers; they do not have any 
rice-fields, and they are therefore not that interested in the 
contrast in land vegetation. 
Nevertheless, both usages of the word pulau seem to have similar 
connotations. In both cases, pulau refers to the relationship between 
two perceptibly different substances -- land and sea in the one case, 
forest and ricefields in the other. This is not, however, a 
symmetrical relationship of equal parts: in the one case, land is 
surrounded by sea, and in the other, forest is surrounded by 
ricefields. I suggest that the stress in the word pulau is not the 
'landness' of the island or the 'forestness' of the patch of forest, 
but rather, the perceptible 'surroundedness' of both by something 
else. Sea and ricefields are thus, respectively, the contexts of 
pulau and pulau hutan. 
Moreover, just as the ricefields are the source of subsistence 
and not the patch of forest, so for most of my informants, the sea is 
the source of their subsistence and not the pulau itself. This is 
particularly significant in the context of my study, for the 
overwhelming majority of my informants are inhabitants of pulaus. The 
sites of my fieldwork -- Penyengat, Pangkil, Karas, Sembur Laut, 
Nanga, and Teluk Nipah -- are all pulaus. The only exception is 
Bintan -- that is, the banks of the Bintan river. (See Map 4.) 
It is no mere coincidence that most of my informants dwell on 
pulaus. What these informants prefer is a mode of sedentism that is 
orientated towards the sea and not the land. The pulau is evidently 
the most suitable land-form for such a mode of sedentism. As a small 
island, the pulau may be understood as a halfway house between land 
and sea. There is enough land to live on, to provide a refuge from the 
sea. At the same time, one has easy access to the sea in all 
directions, in all seasons of the monsoon. 
Because this mode of sedentism is intermediate between sea and 
land, it is related to sea-orientated nomadism, as well as to land-
orientated sedentism. In the Riau archipelago, the people who 
identify themselves as Melayu in one sense or another, may be divided 
into the following four categories according to their mode of 
habitation: 
LAND-
ORI ENT A TED 
SEA-
ORIENTATED 
SEDENTARY 
orang kampung 
'village people' 
(on river banks) 
orang kampung 
'village people' 
(on pulaus) 
NOMADIC 
orang hutan 
'forest people' 
orang sampan/orang laut 
1boat people/sea people' 
Figure 1 Indigenous Modes of Habitation 
My informants in the four 'headman-dams' I am studying may be 
differentiated in terms of their respective mode of habitation. My 
informants in Kepenghuluan Penyengat are all orang kampung living on a 
pulau. So are my informants in Kepenghuluan Pangkil. Those in 
Kepenghuluan Bintan are orang kampung living on the banks of a river. 
And those in Kepenghuluan Karas are the most varied: they range from 
orang kampung living on pulaus (namely -- Karas, Sembur, Nanga, and 
Teluk Nipah) to orang sampan/orang laut living on boats. My 
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informants in Nanga and Teluk Nipah are, however, only recently 
sedentary, having changed their mode of habitation from boat-dwelling 
to land-dwelling a generation or two ago. Some of their boat-dwelling 
kin still visit them. I have no informants who are nomadic orang 
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hutan, although I have a few Bintan informants who are said to be 
the descendants of the formerly nomadic, forest-dwelling orang Bintan 
µsli 'original Bintan people', whose way of life is apparently now 
extinct. In any case, there are only a few islands in the Riau 
archipelago large enough to have substantial forests. 
The mode of habitation is directly related to the mode of 
subsistence. To examine the relationship, I shall compare three 
fishing techniques used by my informants -- spear, line, and net. 
Spear fishing is the main fishing technique of the nomadic boat-
dwelling orang laut. Spear fishing is, to put it simply, the spearing 
of fishes in clear shallow water. A variety of spears and harpoons 
are used. One is, for example, the serampang 'trident', which has 
been described by Wilkinson (1959:1080) thus: 
The two outer spikes of this fish-trident are barbed on the 
inside only; the central spike is shorter and barbed on both 
sides. All three meet in a common base, attached firmly to 
the wooden shaft by a ferrule or band. 
The 'shaft' (gagang) may also be made of bamboo. The serampang is 
used for the relatively smaller fishes. For larger prey such as 
dugong, the tempuling 'single-pronged harpoon' is used. Although the 
single prong is also attached to a wooden or bamboo shaft, it is, in 
addition, affixed to a line and float. After the prey has been 
impaled, the shaft is detached from the prong and the line is played 
out; the reason is that unlike the smaller fishes, the larger prey can 
be pulled in only after it loses the tug-of-war. 
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To find the relatively smaller fishes, the spear fishers' boats 
are usually moored a short distance from the shore, just when the tide 
is going out. Their prey are the fishes being carried out by the 
tide. Such fishes are usually medium in size, small enough to be 
swept in and out by the tide, yet large enough to be seen by the naked 
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eye and speared. Apart from these fishes, they also hunt turtle and 
dugong. 
Although the spear fishers' catch is not without commercial 
value, and although they do occasionally sell it to obtain some cash, 
for the most part they subsist on what they catch. If they were to 
sell their catch regularly and live on bought food, they would soon 
starve, for spear fishing is too inefficient a method for obtaining a 
sufficient quantity for sale. So if they were to decide to live off 
the sale of their catch, they would have to change their fishing 
technique. 
This is indeed the point: people who use spear fishing as their 
main technique do so not because they are ignorant of other methods of 
fishing, but because this method is the most suitable for their 
economy of subsistence. A few medium-sized fishes would be sufficient 
provision for a family for one day. Since fish is most certainly a 
perishable that does not last beyond a few hours particularly in the 
tropics, any other method of fishing that would obtain a greater 
quantity of fish would be counter-productive for an economy based on 
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day-to-day subsistence. 
In my field observations, I have noticed that only net fishers 
practise fish preservation, usually by various means of salting. This 
is further illustration of the spear fishers' orientation towards a 
material economy of day-to-day subsistence, for they do not appear to 
be interested in preserving excess fish for future consumption. 
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Consequently, it is not unusual for them to go to a Chinese grocer at 
times to trade excess fresh fish for salted fish. 
Despite the boat-dwellers' commitment to the sea, even they need 
certain land resources, especially fresh water and wood. When they 
need to repair or build their boats, they come ashore for a short 
period, building themselves a pondok 'small hut' for shelter. When 
their boats are ready, they abandon these huts and return to the sea. 
These short periods of dwelling on land provide an opportunity to 
compare the advantages and disadvantages of land and sea. If it is 
felt, in certain circumstances, that living on land is more 
advantageous, the boat-dwellers may come more and more to 'live in 
houses' (diam rumah) than to 'live on boats' (diam sampan). Those who 
eventually give up boat-dwelling altogether are said to have 'come 
ashore' (mendarat). 
But what is it that motivates boat-dwellers to become land-
dwellers? A Penyengat informant said that in his opinion, it is the 
Chinese tauke 'merchant' who induces the boat-dwellers to come to 
land. He implied that it is the trading relationship between the 
Chinese merchant and the boat-dwellers that motivates them to become 
land-dwellers. After all, if fresh fish can be exchanged for salted 
fish, it can also be exchanged for almost anything else. In other 
words, fish and other marine products can become a medium of exchange. 
If the goods for which they are exchanged become valued above the 
marine products as such, and if these goods are obtainable only 
through trade, then at that point, it would seem more advantageous to 
participate in an exchange economy rather than to subsist on fish 
alone. In such a situation, the sea is no longer regarded as an all-
encompassing environment. Instead, it becomes merely a resource for 
obtaining marine products to be exchanged for non-marine goods. 
Direct consumption is thus replaced by mediated exchange. 
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The move from sea to land is a shift from nomadism to sedentism. 
Living on relatively small boats, the nomadic boat-dwellers tend to 
wander around sheltered coasts and straits. These include Bulang 
Strait, Tiung Strait, Kijang Strait, Penyabung Strait, and the many 
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other smaller straits between nearby islands. So if and when they 
should come to land, either temporarily or permanently, they are 
likely to do so in those particular areas. They are not likely to 
settle on an island in the middle of the high seas, such as Pangkil, 
for example. 
Indeed, in my fieldwork area, the places where nomadic boat-
dwellers can be found are all located in Galang -- in Tiung Strait, 
Penyabung Strait, and the many straits in the cluster of small islands 
to the east of Galang Baru/Galang Kandap. As mentioned above, my 
informants on Nanga and Teluk Nipah are former boat-dwellers who have 
come ashore recently, in the last generation or two. This shift is 
still recent enough to be remembered. So they are still identified as 
orang laut, both by themselves and by others. Moreover, they still 
have ongoing kin ties with the boat-dwelling orang laut who have not 
shifted to land, and who visit them from time to time. The Nanga and 
Teluk Nipah people are known as orang laut yang diam rumah 'sea people 
who live in houses', in contradistinction to their boat-dwelling kin 
who are known as orang laut yang diam sampan 'sea people who live on 
boats', or more succinctly, orang sampan 'boat people'. 
Both communities of orang laut use spear fishing as their main 
fishing technique. So both still operate in what is basically a day-
to-day subsistence economy. However, as I have pointed out above, 
even spear fishers do occasionally sell their catch for cash. So to 
say that the spear fishers tend towards material self-sufficiency does 
not mean that they have no access to trade goods whatsoever. 
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Indeed they do obtain trade goods, but only on a casual basis. 
For example, they may wish to acquire, say, a radio; for this, they 
need cash which may be raised in a number of ways -- through selling 
marine products such as fish, crab, dugong, sea-slug, seaweed, and so 
on, or through hiring themselves out as temporary labour for cutting 
wood or for any other job. When sufficient cash has been accumulated, 
the radio would be bought, and that would be the end of the cash-
earning activity. They would then revert to their self-subsistence, 
until such time when another trade good is desired. In terms of their 
involvement in the cash nexus, there is a discernible difference 
between the house-dwelling spear fishers and their boat-dwelling kin. 
The former tend to place a higher value on the accumulation of trade 
goods, even if these are obtained only on a casual basis. 
In this context, it is significant that on Nanga and Teluk Nipah 
there are no fishers using other fishing techniques; there are instead 
two Chinese merchants, one on each island, who are involved in sundry 
trading activities. These merchants buy whatever saleable product may 
be offered to them by the inhabitants of the area, and sell in turn 
whatever product that may be in demand. The products that are bought 
and sold cover a very wide range indeed, including marine products, 
forest products, and consumer goods. Thus, they may buy, for example, 
sea-slug and seaweed from a particular person, and in exchange, sell a 
pair of Western-style leather shoes to him or her. For the house-
dwelling spear fishers to live in proximity to such merchants means 
that they have easy access to the cash nexus, if and when they choose 
to enter it. Indeed it would seem that this easy access to the cash 
nexus is still a major incentive for shifting from a boat-dwelling to 
a house-dwelling way of life. So as my Penyengat informant suggested, 
in island Riau, house-dwelling spear fishers are almost always 
clustered near some such sundry merchant. 
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In contrast to spear fishing, line fishing is carried out by 
dropping baited hooks on weighted lines into relatively deep water. 
Fishing rods are not used; the line is simply held in the bare hand. 
The kind of fish that is obtained by this method is the relatively 
large deep-water fish, favoured by Chinese buyers, especially 
restauranteurs. While line fishers also consume the fish they catch, 
the economy in which they operate is based not on day-to-day 
subsistence, but on trading fish for other goods. Since line fishing 
is carried out in relatively deep water, the fishers usually do not 
return to their home base after obtaining their catch, but instead 
take it straightaway to the market. Those who fish further away from 
urban centres used to sell their catch to intermediaries known as 
peraih, who would wait for them at appointed meeting-places on the sea 
at an appointed time, usually at dawn before the market in town opens. 
But this happens rarely now, partly because many of the line fishers 
now have motor-powered boats which can speed them to the markets in 
time. 
In contrast to the spear fishers, the line fishers are much more 
committed to the cash nexus. Among my informants, those who are line 
fishers live on the islands of Karas and Sembur Laut. (See Map 4.) 
So they are sedentary pulau-dwelling orang kampung. According to my 
Penyengat and Pangkil informants, these people also have orang laut 
origins. But if so, their move from a boat-dwelling nomadism to a 
house-dwelling sedentism seems to have happened long ago, long enough 
for them to have lost all kinship ties with boat-dwelling nomads. 
Indeed, my informants in Karas and Sembur Laut do not describe 
themselves as orang laut, but as orang berniaga 'people who trade', 
for whom fish constitutes only one resource among many. 
They are very active traders, whose trade route extends from 
Singapore to Jambi in Sumatra. (See Map 1.) Practically every able-
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bodied man on Karas island goes off on regular trading expeditions. 
For someone who wishes to start with no capital, one way of doing so 
would be to borrow a line and hook, go fishing, sell the fish in town, 
then with the cash that is acquired, collect some goods that would 
sell at the Barter Trading Station in Pasir Panjang, Singapore. The 
goods that are brought to Singapore may include sea-slug, seaweed, 
copra, rubber latex, and wood. The goods that are brought back home 
may include textiles, crockery, and electronic goods. Those who trade 
in Jambi are not beginners, but people who have already accumulated a 
substantial capital. For the Jambi trade, they go to Sungai Jodoh in 
Batam where there is a centre for traders who have just returned from 
Singapore to off-load their goods. Although prices there would be 
more expensive than they are in Singapore, they are still cheaper than 
in Jambi. One of my Karas informants prospered so much from the 
Sungai Jodoh-Jambi trade that he was able to go on the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. 
Perhaps because the Karas people are not dependent upon the 
conversion of a single product into cash, they are flexible in their 
attitude towards available natural resources. They are not adverse to 
going to the forest to gather wood, or to attend to their fruit trees, 
or to collect marine products. In short, they use just about any 
means available to keep their petty entrepreneurship going. 
Nevertheless they are absorbed into the exchange economy, and like the 
people of Pangkil, Bintan and Penyengat, the bulk of their daily food 
is bought. 
Unlike the house-dwelling spear fishers who have access to the 
cash nexus only by living near an individual sundry merchant, the 
line-fishing 'people who trade' participate in the cash nexus by 
travelling to urban centres. However, like the former, the latter's 
involvement in trade is still very much a matter of choice. They can 
still choose when and where they want to go, and what they wish to 
trade. Their material economy is still very mixed and therefore 
relatively unspecialised. 
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In contrast to this situation, the people in the 'headman-doms' 
of Pangkil, Bintan, and Penyengat have a much more specialised 
economy. To discuss Pangkil first, net fishing is the main source of 
income for the people, supplemented for some by the sale of coconuts. 
Of the three fishing techniques under discussion, net fishing is the 
most capital-intensive. The construction and maintenance of nets 
requires so much time and money that they have to be acquired ready-
made. The prices of the nets vary depending on the kind of fish they 
are designed to catch. Prawning nets, for example, are so expensive 
that they are owned by the fish dealers and contracted out to 
individual fishers. The condition of the contract is that all the 
catch has to be sold at a fixed price to the particular fish dealer 
who owns the net. The contract is enforced by the existence of an 
agreement between the dealers themselves, such that if a contracted 
net fisherman were to sell his catch to anyone other than the owner of 
his nets, he would subsequently be boycotted by all the other dealers 
in the market. So the contracted net fishermen are, in effect, the 
employees of the fish dealers, drawing their wages, like salesmen, on 
a commission basis, depending on the amount of their catch. In the 
case of nets for catching ikan tamban 'herring', however, the nets 
have to be bought outright by the fishers. Both the nets for prawns 
and herring last only for a few months - perhaps six to eight months. 
So a periodical capital outlay is necessary on the part of both fisher 
and fish dealer. 
Almost every able-bodied man on Pangkil is contracted to a fish 
dealer in Tanjungpinang, to whom he is obliged to sell his catch. 
Despite this contractual burden, the Pangkil pedple are fairly 
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prosperous, the sea being sufficiently full of fish that they are able 
to bring in a good catch most days. With the money they obtain from 
selling their fish, they buy such things as rice, vegetables, fruit, 
sugar, and salt. While it is true that they cannot themselves produce 
rice, sugar and salt, it is nevertheless possible for them to grow 
vegetables and fruit. Since Pangkil is less densely populated than 
Penyengat, and has its population concentrated only at Tanjung Budus 
and Tajur Kait, there is a lot of land available for plant 
cultivation. 
But strangely enough, apart from some coconut groves, nobody 
makes any effort at growing vegetables or fruit. The only people who 
do so on the island seem to be a lone Chinese family who live by 
themselves on the eastern coast, somewhere between the two 
settlements; they grow brinjal/eggplant for sale in Tanjungpinang. 
The reason my informants gave me for their lack of interest in plant 
cultivation was as follows: To make a kebun 'garden' one must attend 
to it by living nearby. This would, however, result in one feeling 
sunyi 'isolated', since one would be separated from the neighbours by 
one's 'garden'. So in order to be ramai 'joyously crowded' one must 
live in proximity to one's neighbours; hence no 'garden' is possible 
for lack of space. 
Apart from this stated reason, there is another ecological one: 
When people on Pangkil wish to clear some land from the inland scrub 
to build a house, they clear the land so completely that the soil is 
left bare, uncovered by even a single blade of grass. After the rains 
fall a few times, the topsoil is washed away and all that is left is 
sand and gravel. The new house that is build thus stands in a sandy 
yard devoid of all vegetation. Pasir bersih 'sand is clean', my 
informants say. It is true that compared to dark soil, sand is whiter 
and it drains better; in that sense it is cleaner. Evidently, where 
soil is concerned, my Pangkil informants prefer cleanliness to 
fertility. 
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This hostility towards vegetation is also discernible in their 
attitude towards the forest which is said to be 'dirty' (kotor) and 
full of 'spirits' (hantu). Some secondary forest and scrub separate 
the two settlements on Pangkil -- that is, Tanjung Budus in the north 
and Tajur Kait in the south. First of all, there is little social 
interaction between the two settlements. Second, if people want to 
get from the one place to the other, they prefer to use their boats, 
rather than walk through the forest and scrub, even though that is 
only a half-hour's journey. 
The only crop that the Pangkil people grow with any serious 
intent is coconut, which, as it happens, thrives even on sandy soil. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the coconuts are sold. So although the 
owner of the coconut trees may keep a certain portion of the fruit for 
her or his own use, the rest constitutes a sales item to be converted 
into cash. The focus is on cash and not subsistence. 
As the Pangkil example clearly illustrates, although the 
inhabitants of the pulaus are sedentary land-dwellers, their 
orientation is towards the sea and not the land. However, they lack 
the full commitment to the sea that the nomadic boat-dwellers 
manifest. Instead, these pulau dwellers seem to have an ambivalent 
attitude towards the sea: the sea is the source of their livelihood 
yet is not their living habitat. This ambivalence may perhaps be 
discerned in the location of their kampungs 'villages', which are 
usually sited along the strand. As Sopher (1977:2-46) has pointed 
out, the strand alone does not provide a sufficient ecological niche 
for human use, being only an intermediate zone between the sea without 
and the forest within; it is hence limited in its flora and fauna by 
these environmental pressures. Yet that is the zone the pulau 
dwellers choose for siting their kampungs. This is true of all the 
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pulaus where I did research. The Pangkil people's habit of 
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stripping the vegetation around those houses which are built further 
inland may thus be interpreted as an effort to reduplicate the 
environment of the strand. 
The ecological insufficiency of the strand tends to dispose the 
pulau dwellers favourably towards the cash economy. Being 
sedentarists, they are not in the flexible position of the boat-
dwelling nomads, who can move from area to area, depending on the 
plentitude of the resources. The pulau-dwelling fishers are more 
constrained in the distances they can travel to fish, due to the 
necessity of returning to a fixed home-base everyday. So unlike the 
nomads who follow the marine resources, the sedentary fishers have to 
wait for the marine resources to come to them. Thus my pulau-dwelling 
informants speak of a prawning season, an ikan tamban season, and so 
on, depending on the species which comes within their area of the sea. 
So in a good season, the sedentary fishers have to catch as much as 
possible, then quickly convert the surplus into some other foodstuff 
which can be stored. A most suitable foodstuff for that purpose is 
rice. 
The eating of rice as a staple by the pulau-dwellers further 
expresses their ambivalence towards the sea. Rice is, after all, not 
a marine product. Furthermore, it is not grown at all in the Riau and 
Lingga archipelagoes. In recent years, a rice-planting experiment has 
been conducted by the Indonesian government in one of the Tujuh 
islands Natuna. But that seems to be the only incident of rice-
growing in the island world of Riau, Lingga, and Tujuh. There is 
indeed rice grown on Sumatra, even in the mainland area of Riau 
Province, such as Indragiri and Kampar. But the province as a whole 
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is not self-sufficient in rice; it has been estimated that it needs to 
import 60,000-100,000 tons per year. (See Hendra Esmara 1975:31.) 
Certainly for the inhabitants of the island territory, rice is 
necessarily a trade item. Anyone who eats rice as a daily food must 
therefore be involved in the exchange economy in one way or another. 
The pulau-dwelling fishers are indeed regular rice-eaters, whereas the 
spear-fishing orang laut subsist on the marine products that they 
obtain themselves, eating rice only as an occasional exotic food. 
The three fishing techniques -- spear, line, and net -- thus 
exist in three different economic configurations. At one level of 
comparison, there are important differences between spear and line 
fishing on the one hand, and net fishing on the other. Both the spear 
and the line fishers own their means of production, whereas the net 
fishers do so only partially. Although the spear fishers buy the 
metal spear-head and prong they use for their trident and harpoon, as 
well as the nylon line they use for the latter, they make the wooden 
or bamboo shaft themselves, including also the float for the harpoon. 
Their equipment is thus a mixture of self-sufficiency and other-
dependence, with a potential for complete self-sufficiency, since the 
most rudimentary fish-spear would simply be a sharpened wooden shaft. 
Although the equipment of the line fishers -- that is, nylon line and 
metal hook -- has to be entirely bought, this is relatively cheap, and 
once a stock of lines and hooks has been acquired, the line fishers 
are self-sufficient. In contrast, the net fishers are not even able 
to own their means of production completely, and are dependent on the 
fish dealers to whom they are contracted. 
At another level of comparison, however, there are similarities 
between line fishing and net fishing, for both line fishers and net 
fishers are pulau dwellers who are well ehsconced within the exchange 
economy. Interestingly, among my informants, only the net fishers 
refer to themselves as nelayan 'fishers'; the line fishers refer to 
themselves as orang berniaga 'people who trade', whereas the spear 
94 
fishers are referred to both by themselves and by others as orang laut 
'sea people'. In this context, the phrase orang laut is used not as 
an ethnonym, but rather, as a descriptive label. 
Both the nelayan and the orang berniaga look down upon the orang 
laut as being primitive: the orang laut are said to be 'dirty' (kotor) 
because they 'eat anything that is available' (makan sebarang). 
Subsistence on natural resources is thus despised by those who are 
involved in the exchange economy. This derogatory attitude is known 
by the spear fishers, prompting one of them to say to me: 
So what is wrong with being an orang laut? Doesn't everyone 
in Riau live by the sea? Doesn't everyone depend on the 
sea? So isn't everyone an orang laut [a sea person]? 
In this informant's usage, the term orang laut is also used not as an 
ethnonym hut as a descriptive label. From the perspective of the 
nelayan and the 9rang berniaga, however, they themselves are not orang 
laut because while they are fishers, they also eat rice as their 
staple. 
There is hence an economic duality of self-subsistence versus 
other-dependence. The latter is aggravated particularly by a national 
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economy which is regulated by discretionary controls. To enter the 
cash nexus in the context of such a national economy is to be 
subjected to numerous forces beyond one's control. The nelayan and 
orang berniaga in Riau who enter the cash nexus can do so no more than 
as ordinary citizens. Therefore, they can have no control over the 
value of the rupiah, the prices of rice and kerosene, the prices of 
imported goods, or access to bank credit. Even as the sellers of 
fish, they have no control over the fish market, being dependent on 
the fish dealers for marketing the fish to the ultimate consumers, 
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both in Tanjungpinang and Singapore. In the case of the net fishers, 
they are even dependent on the dealers for their very means of 
production -- namely, the prawning nets. 
Such being the case, people who can subsist independently of the 
cash economy may be regarded as materially self-sufficient, whereas 
those who are drawn into the cash nexus may be regarded as materially 
other-dependent. The three fishing techniques discussed above 
illustrate the continuum between the two poles of this economic 
duality. The spear-fishing orang laut are almost entirely self-
subsistent, while the net-fishing nelayan are almost entirely other-
dependent. The line-fishing orang berniaga are in-between. On the 
one hand, like the spear fishers, they use a labour-intensive 
technique. On the other hand, like the net fishers, they are involved 
in the exchange economy. Since the number of fishes that one can 
catch with a line is rather limited, this constrains the profit that 
can be derived from line fishing. And indeed, the line fishing 
communities usually do not trade in fish alone, but are also involved 
in the trade of other products they can collect, such as sea-slug, 
shellfish, and seaweed. 
The division of labour differs in these three fishing techniques. 
In spear fishing, both men and women participate in the activity of 
getting their daily food. For example, a married couple may set off 
with one partner rowing and the other spearing. Or if a whole family 
is dwelling on the boat, then spear fishing would be a family 
activity. In contrast, line fishing is done mostly by the men, 
although occasionally women may accompany them, especially if the 
catch is for home consumption. The collection of sea-slug, shellfish, 
and seaweed is done usually by the women in the line-fishing 
communities. So there is a sexual division of labour in the 
collection of natural products for trade, which contrasts with spear 
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fishing on the one hand, and net fishing on the other. Whereas spear 
fishing is carried out as a family activity in which male and female 
may both participate, net fishing is an exclusively male activity. 
Thus it is only of the net fishers that we may speak generally of 
fisher~. In the net-fishing communities, the women do not go to sea 
with the men; nor do they collect natural products for trade. Widows 
are the only women supposed to earn money for their own living for 
example, by selling cooked food, mending nets, or weaving thatch. 
The economic duality of self-subsistence versus other-dependence 
is thus expressed also through gender: in the former mode, there is 
economic commonality for both sexes, whereas in the latter mode, there 
is economic differentiation based on gender. The other-dependence of 
the net-fishing community as a whole is symbolised by the other-
dependence of the women who are domesticated right out of economic 
production, becoming totally dependent on the men. The other-
dependence of the men, however, is disguised by their social role as 
sole economic provider. (See Plate 1.) 
An interesting contrast to these fishing communities is Bintan, 
where people who live by a river, not too far from the sea, do no 
fishing whatsoever. The Bintan people describe themselves as orang 
darat 'land people' or petani 'cultivators'. Used in this context, 
these are also descriptive labels, rather than ethnonyms. My Bintan 
informants evidently take this description so seriously that they 
would only buy fish but do no fishing themselves. Even though the 
fish is very often stale by the time they buy it, they nevertheless 
persist in their abstinence from fishing. Their main source of income 
is rubber-tapping. Although the rubber trees are owned by only a few 
of the wealthier individuals in the community, everyone does tapping. 
They also grow some coffee bushes, some cassava, and a few desultory 
fruit trees, such as papaya, jackfruit, and mangoes. But no 
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Plate 1. Bolong and Jeri of Nanga form a regular working partnership, 
usually with Bolong spearing the fishes and Jeri rowing the sampan 
'small canoe'. The village of Sembur Laut is seen in the background of 
the picture, 
Plate 2. Most of my informants live in stilted houses perched at the 
edge of the strand. The village of Sebauk depicted above is typical of 
Riau. The coconut trees constitute a buffer zone between the village 
on the strand and the inland forest . A stand of densely growing coconut 
trees is thus an indication of human habitation , 
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vegetables are cultivated. Like the Pangkil net fishers, the Bintan 
rubber-tappers use the money they earn to buy food, instead of trying 
to obtain their food directly from available natural resources. 
Sometimes they will cook the unripe fruit from their trees as a kind 
of vegetable; but that is only an occasional thing. 
They grow no rice, even though they, like the line fishers and 
the net fishers, also eat it as a staple. In order to obtain the cash 
with which to buy rice, they tap and sell rubber latex. Therefore, 
the cultivators of Bintan are as other-dependent on the town as are 
the net fishers of Pangkil, despite the possibility of self-
sufficiency through the cultivation of more food crops. 
Interestingly, my Bintan informants told me that shortly before my own 
arrival, there had been a man from Indragiri (on the east coast of 
Sumatra) who had come to Bintan with the idea of cultivating rice by 
45 
using the marshy swamps of the Bintan river. But my informants were 
unenthusiatic about the idea, considering it newfangled and 
untrustworthy. So it was never taken up. 
There is, quite discernibly, a symbiotic relationship between the 
rural hinterland of Pangkil and Bintan on the one hand, and the urban 
centre of Tanjungpinang on the other. In their single-minded devotion 
to a cash income, the people of Pangkil and Bintan may perhaps be 
regarded as peasants who supply raw materials to the urban centre, and 
who obtain in turn their daily necessities from there. But if Pangkil 
and Bintan are symbiotically related to Tanjungpinang, Penyengat may 
be considered as one of its suburbs. 
The proximity of Penyengat island to Tanjungpinang allows a 
substantial proportion of the island's population to work as pegawai 
'salaried employees' in town -- mostly, as minor civil servants and as 
employees of private companies. Only a small sector of the population 
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derive their income from net fishing. In addition, a supplementary 
source of income for those with boats is to provide a ferry service 
between Penyengat and Tanjungpinang. This regular ferry service means 
that the people of Penyengat can get to Tanjungpinang very easily, not 
only for work, but also for shopping, schooling, and entertainment. 
In short, the Penyengat population are effectively urbanised and 
almost fully integrated into the material economy of Tanjungpinang. 
The island produces almost nothing for itself. The small amount of 
fish that is caught by the few net fishers on the island is brought 
directly to Tanjungpinang and sold there. The few coconut trees on 
the island are owned by a few individuals who sell the fruit not to 
the other islanders, but at the Tanjungpinang market. So of the four 
communities that we are discussing, the Penyengat community is the 
most other-dependent. 
In the four 'headman-dams' under discussion, we can thus find a 
range of economic activities. Given the implications of these 
activities, as discussed above, it is clear that the different 
communities are involved in the cash nexus in varying degrees. Such 
being the case, we can perhaps locate the four 'headman-dams' in terms 
of their material economy thus: 
Penyengat 
towards greater 
other-dependence 
Bintan 
Pangkil K a r a s 
towards greater 
self-sufficiency 
Figure 2 Self-Sufficiency and Other-Dependence 
The respective location of the different communities on this continuum 
is in accordance with their relative involvement in the cash nexus. 
. _4--~·:._ 
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As the discussion above suggests, important roles are played by 
individual merchants who service the rural population, as well as 
those who are in the trading and employment sector of urban centres 
such as Tanjungpinang, Jambi, and Sungai Jodoh in Batam. It is 
through entering into a relationship with one or several of these 
people that one may enter the cash nexus. Such a relationship may be 
based on exchange, contract, or employment. The existence of these 
merchants and employers is thus an important fact in the everyday 
lives of my informants. 
Apart from these, there is another category of people whose 
existence is also an important everyday fact. These are the people 
referred to as pegawai pemerintah 'government employees', whose duties 
impinge upon the movement of the material economy, particularly if 
they are employed in the police force, the army, the navy, or Customs 
and Excise. The last-mentioned is perhaps the most relevant of all. 
Every fishing boat that goes to Tanjungpinang, even on a daily 
basis, must get official clearance to enter and leave the port. Every 
trading vessel that enters and leaves Indonesia must similarly get 
official clearance to do so. Since to obtain such official clearance, 
one usually has to pay heavy fees for the licenses and heavy duties on 
the goods imported, many people try to evade this bureaucratic 
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hurdle. Smuggling thus occurs as a consequence of tax evasion, the 
taxes being disproportionately onerous. For my informants, the centre 
from which government control emanates is Tanjungpinang. So both 
commercially and administratively, the importance of Tanjungpinang in 
their everyday lives is not to be under-estimated indeed. 
As the discussion above indicates, the various communities we are 
discussing differ significantly from each other in material terms. 
Not only that, they have almost nothing to do with one another in the 
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context of their material economy. They all trade with Tanjungpinang 
but not with each other. The people of Pangkil and Bintan do not 
trade fish for rubber. Nobody goes to Karas island to buy the goods 
of the traders there. It is the Karas traders themselves who bring 
their goods into Tanjungpinang, Jambi, and elsewhere to sell. The 
bosses of the salaried employees of Penyengat are in Tanjungpinang. 
Even the spearfishing orang laut come to Tanjungpinang occasionally 
for example, when they want to sell a dugong that they have caught, or 
when they want to buy some article not available from the sundry 
merchant near them. 
If we were to consider these communities solely in terms of their 
material economy, we would perhaps picture them thus: 
Bintan 
Pangkil 
Karas island 
Nanga & Teluk Nipah 
Figure 3 The Material Nexus 
In such a picture, Tanjungpinang is the urban centre to which the 
various places in the periphery are related, each separately and in 
varying degrees of closeness. This picture would seem to be an 
appropriate one in the context of transport logistics. For example, I 
myself, as someone without a boat, found it easier to go from one 
island to another, by hitching rides to and from Tanjungpinang, rather 
than try to catch a ride with someone going from, say, Pangkil to 
Karas island. The former route -- that is, to and from Tanjungpinang 
-- is an everyday occurrence. Fishing boats travel to Tanjungpinang 
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daily; but people on one island visit those on another island only on 
special occasions, such as weddings and funerals. 
This gives us a clue to the nature of relations between the 
various island communities: these are not material but symbolic 
relations, having to do less with fishing and more with weddings and 
funerals. Indeed, it is only in terms of a symbolic economy that we 
may talk of these communities as being inter-connected. In doing so, 
I follow the usages of my informants in these communities. In their 
perceptions of Self and Other, they were concerned with relating 
themselves not to the merchants and bureaucrats living in 
Tanjungpinang, but rather, to each other in the different island 
communities. This relationship is couched in terms of being Melayu, 
such that one can be 'pure' or 'impure', 'indigenous' or 'foreign' in 
one's Melayu-ness. Thus in the everyday discourse of the people 
living in these island communities, we discover a symbolic economy 
that is markedly different from their material economy. It is this 
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symbolic economy that is the main topic of the present study. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
1. The very name 'Indonesia' is indicative of Dutch colonisation. 
To quote Anderson (1983:110) on the matter: 
••• As its hybrid psuedo-Hellenic name suggests, its 
stretch does not remotely correspond to any precolonial 
domain; on the contrary, at least until President 
Suharto's brutal invasion of ex-Portuguese East Timor in 
1975, its boundaries have been those left behind by the 
last Dutch conquests (c.1910). 
Moreover, the present capital of Indonesia, Jakarta, is on the 
same site as the previous administrative centre of the Dutch 
empire, Batavia. An earlier name of the place was Sunda Kalapa; 
at that time it belonged to the inland Javanese state of 
Pajajaran. In 1527 it was conquered by Demak, a coastal Javanese 
state, and renamed 'Jayakerta or Surakarta (synonymous Javanese 
names of Sanskrit origin meaning 'Victorious and Prosperous')' 
(Ricklefs 1981:34). In 1619 the Dutch VOC conquered Jayakerta, 
and on 12 March 1619, it was renamed 'Batavia' after an ancient 
Germanic tribe in the Netherlands. (See ibid.:28.) The place 
was renamed 'Jakarta' by the Japanese conquerors in the Second 
World War, as part of their propaganda campaign aimed at 
destroying European influences and persuading the Southeast Asian 
indigenes that they and the Japanese were brothers-in-arms. (See 
ibid.:189.) So even the name 'Jakarta' derives from military 
conquest. 
2. The declaration of independence has been translated thus: 
Proclamation: 
We the people of Indonesia hereby declare the 
independence of Indonesia. Matters concerning the 
transfer of power, etc., will be carried out in a 
conscientious manner and as speedily as possible. 
Jakarta, 17 August 1945 
In the name of the people of Indonesia, 
[signed] 
(Quoted from Ricklefs 1981:198). 
Sukarno Hatta 
The key phrase in this declaration is 'the transfer of power'. 
What was being sought was not a change in the spatial 
configuration as such, but merely a transformation of the force 
relations that held the spatial configuration together. In other 
words, some of the colonised sought to take the place of the 
coloniser, but they did not seek to change the shape of the 
colonised territory. 
3. Gaung, Kateman and some other eastern parts of Sumatra belonged 
to the Riau-Lingga sultanate. (Se~ Map 1 and Appendix 12.) 
4. Kato (1984:10) describes the history of Pekanbaru thus: 
It initially developed as a riverside market town in the 
late eighteenth century. During the Dutch period it grew 
to be an important port town which accommodated 
steamships relatively deep in the interior of inland 
Riau. However, Pekanbaru was still a small town of 2,990 
souls in 1930. Its fortunes dramatically turned upward 
when large reserves of oil were found by Caltex near it 
in 1939; the exploration of these reserves began soon 
after the Second World War. In 1960, the capital city of 
the still young Province of Riau was moved from Tanjung 
Pinang in island Riau to Pekanbaru. 
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5. See Mochtar Nairn (1974) on merantau. He explains it (ibid.:18-
19) as implying the following six elements: 
(1) to leave one's home village (for rantau) 
(2) voluntarily 
(3) for a short or long time period 
(4) with the aim of earning a living, seeking further 
knowledge or experience 
(5) normally with the intention of returning home •••• 
(6) Merantau is a culturally patterned social 
institution. 
6. Transmigration actually began under the Dutch colonial goverment, 
when in the early years of the twentieth century, it instituted 
what was described as a 'colonisation' policy, with the aim of 
establishing 'colonies' of Javanese settlers in the other 
islands. Apparently, what had spurred this action was the 1905 
Dutch census which showed that whereas there was a population of 
some thirty million in Java and Madura, there was only a total of 
some seven and a half million in all the other islands combined. 
(See Hardjono 1977:16.) 
The arrival of the Japanese in ••. 1942 put an end to all 
colonisation projects •••• In the years immediately 
following the end of the Second World War, while 
Indonesia was still involved in the war of independence 
against the Dutch, thoughts were already being given to 
plans for the resettlement of people from Java and Bali 
in other parts of the country. 
(Ibid.:21-22). 
Since then, the transmigration policy has been carried out 
extensively. According to Hardjono (ibid.:63), there are three 
transmigration projects in Riau Province, all located in the 
Sumatran part of the province, with two in the Indragiri area. 
(Also see Meyer and MacAndrews 1978:97-99 on these particular 
projects.) 
7. From my field research, I would agree that the migration from 
Sulawesi is largely seasonal. Travelling in sailing ships, the 
all-male crews sail west from Sulawesi during the northeast 
monsoon, stopping and trading at various places along the way, 
including Kampung Bugis opposite Tanjungpinang. (See Map 4.) 
They may continue on to Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. In 
Singapore, they usually dock at the Barter Trading Station in 
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Pasir Panjang. They may then stay on for a few months, working 
as contract labourers -- for example, on construction sites --
until the winds change to a southwesterly direction and they can 
sail home eastwards. Those who stay on permanently in the 
western part of the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago tend to be men 
who marry local women. 
8. Some of these Chinese are warganegara Indonesia 'Indonesian 
citizens'; others are warganegara asing foreign citizens'. (See 
Suryadinata 1978:113-127) on the complications of citizenship for 
the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. The 1980 census gives us an 
indication of the number of ethnic Chinese in Riau Province who 
are 'foreign citizens': under the sub-category 'Taiwan, China or 
stateless', the figure of 11,858 is given. Of these 4,867 reside 
in the District of the Riau Archipelago. In the classification 
of the population by religion, however, there are 97,098 
Buddhists, of whom 39,729 reside in the District of the Riau 
Archipelago. (See Penduduk Indonesia 1980.) Most of these 
Buddhists are likely to be ethnic Chinese. Therefore, 
indications are that the majority of the Chinese in Riau Province 
are Indonesian citizens. Since the Indonesian census does not 
classsify the population by ethnicity, it does not indicate the 
number of Chinese who are Indonesian citizens. 
9. Suryadinata (1978:135) confirms that in May 1959, a regulation 
was issued 'banning alien retail trade in rural areas and 
requiring the aliens to transfer their businesses to Indonesian 
citizens by September 30 1959. • •• In the Outer Islands, some 
military commanders declared rural areas closed to aliens (read: 
alien Chinese) before the September deadline.' This situation 
was aggravated after the failed coup in 1965: 
••• the overseas Chinese were held responsible for the 
alleged role of the PRC in the abortive Coup •••• 
Regional authorities took independent action against 
them. For instance, the military authorities in early 
1967 prohibited alien Chinese from trading in East Java 
and parts of Sumatra. 
(Ibid.:138). 
10. While 'unity in diversity' may be a laudable ideal, the two terms 
'unity' and 'diversity' do not seem to be equivalent in status. 
Ethnic diversity is regarded as historically given and hence 
inherent in the Indonesian situation. Political unity, however, 
had to be fought for through revolution and therefore needs to be 
maintained through conscious effort. The implication is that the 
diversity will be there, whether or not there is unity; but the 
reverse may not be true. So to have 'unity in diversity', 
emphasis has to be placed on unification, rather than on 
diversification. 
11. This creed prescribes belief in: 
1. Ke-Tuhan-an Yang Maha Esa 
2. Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab 
3. Persatuan Indonesia 
4. Kerakyataan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan 
dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan 
5. Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia. 
(Quoted from Dardji Darmodihardjo et al 1978:17). 
(1. A Supreme Godhead 
2. A humanism that is legal and proper 
3. The one-ness of Indonesia 
4. A citizenry that is led by wise guidance through 
consultation/representation 
S. Social justice for all the Indonesian People.) 
(My translation). 
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Adherence to these 'Principles' is supposed to generate the 
desired political unity among the ethnically diverse citizenry. 
These 'Principles' seem to be so broadly worded that they can be 
interpreted with sufficient flexibility to accomodate the range 
of ethnic diversity. Indeed they may be more significant in 
terms of their negative implications, rather than their positive 
prescriptions. Of these, the most important seem to be the 
following. Adherence to 'A Supreme Godhead' implies that atheism 
is un-Indonesian. 'Atheism' is, in this context, a code word for 
communism; indeed adherence to a recognised religion is 
considered official proof that one is not communist. Adherence 
to 'the one-ness of Indonesia' implies that secessionism is un-
Indonesian. Adherence to 'a citizenry that is led by wise 
guidance through consultation/ representation' implies that 
political dissension is un-Indonesian. 
12. As Siddique and Suryadinata (1982:677) have pointed out, the only 
public definition of pribumi is the following: 
[In 1974] President Suharto issued an instruction 
requiring foreign companies to initiate joint ventures 
with indigenous Indonesians, not just with Indonesian 
nationals~··· No public definition of 'indigenous 
Indonesians' was given, although it was believed that 
some kind of guideline existed. On 24 March 1976, 
however, the leading Jakarta newspaper Kompas published 
Bank Indonesia's 'secret circular' -- 'a practical guide 
to the definition of pribumi'. According to this 
circular, pribumis are people who are not foreign 
citizens, who do not belong to the categories of 
'European' or 'Foreign Orientals' (i.e. Arabs, Indians, 
Pakistanis, etc.), and who are not Indonesian citizens of 
Chinese descent. The circular further stated that 
tribumis are members of indigenous Indonesian society 
1masyarakat Indonesia asli) who include, among others, 
the following ethnic groups ('suku-suku'): Aceh, Ambon, 
Batak, Irian, Jawa, Dayak, Madura, Minangkabau, Minahasa, 
and Sunda. 
13. See, for example, Andaya and Andaya (1982:37-113) on the 
historical relationships between the sultanates listed above. 
14. As noted by Brown (1970:x), the word sejarah means 'genealogical 
tree'; Wilkinson (1959:1036) also explains the word as 'family-
tree; genealogy'. Indeed, in speaking of Seiarah Melayu as the 
title of the Penurunan, Wilkinson (ibid.) describes the text as 
'a book of the nature of an anecdotal family history'. 
15. For a full analysis of these written genealogies, see Wee and 
Matheson (forthcoming). 
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16. This bowl of water was and is an important crossroad for sea-
borne trade -- for example, between the Indian sub-continent, the 
Chinese mainland, and the Southeast Asian islands in the south 
such as Java, Bali, and Sulawesi. I suggest that the spatial 
configuration known as alam Melayu was historically unified by 
this sea-borne trade, from the past to the present. I further 
suggest that my informant's perception of such a spatial 
configuration is shared by others within and without that 
configuration. In other words, the existence of such a spatial 
configuration would seem not to be phenomenologically unique to 
my informants, but rather, an historically established 
objectification accessible even to outsiders. (See Appendix 2.) 
17. Geertz (1963:40) describes the pasisir economy thus: 
That is to say, within a single narrow area many 
different environmental possibilities are exploited, from 
fishing and coconut-grove tending near the shore to wet-
rice paddies, permanent gardens, and swidden farming in 
the near interior. 
18. Geertz (1963:40) describes pasisir politics thus: 
In these kingdoms ••• the level of status was tied to 
actual political power, so that the kings needed 
constantly to prove their charisma and wealth in order to 
maintain the personal loyalty of their followers, and 
there was ••• sharp competition for positions of prestige 
at all levels. 
19. There is textual evidence that a political network of kin-related 
allies did indeed exist. For example, after the fall of Melaka 
to the Portuguese, the defeated ruler, Sultan Mahmud I, and his 
entourage escaped to Pahang, which was then ruled by a collateral 
line of the same descent. (See, for example, Brown 
1970:89,90,136,145,164 and 183.) There are numerous other such 
instances of kin-related allies. 
20. The territory of the Lingga archipelago is approximately 
equivalent to the area covered by the Indonesian 'sub-districts' 
of Lingga with its administrative centre, Singkep with its 
administrative centre at Dabo, and Senayang with its 
administrative centre at Senayang. (See Riau Dalam Angka 
1975:32.) 
21. The territory of the Tujuh islands is approximately equivalent to 
the area covered by the Indonesian 'sub-districts' of Bunguran 
Timur with its administrative centre at Ranai, Bunguran Barat 
with its administrative centre at Sedanau, Siantan with its 
administrative centre at Terempa, Jemaja with its administrative 
centre at Letung, Serasan with its administrative centre at 
Serasan, Tambelan with its administrative centre at Tambelan, and 
Midai with its administrative centre at Midai. 
This means that the territory of the Riau archipelago includes 
only the area covered by the Indonesian 'sub-districts' of Batam 
with its administrative centre at Belakang Padang, Bintan Selatan 
with its administrative centre at Tanjungpinang, Bintan Timur 
with its adminstrative centre at Kijang, Bintan Utara with its 
administrative centre at Tanjunguban, Kundur with its 
administrative centre at Tanjungbatu, Moro with its 
administrative centre at Moro Sulit, and Karimun with its 
administrative centre at Tanjungbalai. (See Riau Dalam Angka 
1975:32.) 
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22. In the Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor (written perhaps during 
the 1750s), it is said: 
The Laksamana was told by Sultan Abdul Jalil to go to the 
island of Bintan and build a settlement on the Carang 
River, which was called Riau. 
(My translation of the Kratz recension 1973:43). 
This seems to be the very first textual mention of the name 
'Riau'. The same information is repeated in the Hikayat Negeri 
Johor (written perhaps in the early 1800s). (See Ismail 
Hussein 1979:191). The Tuhfat (completed in perhaps 1866) also 
repeats the information but goes on to date the event: 
The Laksamana was commanded to establish a settlement on 
Riau, on the Carang River, and to make ready a fleet to 
attack the Portuguese should they come •••• When Sultan 
Abd al-Jalil died, Raja Ibrahim ••• became king •••• Sultan 
Abd al-Jalil died in the year of the hijra of the Prophet 
one thousand and eighty-eight, the Muslim year Dal-akhir 
1088 [that is, 1677/8]. Then Sultan Ibrahim moved to 
Riau. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:19). 
23. As Tengku Ahmad (1972:3) wrote: 
NAMA RIAU. Dari mana asal nama Riau? Apakah makna yang 
tepat dari kata "riau" itu? Kitab-kitab sumber sejarah 
tidak memberikan jawaban yang memuaskan tentang hal ini, 
karena itulah para cerdik-pandai dibidang ilmu sejarah 
dan orang-orang yang berminat besar pada sejarah Riau 
terus berusaha menelusurinya. 
Tapi pendapat yang paling mengendap (dominant) ialah yang 
mengatakan bahwa nama itu berasal dari kata "riuh11 : konon 
disebabkan ramainya negeri yang berpusat pada tempat yang 
kini dikenal dengan nama Hulu Riau, sangat kentara sekali 
perbedaanya jika dibandingkan dengan daerah-daerah 
disebelah luar. 
(THE NAME RIAU. What is the origin of the name 'Riau'? 
What is the precise meaning of the word '~'? The 
historical sources do not give a satisfactory answer to 
this question. Because of this, historians and others 
interested in Riau history have continued their efforts 
at unravelling this problem. 
But the most dominant opinion is that the name originated 
from the word 'riuh'. It is said that this was caused by 
the hustle and bustle that was going on at the political 
centre situated at the place now known as Hulu Riau. 
This noise and clamour made the place obviously different 
from the other areas in its periphery.) 
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24. Sultan Ibrahim who came to the throne in 1677/8 was apparently 
the very first sultan to have had his court located on the banks 
of the Riau River. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:19.) He reigned 
there until 1683 when he moved his capital back to the banks of 
the Johor River on the Malay Peninsula. (See Andaya 1975:135.) 
However, Governor Slicher's report of 1687 indicates that even 
after that, traders still frequented 'Riau' as a trade centre. 
Sultan Ibrahim's son, Sultan Mahmud Syah II, reigned in Johor 
until 1699 when he was assassinated. This assassination is of 
great historical significance because it ended the Melaka-derived 
dynasty that had begun with Seri Teri Buana. The various 
indigenous histories that deal with this period all discuss this 
event at length, mostly trying to justify the assassination in 
one way or another. (See Andaya 1975:186-191.) 
25. The successor to the assassinated Sultan Mahmud Syah II was his 
bendahara 'prime minister', who became Sultan Abd al-Jalil. It 
was in his reign that 'Riau' again assumed prominence, for in 
1708/9 he moved his capital there. Captain Alexander Hamilton 
writing in 1727 described this move in the following way: 
In 1708 the King's brother persuaded him to leave Johore 
Lami, and reside at Rhio on the island of Bintang, about 
three leagues off the River of Johore, because he thought 
he could act his Tyranny with more Security than on the 
main Continent, and so at Rhio he engrossed all Trade in 
his own Hands, buying and selling at his own Prices, and 
punishing those who dared to speak against his arbitrary 
Dealings. At last, in 1712 a Rebellion broke, that 
nothing could stop but a Revolution, which dissolved the 
State into Anarchy. 
(Quoted from Winstedt 1979:52). 
(Also see Raja Ali Haji 1982:43.) In 1716, however, the capital 
was once again moved back to the banks of the Johor River. (See 
Andaya 1975:241.) 
26. In 1718, the Johor capital was conquered by Raja Kecik, a 
Minangkabau pretender who claimed to be the posthumous son of the 
assassinated Sultan Mahmud Syah II. (See Andaya 1975:250-273.) 
However, after driving Sultan Abd al-Jalil away from Johor, Raja 
Kecik himself returned to Siak where he had already established 
himself. But in the middle of 1719, he was chased out of Siak by 
an usurper and by December of the same year, he had apparently 
'selected Riau as his place of residence' (Andaya 1975:287). He 
stayed there until 1722 when he was driven out by the Bugis 
adventurers, led by the five Opu Daeng brothers, one of whom was 
Opu Daeng Cellak. 
27. To legitimate their conquest, the Bugis conquerors decided to 
recognise as sultan Raja Sulaiman, the son of Sultan Abd al-Jalil 
who had been defeated and who was subsequently murdered by Raja 
Kecik. They reserved for themselves the office of 'underking' 
(yang dipertuan muda or yamtuan muda). Both the sultan and the 
yamtuan muda had their capitals on the Riau river, though at 
different locations. This was the case until 1787 when to escape 
from the Dutch, the then reigning Sultan Mahmud III moved his 
capital to Lingga. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:62-186.) The move to 
Lingga will be further discussed in Chapter Four. 
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28. From 1784 to 1795, 'Riau' was under the control of the Dutch who 
stationed a garrison at Tanjungpinang. (See Appendix 5.) 
29. In 1795 because of the Napoleonic conquest of the Netherlands the 
exiled Stadhouder authorised the British to take charge of all 
the Dutch settlements in Southeast Asia. (See Matheson and 
Andaya 1982:377.) One action that the British took in their 
newly bestowed position of authority was to withdraw the Dutch 
garrison at Tanjungpinang and restore 'Riau' to Sultan Mahmud 
III. The sultan decided to stay on in Lingga. As a result of 
this power vacuum, 'Riau' became the arena of rivalry between 
Engku Muda, a descendant of Sultan Abd al-Jalil, and Raja Ali, 
the Bugis 'underking' who had abandoned 'Riau' in 1784. In 1804, 
Sultan Mahmud III intervened in favour of the Bugis faction, and 
gave 'Riau' to them, while Engku Muda and his followers ensconced 
themselves in Bulang. (See Winstedt 1979:71-73.) This episode 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
30. Turnbull (1977:29) has summarised the main conditions of the 1824 
treaty thus: 
Among its territorial stipulations, the Dutch ceded 
Malacca to Britain, withdrew objections to the British 
occupation of Singapore and undertook not to make any 
establishment in the Malay peninsula, while the British 
agreed not to interfere in the islands south of 
Singapore. 
31. This is how the territorial enlargement of Bugis-dominated 'Riau' 
is described in the Tuhfat: 
A messenger from the Governor-General came to Riau, the 
astute young man called Angelbeek. He visited the Yang 
Dipertuan Muda, and informed him that the English and 
Dutch governments had agreed to divided the lands below 
the winds between Sultan Husain and Sultan Abd al-Rahman, 
with each having his own boundaries. [Sultan Husain was 
the sultan that the English had installed in Singapore in 
1819, while Sultan Abd al-Rahman was the sultan at Lingga 
who was recognised by the Dutch.] The land of the 
Malays ••• which lay to the starboard of Indiamen bound for 
Chinese was the legal allocation of the Dutch government, 
while that on the port side was allocated to the English 
government •••• Angelbeek had also come to increase the 
Riau revenues which went to the Yang Dipertuan Muda •••• 
The islands of Karimun, Buru, and Kundur were included in 
the jurisdiction of Sultan Abd al-Rahman and the Yang 
Dipertuan Muda of Riau. However, the Yang Dipertuan of 
the Straits (that is, Sultan Husain), Temenggung Abd al-
Rahman, their dependents and their people still acted 
according to the old customs •••• The Yang Dipertuan of 
the Straits ••• still continued to exercise his authority 
in the Riau sphere, in places like Pintu, Serah, Rampai, 
Duyung, and Galah. He even ordered the tin on Karimun 
Island to be developed for export. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:244-245.) 
(Sultan Hussain of Singapore and Sultan Abd al-Rahman of Riau-
Lingga were both sons of Sultan Mahmud III, who competed with 
each other for the throne after their father's death.) 
Further on in the Tuhfat (ibid.:252), there is mention of some 
other places that were newly included in the post-1824 'Riau 
sphere' --
places close to Karimun such as Ungaran, Buru, Mundur, as 
well as areas frequented by the sea-people, like Moroh 
and the Terung Islands. 
(Ibid.:252). 
32. In a footnote to this passage, Matheson and Andaya 
(1982:404) said that they found the meaning unclear. My 
reading of it is that the Yang Dipertuan Muda found that he 
was losing revenue to the Tujuh islands through princes 
taking deliveries there. The Tujuh islands -- or better, 
island-groups -- are not easily accessible. Indeed my 
informants warned me off from making a trip to the Tujuh 
island-groups, telling me that if I went there, I would not 
be able to return until at least six months later. 
Apparently, travel to the Tujuh island-groups is feasible 
only during the transitional periods at the beginning and 
end of the monsoon seasons; otherwise, during the full blast 
of the monsoon seasons, the winds are too strong for small 
craft. This information is confirmed by the Sailing 
Directions for Soenda Strait (1949): 
The Pulau Tujuh in the open waters of the South 
China Sea are accessible only with difficulty during 
either monsoon season, because of the heavy surf on 
the rocky and reef-bound coasts, and the absence of 
fair weather in the offing during most of this time. 
Conditions in the transition period, however, are 
quite different. 
(Quoted from Sopher 1977:30.) 
Therefore, if there were princes taking deliveries to the 
Tujuh island-groups, it would have been extremely difficult 
for the yamtuan muda situated at Penyengat to keep track of 
these deliveries. 
33. In cartographic convention, Galang Senyantung is known 
simply as Galang. There is a reason for this. This island 
is where the Galang river is located. According to my 
informants, this river -- known to them as Galang Tua 'Old 
Galang' -- was the very first site to which the name 
'Galang' was attached. Since the cartographic convention 
for the Riau archipelago is derived from the Admiralty maps 
of the British and Dutch colonial administrations, it is the 
usage of the time that has been preserved in the maps. 
Nowadays, however, my informants tend to refer to the island 
in association with another river -- that is, Sungai 
Senyantung -- because that became the site of a later 
settlement. 
In cartographic convention, Galang Kandap is known as Galang 
Baru. But my informants tend to refer to it as Galang 
Kandap. The reason for their usage is not clear. 
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34. According to Coope (1976:77), 1 gantang is equivalent to 5 
~in weight. Since 1 kati is 1 1/3 lb. (see ibid.:125), 
1 gantang is equivalent to 1 1/3 lb. x 0.4536 kg. x 5 = 
3.024 kg. 
35. In modern Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia, the word 
benua is used for continent, so that in these modern 
varieties of the Malay language, the word pulau has come to 
assume the English meaning of 'island'. But, as Wilkinson 
(1959:122) has pointed out, 'to the old Malays even a large 
island like Java was a benua'. In my informants' usage, the 
word benua does not refer to 'continent'. For example, as I 
have mentioned above, the title of the mythical founder of 
the Melaka dynasty, Seri Teri Buana, is interpreted as 
meaning Raja Tiga Benua 'King of Three Lands' -- namely, 
Palembang, Bintan, and Temasik/Singapore. The three words 
are of Sanskritic origin. According to Wilkinson 
(1959:1085), seri is an honorific prefix to: 
(i) the ~s or descriptions of royal personages; 
(ii) honorary non-royal titles of the highest rank. 
Teri means 'three' (ibid.:1210); and buana means 'world; the 
earth as a whole' (ibid.:155). So Wilkinson (ibid.) 
explains the title Seri Teri Buana as meaning 'Light of the 
Three Worlds', the Three Worlds being Earth, Heaven, and 
Earth. Wilkinson (ibid.) points out that benua can also 
mean 'empire'. The three~ may thus refer to the 
kingdoms of Palembang, Bintan, and Temasik/Singapore, and 
not to the islands on which these kingdoms were located. 
This would indeed seem to be the case, since it is 
Palembang, and not Sumatra, that is named as one of the 
three benua. 
36. If Bintan was indeed considered a benua in bygone days, 
whether in the sense of a large island or a kingdom, it does 
not seem to be so termed at present. The island is instead 
referred to tanah 'land' or bahagian 'parts'. The word 
tanah is used in three ways in this context -- tanah ini 
'this land', setanah dengan sini 'land continuous from 
here', and tanah Bintan. These terms are more likely to be 
used when the speaker is herself/himself on the island. 
Tanah thus refers to the ground beneath, with the 
implication that it extends beyond the spot where the 
speaker is standing at the moment. But where the extension 
of ground ends does not seem to be the prime concern here; 
instead the focus is simply on the expanse of ground 
spreading outwards from one point. 
Wilkinson (1959: 1162) explains the word tanah in the 
following way: 
land 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
i.e. 
state, country 
surface of soil, especially with regards to 
ownership ••• ; 
surface of soil with regards to its 
character ••• ; 
soil itself and its character •••• 
Wilkinson's explanation in (iii) above is closest to my 
informants' usage of the word tanah, by which they refer to 
the surface of the soil, particularly with respect to its 
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spreading character. The phrase setanah dengan sini 'land 
continuous with here' makes this focus on expanse explicit, for 
it refers to a relationship between two localities -- here and 
beyond -- joined by the same surface of the soil. But this is 
not a symmetrical relationship, for 'here' is specific, being 
where the speaker is, and 'beyond' is vague, undefined. 
However, the one point from which the surface of the soil 
radiates may not be where the speaker is; if the phrase tanah 
Bintan is used, the single point referred to is the Bintan river. 
Therefore, the 'Bintan' of tanah Bintan is really of a quite 
different order from the 'Bintan' in the English phrase 'the 
island of Bintan'. Tanah Bintan does not mean 'the island of 
Bintan'; rather, it refers to the spread of the soil from the 
Bintan river. As would be logically expected, the phrase tanah 
Bintan may be used, even if the speaker were not on the island 
itself, since the river would constitute an objective, fixed 
point of reference. 
37. The word bahagian 'parts' is more vague than tanah. In contrast 
to tanah, bahagian is more likely to be used when the speaker is 
not on the island but elsewhere. It may also include an area 
larger than the island itself. How much territory the term 
includes depends on how far the speaker is from the island. For 
example, if she/he is on, say, Pengujan, then bahagian Bintan 
would not include Pengujan itself, but would refer primarily to 
the island of Bintan. But if she/he is on Pangkil, then bahagian 
Bintan could well include Pengujan. If she/he is even further 
away, say, on Temiang, then even Pangkil might be included. (See 
Map 4.) There are, however, limits on the maximum area that may 
be included as bahagian Bintan; these limits seem to be the Riau 
Strait on the west, Telang and Merodong Straits on the south, the 
South China Sea on the east, and the Singapore straits on the 
north. These are all relatively wide stretches of sea which have 
served as major shipping lanes since ancient times. Bahagian 
Bintan at its maximum extent thus seems to be demarcated by the 
trade routes surrounding it. 
Bahagian may be understood also as 'island-cluster', for each of 
the larger islands is surrounded by numerous small islands and 
islets. The word bahagian could thus refer to the island-cluster 
as a whole, including the smaller surrounding islands and islets. 
What separates one bahagian from another would be the wide 
stretches of sea, which serve as major shipping lanes for the 
trade vessels of the world. 
A contrast may be drawn between the terms tanah Bintan and 
bahagian Bintan. The former has a 'here' orientation, whereas 
the latter has a 'there' orientation. 
38. The island is simply too big to see the sea all around from any 
one point, not even from Gunung Bintan which has an elevation of 
347 m (1138 ft). (See Map 3.) It is also too big to 
circumscribe in a few hours. The island can be directly viewed 
as an island only from an aeroplane and that is a perspective not 
easily available to my informants. This is not to say that they 
are unaware that this piece of land is an island surrounded by 
water on all sides. They do know that it is possible to sail 
around it, even though that may take days. But then in their 
experience, all land in Riau is surrounded by the sea; all are 
islands. 
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39. There are evidently very few orang hutan in the Riau archipelago. 
There are said to be some on the relatively larger islands of 
Rempang and Batam. Kahler (1960) worked on the language of the 
orang hutan of Rempang. And ~yvind Sandbukt (personal 
communication) witnessed how a group of them were brought to 
Tanjungpinang in the late 1970s by some district government 
officials for conversion to Islam. But I have heard from my 
informants that these converted orang hutan have since abandoned 
the huts built for them by the government and have returned to a 
nomadic way of life in the forest. See note 6 in Chapter One. 
40. As Sopher (1977:233) has pointed out, spear fishers: 
have no means of taking some of the gregarious migratory 
fishes like the Engraulidae and Clupeidae, resembling the 
anchovies, sardines, herrings and shad of northern 
waters, and only take a few individuals from the schools 
of the larger fishes, like the mackerels and Spanish 
mackerels, or the flying-fish •••• The oceanic pelagic 
kinds like skipjack, tunny and bonito, as well as 
porpoises, ••• appear to be quite disregarded by the sea 
nomads. . •• Their hunting techniques require them to 
concentrate on large, slow-moving surface fish, such as 
an individual Spanish mackerel, dorab or mullet and in 
the neighbourhood of coral reefs, the parrot fish, 
constituting a brilliantly coloured and delicately 
flavoured prey, easily seen in the clear water near the 
face of the reef. In addition, sharks and rays, whose 
capture is always dangerous, are occasionally caught by 
the sea nomads, partly for food, but also for their 
commercial value. 
41. In connection with this, Sopher (1977:234) has commented: 
••• Only small amounts of food are available to them from 
day to day and ••• they have few means of preserving and 
storing an occasional large surplus. Thus, none of the 
sea nomad groups practise any of the methods of 
preserving fish by fermentation or marination which are 
common among a seaboard people of the Malaysian high 
cultures. An economic factor which is of significance 
here is the cost either of manufacturing salt, an 
essential ingredient, in terms of effort, time, and 
equipment, or of obtaining it in trade •••• Smoking and 
drying of fish over a wood fire are hardly known in the 
western part of the archipelago, but are very common 
methods in Celebes and the Moluccas. In the absence of 
this method, and without the use of considerable amounts 
of salt, preservation of fish by simple means become 
difficult in the area of the Strait of Malacca, the east 
coast of Sumatra and the Pulau Tujuh, because of 
climatological reasons which make sun-drying often 
impracticable. The same climatological reasons, namely 
the continual raininess and heavy cloud cover, also make 
the production of salt from sea water a long and 
relatively expensive operation, particularly in the 
Strait of Malacca where the discharge of fresh water and 
salt is enough to reduce salinity considerably. 
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42. Like the rest of Southeast Asia, the Riau archipelago is 
dominated by two monsoon seasons -- the north-east and the south-
west monsoon. My informants refer to these, respectively, as 
musim utara 'the northern season' and musim selatan 'the southern 
season'. The north-east monsoon blows in from the South China 
Sea, beginning from what my informants call bulan yang ber 'the 
ber months' -- that is, SeptemBER, OctoBER, NovemBER, and 
DecemBER. (The names of these months are pronounced in a similar 
way in Bahasa Indonesia.) The 'northern season' continues until 
March, followed by a short transitional period, when the winds 
die down before shifting to a southerly direction. During the 
'northern season', the nomadic boat-dwellers are likely to be 
found not in the Riau archipelago, but in the straits of the 
Lingga archipelago where they may find shelter from the northern 
winds. It is generally not until the transitional period in 
March that they would return to the straits of Riau. The 
'southern season' begins in April and continues till August, 
followed by another transitional period. During this second 
transitional period, the boat-dwellers would return to the Lingga 
archipelago. 
43. Sopher (1977:2) differentiates between four types of strand in 
insular Southeast Asia: 
It is convenient to recognise four distinct elements of 
the coastal landscape of this region, each of which may 
be characteristic of long stretches of shore line. These 
are (1) low land or swamps with shallow waters offshore 
covering more or less extensive banks of mud and sand, 
(2) well developed shelving beaches of sand, (3) steep or 
rocky faces and sea cliffs, with or without narrow 
shingle beaches, (4) coral reefs. 
The strand environment of my pulau-dwelling informants belong to 
the second type. (See Plate 2.) 
44. As Booth and Mccawley (1981:17-18) have pointed out: 
Prices are fixed by regulation for a number of important 
items such as rice, fertilizers and kerosene and the 
government attempts to inhibit the appearance of black 
markets by directly controlling supply. Licensing 
arrangements are common for a wide range of imported 
goods, and bank credit tends to be rationed according to 
the rather arbitrary imposition of credit ceilings rather 
than through interest rates •••• Discretionary controls 
of this sort have been found to be unsatisfactory in many 
countries, and the experience in Indonesia does little to 
suggest that there is more justification for using them 
there than elsewhere. In Indonesia they have often been 
rather ineffective in controlling market forces and the 
arbitrary nature of the controls which allows 
administrators room for discretion in applying the 
regulations encourages corruption. 
45. According to Kato (1984:12), Indragiri is indeed one of the major 
rice-farming areas of Riau Province: 
About forty-four percent of the so-called sawah in the 
official statistics of 1979 are located in the District 
of Indragiri Hilir. Sawah under tidal irrigation is 
cultivated in this district by the Banjarese and Buginese 
settlers. These people have been migrating respectively 
from Kalimantan and Sulawesi since the late nineteenth 
century. Rain-fed sawah (sawah berbandar langit or sawah 
tadah hujan) are found in some areas near the Bukit 
Barisan mountain range, while sawah ranah or sawah 
bencah, which makes use of flooded areas for sawah, is 
common along some parts of riverside regions. 
Kato (ibid.:51) clarifies these terms thus: 
Ranah or ronah means meadow and low-lying valley, while 
bencah or bancah means swamp. Although both involve 
transplanting of rice, they are more commonly called 
ladang ranah or ladang bencah and can be conceived of as 
an agricultural form halfway between sawah and ladang. 
These terms are not known to my informants in the Riau 
archipelago. It is significant that even in Indragiri, the 
people involved in rice-farming are not the indigenes of the 
area, but Banjarese and Buginese settlers from Kalimantan 
and Sulawesi. 
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46. In April 1985, a 'Presidential Instruction' (Inpres 4) was 
announced, aiming at 'a wholesale regulatory clean-up of 
Indonesia's ports' (Far Eastern Economic Review 25 April 
1985:118). Some of my informants are optimistic that the 
intended changes will make life easier for them, in that they 
will face fewer problems with the bureaucrats. But it is still 
too soon to tell whether this is really so. 
47. In Wee (1984, see backpocket), I used Bourdieu's (1977) theory of 
symbolic misrecognition to explain the inverse relationship 
between the material economy and the symbolic economy. In the 
present study, however, I am contextualising the symbolic economy 
within relations of power -- in particular, the elusion of socio-
psychical domination on the part of the dominated party. Economy 
and politics are of course related aspects of the same social 
situation. There is thus no inherent incompatibility in the two 
terminologies I am using. What I am referring to in both cases 
is an ideological structuration that has at least two valencies 
-- to the material economy and to political power. The choice of 
words depends on the aspect that is being highlighted. 
rnAPTER THREE 
TEMPORAL CONFIGURATIONS 
3.1 Zaman 
3.2 Fran Zaman Ba.tin to Political Centralisation 
3.3 Zaman Sultan and the Palernbang-Temasik-.Melaka-Johor 
Dynasty 
3.4 Zaman Belanda 
3.5 Zaman Jepang 
3.6 Persatuan .Melayu Riau Sejati 
3.7 Zaman Indonesia 
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3.1 Zaman 
My informants use the term ~ to denote certain patterns of 
1 
political domination. They speak of five zamans: 
zaman batin 'the era of the chief', 
zaman sultan 'the era of the sultan', 
zaman Belanda 'the era of the Dutch', 
zaman Jepang 'the era of the Japanese' 
zaman Indonesia 'the era of the Indonesia' 
Of these, zaman sultan and zaman Indonesia are the two most 
significant to my informants, for they live in zaman Indonesia yet 
focus their attention on zaman sultan. 
I stated in Chapters One and Two that my informants elude their 
present experience of being Indonesian citizens by escaping into the 
pre-Indonesian past. One way they have achieved this is by listing 
both zaman sultan and zaman Indonesia as phenomena of the same type: 
Both are zamans, both are political eras, both are temporal 
objectifications. Their equivalence as similar phenomena is enhanced 
by the inclusion of three other zamans -- namely, zaman batin, ~ 
Belanda, and zaman Jepang. By listing the present as merely one era 
in a sociocentrically defined temporal series, the reality of the 
present is relativised in terms of the not-present. Zaman Indonesia 
is thus bracketed within a larger temporal context. So even though my 
informants acknowledge that they are currently existing in zaman 
Indonesia, it is nevertheless possible for them to elude the 
experience of the present by locating themselves in this larger 
encompassing context. 
The large scale of this encompassing context may be discerned not 
only in the number of zamans listed, but also in the length of time 
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that is included. Zaman Indonesia began with the independence of 
Indonesia as a nation-state. As pointed out in Chapter Two, this was 
unilaterally declared by Sukarno on 17 August 1945, even though it was 
not formally achieved until 1950. So zaman Indonesia has been in 
existence for only some thirty-odd years. Where my informants are 
concerned, zaman Jepang and zaman Belanda were also relatively short. 
The former lasted for only three years (1942-1945), while the latter 
commenced in 1911 with the abdication of the last sultan and lasted 
until 1942, a total of thirty-one years. 
In contrast, zaman sultan is perceived as an immense stretch of 
time that originated, to translate an informant's words, 'from Melaka, 
from Bukit Si-Guntang, from Palembang'. What he was referring to was 
the founding myth of kingship which exists not only in the various 
versions of the Penurunan, but also in the oral traditions of my 
informants. With regards to the dating of this stretch of time, some 
of my literate informants do know that Melaka fell to the Portuguese 
in 1511. They do not say when Melaka was founded, but the founding 
date would obviously have to be earlier than 1511. Moreover, before 
Melaka was founded, the kingdom was supposedly sited at Palembang, 
with an ever earlier derivation from Bukit Si-Guntang. So, taking 
1511 as the minimal base-line, a zaman sultan that derives from Bukit 
Si-Guntang would have had a duration of more than four hundred years. 
Such being the case, it is plausible for my informants to 
perceive zaman Indonesia as a mere episode in the larger historical 
context of zaman sultan. There is thus a mutual bracketing of zaman 
sultan and zaman Indonesia: The institutionalised present of zaman 
Indonesia brackets zaman sultan, and the mythologised past of zaman 
sultan brackets zaman Indonesia. The term zaman thus refers not to an 
unilineal progression of time, but rather, to a multiple layering of 
temporal conditions. A particular sense of time is expressed whereby 
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the experiences of the present are relativised in the larger context 
of the past. Hence a way of perceiving the past entails a way of 
perceiving the present. 
My informants seem to perceive a fundamental difference between 
zaman sultan and the three subsequent zamans: that is, during zaman 
sultan, the centre of political power was located within Riau-Lingga, 
whereas during the three subsequent zamans, power was located 
elsewhere. My informants seem to view the three zamans following 
zaman sultan as externally caused happenings in which they and their 
predecessors became involuntarily implicated. In the words of an 
informant: 
Datang Belanda. Belanda pergi, datang Jepang. Jepang 
pergi, datang Indonesia. 
(The Dutch came. The Dutch went, and the Japanese came. The 
Japanese went, and Indonesia came.) 
These three zamans thus seem to have been brought about by the coming 
and going of various outsiders. The listing of the zamans refers to 
more than mere temporal succession; it refers to an institutional 
shift from the endogenous power of zaman sultan to the exogenous power 
of the following three zamans. 
Zaman Indonesia is thereby typed as a zaman of exogenous 
derivation, like zaman Belanda and zaman Jepang. The relationship 
between zaman sultan and zaman Indonesia may therefore be understood 
also in terms of endogenous power versus exogenous power. This gives 
a spatial dimension to the idea of ~· The originating context of 
zaman sultan is Riau-Lingga and the rest of alam Melayu (including 
Melaka, Palembang, and Bukit Si-Guntang), whereas the originating 
context of the three subsequent zamans is the world beyond. We may 
correlate these temporal and spatial relations in the following way: 
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TIME past present 
SPACE here there 
In my informants' perceptions, time and space seem to be out of joint, 
with correlations of here-and-then and there-and-now. Zaman sultan is 
in the here-and-then, and zaman Indonesia is in the there-and-now. 
It is in this context that we may discuss the ~ that precedes 
zaman sultan -- namely, zaman batin -- for it also entails a spatial 
dimension. In my informants' usage, the word batin refers to the 
chief of an autonomous local community. As one informant described 
this zaman: 
In the beginning, people did not want to follow the raja and 
the sultan, except that they were forced to do so. Force 
came through the use of the sword •••• The people previously 
had their own batin, different from the raja and the sultan. 
The rajas caused disturbance and unrest. This one wanted to 
rule, that one also wanted to rule •••• Later on, when there 
were no longer any rajas, there arose the government, the 
communists. But they are also the same: they cause 
disturbance. 
2 
(My translation). 
In this description, zaman batin is portrayed as an era of inward-
looking tranquility, undisturbed by power-seeking outsiders, be they 
raja, sultan, government, or communists. 
The word batin could be derived from the Arabic batin meaning 
'internal', since, as Wilkinson (1959:91) has explained, the Malay 
word has the meaning of 'esoteric, secret'. Such a connotation is 
known to my informants. Hence the term zaman batin 'the era of the 
chief' may be alternatively translated as 'the inward-looking era', in 
contrast to which the succeeding zaman sultan may be considered an 
outward-looking era. Indeed, orientation would seem to be the crucial 
difference between zaman batin and the four subsequent zamans. The 
batin was not the government of Riau as a whole, in whatever manner 
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that whole may be defined. The batin was the chief of a local 
community, and hence each community had a different batin. The term 
zaman batin thus refers to an era of uncentralised power, prior to the 
subsequent situation of political centralisation, first under the 
raja/sultan, then the Dutch, the Japanese, and finally, the Indonesian 
government. So if the contrast between zaman sultan and the three 
subsequent zamans is between endogenous power and the exogenous power, 
then the contrast between zaman batin and the four subsequent zamans 
is between uncentralised power and centralised power. 
The spatial implication is that in zaman batin one cannot even 
speak of Riau-Lingga, since without political centralisation the 
various islands would not have constituted a single territory. In 
such a situation, there would have been neither centre nor periphery. 
There would have been merely different localities related in spatial 
but not political terms. Such a context is locally immanent, requiring 
no further definition in relation to a centre, whether endogenous or 
exogenous. The five zamans that are mentioned in my informants' 
discourse imply a process of change, first from uncentralised localism 
to a centralised state, then from an endogenous government to 
exogenous colonisation. 
3.2 From Zaman Batin to Political Centralisation 
The centralised politics that emerged in the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh 
islands were founded upon a mobile population of boat-dwelling 
3 
nomads. For the rise of such a state however, sedentism is perhaps a 
necessary precondition, without which it would not have been possible 
to establish a fixed political centre. And without such a centre, the 
political groupings would have remained fragmentary. But in an island 
world of sea and land, a political centre located in one place must 
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combine sedentism with mobility, if it is to exercise any 
centralisation of power. The point is: it is ecologically not easy, 
even now, to institutionalise political centralisation in an 
archipelago of small islands where there are definite ecological 
constraints on population size and density. There are inherent 
centrifugal tendencies in such a sparsely scattered island population 
of self-sufficient communities, a significant proportion of whom are 
nomadic. Any political centre that developed in such a situation 
would have had to establish an expansive network of alliances with the 
various far-flung communities. Under these ecological constraints, 
the state could not have become strongly institutionalised. To employ 
a maritime metaphor, the state merely floated on top of the local 
4 
currents and eddies of an open sea. 
In the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands, one of the ways in which this 
expansive network of alliances was maintained was through the 
institution of vassalage. Bloch (1932:204) discusses a similar 
situation in Carolignian and post-Carolignian Europe, where he draws a 
linkage between vassalage on the one hand, and on the other hand, the 
existence of a weak state, a political incapacity for hegemony on the 
part of government, and the less than thorough monetisation of the 
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economy. These conditions are exactly those that had prevailed and 
still prevail in the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands. So even though 
vassalage no longer exists at present, its derivative conditions are 
still extant. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the idea of 
vassalage is still important to some of my informants, though the 
practice of it is extinct. 
What the weak state structure implies is that even after the 
development of political centralisation, community leadership at the 
local level remained important. So even though zaman batin may have 
preceded zaman sultan chronologically, political centralisation did 
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not occur for all in toto. This process was perhaps most relevant to 
those who claimed centralised leadership over others, and least 
relevant to those who ignored such claims. In this light, it is 
significant that not all my informants mentioned zaman batin. The 
ones who did so are those still associated with a tribal orang laut 
6 
identity. 
Wilkinson (1959:91) also associates the title ~ with the 
'Protomalayan headman', illustrating this association with the 
following saying: 
Adat negeri itu tiada beraja, batin sahaja penghulu-nya (the 
law of that country recognised no king, the Chiefs were only 
batin). 
This saying is compatible with my informants' view that zaman batin 
was marked by uncentralised power: hence no raja 'king' was 
recognised, and the penghulus 'headmen' were merely batins 'chiefs'. 
In this context, Benjamin's (1968b) differentiation between 
headmanship and leadership among the Temiar of the Malay Peninsula is 
of relevance to our discussion. In his usage (ibid.:!), headmanship 
refers 'to those positions of authority that are held to be legitimate 
in relation to some locus of higher authority situated outside' the 
local community; in contrast, leadership refers 'to those positions of 
authority that gain their legitimacy by virtue of their place within 
the nexus of internal social relations that constitute' the local 
community. In other words, headmen are appointed from without, 
whereas leaders emerge from within. 
It is thus significant that my informants do not speak of a ~ 
penghulu, but only of a zaman batin, for it does seem to be indeed the 
case that the penghulu was a headman appointed by a higher outside 
authority, whereas the batin was a leader emergent from within the 
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local community. So if the title batin is a remnant of a previous 
political situation, then it would seem that this previous situation 
was marked by a network of alliances formed by local chiefs who were 
emergent from within their own respective community, and who were 
perhaps approximately equal in status to one another. This network of 
equal allies was subsequently replaced by a hierarchy, where penghulus 
were appointed by a higher central authority. 
This difference between the penghulu and the batin is currently 
still relevant, for the present-day penghulu is indeed appointed by 
the Indonesian government, whereas the title batin is not even 
officially recognised within the Indonesian system of administration. 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, the Indonesian kecamatan 'sub-district' 
is divided into kepenghuluan 'headman-dams', each of which is under a 
government-appointed penghulu. 
Where the orang laut are concerned, although they are aware of 
being Indonesian citizens, it is nevertheless their own local 
community that is of paramount importance to them. In several cases, 
they still have their own local batin. Even those that no longer have 
batins can still remember the identity of the various batins just a 
few generations back. So for these people, zaman batin is still a 
reality, or at least a recent memory, co-existent with zaman 
Indonesia. 
3.3 Zaman Sultan and the 
Palembang-Temasik-Melaka-Johor Dynasty 
The opposition between zaman batin and the other four zamans is, 
however, relevant only to a minority of my informants. Since the 
majority of my informants happened to be those who are not associated 
with any tribal orang laut identity, the crucial opposition for them 
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is between zaman sultan and the three subsequent zamans. 
As I have mentioned above, for my informants, zaman sultan began 
not just in Riau-Lingga, but long before that, from the time of 
Melaka, Palembang, Bukit Si-Guntang. However, they are rather vague 
about the calendrical date of this beginning; it is located simply in 
the dulu-dulu 'long, long ago'. But the end of zaman sultan is very 
definite; it happened in 1911 when the last sultan of Riau-Lingga 
abdicated his throne. My informants are well aware that elsewhere in 
alam Melayu, specifically in Brunei and the Malay Peninsula, there are 
still reigning sultans in existence. Some of them are even aware that 
in Medan, northern Sumatra, the sultan of Deli was ceremonially 
installed in recent years to serve as the symbolic figurehead of the 
four former sultanates of the area Langkat, Asahan, Deli, and 
7 
Serdang. Whereas my informants may acknowledge that zaman sultan 
still continues in those places where there are reigning sultans, they 
regard the era as having reached its end in 1911 in Riau-Lingga. So 
their interest in zaman sultan is very much from a Riau perspective --
that is, in terms of their own situation. 
As I have shown in Chapter Two, the name 'Riau' came to be 
attached to that particular groups of islands, only as a result of the 
political demarcation of territory, a process that my informants seem 
to date as beginning from the time of Opu Daeng Cellak's wedding which 
occurred in 1722. So that wedding may be interpreted as a means of 
dating the period within zaman sultan that is most relevant to my 
informants. Some of my literate informants, who are aware of 
calendrical dates, do indeed talk of the year 1722 as the beginning of 
the Bugis presence in Riau. (See, for example, a book written by my 
informant Raja Hamzah Yunus n.d.(b).) 
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On the other hand, the Riau segment of zaman sultan is not 
regarded by my informants as wholly separate from the earlier period 
which had begun from Melaka, Palembang, and Bukit Si-Guntang. After 
all, the significance of this temporal segment resides in its 
continuity from the farther past. I will discuss the 1722-1911 period 
in detail in Part Two. For the present chapter, I shall deal only 
with the farther past preceding 1722. 
As I have pointed out above, the mention of Bukit Si-Guntang 
derives from the founding myth of Melayu kingship, as known in the 
Penurunan and in my informants' oral tradition. Wolters (1970:7) 
argues that this myth contains 'a Malay perspective for what today we 
call "the history of Srivijaya"'. He further argues (ibid.:77-107) 
that the origins of the Melaka kingdom are to be found in the kingdom 
8 
of Srivijaya, the capital of which he locates at Palembang. 
The evidence indicates that, like other Southeast Asian kingdoms 
of the time, this was an Indianised state, based ideologically on 
9 
Sanskritic and Buddhistic civilisation. So the term zaman sultan 
'the era of the sultan' is quite clearly anachronistic. The word 
sultan refers to an Islamic title and Srivijaya-Palembang was 
evidently not Islamised. 
Despite the religious discontinuity, however, there seems to have 
been political continuity from pre-Islamic to post-Islamic times. 
Srivijaya spanned those areas which are even today considered as part 
of alam Melayu 'the Melayu world'. Moreover, it seems to be the case 
that like the later sultanates, Srivijaya was also a pasisir 'coastal' 
state, composed of a federation of trading ports sited on important 
10 
trade routes but without any significant agricultural base. Such a 
characterisation would fit the coastal kingdoms that directly 
succeeded Srivijaya -- namely, Melaka, Johor, and Riau-Lingga. (See 
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Wolters 1970, Sandhu and Wheatley 1983, Andaya 1975, and Trocki 1979.) 
This kind of political structure meant that the capture of a 
capital was not necessarily the end of the kingdom. Another capital 
was usually set up at another port. What linked the old capital to 
the new capital was evidently the king himself. Wolters (1970) argues 
that the connection between Srivijaya and Melaka was indeed provided 
by the very person of the king: the founder of Melaka was the former 
ruler of Palembang driven out by Javanese forces in 1391. 
In the founding myth told in the Penurunan, the connection 
between Palembang and Melaka is indeed personalised, though not in one 
ruler, but in a line of rulers connected through descent. In this 
myth, three Indic princes appear magically on Bukit Si-Guntang. They 
each become the ruler of an area in Sumatra. One of them becomes the 
ruler of Palembang, and it is from him that the dynasty of Melayu 
kings are descended. He establishes this dynasty by leaving 
Palembang, staying briefly in Bintan, then settling in 
Temasik/Singapore, where he is succeeded by four generations of 
descendants. In the reign of his great-great-grandson, Seri Sultan 
Iskandar Shah, Javanese forces attack Singapore. The defeated ruler 
escapes and makes his way northward until he reaches Melaka where he 
establishes a new capital for himself. (See Brown 1970:11-42.) 
The mention of Bintan in this context is particularly significant 
in our discussion. According to the description given in the 
Penurunan, it is quite clear that the 'Bintan' mentioned therein 
refers to the same place that is still known as 'Bintan' -- that is, 
11 
the banks of the Bintan river. Furthermore, in the Penurunan, 
Bintan is said to have been ruled by a queen by the name of Wan Seri 
Benian, also known as Permaisuri Sakidar Shah. (See Winstedt 
1938:59.) The implication is that Bintan was already the site of an 
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established polity, even prior to the arrival of Seri Teri Buana from 
Palembang. According to the Penurunan, upon his arrival, Seri Teri 
Buana was anointed as the heir of the Bintan queen. But before he 
could succeed to the throne, he left Bintan and founded himself a new 
capital on Temasik/Singapore. However, according to the Shellabear 
version of the Penurunan (1967:31-37), after the death of the Bintan 
queen, it was not any of her descendants, male or female, who 
succeeded to her throne. Instead, Bintan came to be ruled by the son 
of Seri Teri Buana's chief minister, who was appointed as his deputy. 
So even though Bintan may have started off as an independent 
polity by itself, it was brought into the same genealogical network 
founded by the ruler from Palembang. This was done, evidently, by 
replacing the indigenous Bintan queen's line of descent with a male 
regent appointed by the Palembang king reigning at Temasik/Singapore. 
Significantly, it is mentioned in the Penurunan that the Bintan queen 
had female descendants. In the earlier 1612 version, she is said to 
have had two grand-daughters, both of whom married the two sons of 
Seri Teri Buana. (See Brown 1970:20.) In the later Shellabear 
version, she is said to have had a daughter who married Seri Teri 
Buana. (See Shellabear 1967:31.) In other words, instead of becoming 
rulers themselves, the Bintan queen's female descendants became merely 
the wives of male rulers. The mythology of kingship in the Penurunan 
thus tells of a shift from female rule to male rule. The significance 
of this, as we shall see below, is that the association of gender with 
political power is still a controversial matter among my present-day 
informants. 
In this context, it is interesting that my informants in two 
communities said that the founder of their respective settlement was 
female. In Pulau Seking, the female founder was identified as Mak 
Meleking or Yang Leking, by whose name the island itself came to be 
known -- namely, Si King 'the one known as King'. My information 
tallies with that obtained by Normala Manap (1983:190) who did a 
detailed study of the Seking community: 
•.. Mak Meleking or ••• Yang Leking ••. is held by many to be the 
founder of Seking •••• She is said to be a Selat woman of 
Seking, who was ••• quite unlike other normal women. She was 
very big and had great strength and courage to the extent 
that she was able to counter the attack of pirates 
singlehanded. 
Such a description corresponds closely to that given my 
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informants in Pulau Panjang of their female founder, who was known as 
Tipah. According to them, 'Tipah was trusted by people' (Tipah 
dipercayai orang); so she became the 'village elder' (ketua kampung). 
They claimed that she died at the age of 150, and that although she 
was so old, she still had all her teeth. They said: 
)3iar datang baik atau jahat, dia yang menentang. 
(Be it good or ill that came, she was the one who faced it.) 
What is particularly significant in the context of our discussion 
is that both these communities are still associated with a tribal 
orang laut identity. So even in the oral tradition, the mythology 
suggests that prior to political centralisation at a supra-local 
level, political organisation at the local level was possibly under 
female leadership, at least in some communities. Oral myth thus 
corroborates the written myth of the Penurunan which tells of a 
female-ruled local polity in Bintan, prior to its incorporation in a 
larger regional network that included Palembang, Temasik/Singapore, 
and later Melaka. Upon such incorporation, however, local female rule 
was replaced by a supra-local patrilineal dynasty of male rulers. 
The implications of this mythology are compatible with Benjamin's 
(1983:39-45) ethnological analysis of the Malay Peninsula, where he 
discusses matrifocality and patrifocality as modes of orientation. He 
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argues that the former 'serves to organise centripetal "inward" 
relations (which, by implication, are more homogeneous and familial in 
feel)', while the latter 'organises centrifugal, "outward" relations 
(which, by implication, are more heterogeneous and politico-jural in 
feel)'. In the case of the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands, both the oral 
and written forms of mythology suggest that the former preceded the 
latter. 
Furthermore, there is a suggestion in the Penurunan that the 
shift from female rule to male rule was legitimated by the ideology of 
Indianised kingship, for the founder of what eventually became the 
Melaka dynasty is depicted as the son of an Indian king. (See Brown 
1970:12-15). The significance of this is perhaps that the ideology of 
Indian kingship quite unquestionably allocated political power to 
males alone. There is indeed some evidence that Hindu-Buddhist ideas 
12 
were used to legitimate the institutionalisation of male rule. 
13 
Islam subsequently came to play this ideological role. As we shall 
see below, Islam continues to be important in this respect for my 
present-day informants. 
There was also a temporal dimension in the institutionalistion of 
male rule. Whereas the female leaders in mythology are characterised 
as charismatic individuals, -- for example, in the way that my 
informants described the female founders of their settlements (see 
above) -- the male rulers routinised their charisma in the form of a 
patrilineal dynasty. I will discuss the process of such routinisation 
14 
in detail in the subsequent chapters. 
The institution of a divine, or at least super-human, king was 
particularly significant in the ecological context of Riau-Lingga, 
Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. As I have stated above, it is 
difficult to maintain a strong state structure under such ecological 
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conditions. As Bloch (1932:204) has argued, in a weak state, 
relations of domination and submission tend to remain personalised. I 
would suggest that this was true of the kingdom that was based first 
in Palembang, then in Melaka, then in Johor, and finally in Riau-
Lingga. In such a state, historical continuity was preserved purely 
in the person of the king who had inherited his office through by 
15 
descent. Legitimation was thus genealogical in nature. 
This mode of legitimation is clearly evident in the events that 
occurred after Melaka was conquered by the Portuguese in 1511. The 
16 defeated Sultan Mahmud I escaped to the interior and eventually 
settled on Bintan island. (See Andaya and Andaya 1982:56.) The ex-
Melakan court was able to re-establish itself successfully in Bintan, 
apparently by providing the necessary continuity in the person of the 
ruler himself. But the success of the newly re-established court led 
the Portuguese to send a punitive expedition to destroy the settlement 
in 1526. This resulted in another exodus which ended in the upper 
reaches of the Johor river, where the court was again re-established, 
thus begining the history of the kingdom of Johor. (See ibid.:56-57.) 
It is perhaps significant that the earliest version of the 
Penurunan has been dated to 1612 by Roolvinck (1970). The Penurunan 
is basically a genealogy of kings that legitimates power on the basis 
of patrilineal descent. (See Bowen 1983.) So the implication is that 
this text was written at the Johor court for the purpose of 
legitimating the Johor rulers by tracing their patrilineal origins to 
Melaka, to Palembang, and to Bukit Si-Guntang. 
However, this mode of legitimation through descent seems to have 
been a double-edged sword. A crisis of power arose in 1699 with the 
assassination of Sultan Mahmud II, the sole legitimate descendant of 
the Melaka patri-line. This meant the end of legitimate power. So 
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when the bendahara 'chief minister' succeeded to the throne as Sultan 
Abd al-Jalil, his political position was so precarious that he was 
easily defeated in 1718 by a pretender who claimed to be the 
posthumous son of the assassinated sultan. Moreover, this pretender 
was not even a native of Johor, but someone from the Minangkabau court 
at Pagar Ruyung in West Sumatra. It was in the ensuing contest for 
power that the Bugis adventurers came and established themselves as a 
force in the kingdom, by installing Sultan Abd al-Jalil's son, Sultan 
Sulaiman, as their candidate for the throne. (See Andaya 1975:198-
323.) The aristocratic rajas of Penyengat who are my informants, are 
directly descended from these Bugis adventurers of the eighteenth 
century. 
As we shall see below, the assassination of Sultan Mahmud in 1699 
is still a significant event in my informants' perceptions. To this 
day, some of them are still trying to justify why the last legitimate 
descendant of the Melakan dynasty was killed, an act which broke the 
rulers' line of descent. So rather paradoxically, it is the 
assassination that provides the 'genealogical' linkage between the 
zaman sultan of Riau-Lingga and the earlier period which extended back 
to Melaka, Palembang, and Bukit Si-Guntang. 
As mentioned above, legitimation through descent was particularly 
important in the context of personalised power. But after the 
assassination of the last legitimate descendant of the Melaka dynasty, 
whatever genealogical claims the post-1699 rulers could make, they 
could not claim that they were descended from the founding god-king of 
Ure V C ~ ~ 'd - ~~-\- f<---,, 
Palembang.~ Yet in the Riau-Lingga sultanate, ' 
, 
relations of domination-
17 
submission remained personalised. So, without the appropriate 
genealogical links to the Melaka dynasty, how was this personalised 
power legimated? 
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The clue to this alternative mode of legitimation may be found in 
the writings of Raja Ali Haji -- both in the Tuhfat and elsewhere. In 
these works, he puts forward the view that rulers are appointed by 
God; if they are dethroned, that is because they have failed to obey 
God's commands. (See Chapter Five below; also Andaya and Matheson 
1979.) God thus replaced genealogical descent as the source of 
political power. 
Interestingly, this mode of legitimation was not unknown in the 
earlier period of zaman sultan, prior to 1722. As Milner (1981:56) 
has argued: 
Two strands of Islamic thinking ••• appear to have appealed to 
the Malay Raja: Persianised kingship, and the mystical 
concept of the Perfect Man. The preoccupations of the Malay 
Raja through time are evident; they are distinctly 
consistent. The ruler of the raja-centred kerajaan, who had 
once been portrayed as a boddhisattva, found attractive in 
Islam those ideas which enhanced kingship, and which 
permitted and assisted the monarch to fulfill the central 
role in the spiritual life of his subjects. 
So just as Hindu-Buddhistic ideas had been used to legitimate the 
power of the king, so Islamic ideas were subsequently used for the 
18 
same purpose. Indeed, as Andaya (1975:48-50) has pointed out, the 
rulers of Melaka and Johor could lay claim to being the heirs of 
kingly power, only because that power had been religiously invested in 
the founder of the dynasty in Palembang. So after 1699, since the new 
rulers could no longer claim to be heirs of such a power, their 
alternative claim was that they were religiously sanctified by God 
himself. 
There is, however, one important difference in the way the two 
religious ideologies legitimated political power. Whereas Hindu-
Buddhistic ideology legitimated the ruler by making him a devaraja 
'god-king', Islamic ideology legitimated him by making him a mediator 
between his subjects and God. The further implication of this is that 
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whereas there can be only one individual god-king in the kingdom, 
there can be a whole class of Islamic mediators in the sultanate, 
among whom the sultan himself is just primus inter pares. As we shall 
' 
see in the subsequent chapters, the latter view is still held by some 
of my informants. Such a shift from the authority of the one unique 
devaraja to the authority of the mediative ruling class would be a 
19 
logical extension of the very process of Islamisation itself. As 
McKinley (1979:315-321) has argued, the Islamisation of the Indianised 
kingdoms in Southeast Asia involved a shift in orientation from the 
inward-looking view of 'one kingdom, one universe', to the outward-
looking view of what I would paraphrase as 'one Mecca, many 
sultanates'. 
With regards to the process of Islamisation in Southeast Asia, 
Milner (1981) makes the salient point that the political significance 
of Islam in the converted kingdoms lay more in its ideological 
influence, than in its institutional presence. He couched this 
argument in the context of rebutting Gullick's (1965) contention that 
Islam was politically insignificant in the nineteenth-century 
sultanates of the Malay Peninsula, because it did not figure 
prominently in the public institutions of the state. Milner (1981:46-
48) points out that to gauge the political significance of Islam, one 
cannot consider merely such institutional aspects as the role of the 
kadi 'Muslim judge and registrar', or the importance of the Islamic 
court of law, or the observance of Islamic rituals. Instead, he 
argues (ibid.:49-58) that one must consider the role Islam played as 
the legitimating ideology of kingship. 
Interestingly, even at the present time, among my informants, it 
seems to be the case that the significance of Islam may be gauged in 
terms of a legitimating ideology, rather than in institutional terms. 
Although at the present time, it is no longer kingship that is being 
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legitimated for the simple reason that there is no longer a king 
-- Islam is still more important to my informants as an ideology that 
justifies existing social practice, rather than as an autonomous 
institutional domain. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters 
below, Islam among my informants consists not only of rituals such as 
going to the mosque or praying five times a day. It also concerns 
other non-ritualistic matters, such as rules regulating marriage, 
descent, inheritance, social interaction, and so forth. As we shall 
see below, these rules do indeed concern current relations of power. 
So even in the absence of institutional kingship, Islam can still be 
an ideological legitimation of power relations. 
Although the term zaman sultan is anachronistic when used for the 
pre-Islamic era, there is nevertheless an implicit logic in such 
usage. The term highlights the role of the sultan as a religiously 
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sanctified ruler. The implication is that zaman sultan is more than 
just a chunk of time; it is, to use McKinley's term (1979), an 
'epistemological age', an age of religious justification for the 
events and actions of this world. 
3.4 Zaman Belanda 
As mentioned above, in my informants' perceptions, zaman sultan 
came to an end in 1911 when the last sultan of Riau abdicated and the 
Riau-Lingga archipelago came under the direct administration of the 
Dutch colonial government. The date of the abdication -- 1911 --
indicates that Riau-Lingga was one of the last areas to come directly 
under the government of the Dutch East Indies. But this doe~ not mean 
that there was no earlier Dutch presence in that area. Indeed, except 
for 62 years at the beginning of the Riau sultanate (that is, 1722-
1784), and 23 years during the Napoleonic Wars (1795-1818), there was 
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actually a Dutch Residency co-existing with the sultanate since 1784. 
(See Appendix 4.) 
By the early twentieth century, however, the Dutch government in 
Batavia felt that there was little need to continue to share their 
power with the traditional rulers of Riau-Lingga. According to my 
informants' oral accounts, about 1911, the Dutch tried to make the 
then reigning Sultan Abdul al-Rahman sign a treaty of total submission 
that would have stripped him of all effective power, leaving him only 
a pensioner. He refused to put his signature to this treaty. So the 
Dutch decided to oust him by another means. At that time, apparently, 
the sultan had a small armed force, serving mainly as his bodyguard. 
The Dutch trumped up a charge that the sultan was plotting armed 
insurrection, and wanted to bring him to Batavia to answer this 
charge. But the sultan and his court managed to escape to Singapore 
the night before. The Dutch tried unsuccessfully to lure him back. 
He eventually died in 1930 in Singapore and was buried in the 
graveyard of the Johor State Mosque in Telok Blangah, Singapore. 
(Also see Matheson 1984:1.) 
My informants' perception of 1911 as the beginning of zaman 
Belanda is significant, because it dates this era as a very recent 
occurence, whereas Dutch presence in Riau had begun as long ago as 
1784. However, if we consider only the views of my informants, when 
they talk about zaman sultan, the Dutch are hardly mentioned at all. 
Zaman sultan existed only within its own terms, or so it seems in my 
informants' articulations. 
As I have mentioned above, although the zaman sultan that my 
informants are most concerned with is the situation that resulted from 
the re-establishment of the bendahara dynasty through Bugis military 
aid, this situation is itself seen as a continuation from Melaka, 
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Palembang and Bukit Si-Guntang. From such a perspective, external 
powers seem to be cast in two alternative roles, either as supporters 
or as disruptors of such continuity -- in other words, as allies or as 
enemies. The Dutch in zaman Belanda are evidently regarded by my 
informants as enemies who disrupted the continuity of zaman sultan. 
Consequently, even though zaman Belanda is chronologically nearer than 
zaman sultan, my informants have a lot to say about zaman sultan, but 
hardly anything to say about the Dutch in zaman Belanda. When they do 
talk about zaman Belanda, it is not about the Dutch they speak, but 
about the various local personalities who were appointed as ~ 
'deputies' of the colonial government. 
There was, apparently, a system of indirect rule which operated 
through the following chain of command: 
Dutch Resident at Tanjungpinang 
• Dutch Assistant Resident at Daik. 
different Dutch controleur variously located 
. 
'local deputies' (~) 
population at large 
Figure 4 The Dutch System of Regional Administration in Riau 
(See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:334-338.) Thus, arguably, the Dutch 
Resident replaced the sultan at the top of the local hierarchy. So it 
would appear that in my informants' perception, zaman Belanda is 
marked by this replacement and not by the mere presence of the Dutch 
in Riau. Hence zaman Belanda is dated as beginning in 1911 and not 
1784. However, although the replacement of the sultan by the Dutch 
Resident is recognised by my informants as an historical fact, it was 
evidently not legitimated at all in indigenous terms -- either in 
terms of descent or Islam. 
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According to a raja informant the Dutch never let a native of an 
area be amir of that area; they always posted him to be !!!!!i!. somewhere 
else. This was their kepandaian 'cunning'. They were afraid that 
ties of kinship and friendship would prevent the amir from being tegas 
'firm'. So at every level, the people of Riau were ruled by non-
indigenes. 
3.5 Zaman Jepang 
The Dutch were themselves replaced by the Japanese during the 
Second World War. Interestingly, the Japanese in zaman Jepang are 
regarded by my informants as allies who provided some hope that zaman 
sultan might be resuscitated. As mentioned in Chapter Two, under the 
Japanese military government, the island territory of afdeeling Riouw 
was amalgamated with Syonanto (Singapore). From my informants' 
perspective, this seems to have been a decision that met with 
approval, for it erased the line of demarcation imposed by the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty, and re-unified what had been the territory of a single 
polity. 
According to some informants, the Japanese commander at 
Tanjungpinang 'had an attitude of sympathy' (bersikap simpatis), 
expressed through his initiative in forming a battalion consisting 
almost entirely of the indigenous inhabitants of the Riau-Lingga 
archipelago. Those of my informants who were in this battalion still 
talk of it with fond memories. Apparently, the officers were mostly 
aristocrats and others who could claim a relatively high status 
through reference to the political hierarchy of zaman sultan. The 
rank-and-file, on the other hand, were mostly commoners who could only 
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claim a relatively lower status in such a hierarchy. (This 
traditional hierarchy will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and 
Five.) 
There is documentary evidence that the Japanese did indeed form 
native battalions not only in this area but also elsewhere -- for 
example, in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. According to Muchtar 
Lufti et al (1977:419-420), in November 1942, recruits from the native 
population in the Riau-Lingga archipelago were sent to 
Singapore/Syonanto for military training. On their return, they 
became gyu tai, a Japanese rank that Muchtar Lufti et al (ibid.) 
translated as tentara pengawal pulau-pulau 'home guard of the 
islands'. My informants corroborated this explanation; they also 
added that there was another higher rank for them -- that of hei ho 
which meant that they were pembantu tentara Jepang 'troops assisting 
the Japanese'. According to Muchtar Lufti et al (ibid.), by 1945 the 
indigenous battalion had grown to a strength of some 600 soldiers, all 
fully armed. My informants told me that this battalion, known as 
Batalyon Kepulauan Riau 'Battalion of the Riau Archipelago', was 
headed by a Penyengat raja -- Raja Haji Muhamad Yunus, who held the 
21 
rank of major. Apparently, the existence of this indigenous 
battalion lent some military substance to the hope that the Riau-
Lingga sultanate could be revived. 
So although the Japanese occupied the area for only three years, 
their political impact upon the Riau-Lingga inhabitants was 
considerable. Indeed, as Andaya (1977) has pointed out, the political 
significance of Japan to Riau dates from a period much earlier than 
the Second World War. For example, in 1914 -- that is, after the 
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Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, and after the abdication of the 
last sultan in 1911 a Penyengat raja by the name of Raja Khalid 
Hasan, better known as Raja Hitam, went to Japan in an attempt to 
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solicit Japanese aid against the Dutch. He died in Tokyo in the 
course of his political activity. My informants claim that he was 
poisoned by the Dutch consul in Tokyo, but Barbara Andaya (personal 
communication) says that there is no documentary evidence that he died 
of poisoning. In her paper (1977:154), she states: 
On March 11, 1914, after a brief period in a Japanese 
hospital, Raja Hitam died, apparently succumbing to the 
bitter cold of Tokyo's winter. 
Her statement is based, however, on a letter (dated March 14, 1914) 
addressed to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, 
written by the Dutch consul in Tokyo, who can hardly be considered a 
disinterested party, in the face of my informants' allegations. 
Whatever the case may be, the Japanese nevertheless seem to have 
been astute enough to realise the importance of Raja Hitam to the 
people of Riau-Lingga. According to my informants, when the Japanese 
forces entered Tanjungpinang in 1942, they had with them a picture of 
Raja Hitam, dating from his visit to Tokyo. This picture they used as 
evidence to demonstrate the long-standing relationship between Japan 
and Riau-Lingga, thereby winning the people to the Japanese cause. 
My informants said that before the Japanese troops arrived, they 
sent agents in advance to tell the people not to be afraid because the 
Japanese had come to free them from their Dutch masters. Apparently, 
these agents even claimed that many of the Japanese had become Muslims 
- but that, my informants said, was of course a lie. After the 
Japanese had ensconced themselves in Riau, they asked the Penyengat 
people who they wanted as the amir 'local deputy'. The Penyengat 
people proposed Tengku Ibrahim, the oldest son of the last sultan, who 
did indeed return to Riau to serve as amir under the Japanese. 
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3.6 Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati 
A five-year hiatus separates zaman Jepang from zaman Indonesia. 
After the war, the Dutch government re-took the island territory of 
what had been afdeeling Riouw, while the Indonesian nationalists were 
ensconced in Sumatra. The Indonesian Revolution was thus waged 
primarily by those living in areas that were free of the Dutch. 
According to my informants, those living in the Dutch-controlled areas 
played both sides of the game ~ that is, they negotiated with the 
Dutch colonialists for a resurrection of the traditional kingdoms but 
at the same time, they allied themselves with the Indonesian 
nationalists. Probably, they felt that it was safer for them to hedge 
their bets, as it was not at all clear at that time which side would 
eventually win. While some of them went to Sumatra to join the 
revolutionary forces, others went to British-controlled Singapore to 
organise for the re-establishment of a sultanate. Apparently, those 
prominent in both these spheres of activity were the very same people 
who had achieved some military rank under the command of the Japanese. 
As mentioned above, these people were, moreover, aristocrats and 
others who could claim high traditional status. (For other details of 
this period, see Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:509-534.) 
According to my informants, for the purpose of re-establishing 
the Riau-Lingga sultanate, an organisation was formed in Singapore 
with the name Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati 'Union of True-born Riau 
Melayu'. My informants said that the words Melayu Riau Sejati 'True-
born Riau Melayu' meant that only people who were truly of Riau Melayu 
origins could join this organisation. However, they did not explain 
why it was considered necessary to make this ethnic distinction, since 
it implies the political interference of non-Melayu Riau inhabitants 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, Melayu people who were not of 
Riau origins. 
I have since found out from Yong Mun Cheong (personal 
24 
communication) that there was indeed a rival Riau group which was 
formed by certain people described in the Dutch documents as niet-
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Riouwers 'non-Riau people'. Apparently, these included Minangkabau, 
Javanese, and Batak. The leader of this group was one Iljas, who was 
a pro-Republican Minangkabau. The aim of this group was to bring 
about the inclusion of the Riau-Lingga archipelago within the 
political structure of Republik Indonesia. This group formed various 
interlinked organisations, one of which was the Badan Kebangsaan 
Indonesia Riau 'Organisation of the Indonesian People of Riau'. It is 
interesting that my informants made no mention of this rival group at 
all. 
The office of the P.-ersatuan Melayu Riau Sejati was located on 
High Street, then a prestigious area in Singapore. Funds for this 
organisation came from several prominent Chinese merchants, who were 
promised contracts and monopolies after the re-establishment of the 
sultanate. One of the merchants named by my informants was a certain 
'Babi' Lee of the Keppel Bus Company, who advanced the Persatuan a sum 
of forty-five thousand dollars in the British currency of the time. 
In return for this, he was promised the monopoly of the building and 
construction industry in the pending Riau-Lingga sultanate. Two other 
merchants who were mentioned were Lim Choo Seng and Hoe Chap Teck. 
However, Yong Mun Cheong (personal communication) says that 
25 
according to the Dutch documents he has read, the Chinese merchant 
prominently involved with the Persatuan was a certain Koh Peng Kuan of 
Geylang, who was promised the monopoly of tin-mining in return for his 
sponsorship of the sultanate. Yong Mun Cheong has also pointed out 
that this Chinese merchant was sponsoring the rival Republican group 
led by Iljas at the same time. Koh was apparently backing both rival 
groups, in the calculation that one of them would eventually win. 
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A son of the last sultan, Tengku Ibrahim (also known as Tengku 
Besar), was chosen as the sultan-to-be. As mentioned above, he had 
previously been amir under the Japanese. Apparently, there was some 
dissension about this choice. Major Raja Haji Muhamad Yunus, who had 
been the Japanese-appointed commander of Batalyon Kepulauan Riau, was 
also a contender for the throne, on the basis of his military 
position, particularly since the indigenous troops still had their 
arms. My informants' account and the documentary evidence tally on 
this point concerning the two pretenders to the throne. However, my 
informants mention another candidate by the name of Tengku Endut of 
Pahang; it is not clear on what basis he made his claim. 
According to my informants, the faction which favoured Tengku 
Ibrahim prevailed. Major Raja Haji Muhamad Yunus went to Sumatra with 
his followers to join a republican group known as the Persatuan Merah 
Putih 'Union of the Red and White', these being the colours of the 
Indonesian flag. The royalist movement thus lost its military wing. 
Tengku Endut apparently also disappeared from the scene. 
Having settled on their candidate for the throne, the royalists 
now began negotiations with the Dutch. My informants said that 
General van Mook was the Dutch authority with whom the Persatuan 
carried out its negotiations. Dr H.J. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor-
General, was indeed then in charge of managing some kind of compromise 
between Indonesian republicanism and Dutch colonialism. (See Schiller 
1955:19-21.) In 1946 he proposed the formation of 'a federal 
Commonwealth of Indonesia, which ••• would become a member, along with 
Holland, Curacao and Surinam, of the Kingdom of the Netherlands' 
(ibid.:19). In this scheme, Republik Indonesia would be merely one 
state in the federal Commonwealth of Indonesia with its territory 
limited only to certain areas of Java and Sumatra. 
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Moreover, in this scheme, Riau-Lingga would not belong to 
Republik Indonesia. And indeed in 1947, the Dutch set up three 'neo-
lands' in the three island-groups of Bangka, Billiton, and Riau-
Lingga, appointing three local councils to represent the respective 
population of each of these areas. (See ibid.:111.) Apparently, to 
gain some political leverage in the Riau-Lingga local council, some 
members of the Singapore-based Persatuan had returned to Tanjungpinang 
to form another organisation, known as the Jawatan Kuasa Pengurus 
Rakyat Riau 'Authority of the Representatives of the People of Riau', 
with the explicit purpose of 'restoring kingship in Riau' 
(mengembalikkan kedaulatan Riau). According to Yong Mun Cheong 
(personal communication), the rival group led by Iljas had also sent 
members back to Tanjungpinang. Apparently, it was the latter group 
that eventually gained the upper hand, for when the local council was 
formed by the Dutch, only three out of the fifteen members were drawn 
from the Jawatan Kuasa Pengurus Rakyat Riau; the others were from the 
Iljas-led group. 
An informant who said that he was the President of the Persatuan 
Melayu Riau Sejati -- Raja Daud Abubakar -- is proud of the role he 
personally played in getting the Dutch to change the Dutch name of the 
local council from Riouwraad 'Riau Council' to its Malay equivalent, 
Dewan Rakyat. The reason put forward was that the local council 
should not have an alien Dutch name which could not be understood by 
the people the council was supposed to represent. After the change of 
name, the Persatuan apparently held a celebration in Singapore. But 
this seems to have been the only victory achieved by the Persatuan. 
By 5 January 1949, the Dutch forces fighting the revolutionary 
forces had accepted a UN call for a ceasefire. (See Ricklefs 
1981:219.) Later that year, the Dutch colonialists and the Indonesian 
nationalists met and agreed on the formation of a Republik Indonesia 
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Serikat 'Republic of the United States of Indonesia', which was to be 
loosely united with the Netherlands, under the Dutch queen as symbolic 
head. (See ibid.:220; Schiller 1955:337.) 
Republic Indonesia Serikat comprised seven states, nine 
constitutional units of lesser status, and several minor 
areas of lower rank. 
(Schiller:ibid.) 
Negara Republik Indonesia was one of the seven states; the 'neo-land' 
of Riau was apparently one of the several minor areas of lower rank. 
(See ibid.:337,432.) But during the next few months following its 
inception, Negara Republik Indonesia gradually incorporated the other 
political units, eventually forming the single unifed polity of 
Republik Indonesia. Significantly, the last areas to be incorporated 
were those in the western part of the archipelago. 
These areas became known as the 'recovered regions' (daerah-
daerah pulihan). 
(Ibid.:338). 
Among the very last areas to join Republik Indonesia was the 'neo-
land' of Riau, which was not incorporated until 4 April 1950. (See 
ibid.:432.) It was thus one of the last 'recovered regions'. There 
were apparently no plebiscites conducted in any of the 'recovered 
regions'. Only in four instances did the existing assembly take 
action. In the other cases, 'exceptional means', to use Schiller's 
term, were employed by the federal government, whereby political 
autonomy was withdrawn from the existing local authorities. (See 
ibid.:338.) 
With incorporation into Republik Indonesia, there was not much of 
a chance left to resuscitate the Riau-Lingga sultanate. The raison 
d'etre of the Persatuan was gone, and with it the Persatuan itself. 
From my informants' accounts, it seems that some of the members who 
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were still in Singapore then returned to Tanjungpinang, and joined the 
new Indonesian civil service at the regional level. Evidently, these 
royalists wanted to be in a position of authority in Riau, be it in 
one guise or another. 
3.7 Zaman Indonesia 
From my informants' perspective, it seems that zaman Indonesia 
' may be divided into three distinct periods -- the period of duty-free 
trade, Konfrontasi 'Confrontation with Malaysia', and Orde Baru 'The 
New Order'. From 1950 to 1963, Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau -- namely, 
the Riau, Lingga, and Tujuh islands -- was a duty-free trade zone 
within Republik Indonesia. This was no innovation; it was merely a 
continuation of Dutch policy during the colonial era, when the Riau-
Lingga-Tujuh islands were designated buiten de tolgebied 'exempt from 
taxation'. So, as before, imports into the zone were not dutiable; 
tax was levied only when these imports were brought into other parts 
of the republic. 
Moreover, the currency in use in this duty-free zone was not the 
Indonesian rupiah but the dollar of British Malaya. (See Muchtar 
Lufti et al 1977:631.) Consequently, imports were cheaper and more 
accessible to the inhabitants of this zone than they were to other 
Indonesians. Indeed, my informants remember this period as a time of 
economic plenty. 
From 1950 to 1958 the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands formed the 
administrative unit of Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau, which was 
incorporated into Propinsi Sumatra Tengah 'Province of Middle 
Sumatra', with the provincial capital located at Bukittinggi in West 
Sumatra. (See ibid.:625-626.) In 1958, Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' 
was differentiated out of Propinsi Sumatra Tengah, with the provincial 
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capital of the former located at Tanjungpinang. (See ibid.:667-672.) 
Tanjungpinang was thus not only the hub of regional trade; it was also 
the administrative centre. 
Such a situation, however, led to considerable regional autonomy, 
both economically and politically. So action was taken by the 
Indonesian Government to alter this situation and enhance the 
integration of the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands into the national 
context. One such alteration occurred in 1960 when the provincial 
capital was shifted from Tanjungpinang in the insular part of the 
province to Pekanbaru in inland Sumatra. (See ibid.:696-697.) 
Tanjungpinang was thus demoted from being the provincial centre to 
being part of the provincial periphery. 
The next important event was !2.!!i!"ontasi. In 1963, President 
Sukarno declared that Indonesia was in a state of military 
'Confrontation' against the newly formed nation-state of Malaysia, 
which incorported the territories of Malaya, Singapore, and British 
North Borneo. Diplomatic ties and trade links between the two nations 
were broken. As noted by Muchtar Lufti et al (ibid.:703-705), Riau 
was the area of Indonesia most severely affected by the consequences 
of Konfrontasi, because of the total severance of the international 
trade on which the people of the area depended. The central 
government's efforts to make up for the loss of international trade 
were unsuccessful. Consequently, there was an increase in smuggling 
and the growth of the black market. 
The central government also banned the use of Malaysian currency 
in Riau, and introduced instead a new currency for the area called 
rupiah Kepulauan Riau 'rupiah of the Riau Archipelago', with the 
acronym of KRRP. Because at that time, the market rate of exchange 
was one thousand ordinary Indonesian rupiah to three Malaysian dollars 
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(Rp 1000 = M$3), this also became the market rate of exchange between 
the ordinary Indonesian rupiah and the newly introduced KRRP. 
Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau was thus an economically isolated area, cut 
off from international trade, yet also separated from the rest of the 
republic, including the Sumatran part of Riau Province, which used the 
ordinary Indonesian rupiah. (See ibid.:704.) My informants remember 
Konf rontasi as a period of economic hardship when even rice was 
scarce, and when they had to engage in smuggling just to obtain the 
necessities of life. Many of them sneaked regularly into Malaysia via 
Pengerang on the southeastern tip of the Malay Peninsula, which became 
a major trading centre for them. (See Map 1.) 
Even more interesting is what some informants told me about their 
personal role in Konfrontasi. Apparently, the Indonesian Government 
had formed a government-in-exile of what they termed Republik Malaya 
'Republic of Malaya', complete with what were supposed to be its own 
forces -- the Tentara Nasional Malaya (TNM) 'National Forces of 
Malaya'. This supposed government-in-exile was based in the Riau 
area, specifically in Belakang Padang on Bulan, and Tanjungbalai in 
Karimun. The TNM had their military training on Batam. Muchtar Lufti 
et al (ibid.:705-706) confirm that Riau did become the Indonesian 
military base for confronting Malaysia, with troops occupying the 
islands and coastal areas nearest to Singapore and the Malay 
Peninsula. As the authors describe it, the Riau area had the 
atmosphere of being in a state of war, with the inhabitants being 
forced to give provisions to the troops. The majority of the troops 
were volunteers drawn from the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) 
'Communist Party of Indonesia'. Apparently, these volunteers included 
some ethnic Chinese who were used as secret agents operating in 
Singapore. 
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According to my informants, several prominent Melayu aristocrats 
in Riau were recruited into this government-in-exile, so as to boost 
its ethnic Melayu component, the other members being largely 
Minangkabau people both from Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. Those 
of my informants who were involved in this government-in-exile said 
that they had little choice but to join when asked to by the 
Indonesian Government. Had they refused, they would have been accused 
of un-patriotic treason. My informants said that the members of the 
Malayan Communist Party were also involved in the TNM; most of these 
were apparently ethnic Chinese from Malaya and Singapore, including 
both men and women. My informants stressed that they themselves had 
no sympathies with the Communists, and were involved only because they 
were forced to serve as token figureheads. 
However, they subsequently had a chance of secretly expressing 
their reluctance. The Indonesian government decided that an invasion 
of Malaysia should be launched by paratroopers landing in Johar. As 
it happened, it fell to the lot of some Melayu members of the 
government-in-exile to pick the paratroopers who were to participate 
in this invasion. My informants said that those of them who had this 
responsibility conferred among themselves saying: why should we help 
the Javanese to fight our own kin in Malaysia? Consequently, they 
took care to pick only Javanese names for the paratrooper force. Then 
they secretly radioed the Malaysian government to inform them of the 
time and place of the invasion. As a result, the Malaysian army was 
waiting for the paratroopers when they landed. 
Then came the failed coup d'etat attempted by the Communist Party 
of Indonesia. This is now officially referred to as 'G30S', an 
acronym for Gerakan 30 September 'Movement of 30 September (1965)'. 
My informants who were in the Malayan government-in-exile said that 
they were very quick to issue a public declaration denouncing the 
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Communists for having misled them. They said that others who did not 
do so immediately were subsequently either imprisoned or executed. 
Despite having been the military base during Konfrontasi, Kabupaten 
Kepulauan Riau was evidently not regarded as a Communist stronghold by 
the anti-Communist elements who were now in political and military 
ascendancy in Indonesia. Consequently, my informants said, the people 
of Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau were spared the horrific massacres of 
26 
Communists that occurred elsewhere in Indonesia. 
The Orde Baru 'New Order' followed 'G30S'. This is still the 
order of the day. The label refers to the Suharto government which 
came to power after the attempted coup, sometime in 1966. (See 
Muchtar Lufti et al ibid.:11-752.) Although there have been periods 
of uneasiness at various time under the 'New Order', for Kabupaten 
Kepulauan Riau this has generally been a period of relative stability, 
particularly in comparison to the turbulence of Konfrontasi and 
'G30s'. The full economic integration of the kabupaten into the 
Indonesian economy also dates only from this period: the Indonesian 
rupiah has replaced the KRRP. 
But to date, this period of relative calm has been in existence 
for only some nineteen years. Given the brief time-span, it is 
perhaps understandable that my informants still regard zaman Indonesia 
as a recent phenomenon, the permanence of which they are still not 
quite certain. After all, who knows how long the 'New Order' will 
last and what will replace it? In this context, it is just as 
plausible for my informants to bracket zaman Indonesia within zaman 
sultan, as it is to bracket zaman sultan within zaman Indonesia. 
Indeed, it is perhaps psychologically more secure to construct a 
worldview on the rock of the unchanging past, rather than on the 
shifting sands of the unknown future, particularly since people like 
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my informants have very little, if any, say in the making of this 
Indonesian future. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, Kabupaten 
Kepulauan Riau is both geographically and politically peripheral in 
the context of the Indonesian nation-state. National politics are 
decided upon by the powerful in Jakarta, not by the powerless in Riau. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
1. See Appendix 3 for an explication of zaman. 
2. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
[Dulu-dulu] orang tidak ikut raja dan sultan kecuali 
terpaksa. Kalau paksa, ini pakai keris •••• Orang ••• dulu 
ada batinnya sendiri, lain daripada raja dan sultan. 
Raja-raja buat kacau, gadoh. Dia nak perintah, dia pun 
nak perintah •••• Belakang tak ada raja lagi, naik 
pemerintah, naik komunis. Tapi sama jugak, buat kacau. 
3. See Appendix 4 for a discussion of the prehistory of boat-
dwelling nomadism. 
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4. Such a pattern of political organisation would have been quite in 
keeping with the rest of Southeast Asia. Wolters (1982:16-33) 
describes the formation of the state in Southeast Asia in terms 
of the Sanskritic concept of the mandala 'circle of kings'. 
In each of these mandalas, one king, identified with 
divine and "universal" authority, claimed personal 
hegemony over the other rulers in his mandala who in 
theory were his obedient allies and vassals. In 
practice, the ~andala ••• represented a particular and 
of ten unstable political situation in a vaguely definable 
geographical area without fixed boundaries and where 
smaller centres tended to look in all directions for 
security. Mandalas would expand and contract in 
concertina-like fashion. Each one contained several 
tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate their 
vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to build 
up their own networks of vassals. 
(Ibid.:16-17). 
In this situation, the king would have been merely a glorified 
chief. The main difference between such a king and a local chief 
would be the farmer's claim to personal authority over other 
chiefs. This would accord with Service's (1975:xii) general 
argument with regards to state formation, that 'the origins of 
government lay essentially in the institutionalisation of 
centralised leadership'. The stability of state government would 
thus depend on the extent to which centralised leadership could 
be institutionalised. In the case of Southeast Asia, it seems 
that centralised leadership was, as a whole, rather weakly 
institutionalised, being founded not upon unquestioned hegemony, 
but rather, upon a network of alliances that were, at least to 
some extent, voluntaristic. (See Wolters 1982; Hall 1976:1-24.) 
5. Bloch (1932:204) describes feudalism in Carolignian and post-
Carolignian Europe thus: 
In the absence then of a strong state, of blood ties 
capable of dominating the whole life and of an economic 
system founded upon money payments, there grew up in 
Carolingian and post-Carolingian society relations of man 
to man of a peculiar type. The superior individual 
granted his protection and divers material advantages 
that assured a subsistence to the dependent directly or 
indirectly; the inferior pledged various prestations or 
various services and was under a general obligation to 
render aid. These relations were not always freely 
assumed nor did they imply a universally satisfactory 
equilibrium between the two parties. Built upon 
authority, the feudal regime never ceased to contain a 
great number of constraints, violences and abuses. 
However, this idea of the personal bond, hierarchic and 
synallagmatic in character, dominated European feudalism. 
154 
6. Sopher (1977:267) notes that 'the preservation of titles like 
batin and panglima is actually an archaic feature which 
distinguishes the Orang Laut from the civilised Malays.' He also 
offers the following suggestion (ibid.:268) for the origins of 
the title batin: 
••• A possible antecedent of the term is to be found in 
the province of the Lampongs in Sumatra, at the southern 
end of the broad eastern lowland of that island. In this 
area of Sumatra Malay high culture, the title ~ is in 
use, denoting 'chief' or 'headman'; specifically, in the 
Lampong dialect the word has the meaning of 'rich', so 
that the title is equivalent to the Malay 'Orang 
Kaya' •••• This ••• suggests that the title batin among the 
primitive peoples farther north may not be an indigenous 
one, but an obsolete Malay term; its retention and 
extension among the forest and sea nomads together with 
its disappearance from civilised Malay hierarchies is of 
culture-historical interest, suggesting centuries-old 
usage among the former. 
7. See Reid (1979) on the demise of the sultanates in North Sumatra. 
8. With regards to the archaeolgical evidence for the existence of 
Srivijaya, Bronson (1979:398-399) has pointed out: 
Only in the seventh century do objects begin to 
appear ••• whose age is not open to serious doubt •••• 
Before that we are in a dark age. As far as we know now, 
Srivijaya sprang fully formed within one or two decades 
from antecedents which, although perhaps progressive and 
complexly organised, are singularly hard to find •••• 
Nothing we now know about the historical and 
archaeological Srivijaya of the late seventh century 
forces us to assume a long period of indigenous 
development. Yet still we may feel that a certain 
implausibility inheres in the idea that the development 
of states and civilisation in Sumatra (and for that 
matter in Java and Borneo) lagged so as far as this 
behind the same process on the South East Asian mainland. 
As I have mentioned in the text, state formation in Southeast 
Asia as a whole may perhaps be dated to the second century A.D. 
(See Mabbett 1977b:143.) So as Bronson (ibid.) has pointed out, 
if we can firmly date Srivajaya only from the seventh century 
onwards, then that would indicate that this was a relatively late 
kingdom that arose only after other kingdoms had been established 
in the area. Bronson (ibid.) finds this relative lateness 
implausible. And perhaps so does Wolters (1970:1-2, 181-183), 
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for he suggests that Srivijaya was preceded by another kingdom 
located also in south-eastern Sumatra. Chinese records of the 
fifth and sixth centuries refer to this earlier kingdom as Kan-
t' o-li, a name which Paranavitana (1966:4-5) has interpreted as 
derived from the Sanskrit word kandara, meaning 'torn away or 
broken by water. A name with such an etymological connotation 
could be interpreted as referring to Sumatra, a piece of land 
torn away by the Straits of Melaka. But even if we accept 
Wolters' suggestion of a preceding Kan-t'o-li, this would still 
mean only a dating going back to the fifth century. The 
implication would still be that Srivijaya was a relatively late 
state, patterned after the other earlier kingdoms. 
There is, however, an alternative explanation for the relative 
paucity of archaeological evidence. As Kumar (1974:148) has 
argued: 
The explanation of this probably lies in the different 
nature of the empire of Sri Vijaya; it was primarily a 
maritime empire, based on sea-borne trade. The Javanese 
kingdoms, with their more substantial agricultural base 
and denser population, had a more settled society with a 
labour surplus which could be used for the construction 
of great monuments. 
There are nevertheless some thirty seventh-century stone 
inscriptions found in Palembang; these constitute the majority of 
such finds in the whole of Sumatra. Between ten to sixteen 
statues have also been found in the Palembang area, dating from 
the first millenium. (See Bronson 1979:400-401.) This 
archaeological evidence may be regarded as supportive of Coedes' 
(1918) location of Srivijaya in southern Sumatra, and also 
Wolters' (1970) identification of Srivijaya with Palembang. But 
whether or not Srivijaya and Palembang are indeed one, Palembang 
itself was evidently an important place. 
9. The first written account of the place comes from the Chinese 
pilgrim I-Ching, who had set out from China in 671 A.D. on a 
journey to India. 
He embarked on a Persian ship and his first port of call 
was Palembang, where he stayed for six months to learn 
Sanskrit. 
(Kumar 1974:143). 
I-Ching reported that there were over one thousand Buddhist monks 
there. At the end of his six-month stay, he sailed to India in a 
ship belonging to the king of Palembang. (See ibid.) 
This little account already gives a good depiction of the place. 
By the seventh century, it seems to have been a cosmopolitan port 
visited by ships from many countries, including China and Persia. 
The king of Palembang owned ships which sailed to India. 
Palembang was evidently an important Buddhist centre, perhaps 
even more Buddhistic than China was at the time, since a Chinese 
pilgrim journeying to India was apparently impressed by the 
number of monks in residence and the facilities for studying 
Sanskrit. 
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I mentioned above that the early Southeast Asian king was of ten 
only a glorified chief. Archaeological and historical evidence 
indicates that for the region as a whole, the trappings of such 
glorification were first derived from Sanskritic and Buddhistic 
civilisation. The rise of the early Southeast Asian kingdoms was 
thus also the beginning of the process known as 'Indianisation'. 
(See Mabbett 1977a and 1977b.) The establishment of Palembang as 
an important centre of Buddhist studies was evidently part of 
this process. The archaeological finds found in Palembang 
include inscriptions in an Indic script, statues of Buddhas and 
Boddhisattvas, and the remains of a stupa. (See Bronson 
1979:399-402.) 
10. Wilkinson (1935:12) suggests that Srivijaya was 'a sort of 
federation of trading ports on the fringe of a large area of 
forest'. Wolters (1970:9) concurs in this opinion: 
The territories under the Maharaja's control comprised a 
number of of ten distant settlements on the estuaries of 
the eastern coast of Sumatra, on the numerous and 
important islands off this coast, of which the largest 
were in the Riau and Lingga archipelagoes, and in the 
Malay Peninsula. 
I have mentioned in Chapter Two that the coastal states were 
based not on agriculture, but on trade. (See Geertz 1963.) As a 
coastal state, therefore, Srivijaya was not likely to have an 
agricultural base of any significance. Indeed, in 1225, a 
Chinese visitor noted that rice was imported into Srivijaya, 
while another Chinese visitor fifty years earlier had noted that 
the population of the surrounding area did not pay taxes, thus 
hinting that the ruler obtained revenue from elsewhere. (See 
Wolters 1970:8.) 
Wolters (ibid.:8-9) describes its ecological conditions thus: 
The mangrove swamps on the south-eastern coast of 
Sumatra, safeguarding the survival of groups of sea-
nomads and forest dwellers, were the major reason for a 
lack of agricultural development and the absence of a 
concentrated population close to the ruler's capital. 
The federation of ports which constituted such a state changed 
through time. Some ports were newly founded, while others fell 
into disuse; still others were conquered and occupied by foreign 
powers. For example, Palembang was conquered by the Javanese 
about 1391 (see Wolters 1970:115), and Melaka was conquered by 
the Portuguese in 1511 (see Andaya and Andaya 1982:56). But 
although the network of alliances changed its shape through time, 
so long as there was enough to keep trade going, the kingdom was 
able to survive. Statecraft in such a situation may perhaps be 
compared to guerilla warfare. It expanded and contracted 
according to circumstances. As in the case of guerilla warfare, 
such states could be crushed only when all avenues of escape were 
totally cut off. This evidently happened only in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Western 
colonisation completely swamped the political ecology of the 
region. 
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11. In the Penurunan, Bintan is described as located near Tanjung 
Rungus at the western extremity of Pengujan. Tanjung Rungus is 
thus the western point of entry to Teluk Bintan or Bintan Bay, 
into which the Bintan river flows. (See Indonesia Pilot 
1975:I,132; also see Map 4.) 
12. According to Wolters (1970:128-135), there are numerous hints in 
the Penurunan suggesting that the founder of the Melaka dynasty 
was consecrated as the god-king of Palembang in an abhiseka 
ceremony, which ritually identified him as a manifestation of the 
bodhisattva Avalokitesvara. However, Wolters does not mention 
what is peculiarly significant about such an identification. The 
point is, in Buddhist mythology, Avalokitesvara is a bisexual 
bodhisattva, who, by the seventh century A.D. (the earliest 
dating we have for Sriviyaja), was already iconographically 
represented in both masculine and feminine forms in many parts of 
the Buddhist world, including China and Japan. (See, for 
example, Boisselier et al 1978.) Icons of Avalokitesvara in 
present-day Chinese Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism still depict 
her/him in both sexes, indeed more often as female than male. 
She/he is popularly known as Guanyin in Chinese, Kannon in 
Japanese. (For more details of the present-day significance of 
Avalokitesvara/Guanyin, see, for example, Wee 1977.) 
Andaya (1975:49) suggests that the abhiseka ceremony invested in 
the god-king of Palembang a spiritual power that may be termed 
sakti. Such a suggestion is also significant with regards to the 
relationship between gender and power, for in Hindu mythology, 
sakti or shakti is 'the female personification of power' 
(Hinnells 1984:293). (See also Wilkinson 1959:1004.) 
Furthermore, this female spiritual power is supposed to be 
actualised only through complementarity with the male principle. 
(See, for example, Mookerjee and Khanna 1977.) Such a dualistic 
logic was of course very suitable for setting up a patrilineal 
dynasty of male rulers, each of whom would inherit this sakti in 
succession. Interestingly, there is a suggestion by Wolters 
(ibid.:131) that the consecrated ruler of Palembang was possibly 
also known as Siva, who is indeed the mythological 
personification of the male principle in conjunction with Sakti. 
(See Mookerjee and Khanna 1977.) 
This association of sakti with political power is still found in 
Java, where it is known as kesakten. (See Anderson 1972:4.) 
An interesting passage (Ht. Pasai 26) tells the story of 
a context between the sakti of a Hindu ascetic and the 
keramat of a Moslem king; victory, of course, went to the 
accepted religion. But Islam only triumphed by putting a 
veneer of orthodoxy over old beliefs; even in the 
Nineteenth Century there was a Yamtuan Sakti in 
Minangkabau and the Negri Sembilan; and the Mustika Adat 
(p. 1) speaks of warriors who are sakti at the present 
day. 
(Wilkinson 1959:1004). 
13. After Islamisation, sakti was converted to daulat, a word which 
Wilkinson (1959:261) explains as denoting 'the divine element in 
kingship; the divinity that hedges a king.' Despite 
Islamisation, however, daulat continued to be a quality which 
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could be held solely by males, since only males could be rulers. 
But as we shall see below, the reason for male rule in Islamic 
legitimation is quite different from that of the Hindu duality of 
male ruler and female sakti. 
14. In this regard, it would be relevant to consider Service's (1975) 
general argument about the development of states from chiefdoms. 
As mentioned in note 4 above, he argues (ibid.:xii) that the 
origins of the state as a political form lies 'essentially in the 
institutionalisation of centralised leadership'. He further 
argues that an important means of such institutionalisation was 
the routinisation of chiefly charisma in the hereditary office of 
kingship. To this I would add that the emergence of such a 
hereditary office was possibly linked to the institutionalisation 
of male rule. 
15. Milner (1981:49) discusses the nature of this personalised power 
in the following terms: 
Every Malay considered himself to be living not under a 
divinely revealed law but under a particular Raja, an 
institution which ••• had deep roots in the Malay world's 
animistic and Indian-influenced past. The Malay word 
often translated as 'state' or 'government', kerajaan, 
means literally 'the condition of having a Raja'. The 
Raja, not the Malay race or an Islamic umma (community) 
was the primary object of loyalty; he was central to 
every aspect to every aspect of Malay life. 
16. There are four distinct 'Sultan Mahmuds' in the history of alam 
Melayu: Sultan Mahmud I was the ruler of Melaka who was defeated 
and driven out by the Portuguese in 1511. After eventually 
setting up court in Bintan, he was again attacked by them. He 
escaped to Kampar where he died. (See Brown 1970.) Sultan 
Mahmud II was the last direct descendant of Sultan Mahmud I; he 
ruled at Kota Tinggi on the Johor river, where he was 
assassinated in 1699. (See Chapter Five.) Sultan Mahmud III 
belonged to the succeeding bendahara dynasty; in 1787 he moved 
his court from the Riau river to Lingga. (See Chapter Four.) 
Sultan Mahmud IV was Sultan Mahmud Ill's son's son; he was 
deposed by the Dutch in 1857. (See Chapter Five.) 
17. In her analysis of the concepts of state articulated in the 
Tuhfat, Matheson (1975:21) notes: 
••• I can find in the Tuhfat no evidence for the existence 
of the state as a concept, an abstract ideal about and 
beyond the ruler, which was to be sustained and 
protected. What does seem to have existed was a complex 
system of personal loyalties, which it was in the ruler's 
interest to maintain. 
18. In the Penurunan, it is explained that 'a just prince is joined 
with the Prophet of God like two jewels in one ring. Moreover, 
the Raja is as it were the deputy of God. When you do your duty 
to the Prophet of God it is as though you were doing your duty to 
God himself' (Brown 1970:111). 
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19. It is not clear when the proselytisation of Islam reached 
Southeast Asia. Fatimi (1963) suggests a date of the eleventh 
century, based on the discovery of two Islamic monuments in 
Indochina. Johns (1981) also points out another indication of 
Islam at about the same time -- that is, the tomstone of one 
Fatimah in East Java. But there seems to be no firm evidence 
about Islamised communities until much later, with the rise of 
the sultanates of Pasai and Melaka. It is not clear when Pasai 
became a sultanate, but according to Johns (1981:67), certain 
Chinese accounts recorded in 1416 that the people and the ruler 
in Melaka were Muslims. Furthermore, 
according to a Portuguese source, the first ruler, or his 
successor, accepted Islam upon marriage to a princess 
from the long-Islamised port city of Pasai, across the 
straits. 
(Johns 1981:67). 
So Pasai was evidently Islamised before Melaka. However, as 
Johns (ibid.:68-69) has pointed out, the degree of Islamisation 
in these sultanates is ambiguous. It is questionable how far 
Islam spread beyond the court and the community of foreign Muslim 
traders. (As we shall see in the chapters below, the degree of 
Islamisation is still a relevant issue in the context of present-
day Riau.) But be that as it may, Melaka did indeed become a 
sultanate. So the term zaman sultan may be considered as 
properly applicable to the Melakan period -- that is, from about 
1400 to 1511 -- and thereafter. (For more details about the 
Melaka sultanate, see Sandhu and Wheatley 1983, Vols. 1 & 2.) 
20. According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1934:IV, 543): 
The word [sultan] is of frequent occurence in the Kur'an, 
most often with the meaning of a moral or magical authority 
supported by proofs or miracles which afford the right to 
make a statement of religious import •••• In the literature 
of the Hadith, sultan has exclusively the sense of power, 
usually governmental power ••• but the word also means 
sometimes the power of Allah. The best known tradition, 
however, is that which begins with the words al-sultan zill 
Allah fi 1 1-ard, 'Governmental power is the shadow of Allah 
upon earth' •••• The word Sultan ••• became the highest title 
that a Muslim prince could obtain •••• 
In this context, it is significant when the ruler of Pasai was 
converted to Islam, he received the title sultan and was 
proclaimed 'God's Shadow on Earth' (zill Allah fi 1-alam). 
Furthermore, 15th-century Melaka coinage proclaimed the ruler as 
sultan, shah, and 'Helper of the World and of the Faith' (Nasir 
al-dunya wa 'l-din). (See Milner 1981:52.) 
21. He is still alive and well and living in Johor Baru, where he is 
well-known as a bomoh 'traditional healer', whose patients 
include the sultan of Johor. He was one of my informants. 
22. This event greatly encouraged Asian nationalism because it 
demonstrated that an Asian nation was capable defeating a 'white' 
nation. See, for example, Hall (1981:767). 
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23. Raja Hitam was the fourth son of Raja Ali Haji, the compiler of 
the Tuhfat, and was himself a royal scribe. (See Matheson and 
Andaya 1982:321.) 
24. Yong Mun Cheong is currently researching on the history of this 
period. 
25. These documents consist largely of Dutch official correspondence 
held at the Royal Archives at the Hague. Yong Mun Cheong has 
kindly given me access to his notes on these documents. 
26. As Ricklefs (1981:274) describes the situation after the abortive 
coup: 
From Java and Bali particularly, there came news of mass 
graves and of streams choked with bodies. No one knows 
who many died in late 1965 and early 1966, for no one 
counted. Most scholars accept a figure of 500,000 
deaths, but this can only be an estimate. 
The failed Communist coup is still remembered as an important 
event in Indonesian history. Indeed, on one of the bureaucratic 
forms I had to fill for obtaining my research visa, there was the 
question: Where were you and what were you doing during 'G30S'? 
Even as a foreigner who was not in Indonesia at that time, I had 
to provide an alibi for myself with regards to an event that had 
occurred more than ten years ago. 
PART '!WO 
THE PAST IN THE PRESENT: 
A REAR-VIEW IMAGE OF ZAMAN SULTAN 
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Like the image one sees in a rear-view mirror, a rear-view image 
of the past is necessarily a selective one shaped by the perspective 
of the present. In this part of the study, I will describe a rear-
view image of zaman sultan 'the era of the sultan', as it appears from 
the perspective of my informants. 
From such a perspective, the different events of the past tend to 
merge, like distant mountains, into a single horizon. The most 
striking landmark on the horizon may not be the nearest low hill, but 
a farther high mountain. In the same way, from my informants' 
perspective, the most significant event of the past may not be the 
most recent, but rather, the one of greatest consequence. Therefore, 
the description of this rear-view image of the past is ordered not 
chronologically, but instead in terms of a metaphorical single horizon 
on which protrude certain prominent landmarks. 
I adopt this perspective because my informants are themselves 
interested in the past not out of historical curiosity, but for its 
significance to them in the present. So my primary concern is not 
with a reconstruction of the past as such, but with an explication of 
its significance to my informants. The rear-view image is thus an 
image of the past-in-the-present, which is located not in the bygone 
past but in the ongoing present. Like a rear-view mirror which 
reflects what is behind us yet presents this image in front of us, the 
past-in-the present is a bracketed part of the present that is 
nevertheless connected to the past. (Because of this overlapping 
between past and present, the grammatical tense of the following 
discussion will also shift to and fro.) 
In Chapter One I pointed out the difference between history and 
nostalgia as modes of discourse, the difference being that in history 
one attempts to reconstruct the past as a knowable object out there, 
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whereas in nostalgia one attempts to reconstruct the past by living 
it, by making the past present. So in the historical mode of 
discourse, one is interested in the past as past, whereas in the 
nostalgic mode of discourse, one is interested in the past-in-the-
present. Which type of past is to be considered more 'real' depends 
on the values one holds. If one values the past precisely because it 
is past, never to return, then one may consider as inauthentic any 
attempt to recreate this bygone past. On the other hand, if one 
values the past because of its consequences for the present, then one 
may consider as relevant only that part of the past that lives on in 
the present. I suggest that my informants hold the latter value. So 
from their perspective, the past-in-the-present is more 'real' than an 
extinct, and hence irrelevant, past. Indeed, they often concluded the 
stories of the past they told me with the following punch-line: 
Ini bukan dongeng. Ini benar. Sekarang masih ada. 
(This is not a myth. This is true. It is still so at 
present.) 
So the status accorded to the past-in-the-present is that it is 'real' 
precisely because it is still present. 
In this part of the study I will thus focus on those portions of 
the past that my informants consider still present. In so doing, 
however, I must also mention other portions of the past that are 
extinct and therefore do not belong to the past-in-the-present. So I 
shall treat this past-in-the-present as a text to be contextualised in 
the larger past, which has been discussed in the last two chapters 
above. In this part of the study I will introduce topics of 
discussion that will be further elaborated upon in Part Three. 
The rear-view image transcends the present by bracketing a part 
of the present in an unchanging past-in-the-present. This also means 
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that it transcends the unique life-experiences of individuals existing 
in the present. So the past that is relevant and existent is not the 
personal past of an individual but what is supposedly the collective 
past of the community. 
Perhaps the most significant portion of the larger past that is 
absent from the past-in-the present is the existence of the sultanate 
as an institutional reality. As mentioned above in Chapter Three, the 
sultanate became institutionally extinct after the sultan was forced 
to abdicate in 1911. Despite this, however, I have found that among 
my informants, an image of the sultanate exists as an ideological 
construction. There is thus an ideology pertaining to a traditional 
state but without the institutional existence of such a state. On the 
contrary, this ideology is encapsulated by the institutional framework 
of a modern nation-state. 
There are two key concepts in this ideological construction --
dera jat 'rank' and keturunan 'descent'. In my informants' usage, the 
word derajat refers to the hierarchy that had prevailed in the bygone 
zaman sultan 'era of the sultan', and the word keturunan refers to the 
inheritance of rank through descent, such that this hierarchy of 
inherited ranks persists even in presentday zaman Indonesia 'the era 
of Indonesia'. To borrow a term from Dumont (1972), my informants' 
usages of derajat and keturunan point to a notion of homo hierarchicus 
-- that is, 'hierarchical personhood'. It is precisely in the 
opposition between this notion and the notion of homo aequalis 
'equal personhood' -- that I found a patterning of difference in the 
perceptions of my various informants. 
What de Tocqueville (1961:II,92) said more than a century ago is 
still of relevance: 
Aristocracy has made a chain of all the members of the 
community, from the peasant to the King; democracy breaks 
that chain and severs every link of it. 
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Indeed, among my informants, I found that the idea of hierarchy is 
strongest among those who can claim aristocratic rank, and that the 
idea of equality is strongest among those who are ascribed lowly ranks 
in the hierarchy. So this ideological construction is itself 
hierarchised, with more adherents among those who can claim high rank, 
than among those who can make no such claim. My Penyengat and Pangkil 
informants are among the former. Since my fieldwork was conducted 
primarily among these informants, the image of zaman sultan that I 
shall describe is basically theirs. 
However, my Penyengat and Pangkil informants' claim to high rank 
is responded to by some of my other informants with a counter-claim to 
equality with the former. Perhaps because of the bias in my research, 
these counter-claims to equality appear to be responses to the prior 
claim of hierarchy, and not first principles in themselves. From such 
a perspective, it would seem that one attempts to break loose from the 
chain of hierarchy, only because one is indeed held by such a chain. 
Because this is the picture that has emerged from my research, I am 
treating these counter-claims to equality not as an alternative 
ideology, but as part of an internal struggle within the context of 
hierarchy. 
The image of hierarchy is indeed so publicly and collectively 
held that it has become an objectification that impinges even upon 
those who do not adhere to it. It has thus become a phenomenon that 
others must deal with in one way or another. The inherent 
contradictions between the claimants to high rank and the non-
claimants to rank, feed back into the rear-view image, such that it 
contains within itself information concerning patterns of domination, 
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submission and resistance, which in turn become the means of 
explaining away the contradictions of the present. Thus even though 
the rear-view image of zaman sultan is a collective objectification, 
it is nevertheless more relevant to some than to others. It is not a 
monolithic structure uniformly shared by all. 
4.1 Derajat 
4.2 Ketu.runa.n 
4.3 Mas Ka.win 
GIAPTER FOUR 
DERAJAT AND KETURUNAN 
RANK AND DESCENT 
4.4 Raja Gelaran and Raja Keturunan 
4.5 Keturunan Raja and Keturunan Tengku 
4.6 Raja Hamidah's Mas Kawin 
4.7 The Male Monopoly of Political Office 
4.8 'Sultan' Fatimah 
4.1 Derajat 
When talking about zaman sultan, a term that is invariably 
1 
mentioned by my informants is derajat. Wilkinson (1959:259) 
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translates the word as 'step; scale; grade; rank.' These ~erajat are 
indeed ranked in a single top-to-bottom hierarchy thus: 
raja, tengku 'princes' 
tuan said 'descendants of the Prophet Muhammad' 
encik datuk 'local chiefs' 
encik keturunan 'personages of honourable descent' 
keturunan Bintan 'descendants of Bintan' 
orang biasa 'ordinary people' 
hamba raja 'serfs' 
hamba orang 'slaves'. 
This mode of hierarchisation is referred to as tingkatan 
'vertical layering', by which is meant that each derajat formerly had 
a specified ceremonial 'seating place' (tempat duduk) in the sultan's 
'pavilion' or 'hall of audience' (balai). There were apparently three 
'levels of seating places' (tingkat tempat duduk): Di atas tingkat 
'on the platform or raised dais' was the highest point in the 
pavilion. Di tengah 'in the middle' was at the middle level that 
is, on the floor below the sultan's platform. Di luar pintu 'outside 
the door' was the lowest level, since those outside would have been on 
the ground itself, below the floor of the stilted pavilion. 
Apparently, only the sultan, raja, tengku, and tuan said had the right 
to sit on the dais. The encik datuk, encik keturunan, and keturunan 
Bintan had the right to sit on the floor of the pavilion. And the 
orang biasa, the hamba raja, and the hamba orang could only sit or 
stand on the ground outside the pavilion. 
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There is no longer any sultan's pavilion in existence in Riau. 
So the desc~iption of tingkatan given above by my informants is in the 
realm of mythology, which depicts the hierarchy in structural 
relations that were supposed to have been physically expressed: 
high low 
inside outside 
I term these 'structural relations', not 'structural oppositions', 
because the focus of my informants' discourse on hierarchy is 
integration and not disjunction: The hierarchy integrated the 
2 
different ranks within one system of relations. The entire polity 
was supposed to have been encompassed in this hierarchy. So the 
physical arrangement of the court, in terms of the structural 
relations described above, was supposed to have represented the polity 
at large. The court was thus a symbolic microcosm of the political 
macrocosm. 
My informants further divide the derajat named above into the 
following categories: The raja, tengku, and tuan said were orang 
bangsawan 'aristocrats'. The encik datuk, encik keturunan and orang 
biasa were orang merdeka 'free people'. The keturunan Bintan and 
hamba raja were orang kerahan 'vassals'. And the hamba orang were 
orang hamba 'slaves'. The free people, vassals and slaves are further 
subsumed under an umbrella category -- orang kebanyakan 'the masses'. 
The description of these categories carries certain implications. 
The term orang bangsawan may be literally translated as 'people of 
3 
breeding'. This emphasises the element of heredity for this category 
of people. In contrast, there is no such emphasis in the labels of 
the other three categories -- namely, the orang merdeka 'free people, 
the orang kerahan 'vassals', and the orang hamba 'slaves'. Instead, 
the description of these three categories implies interactions of a 
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certain nature with some Other. Slave implies master; vassal implies 
feudal lord; and free person -- that is, not-slave, not-vassal --
implies freedom-granting patron. These are thus relational terms, 
implying the interactions of the three lower categories of people with 
the aristocrats who were thereby the masters of the slaves, the feudal 
lords of the vassals, and the freedom-granting patrons of the free 
people. Orang kebanyakan 'the masses' is also a relational term 
implying that the aristocrats were a minority, an elite. These 
relational implications indicate that the hierarchy was not just an 
arbitrary ranking, but a scale of power with the aristocrats as the 
most powerful and the slaves as the least powerful. The hierarchy of 
derajat was thus the political structure of the sultanate itself, with 
the ruling elite on top and the ruled masses at the bottom. 
This divide was further marked by the use of a title to prefix 
4 
the personal name and the patronym of certain people. There were 
basically two kinds of titles -- hereditary titles and bestowed 
titles. The hereditary titles were raja, tengku, and said/syarifah. 
Said is the title for males; syarifah is the title for females. The 
other two titles, raja and tengku, are the same for either gender. 
All members belonging to the three respective derajat had the right to 
bear these titles. Those bearing the title raja were, however, also 
known as engku, a title which implies that they were a little less 
than tengku; those bearing the title said/syarifah were also known as 
wan. My aristocrat informants still maintain their right to bear 
these hereditary titles. 
The bestowed titles were those conferred upon individuals 
belonging to the lower derajat. These titles were non-hereditary and 
each title-holder had to be appointed anew. The phrase datuk kaya 
'rich grandparent' was the common element in these titles which 
otherwise varied with each individual title-holder. Some examples of 
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such titles were Datuk Kaya Mepar, Datuk Kaya Sang Ir, and Datuk Kaya 
Indrajaya. The individual title-holders were thereby promoted from 
their own derajat to that of encik datuk. The derajat of encik datuk 
thus consisted of individuals elevated from the lower derajat. 
The children of an encik datuk could be called encik as a matter 
of courtesy. But this was more of an honorific than a title, the 
difference being that a title denoted nobility, office, or 
5 
distinction, whereas an honorific merely signified respect. The 
three lowest derajat namely, the 'ordinary people' (orang biasa), 
the 'serfs' (hamba raja), and the 'slaves' (hamba orang) -- were not 
privileged to be termed encik as a mark of respect. 
This usage of titles thereby differentiated the ranks of the 
hierarchy into the orang yartg bergelar 'people bearing titles' or the 
orang yang berpangkat 'people holding office' on the one hand, and the 
orang kecil 'small people' on the other hand. Among the former, only 
the aristocrats bearing hereditary titles constituted a self-
perpetuating ruling class, whereas the individual datuk kaya, the 
honourable encik, and the orang biasa 'ordinary people' constituted 
the orang pertengahan 'middle people' who mediated between the ruling 
aristocracy and the ruled 'small people'. 
While my informants unanimously agree that derajat did exist in 
zaman sultan, they nevertheless differ in their opinions concerning 
its relevance in the present. These differences are directly related 
to the rank they can claim on the hierarchy on the basis of descent. 
For example, an informant who can claim to be a raja on the basis of 
descent is more likely to see the present-day relevance of derajat, 
than another informant who can only claim to be a hamba orang. Since 
those who are more interested in a particular matter generally know 
more about it and are more ready to comment on it, the description of 
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derajat in this chapter cannot help but be coloured by the opinions of 
interested parties. 
4.2 Keturunan 
From the perspective of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants, the 
Melayu people of Riau still belong to different derajat, even though 
there has not been a sultanate since 1911. By their reckoning, 
derajat persists because keturunan exists. As they explained, derajat 
menurut keturunan 'rank goes with descent' and keturunan ikut sebelah 
bapak 'descent follows the father's side'. One informant, a male 
raja, explained the connection between derajat and keturunan to me in 
the following way: 
Keturunan atau zuriat ikut sebelah laki-laki. Kalau ikut 
Islam, laki-laki yang membawa keturunan; perempuan tak 
bawa •••• Jadi, tengku perempuan dan raja perempuan tidak 
mau kawin sama orang biasa, kerana takut hilang darah. 
6 (Descent or zuriat follows the male side. If we follow 
Islam, it is the male who carries descent; the female does 
not carry it •••• So female tengku and female raja do not 
want to marry ordinary people, for fear of losing their 
blood.) 
However, the idea that keturunan is patrilineal is not limited to 
the aristocrats alone, but is shared by people of the other ranks. 
For example, an informant who belonged to the rank of orang biasa 
'ordinary people' said: 
Keturunan dari b~p_ak, kerana darah dari bapak. Perempuan 
lemah. 
7 (Descent is from the father, because blood is from the 
father. The female is weak.) 
Significantly, however, among some informants who belong to the 
rank of hamba raja 'serfs', keturunan does not seem to be regarded as 
exclusively patrilineal. One such informant said: 
Keturunan kuat dari sebelah bapak. Keturunan lemah dari 
sebelah mak. 
(Descent is stronger from the father and weaker from the 
mother.) 
Another informant from the same rank said: 
Payah nak sebut keturunan orang kerana bapak satu keturunan, 
mak satu keturunan lagi. 
(It is hard to state people's descent, because the father is 
of one descent, and the mother is of another descent.) 
In this light, it is significant that my raja informant cited 
above specially mentioned Islam to support the case for 
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patrilineality. As he put it, 'if we follow Islam, it is the male who 
carries descent; the female does not carry it'. So the implication is 
that if one does not follow Islam, then even the female can carry 
descent. As we shall see below, in the context of Riau, the 
aristocrats may be perceived as the most Islamic of my informants, and 
those belonging to the rank of 'serf' as the least Islamic. So there 
is a connection between Islam and patrilineality, such that the most 
Islamic are the most patrilineal and the least Islamic are the least 
patrilineal. Indeed, I would suggest that there is an inherent 
tension between patrilineal descent and bilateral f iliation within the 
hierarchy, a tension which is manifested in the rear-view image of 
zaman sultan. 
Even my aristocrat informants recognise bilateral filiation, for 
they differentiate between anak gahara and anak gundik. An anak 
gahara is a child born of an aristocrat father and an aristocrat 
mother. An anak gundik is a child born of an aristocrat father and a 
8 
commoner mother. An anak gahara ranks higher than an anak gundik, 
the former being high-born on both sides, whereas the latter is high-
born only on the father's side. Thus even among the aristocrats, 
patrilineal descent can be further qualified by matrifiliation. The 
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child of an aristocrat mother and a commoner father, however, is not 
considered aristocratic at all. So even though matrifiliation can 
qualify patrilineality, the former is not supposed to supersede the 
latter. As we shall see below, some of my informants think that it 
was precisely the supersession of matrifiliation over patrilineality 
that led to the demise of the sultanate. 
I am using the terms 'filiation' and 'descent' in Fortes' sense 
(1969:250-310) -- that is, where filiation refers to the parent-child 
relationship operative primarily in the familial domain, and where 
descent refers to the ancestor-descendant relationship operative 
primarily in the extra-familial domain of political and jural 
9 
institutions. Complementary filiation is significant in this 
context, for that is the emphasis on filiation with the parent who 
does not transmit descent. Fortes (ibid.:254) points out that this is 
an important mechanism for segmentation within the descent category. 
So the anak gahara and the anak gundik of the aristocrats may be 
understood as the consequences of segmentation through complementary 
filiation -- namely, the mother who does not transmit keturunan. 
In the context of natural demographic proliferation, such a means 
of segmentation would have been strategically useful for the male anak 
gahara - that is, the male aristocrats who were high-born on both 
sides. On the one hand, they would be differentiated from their 
gundik brothers who were born of commoner mothers. And on the other 
hand, they would be differentiated from their gahara sisters, who were 
high-born but were not able to transmit their patrilineal descent. 
This dual differentiation would have marked out the male anak gahara 
as the true descendants of their patri-line. 
According to my raja informants, during zaman sultan the 
distinction between anak gahara and anak gundik was formerly so 
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important that they were not even supposed to eat together. They said 
that it was Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali [1845-1857] who eventually 
banned this practice of commensal segregation, because he considered 
it un-Islamic. Even so, as a raja informant put it, 
Anak gahara tinggal di Penyengat; anak gundik dibuang 
keluar. 
(The anak gahara lived on Penyengat, whereas the anak gundik 
were thrown outside.) 
As mentioned in the preceding chapters, Penyengat was the yamtuan 
muda's capital. Apparently, the aristocrats born of commoner mothers 
often had to leave Penyengat to settle elsewhere. My informants 
mentioned Ketir near Bintan as an example of a settlement that was 
founded by a gundik aristocrat from Penyengat - namely Raja Haji Umar, 
10 
also known as Raja Endut. (See Map 4.) 
Patrilineal descent was thus modified by complementary filiation 
through one's mother. Following Sheffler (1973:756-765), I think it 
is useful to make a differentiation between kinship ideology and 
descent ideology. The major difference between these two ideologies 
is their respective focus: the categories of kinship ideology are 
egocentrically derived; those of descent ideology are derived 
sociocentrically from at least one apical ancestor. The categories 
bapak 'father' and mak 'mother' are egocentrically derived in relation 
to the anak 'child'; so these are categories pertaining to kinship 
ideology. But the categories raja, tengku, tuan said, and so on are 
sociocentrically derived from apical ancestors; so these are 
categories pertaining to descent ideology. The tension between these 
two ideologies is intensified by the bilateral kinship terminology 
which makes no linguistic differentiation between the mother's kin and 
the father's kin. The kinship terminology thus contradicts the 
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descent ideology where the father's kin is the more important by 
virtue of keturunan. The result of this ideological tension is the 
opposition between matrifiliation (that is, the filiation that does 
not transmit descent) and patrilineal descent. 
The importance of matrif iliation was apparently enhanced by the 
residence rule that marriage should be uxorilocal. My raja informants 
said that this rule was strictly observed by the Penyengat people in 
zaman sultan. If a man had several daughters, he would extend his 
house so as to accomodate all his daughters and their husbands. 
However, such an arrangement was likely to last only so long as the 
male head of the household was still alive. After his death, 
disagreement might break out between the different daughters' husbands 
as to who should head the household. In such a case, the old house was 
likely to be demolished, and the site used for building separate 
houses for the different daughters' families. 
At first sight, this combination of patrilineality and 
uxorilocality may seem curiously dysharmonic, in that it poses a 
structural contradiction between descent and residence. However, 
following Benjamin (1983:39-43), I would argue that it is precisely 
this combination that kept male inter-relations within the politico-
jural domain. 
In a 'matri' regime, the locally co-residential males have 
no consanguineal bonds of kinship through which to mediate 
their relations with each other: their links are supra-
kinship in character, and this tends to lead to the 
emergence of an administrative structure. 
(Ibid.:40). 
In such a situation, a sociocentrically derived descent ideology would 
have been important in the structuring of relations between the male 
affines. 
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At the present time, marriages in Penyengat and elsewhere in Riau 
still tend to be uxorilocal. But this rule is not so strictly 
observed to the extent that a house would be extended to accomodate 
all the daughters and their husbands. Where houses are concerned, 
uxorilocality is combined with neolocality. With regards to village 
residence, however, uxorilocality is still the rule. In other words, 
the couple may build a new house but in the wife's village. This 
indicates the continuing importance of descent ideology in male inter-
relations, particularly among the aristocrats whose very status as 
such depends on the maintenance of this ideology. 
My raja informants refer to their apical ancestors as sumbe~ 
'springs; watery sources welling up from the earth'. This 
metaphorical usage of water is consonant with the word keturunan 
itself. The root form of keturunan is turun, the fundamental meaning 
of which is 'to descend physically from a higher position to a lower 
one'. The extension of this word to refer to 'descent from generation 
to generation' implies that the movement from an ascendant generation 
to a descendant generation is structurally analogous to the movement 
from hill to valley, from interior to coast, from 'windward' port to 
'leeward' port, from sky to earth, from spirit to human -- in short, 
11 
from high to low. Such movements are unidirectional; rain, for 
example, descends unidirectionally from sky to earth. In the case of 
inter-generational descent, what passes down unidirectionally, like 
rain from sky to earth, is the transmission of derajat from past to 
present. 
What this implies is that the people of the present can no longer 
achieve rank, they can merely inherit it. Indeed, with the demise of 
the sultanate, there is no longer a sultan who can bestow titles of 
distinction upon individuals from the lower ranks of the hierarchy. 
So no individual from these lower ranks can be elevated to the rank of 
178 
encik datuk. Only the hereditary titles of the aristocrats can be 
passed down through the principle of descent alone. Rank has thus 
become purely ascriptive in the present time, whereas in zaman sultan 
it was possible to achieve rank without being born to it. But the 
principle of descent is important to my aristocrat informants, 
precisely because it links each and everyone of them, on a personal 
basis, to the bygone past. In this sense, the past-in-the-present is 
realised in them. Fortes (1969:309) has noted the significance of 
descent with regards to social continuity over time. However, whereas 
he seems to have accepted such continuity as an objective 'fact' of 
any society, I would argue instead that at least where my informants 
are concerned, social continuity is a phenomenon that they are 
subjectively constructing, for personal motivations of their own. 
I should, however, stress that although my informants adhere to 
the principle of descent, they do not form descent groups in the sense 
12 
of these being corporate groups. There is thus lineality, but no 
13 
lineage. The sole 'corporate property' that they presently share as 
a consequence of descent is their derajat, which is not materially 
realised in any way, but remains a purely symbolic rank that is 
meaningful only in relation to other such ranks. For the aristocrats, 
their common membership in their respective derajat is expressed in 
the right to use hereditary titles -- namely, raja, tengku, or 
said/syarifah. So even though the aristocrats do not constitute 
either one or several corporate groups, their right to use hereditary 
titles does nevertheless mark them as members of specific descent 
categories. Thus those with the right to use the hereditary title 
raja identify themselves as keturunan raja 'of raja descent'. Those 
with the right to use the title tengku identify themselves as 
keturunan tengku 'of tengku descent'. And those with the right to use 
the title said/syarifah identify themselves as keturunan tuan said 'of 
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tuan said descent'. Because the titled aristocrats manifestly exist 
as specific descent categories, then in their perceptions at least, 
the other derajat also exist as descent categories, even if only 
negatively defined -- that is, as people without the right to use 
14 
hereditary titles. 
But to what extent do the people assigned to the other derajat 
see themselves as members of descent categories? To answer this 
question, let us consider whether they would use the word keturunan as 
an identifying label for themselves, in the way that word is used for 
the keturunan raja, keturunan tengku, and keturunan tuan said. To 
progress down the hierarchy, I have found that my informants who can 
claim descent from the next two derajat do indeed identify themselves, 
respectively, as keturunan encik datuk 'of encik datuk descent', and 
keturunan encik 'of encik descent'. The next derajat down on the 
hierarchy is explicitly labelled as a descent category -- namely, the 
keturunan Bintan 'of Bintan descent': my informants who can claim 
descent from this derajat do indeed identify themselves as such. 
Similarly, my informants who claim descent from the derajat of orang 
biasa identify themselves as keturunan orang biasa 'descended from 
ordinary people'. 
But the next derajat down -- namely, the hamba raja 'serfs' -- I 
found the word keturunan used in a very different way. My informants 
who are descended from this derajat do not identify themselves as 
keturunan hamba raja 'of serf descent'. Instead they combine the word 
keturunan with a toponym (place-name) for example, keturunan Gelam, 
keturunan Galang, and keturunan Ladi. These toponyms evidently refer 
to specific places in the Riau-Lingga islands. My informants 
identified Gelam as a place known as Gelam Tua 'Old Gelam' located on 
the southern tip of Bulan island. (See Map 3.) Galang, in this 
context, was identified as Galang Tua 'Old Galang', which is on the 
upper reaches of the river Sungai Galang Batang on the island of 
Galang Senyantung. (See Map 4.) Both Gelam Tua and Galang Tua are 
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said to be uninhabited at present. 
near Daik in the Lingga archipelago. 
further in Chapter Five.) 
Ladi was identified as a place 
(Its location will be discussed 
My informants said that these places were the original places 
known by these particular names; all other places known by the same 
names were given those names subsequently by migrants from the 
original places. So the keturunan Gelam are supposedly descendants of 
the original inhabitants of Gelam Tua. The keturunan Galang are 
supposedly descendants of the original inhabitants of Galang Tua. And 
the keturunan Ladi are supposedly descendants of the original 
inhabitants of Ladi. I will discuss in Chapter Five why the hamba 
raja are labelled toponymically in this way. 
As for the lowest derajat on the hierarchy -- the hamba orang 
'slaves' -- I found only one family who admitted to being descendants 
from this derajat. However, they too did not identify themselves as 
keturunan hamba orang 'of slave descent'. Instead they referred to 
themselves as keturunan Hapsi 'of Abyssinian descent', their slave 
ancestor having been Abyssinian. 
There is evidently a distinct contrast in the usage of the word 
keturunan as an identifying label. Whereas the descendants from the 
higher-ranking derajat use the word in conjunction with their titles 
or honorifics, the descendants from the lower derajat use it in 
conjunction with their ancestral place-names. The latter includes the 
keturunan Bintan, who still live in Bintan. The keturunan Bintan are, 
however, unusual in that they do not belong to the derajat of hamba 
raja, but constitute a derajat by themselves. The reason for this 
will be made clear in Chapter Five. 
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Moreover, while many of my informants of raja and tengku descent 
could trace their genealogical origins back to their apical ancestors, 
my informants from the other derajat generally could not do so. The 
latter includes the keturunan tuan said, who are supposedly the 
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad; they generally leave their claim 
undemonstrated. In contrast, many of my raja and tengku informants 
are only too eager to demonstrate exactly how they have been descended 
from their apical ancestors. Some of them even hang silsilah 
'genealogical charts' in their living rooms as part of the wall 
decorations. (See Genealogical Chart 3 as an example of one such wall 
chart.) Even those who do not display their genealogies so 
prominently usually have charts tucked away in a drawer, ready to be 
pulled out at a moment's notice. Indeed some of them are so 
conversant with their genealogies that they can sketch one out on the 
spur of the moment, showing the relationships between the different 
people present on any particular occasion. (See, for example, 
Genealogical Chart 5 which was drawn by a raja informant expressly for 
my education.) 
These genealogies obviously mean more than just a memory test. 
They constitute proof of descent. Such proof is evidently taken 
seriously not only in Riau, but elsewhere in alam Melayu. For 
example, when travelling to Singapore and Malaysia, my raja and tengku 
informants often take care to prepare genealogical charts showing 
their relationships to specific royal houses there. At least one of 
my raja informants has been able to gain admittance to the palace of 
the sultan of Selangor, on the strength of his genealogical 
connections. Quite obviously, genealogical knowledge is an asset. 
Therefore, this interest is not an antiquarian pursuit confined only 
to the older aristocrats. The younger ones often spend time copying 
out the charts, particularly to add their own names. Male aristocrats 
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are, however, more concerned about their genealogies than are the 
female aristocrats. This is not surprising given that rank can be 
transmitted only through patrilineal descent. 
My paja informants said that during zaman sultan, there was an 
official genealogist on Penyengat, whose job was to record the births, 
deaths, marriages, adoptions, and other such matters relating to all 
the rajas. After zaman sultan ended in 1911, some individuals 
privately took up this task of documentation, the difference being 
that they had to do so on through their own knowledge of events, 
rather than have people come to report goings-on to them. (See Wee 
and Matheson forthcoming.) This implies that during zaman sultan, 
there was a clearly defined membership of the raja rank, which 
possibly constituted a corporate lineage and not just a descent 
category, as it is at present. As we shall see below, this would have 
been particularly so with the existence of a particular political 
office as corporate property. 
Among my informants from the lower derajat, I have only one 
informant with a written genealogy. (See Genealogical Chart 6.) He 
is of encik datuk descent. According to him, the title encik datuk is 
also hereditary and those of encik datuk descent are also orang 
bangsawan 'aristocrats'. The implication is that only the aristocrats 
have silsilah 'genealogical charts'. So if someone of encik datuk 
descent were to claim aristocratic status, then he/she must also have 
a genealogical chart to demonstrate that. 
My other informants do not draw genealogical charts for 
themselves. However, I found a bias in the oral genealogies that I 
obtained from them. The higher the derajat is, the stronger is the 
patrilineal bias. The lower the derajat is, the more bilateral the 
15 
genealogy is. (Compare Genealogical Charts 7 to 12.) The reasons 
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for this bias will be further discussed below. For the moment, 
suffice it to note that among my informants, I found descendants from 
all the different derajat who identified themselves as such. So even 
though the various ranks of the hierarchy pertain to a defunct 
sultanate and are hence institutionally hollow, they nevertheless 
still exist as descent categories to which my informants belong. 
4.3 Mas Kawin 
Our discussion of derajat and keturunan is not complete without a 
consideration of mas kawin. On every occasion my informants talked to 
me about derajat, they would also mention mas kawin -- literally, 
'marriage gold'. There are different amounts of mas kawin specified 
for the various derajat of the hierarchy. The following is a list of 
these specified amounts, as derived from my informants: 
DERAJAT MAS KAWIN 
raja, tengku 400 ringgit 
tuan said 25 ringgit 
encik datuk 101 ringgit 
encik keturunan: 
mak inang 88 ringgit 
dayang, khadam 66 ringgit 
orang biasa 44 ringgit 
keturunan Bintan 44 ringgit + mas 1 paha 
hamba raja 44 ringgit 
hamba orang 22 ringgit 
There is some variation of opinion among my informants concerning the 
specified amounts of mas kawin for the different derajat. But the 
list given above is the most comprehensive composite list I have been 
able to compile on the basis of different informants' opinions. But 
all agreed that mas kawin was so important a matter in zaman sultan 
that it had to be regulated by state law. 
The present-day significance of mas kawin has, however, 
diminished. As a raja informant explained the current practice: 
This is only an utterance, a kind of respect given to the 
female side. It is usually in the form of jewellery. The 
price is not certain; it is not calculated. Sometimes it is 
not stated in ringgit but in rial. 
16 (My translation). 
At the marriage ceremonies I managed to witness at close range, 
although the specified amounts of mas kawin were publicly announced 
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and accepted, no money was transacted. Instead it was agreed by both 
sides that the specified amount -- for example, 400 ringgit would 
be in some other form -- for example, a ring. I found this to be the 
case in a range of derajat. 
What seems to remain fixed is the number itself. So, for 
example, the mas kawin for the rajas and tengkus is always 400, 
whether it is in ringgit or rial, and in whatever representative form. 
The word rial refers to the 'old Spanish real, i.e. dollar or piece-
of-eight', whereas the word ringgit refers specifically to 'milled or 
17 
serrated' coinage. According to my older informants, in the last 
generation, these silver coins were still used for mas kawin, 
especially on Penyengat. A few individuals kept a store of these as 
antique money, and people getting married would borrow the appropriate 
amounts from them for the duration of the ceremony. So previously the 
mas kawin was not just an 'utterance' (sebutan), as it is now; there 
was an actual transfer of silver coins. But even then such coinage 
was already no longer circulated as everyday currency, so the transfer 
was purely symbolic. After the wedding, the silver coins were 
returned to their original owner, and reimbursement would be made to 
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the bride, either in the form of real currency, jewellery or some 
other representation. 
Nowadays, however, these individually kept stocks of antique 
coinage no longer exist. Instead the various specified amounts of 
ringgit or rial are most commonly represented by simple gold rings, 
which do not vary significantly in price. So rings in the same price-
range may represent ~as kawin of different specified amounts. This is 
what my informant meant when he said that the actual price of the ma~ 
kawin is not calculated. Nevertheless, the specified amount of mas 
kawin in ringgit or rial must be formally uttered during the marriage 
ceremony. 
The institution of mas kawin is evidently derived from the mahr 
stipulated by Islamic law. In the al-Figh or Corpus of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, it is stated that marriages are valid only when mahr is 
18 
given to the bride by the bridegroom. As Fyzee (1964:126-138) has 
shown, the canonically prescribed mahr is intended for the bride to 
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keep for herself permanently. It is thus not a bride-price in the 
conventional sense of being a payment from the bridegroom to the 
bride's consanguines. Among my informants, the bridegroom's payment 
of mas kawin is indeed kept by the bride herself as part of her 
personal property. This is why jewellery is the most prevalent 
representative form of mas kawin at the present time. 
But while Islamic law prescribes payment of the mahr as an 
essential part of the marriage contract, it specifies neither the 
amount nor the form of payment. To understand the specification of 
the various amounts and the various forms which payment takes, we must 
therefore look beyond the prescriptions of Islamic law. Hooker 
(1976:30) points out that in Malaysia, the amount 'normally depends on 
the rank of the bride's father'. (See Appendix 6.) In other words, 
186 
it depends on her derajat inherited from her father. If, in the words 
of my informant cited above, mas kawig is 'a kind of respect given to 
the female side', what it acknowledges is the rank of the bride and 
her agnates. 
And what would happen if mas kawin were not paid? In that case, 
my informants said, any child that issues from the sexual union would 
be an anak haram 'illegitimate child' who would not be considered as 
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the father's child and so would not belong to the father's derajat. 
The father's transmission of derajat is thus Islamically valid only 
through the payment of mas kawin to the mother of the child. 
But why is the bride's own derajat considered so important that 
different amounts of mas kawin are specified for the different ranks? 
I suggest that mas kawin may be interpreted as a contractual 
settlement, the acceptance of which signifies the agreement of the 
bride not to transmit her own derajat to her child, thereby allowing 
the bridegroom to become the sole transmitter of derajat to the child. 
Mas kawin thus seems to be essentially about the transmission of rank. 
So although mas kawin is apparently derived from the Islamic mahr, the 
linkage between derajat and mas kawiq, as found in Riau, is a local 
adaptation that extends beyond the prescriptions of Islamic law. 
Furthermore, this linkage seems to be found elsewhere in alam Melayu 
-- for example, in Malaysia. (See Appendix 6.) 
Because the idea of mas kawin symbolises the surrender of women's 
rights to transmit derajat, it also symbolises the limits of the 
derajat -- that is, by closing off one whole channel of transmission. 
The relative standing of a derajat is thus indicated by the amount of 
wealth that a bride from that derajat would have to be paid, so as to 
prevent matrifiliation from overriding patrilineal descent. This 
would have been particularly relevant in inter-derajat marriages that 
21 
are hypogamous for the bridegroom, and hypergamous for the bride. 
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In such cases, if the higher-ranking ranking groom wishes to have his 
children in his own derajat, then it would be necessary indeed to 
block the transmission of their mother's lower-ranking derajat to 
them. The maintenance of keturunan as patrilineal descent is 
logically possible only through such blockage. 
As I have stated above, the hierarchy of derajat is not just an 
arbitrary ranking but a scale of power. My informants' seeming focus 
on the limits of derajat suggests that the various derajat may be 
regarded as limited political shares in the sultanate, with the 
different specified amounts of mas kawin as the nominal values of 
these limited shares. To put it another way, the political standing 
of the males in relation to each other was indicated by the amount of 
mas kawin for the females of their respective derajat. The nominal 
values of the mas kawin should thus signify the relative power of the 
various derajat. 
I would suggest that the larger the nominal value specified as 
mas kawin, the more powerful would have been that particular derajat. 
In other words, there would have been a positive correlation between 
the specified amount of mas kawin and the power of that particular 
derajat. This would explain why the figures vary the way they do: the 
hierarchy of derajat from top to bottom correlates significantly with 
the specified amounts of mas kawin from the largest to the smallest 
amount. 
This correlation may also be read as a comment on the nature of 
power in the sultanate: the existence of power depends on the 
acknowledgments made to it. To use Batesonian terms of analysis, 
power-acknowledgment would form one complementary pattern of 
interaction. (See Bateson 1973:62-79.) If we translate derajat as 
'power', and mas kawin as 'acknowledgment', then the hierarchy of 
derajat and mas kawin listed above may be understood as a ranked 
series of power-acknowledgment complementary patterns. 
There are, however, three significant exceptions to the 
correlation between derajat and mas kawin: 
first, the meagre sum of 25 ringgit specified for the 
derajat of tuan said, who rank second in the hierarchy; 
second, the peculiar sum of 44 ringgit + mas 1 paha 
specified for the derajat of keturunan Bintan; 
third, the same figure of 44 ringgit specified for the three 
derajat of keturunan Bintan, orang biasa, and hamba raja, 
which are themselves mutually ranked vis-a-vis each other. 
As we shall see below, these exceptions are significant indeed. 
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Nowadays, however, despite the different specified amounts, the 
mas kawin is 'only an utterance' (sebutan aja). During the marriage 
ceremony, although the specified amount of mas kawin is formally 
uttered, it is usually represented by some form of jewellery, most 
often a ring. As I have noted, simple gold rings of about the same 
price are used to represent different specified amounts of mas kawin. 
This implies that although my informants still acknowledge the 
different nominal values of the political shares, they consider their 
real values to be the same. This makes sense in the context of a 
defunct sultanate. Since there is no longer even a sultanate, how can 
there be different political shares in it? Therefore, the linkage 
between derajat and mas kawin seems to be a phenomenon that 
fundamentally pertains to zaman sultan. If it still seems currently 
relevant to my informants, then the implication is that the ghost of 
the defunct sultanate is still haunting the present. 
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4.4 Raja Gelaran and Raja Keturunan 
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To understand how the various derajat may have originated in the 
very first place, let us consider the differentiation my informants 
make between two kinds of rajas -- the E§l~elaran 'ruler by 
designation' and the raja keturunan 'ruler by descent'. In the most 
general sense of the word, raja denotes 'king, prince or 
administrator' (Wilkinson 1959:934). This general usage is certainly 
found in Riau, in co-existence with the specific usage of the word as 
a hereditary title. In this section of the discussion, I am focussing 
on the general usage of this term. So I include not only those people 
who bear the hereditary title of raja, but also others who may be 
considered 'kings, princes, or administrators' in a general sense. 
Some of my informants, for example, even refer to Lee Kuan Yew, 
the current Prime Minister of Singapore, as raja Cina 'the Chinese 
ruler'. Such a usage is not without precedent: in the Tuhfat al-
Nafis, the Dutch and British residents of Melaka were referred to as 
[aja Melaka. However, not all foreign administrators were so termed 
in the Tuhfat: the Dutch Resident at Tanjungpinang was called Residen 
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~iau, and was not, for good reason, called raja Riau. Then and now, 
Riau has always had its own raja keturunan. 
So in my informants' usage, Lee Kuan Yew and the former Dutch and 
British Residents of Melaka would be raja gelaran -- that is, people 
who are rajas only because they are so called. The aristocrats who 
ruled Riau-Lingga were, however, raja keturunan by virtue of their 
inheritance of political authority. These included not only those who 
bore the title of raja, but also those who bore the other hereditary 
titles of tengku and ~aid/syarifah. Only the raja keturunan 
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constituted a fterajat; the raja gelaran were merely individuals who 
were called raja because of the role they happened to play at a 
particular moment. 
But Lee Kuan Yew and the former Residents of Melaka are not the 
only examples of raja gelaran. According to my informants, in the 
past there were pirate chiefs who may be so considered. These were 
apparently powerful and charismatic individuals who could command 
their followers so effectively, that they began to rival the rule of 
the legitimate rulers -- namely, the raja keturunan. I suggest that 
it is precisely in these charismatic individuals that we may discern 
the source of the raja keturunan as a derajat. I would further 
suggest that the raja keturunan could be institutionalised as a 
derajat only when, to use Weberian terms of analysis, the charisma of 
the founding raja gelaran was routinised. 
In the absence of the sultanate as an institutional reality, 
there are no ruling rajas of either kind. However, as we shall see 
below, there are still claims to some kind of authority made by my 
aristocrat informants on the basis of their hereditary position. Such 
claims do not rest on individual charisma, for they clearly see 
themselves as raja keturunan, not raja gelaran. Most of my informants 
who perceive themselves in such a light are those who bear the 
hereditary title of raja. So in the rest of this section, I shall 
focus my attention mainly on these hereditary rajas. I shall thus be 
discussing how the general usage of the word raja as meaning simply 
'king, prince or administrator' is related to the specific usage of 
the word as a hereditary title. 
When my raja informants trace their patri-line backwards to the 
founding ancestor, they invariably end with one Opu Tendriburang Daeng 
Rilaga and his five sons. (See, for example, Genealogical Charts 2 
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and 3.) My informants' story of their founding ancestors do not 
differ significantly from the version that is told in the Tuhfat. So 
in the following section, I will give a summary of the account in that 
text. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982.) 
According to the Tuhfat, Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga and his 
five sons left Bone in Sulawesi 'to embark on a journey to the west' 
(ibid:45). Matheson and Andaya (1982:324) suggest that this event 
occurred sometime before 1715. Opu Tendriburang died shortly after he 
left Sulawesi, but his five sons continued to wander around in the 
western part of the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago, until Raja Sulaiman 
of the Johor-Riau sultanate who had lost his father's throne to Raja 
Kecik, requested these raja Bugis, as they were known, to help him 
recover the throne. According to Matheson and Andaya (ibid.:328), 
this event occurred sometime in late 1721. The raja Bugis agreed to 
help Raja Sulaiman against Raja Kecik, and they eventually drove the 
latter away to Siak. 
This military success established the charismatic power of the 
raja Bugis, to the extent that they were in a position to invest 
sovereignty upon Raja Sulaiman and install him as sultan. In return, 
the newly installed sultan created the office of yang dipertuan muda 
or yamtuan muda -- literally, 'he who is made junior lord' as the 
political monopoly of these ~?ia Bugis. The establishment of this 
off ice seems to have been the means whereby the charismatic power of 
the raja Bugis was routinised into legitimate authority, thereby 
converting them from mere raja gelaran to the founding ancestors of 
the raja keturunan of Riau. 
The transition from raja gelaran to raja keturunan is evident in 
the use of titular prefixes. Although the five sons of Opu 
Tendriburang were referred to as raja Bugis in the Tuhfat, their names 
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were prefixed not by the title raja, but by the title opu daeng. 
According to Wilkinson (1959:821) opu denotes 'district-headman (in 
Celebes)', whereas daeng was 'a title borne by any Bugis of good 
family' but was 'in no sense a princely title though often represented 
as such by descendants of the Bugis leaders'. The five Opu Daeng 
brothers thus seem to have been the Bugis equivalent of the datuk kaya 
in Riau. So if they were considered as raja, then they would have 
been only raja gelaran and not raja keturunan. To this day, my 
informants do not refer to these five Opu Daeng brothers as Raja So-
and-So, but only as Opu Daeng Parani, Opu Daeng Menambun, Opu Daeng 
Marewah, Opu Daeng Cellak, and Opu Daeng Kemasi. 
The patrilineal descendants of these Opu Daeng brothers, however, 
have since acquired the prefix of raja as a hereditary title. The Opu 
Daeng brothers were thus raja gelaran, whereas their children and 
subsequent generations of patrilineal descendants were and still are 
raja keturunan. With the exception of a few rajas who have immigrated 
to Riau from elsewhere for example, from Rengat in Sumatra -- all 
my raja informants are raja keturunan descended from these five Opu 
Daeng. (The few other rajas from Rengat and elsewhere are completely 
unrelated to the Riau rajas.) 
I did not encounter any raja gelaran in the course of my 
fieldwork, although I did hear stories of a few pirate chiefs in the 
past who were called raja. However, the charisma of these piratical 
raja gelaran was evidently not routinised into a derajat of raja 
~eturunan, probably for lack of a political office that they and their 
descendants could hold in perpetuity. In Weberian terms, the 
routinisation of charisma does indeed require the devolution of 
individual power onto institutions. 
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An example of a piratical raja gelaran is Raja Alang Laut of 
Galang, who is said to have lived sometime in the nineteenth century. 
My Galang informants of ten speak of him; one described him thus: 
~aj~ Alang_~J:It """'.- dia bu~?_!!_raja betul. Dia merajakan 
dirj.-L Keran~ia ter_lebih_g_~!!_as_.__9i:g_elar anak buahnya 
'raja'. An~knya bukan raiat dia orang Galang. 
(Raja Alang Laut he was not a true raja. He made himself 
a ~aja. Because he was so fierce, he was called 'raja' by 
his followers. His children were not rajas; they were 
Galang people.) 
Interestingly, my raja informants on Penyengat have a different 
version of Raja Alang Laut. They said that he was a relative of 
Sultan Sulaiman, and that his full name was Tengku Takdir Raja Alang 
Laut. He did not get on with the Bugis rajas; so he went off to the 
Galang area to found his own territory. But because he was a relative 
of Sultan Sulaiman, the Bugis rajas left him alone and did not try to 
suppress him. 
This second version about Raja Alang Laut describes him not as a 
charismatic ra ja __ g_~].a!"_f!!!, but as a renegade ra ja keturunan. By 
identifying him as a relative of Sultan Sulaiman, my !2..t! informants 
achieve the dual effect of categorising him as a raja keturunan, but 
one who was not related to themselves. It appears that my D!~ 
informants would rather have a renegade raja keturunan than a 
charismatic raja gelaran -- that is, better a bad raja through 
ascription than a powerful raja through achievement. They thus seem 
to value the routinised over the charismatic, and institutionalised 
authority over individual power. From their perspective, such an 
attitude is indeed not surprising. 
On the other hand, my Galang informants who belong to the rank of 
hamba raja 'serf' evidently prefer to have the opposite that is, to 
describe Raja Alang Laut as a raja gelaran rather than as a raja 
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keturunan. From their particular perspective, this attitude is again 
not surprising. The documentary evidence of Raja Alang Laut will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
Whatever the case may be concerning Raja Alang Laut, it is clear 
that he left no raja descendants behind. If he was indeed a 
charismatic raja gelaran, his charisma was evidently not routinised 
into a derajat. As mentioned above, only the raja keturunan 
constitute a derajat; the raja gelaran are merely charismatic 
individuals of the moment, who do not belong to the derajat of raj~. 
This differentiation again highlights the importance of the 
transmission of derajat. In order to belong to the derajat of raja, 
one must inherit one's raja-hood through patrilineal descent. It is 
not enough merely to be raja-like and thereby become a raja gelaran. 
If the Opu Daeng brothers had not routinised their charisma 
though the office of yamtuan muda, they would not have been more 
significant than any of the piratical raja gelaran who had not been 
able to transmit their individual power to their patrilineal 
descendants. The Opu Daeng brothers are significant precisely because 
they did manage to do this successfully, thereby founding a derajat of 
raja keturunan. Derajat thus seems to be not a static thing, but 
rather, in its very essence, an intergenerational transmission of 
power. 
This idea of intergenerational transmission was expressed by a 
raja informant in the following terms: 
Yes, it belongs to the past -- descent from the Bugis 
people .... Among us Riau rajas, many are of Bugis descent. 
At one time in the past, the ~elay~ raja was at war ..• ; 
[because of this] he requested the aid of the Bugis from 
Sulawesi. So the Bugis came here to help the Mel~u raja at 
war. So they won. Consequently they married the people of 
the ~~!?Y.U raja, the females of the Me!§..Y~ raja. Thus they 
produced many children who became rajas. All those bearing 
the title of ~~ are considered BugiS: similarly in 
Malaysia -- they are thus keturunan Bugi§. Indeed in this 
archipelago, Bugis descent has spread. What this means is 
that it is like a drop of indigo dye in a bowl of coconut 
cream. As a result, all follows the single drop. Because 
the indigo dye is blue, all the coconut cream that is white 
also becomes blue. So it is also with the blood of the 
Bugis, beginning with one drop and apreading out until it 
has become thus plentiful. 
25 (My translation). 
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In my informant's metaphor, the Bugis males were the one drop of 
indigo dye colouring the white coconut cream. By implication, the 
many children they produced from marrying the Melayu females were the 
white coconut cream, and these females were presumably the bowl 
containing the white cream that was coloured blue. My informant 
locates this coloration as an event that occurred in the past: there 
was but one drop of indigo dye that dropped but once into the bowl of 
coconut cream. So, according to him, the Bugis from Sulawesi 
contributed the one metaphorical drop of 'blood' (darah) to the Melayu 
people of Riau and Malaysia. The substance of intergenerational 
transmission is identified as darah 'blood'; so those who belong to 
the same derajat share the same 'blood', which originated from the 
metaphorical first drop. 
It is also clear in my informant's statement that matrifiliation 
is important. The implication is that as a reward for their military 
victory, the Bugis from Sulawesi were able to marry the females of the 
Melayu raja, thereby producing the Riau rajas who are considered thus 
as ke~J:II_~nan Bugi~. The charisma of the Bugis was thus routinised 
through marriage and matrifiliation, such that their children would 
have been ~ak gah<!!2. -- that is, high-born on both sides. 
In Chapter Two, I have already mentioned the importance of Opu 
Daeng Cellak's wedding to Sultan Sulaiman's sister, Tengku Mandak. In 
the Tuhfat, this marriage is given as much emphasis as the 
installation of Opu Daeng Marewah (also known as Opu Kelana Jaya 
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Putera) as the yamtuan muda. Not surprisingly, after the death of 
Opu Daeng Marewah, it was Opu Daeng Cellak who succeeded as yamtuan 
Opu Daeng Cellak was evidently not the only one to have 
contracted such a strategic marriage. Opu Daeng Parani also married a 
sister of Sultan Sulaiman, Tengku Tengah, though not as his first 
wife. Furthermore, he had no sons by her. Nevertheless, after the 
death of Opu Daeng Cellak, it was Opu Daeng Parani's son by his first 
wife -- Daeng Kamboja -- who succeeded as yamtuan muda. 
Significantly, the next yamtuan muda after that was the son of Opu 
Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak Raja Haji. (See Genealogical Chart 
1.) As we shall see below, in my informants' rear-view image of zaman 
sultan, Raja Haji figures very importantly indeed. 
The Opu Daengs' charisma was thus routinised not only through the 
monopoly of the political office of yamtuan muda, but also through the 
establishment of a political alliance with Sultan Sulaiman and his 
agnates through strategic marriages with his sisters. These marriages 
of alliance would have been particularly significant at the time 
because both the Bugis and the Melayu patri-lines were still 
incipient. Indeed, descent was not yet established as a principle, 
because in both these patri-lines only the second generation had 
emerged. 
On the one hand, the Opu Daeng brothers were merely the sons of 
Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga, who was eventually recognised as the 
apical ancestor of his patri-line. And on the other hand, Sultan 
Suleiman and his siblings were merely the children of Sultan Abd al-
Jalil, who was also eventually recognised as the apical ancestor of 
his patri-line. Since both these apical ancestors were already dead 
by 1722 when Sultan Sulaiman and the Opu Daeng brothers came to power, 
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patrifiliation alone was probably insufficient as a legitimating 
principle. 
When Sultan Abd al-Jalil was still alive, he was not even able to 
legitimate his own rule, to the extent that he lost his throne to a 
Minangkabau pretender. (See Chapter Three.) Indeed he was murdered 
on the orders of this pretender. (See Andaya 1975:280-281.) With 
such a record, it would have been highly unlikely that his son could 
have legitimated himself through patrifiliation alone. Opu 
Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga, the father of the Opu Daeng brothers, had 
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nothing whatsoever to do with Riau. So in this case too, it is very 
unlikely that his sons could have legitimated themselves through 
patrifiliation alone. 
Alliance was hence more important as a mutually legitimating 
contract. On the one hand, Sultan Sulaiman's position as~ 
dipertuan besar or yamtuan besar -- literally, 'he who is made senior 
lord' -- was legitimated through recognition by the Opu Daeng brothers 
who had put him on the throne in the very first place. And on the 
other hand, the military power of the Opu Daeng brothers was 
legitimated through Sultan Sulaiman's recognition of the office of 
yang dipertuan muda or yamtuan muda 'he who is made junior lord' as 
their political monopoly. This mutual recognition of the two most 
powerful forces in the newly re-established state of 1722 was 
evidently contractualised through the two strategic marriages 
mentioned above. 
Once such a marriage alliance was established, it allowed the 
transmission of legitimate authority through time, from the preceding 
generation of the original few to the subsequent generations of the 
succeeding many. Indeed, in the context of this study, the marriage 
between Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak may be considered 
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particularly significant, because many of my raja informants trace 
direct descent from that particular marriage, which took place more 
than two centuries ago. 
What is interesting is that both in my informants' genealogies 
and in the genealogies given in the Tuhfat, the children of this 
ancestral couple bore different titles in accordance with their 
gender. Thus their sons bore the title raja, and their daughters bore 
the title tengku. As we shall see below, the title raja was 
subsequently inherited by the Opu Daeng brothers' descendants, both 
male and female, whereas the title tengku was restricted to those in 
Sultan Sulaiman's patri-line, also both male and female. But such a 
rule was evidently not yet established at the time of the first 
marriage of alliance. 
This may also be discerned in the relative location of the graves 
of these personae. The graves of the two patri-lines are generally 
found in quite different sites. In Sungai Riau, for example, there is 
an upstream site, at Hulu Sungai Riau, where the graves of the first 
two yamtuan mudas are located; and there is a downstream site, at 
Kampung Melayu where Sultan Sulaiman and some of his descendants are 
buried. (See Map 5.) Interestingly, however, at the latter site, 
located in the same compound are the graves of Tengku Mandak (Sultan 
Sulaiman's sister) and Tengku Putih (the daughter of Opu Daeng Cellak 
and Tengku Mandak). This suggests that both these women were 
perceived as members of Sultan Sulaiman's descent unit, rather than 
that of the Opu Daeng brothers. 
When I questioned my raja informants about this, they said that 
it was only natural that Tengku Mandak should have been buried with 
Sultan Sulaiman because she was his sister. As for Tengku Putih, they 
said that she bore the title tengku and was buried in that compound, 
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because she was her mother's daughter and that was the practice at 
that time. However, my informants do take note that according to the 
rule of patrilineal descent, Tengku Putih should have borne the title 
raja and should have been buried with other rajas. The significance 
of these graves to my informants will be discussed further below. For 
the moment, suffice it to note that frequent ritual visits are still 
made to these graves, and as I shall show below, these visits are an 
important way of realising the past-in-the-present. 
In the argument above, I am thus suggesting that in post-1722 
Riau, the inheritance of derajat through patrilineal descent was 
established gradually, and that prior to such a principle, marriage 
alliance was more important. Following the first two strategic 
marriages, there were several others. Significantly, the most 
important of these occurred in periods of political crisis when the 
alliance between the two factions needed to be renewed. One such 
marriage was between Sultan Mahmud III on the Melayu side and Raja 
Haji's daughter, Raja Hamidah, on the Bugis side. The other was 
between Sultan Mahmud IV's daughter, Tengku Embung Fatimah, on the 
Melayu side and Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhamad Yusuf on the Bugis side. As 
we shall see below, the consequences of those two particular marriages 
are regarded by my informants as weighty indeed. (See Genealogical 
Chart 1.) 
4.5 Keturunan Raja and Keturunan Tengku 
The two patri-lines, Bugis and Melayu, that were allied through 
marriage still exist as the keturunan raja and the keturunan tengku 
that is, respectively, the rajas' line of descent and the tengkus' 
line of descent. As shown above, the rajas and the tengkus are ranked 
as one derajat in the hierarchy. Significantly, however, my Riau 
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informants from this derajat were almost entirely rajas. This was due 
not to any omission on my part, but to the fact that there are indeed 
very few tengkus to be found in the Riau archipelago. In the course 
of my fieldwork I encountered only two there, and of the two, only one 
was a resident; the other was a visitor from the Lingga archipelago in 
the south. The tengkus are localised in the Lingga archipelago, which 
I was able to visit only in December 1983. Conversely, there are very 
few rajas in Lingga. 
So although the rajas and the tengkus are ranked as one derajat, 
they are territorially differentiated, such that the former are 
localised in Riau and the latter in Lingga. They are thus located in 
complementary distribution to each other. Even the titles of raja and 
tengku are used in complementary distribution, although as pointed out 
above, this seems to have been a gradual development. The eventual 
result was: 
The title raja was taken by members of the family of the 
Yamtuan Muda of Riau, while those of the house of the 
Yamtuan Besar took the title of tengku. 
(Wilkinson 1959:934). 
This complementary distribution harks back to 1722 when Raja Kecik was 
ousted by the Opu Daeng brothers, and the newly installed Sultan 
Suleiman created the office of yang dipertuan muda or yamtuan muda for 
them. In the Tuhfat, it is said that he did this to reward them for 
their service to him. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:62-63.) It is also 
possible that, as Andaya (1975:293-296) has suggested, the Bugis 
adventurers decided to install Sultan Suleiman, almost as an 
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afterthought, following their conquest of Riau. 
But whatever the circumstances might have been -- whether it was 
Sultan Suleiman who had asked the Opu Daeng brothers to help him, or 
whether it was the Bugis who had fortuitously decided to install him 
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-- what is certain is that the post-1722 sultanate was the result of 
violent military conquest. Again, whether or not the military 
campaign was justifiable, is quite another matter. The point is: the 
post-1722 sultanate was the booty of a military conquest by a new 
force who had hitherto not been part of the sultanate at all. This 
new force was none other than the raja Bugis. 
So the division of spoils was an important issue right from the 
establishment of the post-1722 sultanate. The basic line of division 
was evidently between those who were already members of the pre-1722 
sultanate on the one hand, and on the other, the newcomers who had 
fought their way into the sultanate in 1722. It was this division 
that produced, respectively, the keturunan tengku and the keturunan 
raja. 
The sultan's office of yang dipertuan 'he who is made lord' was 
effectively divided into two: the post of yang dipertuan besar 'senior 
lord' was to be the political monopoly of the pre-1722 faction, and 
the post of yang dipertuan muda 'junior lord' was to be the political 
monopoly of the post-1722 faction. The establishment of these two 
posts may thus be understood as the institutionalisation of a 'spoils 
system', whereby public offices are divided among the victorious 
parties. However, the division of spoils continued to be a 
controversial issue right to the end of the sultanate. 
So there was an intra-derajat rivalry between the tengkus and the 
rajas, a rivalry inherent from the very beginning of the post-1722 
sultanate. The complementary distribution of the two factions may 
thus be understood as a controlling factor used to restrain this 
intra-derajat rivalry. The division of the office of yang dipertuan 
was evidently the first step towards such a distribution. 
In the Tuhfat, Raja Ali Haji (1982:64) describes a symbolic 
contract established between the two factions: 
••• Sultan Sulaiman installed Opu Kelana Jaya Putera as Yang 
Dipertuan Muda to govern the kingdom of Johor and Pahang and 
Riau and all the subject territories with absolute 
authority. 
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In return for this bestowal of absolute authority, the yang Dipertuan 
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Muda swore an oath of loyalty to the Yang Dipertuan Besar. In Raja 
Ali Haji's description (ibid.), this exchange of declarations was then 
sealed by the marriage of Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak. 
What this symbolic contract seems to have signified was a 
differentiation between sovereignty and authority. The yang dipertuan 
besar retained sovereignty but bestowed absolute authority upon the 
yang dipertuan muda. The latter, in turn, acknowledged the 
sovereignty of the former and pledged to use his authority in the 
service of the yang dipertuan besar, who was generally known as 
sultan. So only a tengku could become sultan; a raja (or engku) could 
merely become yang dipertuan muda. 
However, this initial complementary distribution evidently needed 
increasing differentiation, eventually reaching full realisation in 
1804, when there was a territorial division between the two factions. 
The pre-1722 faction took Lingga and the post-1722 faction took Riau. 
Hence to this day, there are very few tengkus in Riau and very few 
rajas in Lingga. The territorial division that occurred in 1804 is of 
such significance that we shall discuss it separately below. 
4.6 Raja Hamidah's Mas Kawin 
According to my raja informants, the territorial division between 
the keturunan raja and the keturunan tengku was effected by means of 
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the mas kawin that Sultan Mahmud III gave to his bride, Raja Hamidah, 
the daughter of Raja Haji. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) Penyeqgat 
island was apparently used to represent the mas kawin. And it was 
Penyengat that subsequently became the political base of the yamtuan 
muda and his faction. 
Although the event of territorial division is described in the 
Tuhfat, Raja Ali Haji does not mention that Penyengat was Raja 
Hamidah's mas kawin. Yet the details of the event as he describes 
them suggest that my informants' interpretation is plausible. To 
appreciate its full significance, we must first discuss the political 
situation during that period. The following is a summary of the 
important events recounted in the Tuhfat. 
According to the Tuhfat (see Raja Ali Haji 1982:178-212), at the 
time of the territorial division, Sultan Mahmud III was the yamtuan 
besar and Raja Ali was the yamtuan muda. Shortly after the latter had 
been installed, a crisis arose when a Dutch force from Melaka came and 
attacked Riau. 
The Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali left with all those of 
Bugis descent, whoever could avail themselves of the 
opportunity.... [He] ••• took with him only two daughters of 
the late Raja Haji (that is, Raja Hamidah and Raja Sitti). 
Their mother was his sister and for this reason he took them 
with him when he left Riau and sailed to Mempawah and 
Sukadana. 
(Ibid.:179). 
30 
His departure apparently allowed Sultan Mahmud's second cousin, 
Engku Muda, to rise to power. (See Genealogical Chart 1; Trocki 
1979:29.) As we shall see below, this led to such a struggle for 
power that the sultanate was eventually to divide along that 
particular break. 
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According to the Tuhfat (see Raja Ali Haji 1982:180-186), after 
Yamtuan Muda Raja Ali's departure, Sultan Mahmud stayed on in Riau and 
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put up with having a Dutch agent in Tanjung Pinang. However, his 
threshold of tolerance was soon exceeded. So he invited Ilanun 
pirates from Tempassuk in Sabah to attack the Dutch. The raid was 
successful, but Sultan Mahmud became so nervous of Dutch retaliation 
that he and his followers moved to Lingga. 
This chain of events apparently occurred between the years 1784 
and 1787. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:370-372.) Then from 1787 to 
1795, the Dutch held Riau, while the sultan stayed in Lingga, and 
Engku Muda based himself in the Bulan area. (See Map 3; Matheson and 
Andaya 1982:372-377; Trocki 1979:28-31.) What changed this situation 
was Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of the Netherlands, which led to the 
British take-over of Dutch possessions in the East, including Riau. 
(See Matheson and Andaya 1982:377). According to the Tuhfat, 'the 
English Company ••• restored Riau to Sultan Mahmud' (Raja Ali Haji 
1982:196). Sultan Mahmud, however, continued to live in Lingga, while 
Engku Muda was sent 'to guard Riau' (ibid.:197). 
Shortly after, the former lamtuan muda, Raja Ali, returned to 
Riau. This led to a civil war between Engku Muda's faction and Raja 
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Ali's faction. So Sultan Mahmud had to leave Lingga to intervene 
between them. (See ibid.:203-204.) He apparently decided to favour 
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Raja Ali over Engku Muda. Sultan Mahmud and Raja Ali met and 
'renewed the oath of loyalty made between Bugis and Malay' 
34 (ibid.:205). Immediately afterwards, 'Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali 
married His Majesty Sultan Mahmud to Raja Hamidah, that is, to Engku 
Puteri, daughter of the late Raja Haji' (ibid.). 
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After the marriage, the couple lived at Tanjung Unggat on the 
Riau river where Raja Ali's settlement was located. This would have 
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been in accordance with the rule of uxorilocality. In the meantime, 
Sultan Mahmud ordered that Penyengat island be cleared and built up as 
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a political capital. Then --
••• in the presence of several princes, ••• Sultan Mahmud said 
to his wife Engku Puteri, 'Raja Hamidah, I have built up 
Penyengat Island into a settlement complete with a palace 
and fortifications. I now make it your property Raja 
Hamidah. Riau and its revenues and so forth will belong to 
you and to your brothers and sisters, the children of the 
late Raja Haji •••• I will no longer interfere in the 
slightest way with anything. As for Lingga, that will 
belong to Komeng (that is, my son Raja Jumat, Tengku Abd al-
Rahman) and you and your family must henceforth make no 
claim to its revenues or tribute'. Those versed in oral 
tradition say that this initiated the division of income, 
revenues, and taxes between the Yang Dipertuan Muda and the 
Yang Dipertuan Besar. This all took place in the hijra year 
1218 [A.D.1804]. 
(Ibid.:212). 
Significantly, Sultan Mahmud himself then returned to Lingga 
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where he resided for the rest of his life. Nor did Yamtuan Muda Raja 
Ali move to Penyengat, even though it was now declared the seat of 
government. Instead the latter built himself a palace on Bayan Island 
in the Riau river. It was only after his death when Raja Hamidah's 
brother, Raja Jafar, succeeded to the office, that Penyengat became 
the actual seat of the yamtuan muda's government. (See ibid.:212~ 
215.) 
The significance of this detail has to be understood in the 
context of my informants' statement that Penyengat was Raja Hamidah's 
mas kawin. As I have shown in the preceding section, mas kawin is 
given to and kept by the bride as her personal property. So if 
Penyengat was Raja Hamidah's mas kawin, then it would make sense that 
both her husband and her mother's brother would not have wanted to 
live there. Raja Hamidah's brother, however, shared her 
patrifiliative status as a child of Raja Haji and hence had greater 
right to live on his sister's mas kawin. This would have been 
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especially the case since mas kawin symbolises the acknowledgment of a 
woman's rank inherited from her father. 
In view of my informants' statement about Raja Hamidah's ~ 
kawin, it is not clear to me why Raja Ali Haji omitted any mention of 
it in the Tuhfat. Perhaps he wanted to downplay Raja Hamidah's 
ownership of Penyengat. However, if Raja Ali Haji omitted mention of 
the mas kawin, what my informants omit mention of is the European 
presence in Riau at that time and the significance of Engku Muda's 
role. Instead of portraying the territorial division of Riau and 
Lingga as a political compromise struck between two rival factions, 
they talk about it simply as a domestic matter, a mere transfer of .!!ill§. 
kawin from bridegroom to bride. However, in the Tuhfat's account of 
events, as presented above, it is clear that the territorial division 
occurred at a very critical point of the kingdom's history. 
Significantly, the division of Riau and Lingga as the respective 
territories of the yamtuan muda and the yamtuan besar occurred in a 
newly reconstituted sultanate, restored quite unexpectedly by the 
English. Unlike the situation in 1722, the post-1795 sultanate was 
not the spoils of war but, rather, lost property suddenly returned by 
an outside benefactor. Indeed, by 1787, Sultan Mahmud had already 
seemed quite resigned to making his home in Lingga, having abandoned 
Riau to the Dutch. By 1784, with the departure of Raja Ali from Riau, 
there was no longer a yamtuan muda in the sultanate. 1795 thus marked 
the reunion of the already fragmented sultanate. 
At this juncture, since the Bugis ha9 already withdrawn 
themselves from Riau, Sultan Mahmud could have decided to abolish the 
office of yamtuan muda altogether, thereby giving a de jure 
recognition to the de facto situation. Alternatively, he could have 
appointed someone from his own faction -- for example, Engku Muda --
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to the post, thereby keeping the Bugis out of the sultanate. He could 
have justified his action by blaming the Bugis for failing to defend 
Riau against the Dutch and thereby failing to keep the symbolic 
contract that had been set up. 
Instead, he apparently chose to restore the 'spoils system' 
established in 1722, this time allocating specific territories to the 
two respective factions. There is a likelihood that he did this in 
order to check the ambitions of someone within his own faction --
namely, Engku Muda, who had even taken to calling himself 'Sultan of 
Riau'. (See Trocki 1979:28.) In other words, Sultan Mahmud may have 
felt that it was better to share his newly reconstituted sultanate 
with the Bugis faction, than to lose his own throne to someone within 
his own faction. 
This raises another point concerning keturunan: not only are 
different keturunan 'lines of descent' ranked in relation to each 
other, but individuals within the same keturunan are also ranked vis-
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a-vis one another. My informants use another word -- pangkat -- to 
refer to individual ranking within the same keturunan. 
Interestingly, my informants also use the word to refer to 
generational level. Within the same keturunan, the old generally rank 
higher than the young, presumbably because of the former's greater 
proximity to the source of descent. Unlike keturunan which befalls 
one, pangkat is more amenable to self-manipulation. 
First of all, everyone grows old. So everyone who manages to 
survive an early death, will naturally attain the pangkat of a senior 
vis-a-vis a junior within the same keturunan. Apart from natural 
aging, one can also naik pangkat 'claim the ranks' through the 
assertion of one's superiority over lesser fellows, by one means or 
another. There seem to be two ways of doing this: One could receive 
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recognition from someone of a higher rank; this person could be a 
member of a higher-ranking derajat, or else, someone of superior 
pangkat within the same keturunan -- for example, an older kinsperson. 
The second way would be to exude sufficient charisma to awe one's 
peers. 
In this context, we can see how vulnerable Sultan Mahmud's 
position was to the ambitions of Engku Muda. They were second 
cousins; so the generational rank of both within the keturunan was 
equal. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) Indeed, in terms of relative age, 
it seems that Engku Muda was the older by about twelve years. (See 
Trocki 1979:27-28.) Although Sultan Mahmud was already on the throne, 
his right to it was not really that much stronger than Engku Muda's. 
Indeed, the farmer's only claim to a greater right would have been 
that his father's father -- Sultan Suleiman -- was a sultan 'ruler', 
whereas the latter's father's father -- Bendahara Tun Abas -- was only 
a bendaraha 'treasurer'. However, Bendahara Tun Abas was the oldest 
son and an anak gahara, whereas Sultan Suleiman was a younger son and 
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an anak gundik. Apparently, the latter became sultan only because 
he was born after their father became sultan; before that, their 
father was merely a bendahara under Sultan Mahmud II who was 
subsequently assassinated. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:19-20.) 
What further weakened Sultan Mahmud's position was that his own 
father was not a sultan, because the latter had died before he could 
be installed. So Sultan Mahmud had inherited his throne not from his 
father, but from his older brother Sultan Ahmad, thereby setting a 
precedent for succession within the same generation. (See ibid.:122.) 
To make matters worse, it appears that Sultan Mahmud had himself aided 
Engku Muda in his ambitions to naik pangkat, for in 1795, after the 
English had restored Riau to him, the former had sent the latter 'to 
guard Riau while the position of the Yang Dipertuan Muda was being 
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determined and the organisation of Johor was being completed' 
(ibid.:197). Engku Muda thus received recognition from a higher-
ranking person, the sultan himself. 
Particularly in a time of flux, while the sultanate was being 
reconstituted, it would have been very easy to include a change of 
sultan as part of the 'organisation of Johor'. Under these 
circumstances, it is understandable why Sultan Mahmud chose to favour 
the return of the Bugis. What he did may thus be understood as 
sacrificing the power of his keturunan for the sake of preserving his 
own pangkat. 
Although Engku Muda failed to naik pangkat, he nevertheless 
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seemed 'to have held his following intact' (Trocki 1979:29). 
According to my informants, his base was located along the narrow 
Bulang strait, specifically on the two small islands of Bulang Lintang 
and Bulang Gebang. (See Map 6.) From this base, he evidently ruled a 
large dominion that included the Galang area, the Bulan area, and the 
Johor area (with Singapore in it). Engku Muda thus manifested the 
charisma of a raja gelaran. 
He appeared eventually to have achieved the routinisation of his 
charisma. His brother's son and his successor, Engku Abd al-Rahman, 
subsequently became the temenggung who founded the ruling house of 
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what is now the Malaysian state of Johor. So not only can the 
routinisation of charisma found a new keturunan, it can also bring 
about the branching off of a divergent keturunan from the mainstream 
keturunan, while still acknowledging the same river-head as source. 
The fact that Engku Abd al-Rahman was not Engku Muda's son, but the 
son of his brother Daeng Kecil, demonstrates that the acknowledged 
source of this divergent keturunan was still Sultan Abd al-Jalil. 
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Significantly, this divergent keturunan derived from another 
marriage of alliance between the Melayu and Bugis factions. Both 
Engku Muda and Daeng Kecil were born of Temenggung Abd al-Jamal on the 
Melayu side and Tengku Maimunah on the Bugis side. Tengku Maimunah 
was the daughter of Opu Daeng Parani and Tengku Tengah. (See 
Genealogical Chart l; Raja Ali Haji 1982:20,28.) The use of the 
nominal prefixes daeng by Daeng Kecil and tengku by Tengku Maimunah 
further illustrates that at that time the complementary distribution 
of titles between the two factions had not yet been systematised. My 
raja informants are aware that their connection to the present ruling 
house of Johore is through the matrifiliative link of Tengku Maimunah 
to her sons. (See Genealogical Chart 2.) 
This discussion enables us to identify more clearly the keturunan 
tengku of Lingga: They are the descendants of Sultan Mahmud and his 
followers within the mainstream keturunan, which derived from yet 
another marriage of alliance - that is, between Raja di-Baruh Abd al-
Jalil on the Melayu side and Tengku Putih on the Bugis side, who was 
herself the daughter of Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak. (See 
Genealogical Chart 1.) 
So when Sultan Mahmud III presented Penyengat to Raja Hamidah in 
1804, there appeared the cracks along which the sultanate eventually 
fragmented. There are five names associated with the five fragments 
into which the sultanate eventually broke: 
Raja Haji with Riau; 
Sultan Abdul Rahman (Komeng) with Lingga; 
Sultan Husein (Tengku Long) with Singapore; 
Temenggong Engku Abdu'r-Rahman with Johar; 
Bendahara Tun Abdu'l-Majid with Pahang. 
(See Genealogical Chart 1.) 
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Significantly, Raja Hamidah was also known as Engku Puteri, a 
title which may be translated as 'Royal Daughter'. (See Raja Ali Haji 
1982.) She is still referred to as such by my informants. The 
emphasis is thus on her filial status as a child of Raja Haji. 
Indeed, after the death of Yamtuan Muda Raja Ali in 1805, all 
subsequent yamtuan mudas were the patrilineal descendants of Raja 
Haji. In other words, this was another divergent keturunan, 
established not through the founder's own efforts in his own lifetime, 
but through posthumous recognition given by a higher-ranking person --
namely, Sultan Mahmud III. One can thus naik pangkat even 
posthumously. What makes the establishment of this divergent 
keturunan even more interesting is that Raja Haji was Sultan Mahmud 
III's mother's brother. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) So Sultan 
Mahmud's action may be interpreted, alternatively, as a decision to 
favour his matrifiliative kin over his patrilineal agnates. 
Another significant part of Sultan Mahmud's speech as reported in 
the Tuhfat is his special mention of Komeng (Tengku Abd al-Rahman) as 
his intended heir. After the death of Sultan Mahmud in 1812, there 
was a struggle for the throne between two of his sons, Komeng and his 
older brother Tengku Long. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) The yamtuan 
muda's faction supported the former while Engku Muda's faction 
supposed the latter. By that time Engku Muda's nephew, Engku Abd al-
Rahman, was already temenggung and very much in control of the area 
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spanning from Galang to Johor, including Singapore. So in 1819 he 
was able to arrange for Tengku Long to be installed in Singapore as 
Sultan Husein, with recognition given by the English. (See Turnbull 
1977:8-9; Winstedt 1979:74-77.) 
By the late nineteenth century, the temenggung in Johor and the 
bendahara in Pahang had declared themselves sultans in their own 
territories. (See Trocki 1979:150-151; Winstedt 1979:117.) That 
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completed the break-up of the sultanate, a process that had begun with 
the territorial division of Riau and Lingga in 1804. 
My informants' discourse on this event is thus significant not 
only for what it mentions, but also for what it omits. While they are 
very much aware of the historical events discussed above, they choose 
to focus is on Raja Hamidah's mas kawin. They still regard Penyengat 
as her personal property; she is still referred to as Tuan Puteri 
'Master Princess'. This attribution of ownership is quite in keeping 
with the idea of Penyengat as her mas kawin. Indeed, there is no 
mention either in the Tuhfat or any other text that Penyengat was 
inherited by anyone else after her death. According to the Tuhfat, 
she died on 5 August 1844. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:279.) But that 
raises the question: how can a dead person own an island? The answer 
to this will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
4.7 The Male Monopoly of Political Office 
If, as my informants say, the territorial division of 1804 was 
effected through the payment of mas kawin, it would imply that the 
increased power of the keturunan raja came via the mediation of a 
female member of the keturunan -- namely, Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah. 
If a female member of the keturunan could mediate in the transfer of 
power in this way, could she not also hold power directly? If Engku 
Puteri Raja Hamidah could own Penyengat as a political capital, could 
she not also be the political ruler of the territory? 
There is evidence that the ownership of Penyengat did give her 
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considerable political influence. According to the Tuhfat, she was 
able to intervene and bring to an end a factional fight that had 
broken out between her brother Raja Idris and a newcomer from the 
Bugis homeland. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:222.) Moreover, after the 
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death of Sultan Mahmud her husband, she was in possession of the royal 
regalia and was thus in the position of being kingmaker. 
That, however, raises the question: if she was kingmaker then 
could she not have become king as well? It seems that her role as 
kingmaker caused a rift between herself and her brother Yamtuan Muda 
Raja Jafar. She was apparently in favour of Tengku Long as successor 
to her husband, the late Sultan Mahmud, whereas her brother was in 
favour of Komeng. Matters came to such a head, that eventually the 
latter had to enlist the help of the Dutch in taking the regalia from 
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her by military force. So if her role as kingmaker was so 
unacceptable to her brother, then it would have been extremely 
unlikely indeed that he would have permitted her to ascend the throne 
as sultan. That brings us to the topic of the male monopoly of 
political office. 
Quite a few of my informants felt it necessary to tell me 
voluntarily that the sultan was always a male, because the dominant 
Islamic school in Riau was Madzhab Shafi'i which disapproves of female 
political leaders. Such an attribution is rather surprising. As 
pointed out by Sharon Siddique (personal communication), it is not 
just the Madzhab Shafi'i that disapproves of female political leaders; 
so would any other Islamic school. The reason is that the leader of 
an Islamic polity is also its imam 'the religious guide'. Since the 
polity constitutes a mixed jemaah 'congregation', the imam must be 
male: no man is allowed to pray behind a woman. Sharon Siddique has 
suggested to me that my informants may have mentioned Madzhab Shafi'i 
because that is the school to which they themselves belong, and is 
hence the only one that they would know about. 
It is therefore significant that my informants should have even 
felt it necessary to justify to me the male monopoly of the office of 
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sultan, by attributing it to the particular school of Islam that they 
happened to belong to. Such an attribution seems to be another 
instance of extra-Islamic modification, in this case, used as an 
ideological lock to maintain the idea that the political off ice of 
ruler must always be a male monopoly. I suggest that after the 
payment of Penyengat as Raja Hamidah's mas kawin in 1804, there was an 
intensified use of Islam as an ideology of male dominance. 
In this context, it is significant that it was during the reign 
of Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar, Raja Hamidah's brother, that an Islamic 
revival was actively encouraged on Penyengat, such that the island 
became known as the regional centre for Islamic reformism. It was one 
of Raja Jafar's brothers, Raja Haji Ahmad, who was 'the first prince 
from Riau to perform the haj' (Andaya and Matheson 1979:112). It was 
Raja Haji Ahmad and his son, Raja Ali Haji, who compiled the Tuhfat 
Al-Nafis. The latter was himself 'a religious scholar, who actively 
recruited Islamic teachers for Riau and was consulted on points of 
doctrine by members of the royal family' (ibid:ll2). According to the 
Tuhfat, Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar was himself a very pious man who 
'liked religious scholars and was dedicated to the pursuit of 
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knowledge' (Raja Ali Haji 1982:221). Interestingly, there is no 
mention of the Islamic piety of Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah in the 
Tuhfat. 
4.8 'Sultan' Fatimah 
The male monopoly of political office was subsequently broken, 
but only to benefit the yamtuan muda's own son. I refer to the case 
of 'Sultan' Fatimah, the daughter of Sultan Mahmud IV. (See 
Genealogical Chart 1.) It was from her that the last sultan of Riau 
inherited his political office matrifiliatively. 
215 
The following passage on 'Sultan' Fatimah is translated from a 
book written by my tengku informant in Lingga, Tengku Ahmad (1972:26-
27): 
RAJA PEREMPUAN [QUEEN] 
Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah did not have any son at 
all, since Tengku Besar (the Crown Prince), whose name was 
Tengku Daud, had died long ago. Because of this, for a 
period of two years, the political power of Lingga Riau was 
held by Tengku Embung, also known as Tengku Fatimah, whose 
husband was Raja Muhammad Yusuf, the tenth Yang Dipertuan 
Muda of Riau, successor to the ninth Yang Dipertuan Muda, 
Raja Abdullah. 
Tengku Embung Fatimah was a child of Sultan Mahmud Muzafar 
Syah who had been dethroned by the Government of the Dutch 
Indies on 23 September 1857. She was the only Raja 
Perempuan [Queen] in the history of the kingdom of 'Johar, 
Pahang, Riau and Lingga', which had become the kingdom of 
'Lingga-Riau'. A harmonious administration was attained 
because of her care and ability, together with the close 
cooperation and intercession of the Yang Dipertuan Muda Riau 
(her own husband) •.•• 
After two years of holding political power in Lingga-Riau, 
Queen Tengku Embung Fatimah, in consultation with the Yang 
Dipertuan Muda of Riau, surrendered her power to their child 
Raja Abdul Rahman. 
46 (My translation). 
It was Tengku Ahmad himself who suggested that I translate the 
term raja perempuan (literally: female ruler) as 'queen'. He also 
supplemented the information from his book, by telling me that Sultan 
Sulaiman II had intended his brother's son's son, Tengku Husain, to 
succeed him. This would have kept the off ice of yamtuan besar in the 
hands of a male descendant of the patri-line that had originated from 
the founding ancestor, Sultan Abdul Jalil. (See Genealogical Chart 
4.) 
Instead, it seems that the throne went to Sultan Mahmud IV's 
daughter, Tengku Fatimah, and then via her, to her son, Raja Abdul 
Rahman. The office of yamtuan besar thus passed to a female 
descendant of the patri-line and then to her son via matrifiliative 
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succession. Since the father of her son was Yamtuan Muda Raja 
Muhammad Yusuf, this meant that the son had inherited the title of 
raja. So he still remained in the patri-line of the keturunan raja. 
Nevertheless, through matrifiliation, he became sultan, an office that 
should have been occupied only by the keturunan tengku. So by 
bringing complementary filiation to a logical extreme, the office of 
yamtuan besar was thereby shifted from the keturunan tengku to the 
keturunan raja. What 'Queen' Fatimah's son gained, her own patri-kin 
lost. 
This major historical shift was evidently achieved through 
breaking the male monopoly of political office. Without the elevation 
of 'Queen' Fatimah to the throne in the first place, the 
matrifiliative succession of her son would not have been even 
possible. My informant Tengku Ahmad is of the opinion that it was 
Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf who had orchestrated the whole 
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sequence of events, for the benefit of his own keturunan. Tengku 
Ahmad said that the reason why I should translate the term raja 
perempuan as 'queen' was that a female political leader is a 
phenomenon known only to the Europeans and alien to Islam and the 
Melayu world. 
Significantly, this informant is himself a direct descendant of 
Tengku Husain, who was, according to him, the intended successor of 
Sultan Sulaiman II. So if there were still a sultanate in existence 
at present, Tengku Ahmad would himself be in line for the throne, 
particularly since his only brother died in 1966. He gave me a copy 
of a genealogical chart demonstrating his right to the off ice of 
yamtuan besar, if this were still extant. (See Genealogical Chart 2.) 
According to him, the sultanate fragmented because people did not 
want to recognise as legitimate the female succession to office and 
the resulting matrifiliative transmission. As a result, the 
temenggung decided to secede and make himself sultan of his own 
territory -- that is, what is now the Malaysian state of Johore. 
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Similarly, the bendahara seceded and made himself sultan of his own 
territory that is, what is now the Malaysia state of Pahang. So 
according to Tengku Ahmad, it was because of the 'queen' and her son, 
that the Sultanate of Johor, Pahang, Riau and Lingga, became reduced 
to Lingga-Riau. In the genealogy he gave me, it is stated: 
Sultan Sulaiman II adalah sultan yang terachir yang 
memerintah Lingga Riau keturunan daripada Sang Nila Utama. 
(Sultan Sulaiman II was the last sultan of the keturunan 
from Sang Nila Utama to rule Lingga Riau.) 
It thus appears that from the viewpoint of the keturunan tengku in 
Lingga, at least as expressed by one particular informant, the 
sultanate effectively ended in 1883 when Sultan Sulaiman II died and a 
raja perempuan mounted the throne. 
Tengku Fatimah's son become yamtuan besar in 1884, with the title 
of 'Sultan Abdurrahman Maadlam Syah'. (See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977: 
334.) In 1903 he moved his political capital from Lingga to Penyengat 
in Riau. (See Tengku Ahmad 1972:27.) Thus the mas kawin of Raja 
Hamidah became the seat of the yamtuan besar. According to Tengku 
Ahmad, this was an infringement of the contractual arrangement whereby 
Riau was to be the territory of the yamtuan mud§, and Lingga the 
territory of the yamtuan besar. 
Moreover, after the death of Tengku Fatimah's husband, Yamtuan 
Muda Raja Muhamad Yusuf, in 1899: 
jabatan yang dipertuan muda ditiadakan lagi dan kekuasaannya 
dipegang oleh Residen Belanda. 
(The office of yang dipertuan muda was abolished and its 
authority was held by the Dutch Resident.) 
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(Quoted from Tengku Ahmad's genealogy). 
As a result, the territories of Riau and Lingga were both ruled by a 
male member of the keturunan raja, who had now become the sole ~ 
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dipertuan in the sultanate. 
'Queen' Fatimah and the matrifiliative succession of her son, the 
last sultan of Riau, seem to be an issue that embarrasses my raja 
informants, particularly the males. My female raja informants did not 
articulate their opinions about this matter, whereas my male raja 
informants were quite vocal about it. Interestingly, the latter do 
not attempt to justify the event, even though it did benefit their 
keturunan in the short run. Indeed some of them seem to agree with my 
tengku informant that the demise of the sultanate was due to the 
supersession of matrifiliation over patrilineal descent. 
This view was expressed in an unpublished essay written by a raja 
informant: 
But in Riau something happened that brought about a drastic 
change to custom and tradition -- that is, Sultan Sulaiman 
Badrul Alam Sah died in 1883 without leaving any descendants 
capable of succeeding him. For two years the throne of the 
Riau sultanate was vacant. During this period, efforts were 
made to shift the off ice of Sultan of Riau from the hands of 
the keturunan Melayu to the Bugis, efforts which eventually 
achieved their purpose. The method was sufficiently 
cunRing. In the beginning the vacant office of the sultan 
was represented by Tengku Embung Fatimah. She was the wife 
of Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Muhamad Yusuf and she was a 
direct descendant of the sultans of Riau-Johor. But this 
was a strange situation. In the constitution of the Melayu 
kingdom -- since the era of the Melayu kingdom at Melaka up 
to the sultanate of Riau -- no woman had ever been allowed 
to be sultan, because according to the teachings of the 
Shafi 1 i School to which the Melayu people adhere, the 
Prophet has ordained: Any community that is governed by a 
woman will suffer loss. Because of this rule, Tengku Embung 
Fatimah could not exercise her duties as the official 
occupant of the office of sultan. So she represented the 
office in the name of her son, Abdul Rahman. This was the 
case until the time when Raja Abdul Rahman began to govern 
as sultan together with his father Raja Muhamad Yusuf, the 
Yang Dipertuan Muda, both of them of Bugis descent. This 
deviation from traditional custom was closely observed by 
the representatives of the Dutch Government in Riau. 
Eventually, in 1910, when the Dutch Resident pressured 
Sultan Abdul Rahman Muazam Sah to sign a new treaty which 
would severely restrict his power, and he refused, the 
problem of this deviation from traditional custom had 
already become a worrying controversy. 
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(Raja Hamzah Yunus n.d.(a):5). 
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In contrast to this view, however, there is another view among my 
raja informants: they deny that Tengku Fatimah was ever a 'queen', so 
to speak. They said that there is no record of there ever being a 
'Sultan' Fatimah; itu hanya cerita 'that is only a story', they said. 
According to them, after Sultan Suleiman II died, there was a majlis 
kerajaan 'ruling committee' consisting of Yamtuan Muda Muhammad Yusuf, 
his wife Tengku Fatimah, and others. So Tengku Fatimah was, in this 
account, merely a co~nittee member, and not the ruler. As for her 
son's promotion to the office of yamtuan besar, this is how some of my 
raja informants explain it: Because the temenggung and the bendahara 
had crowned themselves sultans of Johar and Pahang respectively, so 
the Bugis decided that an orang Bugis 'Bugis person' could also become 
sultan. So what my tengku informant construed as effect, my raja 
informants construed as cause. 
Despite the fact that the office of yamtuan muda was abolished 
after Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf's death in 1899, my raja 
informants still think of themselves as pertaining to the yamtuan 
muda's faction. They do not seem interested in laying claim to the 
office of yamtuan besar, which my tengku informant seems to be 
interested in doing indeed. And despite the fact that the keturunan 
tengku had already lost the office of yamtuan besar and hence their 
share of the sultanate, my raja informants still rank them as their 
equals in derajat. So the implication is that even though the 
matrifiliative transmission of political office did benefit the 
keturunan raja in the short run, not even my raja informants are 
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willing to justify it as a legitimate mode of transmission. 
Consequently, the image of the sultanate that they have in mind is 
still that which had prevailed from 1722 to 1883, rather than that 
which came about after that, even though they take the year 1911 as 
the end of zaman sultan. 
It would seem from this discussion that the sexual division of 
power was so important to the political structure of the sultanate, 
that the occupation of the throne by a woman for a brief span of two 
years was enough to destroy its legitimacy. This is evidently the 
view of my informants, particularly the male rajas and tengkus. An 
expression of this view may be discerned in their attitude towards 
'Queen' Fatimah's grave, which is, significantly, located not on 
Lingga with her patri-kin, but on Penyengat with her husband's patri-
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kin. 
In recent years, the Kantor Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan -- the 
Indonesian Department of Education and Culture -- has been putting up 
metal plaques on the historical graves of the area. On 'Queen' 
Fatimah's grave, a plaque with the words 'Sultan Embung Fatimah' was 
put up. One day, the word 'sultan' was mysteriously cut out of the 
plaque by some anonymous vandal. (See Plate 3.) Some of my raja 
informants said, whoever did the deed was expressing a refusal to 
acknowledge that Tengku Embung Fatimah was ever the sultan. They 
regarded it not as an act of vandalism but merely as a correction of 
what they consider as an historical error. 
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Plate 3 . Tengku Embung Fatimah's grave lies neglected on the side of 
a road on Penyengat. Even the plaque made by the Indonesian 
Department of Education and Culture was simply placed on the ground 
without a proper stand. Nevertheless, someone objected to the title 
'Sultan Embung Fatimah' and cut out the offending word sultan. But 
the description of her as a sultan perempuan 'female sultan' still 
remains on the plaque, which also mentions that she was the wife of 
the tenth yang dipertuan muda of Riau , 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
1. The word derajat exists in three forms: derajat, darjat, and 
darjah. Darjat and darjah are more prevalent in the Malaysian 
variety of the Malay language, whereas derajat is more prevalent 
in the Indonesian variety. My informants' use of the Indonesian 
form seems to highlight the fact of their situation -- that is, 
as holders of traditional ranks in a non-traditional state. 
2. See Dumont (1972:70-103) on integration within the caste 
hierarchy. 
3. Wilkinson (1959:81) derives the word bangsawan from bangsa, and 
explains bangsa thus: 
Race; descent; family; ••• In ancient Malaya of 'caste' 
(still so in Bali); cf. (Negri Sembilan) the title Bangsa 
Balang (of the warrior-caste); in modern Malaya of racial 
and family distinctions, e.g.: bangsa China (Chinese) •••• 
4. The names of my Muslim informants take the following format -- a 
personal name followed by the word bin 'son of' or binti 
'daughter of', followed by the father's name. In Indonesian 
usage, the bin/binti is usually omitted. So for official 
purposes, my informants tend to drop the bin/binti, whereas among 
themselves they tend to keep it. 
5. Wilkinson (1959:303) explains the term encik thus: 
a titular prefix to the names of persons of good position 
who are not entitled to any other distinction. 
6. Zuriat is the Arabic word for 'seed; offspring; the scattering of 
the seed; fecundation' (Wilkinson 1959:295). Geoffrey Benjamin 
(personal communication) suggests that it is probably cognate 
with the Hebrew ~· 
7. Darah 'blood' and keturunan 'descent' are often used 
synonymously. However, my informants do not go on to associate 
other bodily parts -- such as bone, flesh or hair -- with other 
social relations. 
8. Such a differentiation accords with standard Malay usage. As 
Wilkinson (1959:317) has explained the term gahara: 
Sanskrit. Of royal birth on both sides. Etymologically, 
'having parity' •••• Anak gahara, raja yang gahara: a 
prince's child by a royal mother, ••• such offspring 
having precedence over children by commoner wives •••• 
Anak gahara should not be translated 'legitimate child'. 
An anak gundek may be fully legitimate under religious 
law. 
Gundek, on the other hand, denotes: 
Secondary wife. Usually a lady of non-royal rank married 
to a royalty but not as his principal wife, or wedded to 
him by some irregular form of marriage such as marriage 
to his kris; in Java a prince's wife who is not his 
regular 'consort' ••• and who bears no princely title as a 
wife; ( Minangkabau) a wife acquired by seizure or 
purchase and not by marriage on a footing of equality •••• 
Anak gundek: a prince's child by a secondary wife; not 
illegiimate but for purposes of succession ranking after 
children by a royal consort (anak gahara). 
('Gundek' is the old spelling of 'gundik'.) 
9. As Fortes (1969:266) has explained: 
Filio-parental relations are intrafamilially generated 
but are also invariably encapsulated in a hierarchy of 
extra-familial structural contexts. 
10. Raja Haji Umar Endut was a brother of Raja Ali Haji. (See 
Genealogical Charts 3 and 5.) 
11. Wilkinson (1959:1254) explains turun thus: 
Not used of a fall (jatoh) nor or a drop by the mere 
force of gravity (terjun); but covering a traveller's 
descent of a hill, or his journey from the interior to 
the coast, or (more figuratively) from 'windward' to 
'leeward' ports, or (more figuratively still) descent 
from generation to generation. The word also covers the 
fall of rain (which is not regarded as due simply to 
gravity); and the 'descent' of the spirit in spirit-
possession •••• Turun temurun: continuous descent, 
whether of rain ••• or of an ancient family. 
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These are not obscure connotations, but current usages in the 
Malay language, including the speech-forms of my informants. 
12. As Sheffler (1973:761) has pointed out, 
[There are indeed] descent units that are not groups •••• 
In many such cases the sole 'corporate property' of the 
unit is its name, and, aside from the right in rem to the 
use of this name, rights conferred by membership of such 
a unit are entirely rights in personam over other 
members ••• and consists largely in claims to hospitality 
and other services of the same general sort. 
Sheffler (ibid.) suggests that the term 'sodality', as explained 
by Service (1962), may be usefully applied to such non-corporate 
units. Service (ibid.:13) explains the term as meaning: 
a nonresidential association that has some corporate 
functions or purposes. Thus sodality is close in'spirit 
to Gesellshaft and 'special-purpose group', but it has 
the advantage of not implying either voluntary membership 
or, necessarily, a single special purpose and thus is a 
somewhat broader concept, and it is explicitly defined as 
nonresidential whereas the others are nonresidential only 
by implication or expectation. 
13. Gullick (1965) talks about lineages in the nineteenth-century 
sultanates of the Malay Peninsula that he discusses. But he adds 
a caveat in the preface: 
The use of the term "lineage" is dictated by lack of a 
suitable alternative. Malay aristocrats were more 
conscious of their individual descent. But ••• they were 
on occasion united in group solidarity against others 
when the political office which was the basis of their 
status was in jeopardy. 
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The sultanates that Gullick discusses were extant and functioning 
polities, with the different 'lineages' holding certain political 
offices as their corporate property. In the absence of such 
political offices, as is the case in present-day Riau, there is 
no corporate lineage to speak of. 
14. As Sheffler (1973:761) has noted, 
Relations of common descent ••• necessarily relate or 
oppose sets of individuals to one another or to other 
sets of the same structural order •••• Thus one's jural 
status as a member of a descent category is necessarily a 
status shared with or by others descended from the 
putative founder of the unit in the same way as oneself. 
15. I have chosen male genealogies for comparison, because derajat 
and keturunan are primarily male concerns. So the differences in 
derajat tend to show up more in male genealogies than they do in 
female genealogies which are generally bilateral. 
16. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Ini sebutan aja, sebagai hormat kepada pihak perempuan. 
Biasanya dalam bentuk 'jewellery'. Harganya tak tentu, 
tidak terhitung. Kadang-kadang ringgit tidak disebut, 
rial disebut pula. 
17. Wilkinson (1959:971,975) explains rial and ringgit thus: 
••• Rial beringgit =milled or saw-edged Spanish dollar; 
and the name ringgit in contrast to the old unmilled 
rial. Nowadays the old meaning has been lost sight of and 
the rial is obsolete, so ringgit may be used of any 
dollar. 
The reported mention of rial in the utterance of mas kawin 
suggests that these particular specified amounts were fixed at a 
time when Spanish coinage was made available. This would date 
the fixing of the various amounts to the beginning of the 
sixteenth century when the Spanish began their conquest of South 
America, and discovered immensely productive silver veins, 
thereby making Spanish bullion the main currency of the world for 
the next three centuries. (See Parry 1966:65 and Roberts 
1980:610-611.) 
18. A Muslim marriage must be performed with what is referred to as 
the 'affirmative proposal' and the 'acceptance'. The bride's 
father is the one who makes the 'affirmative proposal' by saying: 
I give in marriage to you my daughter named for a 
mahr amounting to on the condition of what Allah has 
ordered. 
The groom responds by saying: 
I accept the marriage with her for the said mahr and I am 
satisfied with it and with her. 
(See Moulavi 1978:99.) 
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19. According to Fyzee (1964:126-127), the Islamic mahr was 
historically derived from a pre-Islamic situation, when two kinds 
of marital payments were prevalent. One was the sadaq; this was 
given in a certain type of marriage, known as beena, 'where the 
husband visited the wife but did not bring her home, the wife was 
called sadiqa or female friend', and the payment made to her at 
marriage was called sadaq (ibid:l26). The second type of 
marriage payment in the pre-Islamic situation was the mahr, which 
pertained to the marriage of dominion, known as baal, 'where the 
wife's people part with her and have to be compensated' (ibid.). 
Now mahr in the baal form of marriage was used by the 
Prophet to ameliorate the position of the wife in Islam, 
and it was combined with sadaq, so that it became a 
settlement or a provision for the wife. In Islamic law, 
mahr belongs absolutely to the wife. 
(Ibid.). 
20. Indeed, in Islamic law, 
The custody of illegitimate children appertains 
exclusively to the mother and her relations. 
(Ameer Ali 1965:II,238). 
21. 'Hypogamy' is marrying downwards, and 1 hypergamy 1 is marrying 
upwards. I am not using the convention of describing marriages 
as hypergamous or hypogamous from the perspective of the woman 
alone. For an example of this convention, see Dumont 
(1972:159,346) where he describes 'hypergamy' as the marriage of 
a woman into a superior family, and 'hypogamy' as the marriage of 
a superior woman and an inferior man. I shall, instead, refer to 
both spouses, for an unequal marriage is hypergamous for the one 
but hypogamous for the other. 
22. I am following the word-usage of my Pangkil and Penyengat 
informants; my other informants pronounce these words as gelar 
and keturun. Benjamin (1984:24) argues that nominalisation is a 
feature of formal Malay. 
23. The Dutch Resident at Tanjungpinang was not, however, the only 
foreign administrator who was not called raja. The Governor-
General of Batavia, for example, remained the Gabnor-Jeneral 
Betawi, and was not raja Betawi. Perhaps this variation in usage 
is linked to the historical relationship of the administered 
place in question to the former Melaka Sultanate. The territory 
of Dutch and British Melaka was, of course, that of the old 
Melaka Sultanate itself. The territory of present-day Singapore 
used to be part of the old Melaka Sultanate and, after 1511, part 
of the Johor-Riau Sultanate, until 1819 when the British took 
over the island. Batavia, on the other hand, was certainly not 
part of the Melaka Sultanate. So it seems to me that the 
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underlying idea is that the territories of the old Melaka 
Sultanate require rajas. When there are no indigenous candidates 
for the post, then even foreign administrators are acceptable as 
rajas. 
24. The name Raja Alang Laut may be literally translated as 'the raja 
who is the obstruction of the sea'. Alang, however, is also a 
birth-order name signifying a middle position, which is neither 
the eldest nor the youngest of the siblings. 
25. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Ya, dulu punya -- keturunan orang Bugis .•.• Kalau kita 
raja Riau ini, banyak keturunan Bugis. Waktu dulu raja 
Melayu perang ... ; [sebab itu dia] minta bantuan sama raja 
Bugis dari Sulawesi. Jadi Bugis datang ke sini membantu 
raja Melayu perang. Jadi menang. Maka itu dia kawin 
sama orang raja Melayu ini, perempuan raja Melayu, jadi 
terus daQ?_L anak bal!Y_~~_Qj.___sa jalah. Kalau yang 
bernama raja itu, termasuk Bugis, sama di Malaysia 
keturunan Bugislah ..•• Memang di Nusantara ini keturunan 
Bugis mengalir. Artinya, macam ••. setitik nila [di dalam] 
satu mangkok santan kelapa. Jadi semua ikut setitik. 
Oleh kerana nila itu hijau, semua santan kelapa yang 
putih itu pun jadi hijau. Demikian jugak darah Bugis 
itu, mulai setitik, mengalir sampai begitu banyak. 
The transmission of derajat is thus not merely intergenerational, 
but unidirectional, flowing from the past to the present. The 
word used by my informant -- mengalir -- is particularly 
significant, for its literal meaning is 'to flow', or 'to float 
downstream' (Coope 1976:6). This usage fits in very well with 
the connotations of the word turun, as discussed above. The past 
is thus upstream, as it were, and the present is downstream. 
Therefore, whatever is in the present must have flowed downstream 
from the past. 
This logic seems to have been applied in the Tuhfat even to the 
five Opu Daeng brothers. As I have mentioned in the text, my 
raja informants identify Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga as their 
founding ancestor; they do not bother to go back further beyond 
him, In the Tuhfat, however, Raja Ali Haji (1982:25-27) provides 
him with so illustrious a genealogy that it includes the Queen of 
Sheba, King Solomon, and even various spirit-beings such as 
Patotok, the dispenser of human fate, and his son Batara Guru, 
who came to earth 'on a rainbow in a piece of bamboo' (Matheson 
and Andaya 1982:317). Apparently, Raja Ali Haji thought that 
even the charismatic power of the Opu Daeng brothers needed 
legitimation through descent. 
26. In the Tuhfat, it is stated: 
According to the story, as a result of His Majesty Sultan 
Sulaiman's discussions with Kelana Jaya Putera and all 
the Opus, Kelana Jaya Putera was confirmed in his 
appointment as Yang Dipertuan Muda, because he had no 
commitments or ties, and Opu Daeng Cellak was to be 
married to Tengku Mandak. When all the princes were of 
the same mind, His Majesty Sultan Sulaiman began 
preparations to install the Yang Dipertuan Muda and to 
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marry Opu Daeng Cellak to his sister Tengku Mandak. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:63-64). 
27. According to the Tuhfat, Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga never even 
went to Riau at all. After he left Bone in Sulawesi, he 
travelled to Batavia, Siantan, Johor, Melaka, Cambodia, and 
finally died in Siantan. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:45-46.) 
28. As Andaya (1975:293-296) has pointed out: 
Only after five days of looting and killing did the 
Buginese finally install Raja Sulaiman as Sultan of 
Johor. From ••• Dutch reports it appears that installing 
Raja Sulaiman as ruler of Johor and asking for the 
position of Raja Muda were not acts which had been 
carefully pre-arranged between the Raja Sulaiman and the 
Buginese, but acts which had suggested themselves after 
the Buginese had quite suddenly become conquerors of 
Riau •••• If the Buginese had come for the express 
purpose of rescuing Raja Sulaiman and installing him as 
their puppet lord, they would not have acted in the way 
they did •••• Surely they would not have gone on a 
rampage against a country they intended to rule! 
29. In the Tuhfat, it is stated: 
Be assured, Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-Alam Syah, that I the 
Yang Dipertuan Muda shall govern your kingdom. If what 
is lengthways before you is not to your liking, I shall 
lay it crossways, and if what lies crossways before you 
is not to your liking, I shall lay it lengthways. 
Whatever is overgrown and thorny in your path, I will 
clear.' 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:64). 
30. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:369), however, 'Raja Ali 
did not leave Riau at this time but later, in November 1784, when 
faced with defeat by van Braam's squadron, he fled to Sukadana' 
in Borneo. 
31. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:370): 
The Dutch took possession of Tanjung Pinang on 1 November 
1784 and Sultan Mahmud then signed an eight-clause treaty 
of capitulation. The following day a twenty-six-clause 
contract was signed with the VOC. Its main points were 
that the Sultan held his territory as a fief of the VOC, 
that he could not make decisions without consulting his 
four Malay ministers, that a Dutch garrison be 
established at Tanjung Pinang and that never again would 
a Bugis be appointed as Yang Dipertuan Muda. 
(Also see Surat-Surat (1970:3-31) for both the Malay and Dutch 
versions of these treaties.) 
32. According to the Tuhfat, 
Engku Muda was administering Riau at this time, but when 
the Yang Dipertuan Muda came to Riau, all the Bugis 
presented themselves before him, and the people of Riau 
were divided, waiting for orders from both princes. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:203). 
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The civil war between the two factions may be dated by the report 
of Dutch Resident of Palembang in December 1800, who stated that 
'about forty or fifty lives had been lost in the fighting' 
(Matheson and Andaya 1982:380). 
33. According to the Tuhfat, he sent an envoy to Raja Ali, saying: 
'Abdullah, take this message to my cousin Raja Ali. I 
now wish to take upon myself the heavy and exhausting 
burden he bears, up hill and down dale, through swamps 
and morasses' •.••••• When Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali 
heard Sultan Mahmud's message, he roared with laughter, 
saying, 'Abdullah, I give thanks to Allah Almighty for 
His Majesty Sultan Mahmud's proposal. It is clear that 
he really does intend to protect and care for all of the 
locally born Bugis. And there is a veiled hint in this 
message that he wants to marry Raja Hamidah, daughter of 
the late Raja Haji •••• ' 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:204-205). 
34. According to contemporary Dutch reports, 
the oath of loyalty was made on 3 September 1803 •••• On 
21 December 1804 ••• the pledge was renewed and Raja Ali 
was formally installed as Raja Muda. 
(Matheson and Andaya 1982:380). 
35. Matheson and Andaya (1982) have translated this place-name as 
'Ungkat Point', but it is known to my informants and to 
Indonesian cartograhers as Tanjung Unggat. 
36. In the Tuhfat, it is stated: 
Sultan Mahmud sent Punggawa Bakak to fell and clear the 
Island of Penyengat Indera Sakti, because Punggawa Bakak 
was himself a resident of Penyengat. (There were already 
four or five houses there.) When Penyengat Island had 
been cleared, His Majesty had a palace built there with 
fortifications, a mosque, and audience hall •••• It was 
not long before the work was finished, and Penyengat 
Island then became the seat of government. His Majesty 
moved his wife, Engku Puteri (that is, Raja Hamidah) as 
well as the nobles and princes to the palace on 
Penyengat. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:211). 
37. According to the Tuhfat: 
When His Majesty had finished setting up the 
administration of Riau, he left to reorganise Lingga, 
collect the revenue from the tin on Singkep Island, and 
arrange the division of apanages for the Lingga 
dignitaries and nobles. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:212). 
38. Wilkinson (1959:842) translates the word pangkat as 
tier; stage; floor; grade; rank; school-standard. Of the 
tiers in a roof; the rings or crowns in a tiered diadem. 
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39. Indeed it is mentioned in the Tuhfat that Sultan Sulaiman and his 
sisters were born of a non-aristocratic mother -- Encik Nusamah, 
the daughter of an Acehnese. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:19-20.) 
However, he was born after his father had become sultan, whereas 
his gahara siblings were born when their father was still merely 
a bendahara. 
40. The response of the thwarted Engku Muda illustrates clearly his 
feeling of being equal in rank to Sultan Mahmud. According to 
the unpublished Hikayat Kerajaan, he refused the title of 
temenggung 'territorial minister' and said to his brother's son, 
Engku Abd al-Rahman [Engku Abdu'r-Rahman]: 
If I can't be Raja Muda, I don't want a title. But all 
the islands and islets and Johore are under me and 
certainly Pahang belongs to my 'father', Dato' Bendahara 
Abdu'l-Majid: for today the Sultan no longer heeds Malays 
but lives at Lingga and gives Riau to the Raja Muda. 
Look at our case. WE OUGHT TO OWN THE COUNTRY BECAUSE WE 
ARE CO-INHERITORS WITH THE SULTAN. WHY SHOULD HE DO AS 
HE LIKES? LIKE HIM WE ARE DESCENDED FROM SULTAN ABDU'L 
JALIL AND CUSTOM ORDAINS WE RULE THE COUNTRY AND HOW CAN 
HE STOP US? ALTHOUGH I AM NOT INSTALLED, WHO SHALL 
OBJECT TO MY RULE? If Engku Abdu'r-Rahman wants to be 
called Temenggong, let him seek audience at Lingga. I 
won't. If I die, you, Engku, will rule the islands and 
never lose Johore because to my mind if the Sultan 
behaves like this we've got to look after ourselves or be 
worsted. 
(Quoted from Winstedt 1979:72; my emphasis). 
This suggests a clear distinction between legal authority and 
charismatic power. Furthermore, it is implied in the passage 
cited above, that legal authority comes from above through 
seeking audience with the sultan. Charismatic power, in 
contrast, wells up from below. 
41. The divergent keturunan which still rules the Malaysian state of 
Johor, took the title of ungku, a variant form of engku. They 
thus became the keturunan ungku, in contradistinction to the 
keturunan tengku and the keturunan raja. The present ~ 
dipertuan agung 'paramount lord' of Malaysia, Sultan Mahmood 
Iskandar, is a direct descendant of Engku Abd al-Rahman. Sworn 
in on 26 April 1984, he is Malaysia's eighth king. 
42. Trocki (1979:44) has compiled the following table of the 
temenggung's dominion: 
43. As 
The Temenggung's Maritime Following, c. 1823 
Island Suku Population Boats 
Karimun ? 1,250 ? 
Buru Buru 670 3 
Galang Galang 1,300 20 
Moro Moro 560 15 
Ba tam Terong ? 10 
Sugi Sugi 1,600 6 
Bulang Pekaka 1,050 ? 
Temiang Temiang 1,100 30 
Singapore 1,500 ? 
Johor 1.000 ? 
10,030 84 
noted by Matheson and Andaya (1982:387): 
Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah ••• was one of the most 
influential nobles in Riau and also one of the 
wealthiest, enjoying the income from several islands. 
Begbie [writing in 1834] ••• described her as a 'fine, 
intelligent old lady'. 
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44. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:387), in 1820 Engku Puteri 
tried to leave Riau for Singapore. Since she was then in 
possession of the royal regalia, this meant that she would have 
been able to invest legitimacy in Sultan Husain of Singapore. 
The Tuhfat records that she was forced off the boat by her male 
relatives. (See Appendix 5.) Nevertheless, she still retained 
possession of the royal regalia until the Dutch took them off 
her: 
••• In October 1822 the Governor of Malacca, Timmerman 
Thyssen, accompanied by Adriaen Koek went to Pulau 
Penyengat, where finding no argument would prevail, they 
marched, it is said, a body of troops with their pieces 
loaded into the presence chamber and took the regalia 
from Tengku Putri Hamidah by force. Sultan 'Abdu'r-
Rahman was then invited to return at once to Riau •••• 
From fear of the Tengku Putri His Highness delayed, until 
a Dutch brig took the Yamtuan Muda to Trengganu to fetch 
him. 
(Winstedt 1979:84). 
45. See Appendix 8 on the religiosity of the post-1804 yamtuan mudas. 
46. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
RAJA PEREMPUAN. Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah tidak 
berputera seorangpun sedangkan Tengku Besar yang bernama 
Tengku Daud lebih dahulu telah meninggal dunia. Karena 
itulah untuk waktu selama dua_tahun kuasa atas kerajaan 
Lingga Riau dipangku oleh Tengku Embung atau Tengku 
Fatimah yang suaminya Raja Muhammad Yusuf menjadi Yang 
Dipertuan Muda Riau kesepuluh menggantikan Yang Dipertuan 
Muda IX Raja Abdullah. 
Tengku Embung Fatimah adalah anak dari Sultan Mahmud 
Muzafar Syah yang dimakzulkan (dipecat) oleh Pemerintah 
Hindia Belanda pada tanggal 23 September tahun 1857. 
Beliau ialah satu-satunya Raja Perempuan dalam leretan 
sejarah kerajaan "Johor dan Pahang dan Riau dan Lingga' 
yang telah menciut jadi kerajaan "Lingga-Riau" itu. 
Keharmonisan pentadbiran dapat dicapai karena cermat dan 
cerdiknya dan berkat kerjasama yang sebati dengan Yang 
Dipertuan Muda Riau (suaminya sendiri) •••• 
Setelah selama dua tahun meme~ng kuasa kerajaan Lingga-
Riau Raja Perempuan Tengku Embung Fatimah dengan mufakat 
Yang Dipertuan Muda Riau menyerah kekuasaannya kepada 
anak mereka Raja Abdul Rahman. 
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47. In this context, it is interesting that Yamtuan Muda Raja 
Muhammad Yusuf had the word sultan drawn on his crockery. (See 
Plate 4.) 
48. There is some documentary evidence that the abolition of the 
office of yamtuan muda was opposed by some members of the 
keturunan raja themselves, notably the older brother of Sultan 
Abdurrahman, Raja Ali Kelana, who was born of a different mother. 
This evidence includes a handwritten draft of a letter that Raja 
Ali Kelana wrote to his sultan brother, distancing himself from 
the abolition of the office and warning of the dire consequences 
of such an action. This letter is in the private collection of a 
raja informant. (See Wee and Matheson forthcoming.) 
49. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Tapi di Riau terjadi suatu hal yang melicinkan jalan bagi 
perobahan-perobahan kanun dan istiadat, yaitu mangkatnya 
Sultan Sulaiman Badrul A~am Sah pada tahun 1883, tanpa 
meninggalkan zuriat yang mampu menggantikan dirinya. 
Selaml:"!_dU!!___tahun ta_hta kesultanan Riau vacum. Sementara 
itu usaha-usaha menjajaki agar jabatan Sultan di Riau 
pindah tangan dari keturunan Melayu ke Bugis akhirnya 
ditemui penyelesaiann_y~. Caranya cukup berbelit-belit. 
Mula-mula jabatan sultan yang vacum itu diwakilkan kepada 
TENGKU EMBUNG FATIMAH. Beliau ialah isteri YANG DI 
PERTUAN MUDA Raja Muhamad Yusuf dan T. Embung Fatimah 
adalah keturunan lang~ung sultan2 Riau-Johor. 
Tapi timbu.!_pula suatu hal yan_g_~lik. Karena dalam 
komposisi kesultanan Melayu - sejak dari zaman kerajaan 
Melayu Melaka s/d kesultanan Riau tidak diperbolehkan 
seorang wanita menjadi sultan, karena oleh ulama-ulama 
Mazhab Syafi'i yang dianut oleh orang2 Melayu ada 
ketentuan Nabi: KHASIRA QAUMUM ALLAZINA WALLAU UMURAHUM 
RATAAN. (Rugilah suatu kaum a_p~bila_yang menjadi 
pemegang kekuasaannya ialah_perempuan). 
Karena ~etua itu TENGKU EMBUNG FATIMAH tidak mungkin 
melakukan tugasnya seb~~mangku jabatan Sultan. Maka 
beliau mewakilkan pula jabatan Sultan tersebut kepada 
anaknya: Abdul Rahman. Sehingga dalam waktu yang 
bersamaan memerintah (Raja Abdul Rahman) sebagai SULTAN 
dan ayah (Raja Muha~ad Yusuf) sebagai JANGDIPERTUAN MUDA, 
kedua-duanya keturunan Bugis. 
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I 
Plate 4 . This dish cover is part of a large dinner set that had 
previously belonged to Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf. It is now 
in the possession of a Penyengat raja, Raja Haji Abdul Rahim Mansor. 
The typewritten label on the cover says: 
'Eat Service'["siq,7. Specially comissioned by 
Sultan Mohd. Yusuf (the tenth Yang Dipertuan Muda of 
Riau) for his meals, in the year 1859, from France. 
(Note the logo SMY on each dish . ) 
'SMY' stood for 'Sultan Mohd. Yusuf'. So it seems to be the case that 
Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad thought of himself as sultan. 
Penyimpangan adat istiadat ini diikuti dengan saksama 
oleh wakil Pemerintah Belanda di Riau. Kelak pada tahun 
1910 waktu Residen Belanda mendesak sultan Abdul Rahman 
Muazam Sah untuk menanda-tangani kontrak baru yang sangat 
membatasi kekuasaan dan Menteri2nya ditolak Sultan, 
masaalah penyimpangan adat itu telah dijadikan 
argumentasi yang mengejutkan. 
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SO. Interestingly, the grave of her husband, Yamtuan Muda Raja 
Muhammad Yusuf, is itself located not on Penyengat but in Daik, 
Lingga. But it is not placed with the graves of the sultans and 
tengkus, and is instead in a remote site by itself. He had 
apparently spent most of his life in Daik, which was the capital 
of the yamtuan besar, not the yamtuan muda. But he may have been 
able to reside there because of the rule of uxorilocality, his 
wife being the sultan's daughter. 
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5.1 The Imposition of Hierarchy 
Even though the idea of hierarchy looms larger for those who can 
claim high rank, than for those who can make no such claim, the 
hierarchy itself must necessarily include the latter. A hierarchy in 
which all are high-ranking cannot, by definition, be a hierarchy. It 
must thus include the low-ranking, regardless of whether they are 
receptive to the idea. It is in the very nature of a hierarchy to 
reach out and include even those who do not adhere to it. So a 
hierarchy tends to be imposed by the top upon the bottom. This 
implies that the bottom of the hierarchy is crucial, for without the 
bottom there can be no top. 
In such a situation, tension is likely to occur between top and 
bottom, for the latter must choose whether to submit or to resist the 
farmer's domination. In the following discussion, I shall be 
concerned with patterns of domination, submission and resistance as 
they appear in the rear-view image of zaman sultan. These will be 
analysed in terms of a discourse on the dynamics of power 
As I have stated in Chapter One, following Foucault (1980a:92-94), 
the play of power arises from difference; it begins with at least two 
opposing forces. And difference is the very crux of hierarchy. I 
pointed out in Chapter Four that the hierarchy of derajat is not just 
an arbitrary ranking, but a scale of power. I must now add that this 
is not a static scale but a dynamic one generated by the cross-
tensions of opposing forces. 
Bateson's (1973:35-46) concept of schismogenesis is useful in 
this context. This may be briefly explained as follows. 
Schismogenesis is progressive differentiation between any two 
interacting parties that leads eventually to the breakdown of 
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interaction. Bateson (ibid.:41-42) discusses two types of 
schismogenesis -- symmetrical and complementary. In the former, the 
two parties have similar aspirations and behaviour patterns; so in a 
situation of progressive differentiation, they become competitive 
1 
rivals, trying to outdo each other in doing the same thing. In the 
latter case of complementary differentiation, however, the two parties 
are fundamentally different. Progressive differentiation in this case 
will lead to the excessive exaggeration of their respective 
2 
qualities. However, breakdown can be avoided if there are 
restraining factors to prevent schismogenesis from exceeding certain 
limits. 
Some of the issues we have discussed in Chapter Four may be 
analysed in these Batesonian terms. For example, the intra-derajat 
rivalry between the keturunan tengku and the keturunan raja may be 
seen as symmetrical schismogenesis. The complementary distribution 
the two factions in the usage of titles, the divide between 
sovereignty and authority, and the territorial division may be 
considered as restraining factors which slowed down the process of 
schismogenesis. The eventual takeover of the sultan's office by the 
of 
Bugis faction may be considered as the culmination of schismogenesis, 
which led to the breakdown of the entire system. 
If intra-derajat rivalry may be understood as symmetrical 
schismogenesis, then inter-9erajat interaction may be understood as 
complementary schismogenesis. The relationship between any two 
derajat in the hierarchy is, by definition, a relationship between a 
social superior and a social inferior. The two parties are thus 
fundamentally different in rank. A progressive differentiation of 
their respective qualities would mean that the superior party would 
become increasingly superior, while the inferior party would become 
increasingly inferior, until interaction becomes impossible to 
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sustain. 
5.2 Orang Bangsawan and Orang Kebanyakan 
As mentioned in Chapter Four above, the basic divide in the 
hierarchy is between the rulers and the ruled, the elite and the 
masses. What this means is that while the derajat are progressively 
gradated on the one hand, on the other hand, they also break into two 
opposing categories -- the orang bangsawan 'aristocrat' versus the 
orang kebanyakan 'commoner'. 
The interaction between two such unequal, yet opposing, parties 
is likely to lead to complementary schismogenesis, with the aristocrat 
becoming increasingly dominant and the commoner becoming increasingly 
submissive, in reaction to each other. My informants seem to be 
explicitly aware of this complementary interaction of domination-
submission. For example, a Karas informant said: 
Kalau dulu, siapa yang kuat menang; siapa yang kalah mati. 
(In former times, whosoever was strong would win; whosoever 
lost would die.) 
Thus the weak not merely lost, they perished. This statement 
implies the process whereby domination-submission could lead to 
ultimate breakdown. It implies that death is the ultimate submission. 
Therefore, according to this logic, in any single instance of 
domination-submission, there would be one surviving winner and one 
dead loser; this winner would then have to be matched against someone 
else. The cumulation of such encounters would be a series of 
progressive eliminations, such that the final winner would be the sole 
survivor. In that case, domination-submission would no longer be 
possible, for the simple reason that there would be no one left to 
dominate. 
The same informant went on to say: 
Kalau <lulu, siapa yang kuat boleh menjadi raja di hati, 
sultan di mata; tidak ada yang berani lawan pada dia. 
(Formerly, whosoever was strong could become a raja in his 
mind and a sultan in his eyes; nobody would dare challenge 
him.) 
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The phrase raja di hati, sultan di mata is one that is used by other 
informants too. It may be explained thus. The hati -- literally, 
'liver' -- is considered the seat of one's emotions. So to be a raja 
in one's hati means that one can do whatever one feels like doing; 
raja-hood is thus construed as the unrestrained indulgence of one 
emotions. A sultan di mata is someone who can take whatever it is 
that his eyes happen to see, because-everything belongs to him anyway. 
So according to this logic, a raja is someone who can do anything he 
feels like doing, and a sultan is someone who owns everything he sees 
-- that seems to be a fair characterisation of the unchallengeable 
ultimate winner of domination-submission! 
The view articulated by this Karas informant is certainly not 
unique to him. Another informant who shares his view made the 
statement: 
Raja-raja -- kerjanya cuma memeras. 
(As for the rajas -- their only work is to oppress.) 
Both these cited informants are commoners. The first is a Galang 
person, and the second is a former resident of Penyengat now living in 
Tanjungpinang. Others who have voiced similar opinions are also 
commoners. 
So from the commoners' point of view, the hierarchy can be 
construed in terms of the opposition between strength and weakness, 
victory and defeat, oppression and suffering, even life and death. 
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But as I have pointed out above, this kind of complementary 
interaction can lead to breakdown, with the ultimate victor left with 
no one to dominate. For the continuation of the interaction there 
must be some restraining factor to prevent the complementary 
schismogenesis of domination-submission from progressing to its stark 
relentless end. 
One way of restraining such a situation would be to diffuse the 
opposition such that it would no longer be just the interaction 
between two parties. As pointed out above, the hierarchy may be 
understood both as an opposition and as a series of gradated ranks. 
The gradation of multiple ranks, one on top of another, divides the 
force of the primary opposition between ruler and ruled into a complex 
criss-crossing network of secondary interactions between the different 
derajat. For example, the encik datuk are inferior to the rajas, 
tengkus, and tuan said, but superior to the other ranks. Similarly, 
the keturunan Bintan are inferior to those above, but superior to 
those below. 
So except for the very top and the very bottom, every rank has 
some above it and others below it. The purest form of domination-
submission is thus to be found in the relationship between the very 
top and the very bottom. This is, in other words, the relationship 
between the aristocrats at the very top and the slaves at the very 
bottom. 
5.3 Hamba Orang 
The two lowest derajat in the hierarchy are termed hamba 
3 
'slaves'. The very lowest derajat is hamba orang 'slaves of people'; 
the second lowest is hamba raja 'slaves of the raja'. According to my 
informants, the difference between the two is that the former were 
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milik peribadi 'personal property', and the latter were milik 
pemerintah 'government property'. The hamba orang were said to have 
been acquired through piratical raids or through commercial sale. In 
contrast, the hamba raja were said to have been always there, and were 
neither kidnapped nor bought. The former were foreigners to Riau; the 
latter were indigenes of Riau. 
Let me first discuss the hamba orang, the foreigners imported to 
Riau as slaves. As an example of bought slaves, my informants cited 
the 'negro' [their word] slaves acquired by Raja Haji Ahmad in Mecca 
in the nineteenth century. As mentioned in Chapter Four, he was the 
first raja from Riau to go on the haj. According to the Tuhfat, on 
his return from Mecca, 
Raja Ahmad presented his elder brother the Yang Dipertuan 
Muda with two black slaves, one a Nubian and the other an 
Abyssinian ••• [together with many] blessed things from Mecca 
the Exalted. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:256). 
The 'two black slaves' were evidently included among the 'blessed 
4 
things from Mecca.' This Islamic association with slavery is 
significant, for it implies that the relationship of domination-
submission is one may be perceived as being sanctified by God 
5 
himself. The legitimation of submission thereby legitimates 
domination. 
Raja Haji Ahmad's 'negro' slaves seem to be particularly 
noteworthy to my informants, because they were apparently the first 
historical example of this sort of legitimated submission. According 
to my informants, there were other subsequent 'negro' slaves apart 
from Raja Haji Ahmad's 'Nubian' and 'Abyssinian'. There seem to have 
been also 'short and dark' slaves identified by my informants as 
'Hottentot'. There is said to be one family, presently residing in 
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Tanjungpinang, who are descended from 'Hottentot' slaves. 
Unfortunately, I did not manage to meet them. I have, however, met in 
Singapore the descendants of a female Abyssinian slave, who was bought 
in Mecca by the late father of a raja informant. This is the family 
mentioned in Chapter Four, who identify themselves as keturunan Hapsi 
'of Abyssinian descent'. 
Apart from the 'negro' slaves bought in Mecca, there were also 
the slaves bought from Ilanun pirates based in the Philippines. My 
informants say that these consisted of victims captured from other 
parts of the Indonesian archipelago, and included, for example, 
Balinese and Minangkabau. According to them, if the Ilanun captured 
any Riau indigenes for slavery, they would be sold not in the Johor-
Riau area itself, but in Betawi and Banten in Java. My raja 
informants say that there was an agreement established with the Ilanun 
pirates, which ensured that no indigene of Riau would be sold as a 
slave in his or her own home territory. According to my informants, 
not all the hamba orang 'slaves of people' were bought; some were 
captured through piratical raids launched by the Riau people 
themselves in areas outside Riau. The two areas named as notable 
sources of kidnapped slaves were Bangka island and Lampung in southern 
Sumatra. 
Apparently, only the aristocrats in Penyengat and Daik owned 
slaves. But ownership was of a private nature. That is to say the 
slaves belonged to individual aristocrats and not to the aristocracy 
as a class. My informants claim that these slaves were branded on 
their faces to indicate whose property they were. 
But there are of course no longer any such slaves in present-day 
Riau. As mentioned in Chapter Four, although my informants living in 
the present-day still rank the various derajat in a top-to-bottom 
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hierarchy, ranging from raja and tengku at the very top, to~ 
orang at the very bottom, this differentiated ranking seems to be 
rather nominal in character. In terms of the existing here-and-now, 
the differentiation does not seem to be plausible. It is only in the 
context of the rear-view image of zaman sultan that the role of the 
hamba orang appears to loom significant. 
As I have shown in Chapter Four, my raja and tengku informants do 
take their rank seriously. For them to do so, however, they must 
contextualise their rank in a hierarchy that includes other ranks. As 
pointed out above, a one-rank hierarchy is, by definition, not a 
hierarchy. Therefore, even though slaves are no longer owned in Riau, 
'slaves' must nevertheless remain as·a category in my informants' 
consciousness. To put it another way, for the keturunan raja and the 
keturunan tengku to exist as such, there must be a category of 
keturunan hamba orang, even if it is only an empty category. A rank 
in a hierarchy thus has an inherent valence for other ranks. So to 
perceive oneself in terms of such a rank implies that one must 
perceive others also in terms of rank. In the following discussion, 
we shall consider some of these other ranks. 
5.4 Hamba Raja 
As mentioned above, my informants say that whereas the hamba 
orang were the personal property of individual owners, the hamba raja 
were 'government property' (milik pemerintah). Moreover, whereas the 
former were foreigners to Riau, the latter were indigenes. My 
informants also made it a point to tell me that whereas the hamba 
orang were branded, the hamba raja were not. 
These differences help explain why the .hamba raja ranked above 
the hamba orang. The former's master, which was the government 
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itself, was more powerful than the latter's individual masters. The 
former belonged to Riau, their home territory, whereas the latter were 
homeless. The former were not owned in terms of their bodies, whereas 
the latter were physically owned. 
Wilkinson (1959:391) has translated the term hamba raja as 'debt-
slaves of the ruler'. This explication is indeed consonant with my 
informants' usage. According to them, the debt they owe the ruler was 
6 
kerahan 'corvee'. As my informants explained, kerah means to 'summon 
people to work' (suruh orang kerja); kerahan, they said, is 'an 
obligation on the part of those who have been summoned' (satu 
7 
kewajiban orang yang dikerah). This implies that the hamba raja were 
hamba not in the sense of being owned bodily, but in the sense of 
being obligated to perform certain services for the rulers. For this 
reason, the hamba raja were also known as orang kerahan 'people of the 
corvee' -- that is, vassals. 
At this stage of our discussion, we can perhaps extend our 
translation of the term hamba to include a connotation meaning 
8 
'submissive one'. The hamba orang would thus be those submissive to 
dominant individuals, while the hamba raja would be those submissive 
to a dominant class. The word raja in this context would appear to 
refer not only to the yamtuan besar and the yamtuan muda, but to all 
those in a legally legitimated position of commanding submission. 
It seems that the hamba raja were the indigenous people in the 
political periphery whose submission was claimed by the power holders 
at the political centre. So when these hamba raja were 'summoned to 
work' (dikerah), they were obliged to make a pilgrimage from the 
political periphery to the centre to render the required services. My 
informants told me that the hamba raja were divided into different 
suku 'divisions' on the basis of specific duties assigned to them. 
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Because of this, they were also known as the orang persukuan 'people 
of the divisions'. 
For example, the suku Gelam were supposed to build boats. The 
suku Galang were supposed to launch boats. The suku Ladi were 
supposed to grind spices in the palace kitchen. The suku Kopit were 
biduan 'musicians' who were supposed to perform inside the palace. 
And the suku Bintan had the duty of carrying alat-alat 'various 
articles', such as candles, into the p~lace and to make the bed of the 
ruler. 
The various sukus were apparently ranked according to the 
symbolic value of the task. Thus, those who worked inside the palace 
were ranked higher than those who were not even permitted inside. So 
of the five sukus listed above as examples, the suku Ladi, suku Kopit 
and suku Bintan would have ranked higher than the suku Gelam and suku 
Galang. Among the palace sukus, those whose duties had to do with the 
person of the ruler and which had to be carried out in the private 
chambers of the palace, were ranked higher than those whose duties 
were less personal. So the suku Bintan would have ranked higher than 
the suku Kopit. (However, as we shall see below, the position of the 
former was somewhat ambiguous.) 
Among the outdoor sukus, those whose duty required skill were 
ranked higher than those whose duty merely required strength. So the 
suku Gelam ranked higher than the suku Galang. The work of the suku 
Ladi was in the palace kitchen; so their rank would have been 
intermediate between the suku Kopit above them and the suku Gelam 
below them. These five examples by no means exhausts the list of 
sukus, each with its specified kerahan. 
Since it was the power holders at the political centre who wished 
to claim the submission of the politically peripheral indigenes, it 
245 
was also they who were interested in institutionalising this 
submission in the form of kerahan. So the specification of duties was 
the prerogative of the orang bangsawan 'aristocrats', according to the 
number of sukus into which they wished to divide the politically 
peripheral indigenes. Apparently, once a suku 'division' was 
established on the basis of the specified kerahan assigned to it, a 
territorial definition was concurrently imposed on that suku. The 
result was thus a classificatory fragmentation of the politically 
peripheral indigenes imposed by the power holders at the political 
centre. 
Whether this imposition of classificatory fragmentation had any 
effect on the indigenes themselves would have depended on how 
seriously they regarded the view of the political centre. The 
consequence is that it is practically impossible to obtain a 
comprehensive list of sukus because it all depends on who one asks. 
For example, I found my aristocrat informants telling me about sukus 
which my hamba raja informants deny even knowing about. Suku Kopit is 
an example; only my aristocrat informants on Penyengat seem to have 
heard of their existence. 
This process of classificatory fragmentation seems to be 
something that my aristocrat informants seem to be explicitly aware 
of, for they talk about certain sukus as the suku induk 'mother 
division' of various smaller sukus. For example, a raja informant 
told me that the suku Mantang was the suku induk of the following: 
suku Mantang Limas 
suku Mantang Teluk Air 
suku Mantang Sekapur 
suku Mantang Asli di Kundur 
suku Mantang Pekaka 
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suku Mantang Aijong 
suku Mantang Dasi 
After considerable investigation, I have managed to trace the 
supposed whereabouts of only two of these smaller branch sukus. The 
suku Mantang Limas seem to have been territorially associated with a 
place called Petai on the island of Galang Baru; but it is said that 
they have all left this place which is now apparently deserted. (See 
Chapter Eight.) 
The other suku Mantang I had some information about was suku 
Mantang Pekaka. I happened to meet three fishermen from Pulau Terong 
while I was doing fieldwork on Seking island south of Singapore. 
Terong is a small island off the southwest coast of Kepala Jernih 
island. (See Map 3.) These Terong informants told me that in the old 
days, they were called Pekaka, but they did not use the term suku 
Mantang Pekaka. The term they used instead was Melayu Pekaka, which 
they said was equal in rank to the suku Gelam. But when I 
subsequently asked an old Gelam informant living on Seking island 
about the relative rank of Pekaka and Gelam, he said he had never even 
heard of the former. The Pekaka people are, however, mentioned in the 
9 
Tuhfat. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:243). 
Another ethnographic example I shall cite with regards to the 
suku Mantang are the people who now live on the small island of Nanga, 
off the east coast of Galang Baru. Their neighbours on the opposite 
island of Sembur Laut have identified them as suku Mantang, but when I 
went to ask the Nanga people this, they vehemently denied this label 
and insisted that they were suku Galang. The evidence clearly 
suggests that people do not like to be labelled Mantang. (The 
identity of these people will be further discussed in Chapter Nine.) 
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I suggest that this aversion to the name Mantang has to do with 
the kerahan assigned to them by the aristocrats, which would have been 
indicative of their estimation in the eyes of the power holders at the 
political centre. While not even my aristocrat informants can 
remember the various specialised duties assigned to the small Mantang 
sukus, it seems that the kerahan of the suku induk, the mother suku, 
was to serve as the boat rowers of the rulers, and as such they were 
not even allowed to step on the land of the political capital. This 
apparently meant that the suku Mantang were regarded as very lowly 
indeed. 
But why should this have been so? Why should the suku Bintan 
have been ranked higher than the Kop±t, who were in turn higher than 
the Ladi, who were in turn higher than the ~' who were in turn 
higher than the Galang, who were in turn higher than the Mantang? The 
answer, I suggest, is again power. Those labelled as Mantang were 
apparently non-piratical sea nomads who lived by means of fishing and 
the gathering of other marine resources. The Galang, Gelam, and Ladi 
were pirates who had the means of raiding foreign ships and foreign 
places. As for the suku Kopit, not even my aristocrat informants knew 
their asal 'origins'; nor did I meet any informant who identified 
himself or herself as belonging to suku Kopit. However, there are 
apparently some people on Penyengat itself who are of Kopit descent. 
This territorial association is indeed indicative of the suku Kopit's 
high rank, since Penyengat was the capital where the Bugis rajas 
resided. But it must remain a mystery why the suku Kopit were ranked 
so highly. Finally, with regards to the suku Bintan, as we shall see 
below, they have been credited with playing a pivotal role in the 
transfer of power from the Melaka dynasty to the Johar dynasty founded 
by Sultan Abd al-Jalil. 
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The non-piratical sea nomads were not likely to have posed any 
threat to the power holders at the political centre; not only that, 
they very likely had no such political ambitions. Therefore, they 
were quite safe to despise. The various piratical groups were, 
however, a different story altogether. They were capable of 
threatening the power holders; in the Galang case, as we shall see 
below, they went so far as to consider themselves autonomous of the 
centre. Such people therefore had to be treated more seriously as 
potential rivals. 
The relative ranking of these piratical groups may thus be 
considered as their relative power vis-a-vis each other. That is one 
possible interpretation. Another possible interpretation is that 
classificatory fragmentation was an attempt by the power holders at 
the centre to divide and rule the periphery. In support of the 
latter explanation, I offer the following detail. 
While in the aristocrats' classification, ~alang and Gelam are 
regarded as separate and distinct sukus with separate and distinct 
kerahan, some of my non-aristocratic informants talk about Galang 
Gelam as a single ~· Not even my informants who claim to be Galang 
or to be Gelam could clearly differentiate between the two in terms of 
speech, custom, or any other criterion, apart from their specified 
kerahan and their supposed territorial origins. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the Gelam people are supposed to have 
originated from Gelam Tua 'Old Gelam', whereas the Galang people are 
supposed to have originated from Galang Tua 'Old Galang'. But both 
these sites are said to be uninhabited at present. The Galang people 
and the Gelam people are now found over a wide territory, oft~n in the 
very same places. In Karas, for example, there are both Galang and 
Gelam people. My present informants there claim to be either 
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keturunan Galang or keturunan Gelam, depending on which suku their 
father or father's father was put into. But they all speak the same 
dialect and they inter-marry with each other. So far as I can tell, 
the differentiation between Galang and Gelam seems to be the product 
of the different kerahan assigned by the rulers. 
This suggests to me a possible contrast between the Mantang case 
and the case of the Galang Gelam. It seems possible that in the 
former case, all the various bands of sea nomads may have been lumped 
together, simply on the basis of their shared position of political 
weakness vis-a-vis the centre. The supposed suku induk would thus 
have been a fictive type. In the latter case, it seems possible that 
a single piratical community was split into two sukus, Galang and 
Ge lam. 
As I have shown above, even though the names Gelam and Galang have 
territorial connotations, that does not mean that the people 
toponymically so labelled were limited only to the specific places 
known as Gelam and Galang. On the contrary, I would suggest that such 
toponymic labelling was also politically derived: it was 
characteristic of the people inhabiting the territories peripheral to 
the political centre. By the word 'peripheral', I do not mean 
insignificant, but rather, that these territories surrounded the 
political centre. What I am proposing is that the relationship 
between the orang bangsawan and the hamba raja was also a spatial 
relationship between centre and periphery. 
But whereas the political periphery does not lay claim to the 
political centre -- or at least is not supposed to -- the political 
centre does lay claim over the periphery. The toponymic labelling of 
the people of the periphery thus implies the limits of their 
territorial rights. So whereas the keturunan of the hamba raja are 
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defined toponymically -- for example, keturunan Gelam and keturunan 
Galang -- the orang bangsawan are identified not toponymically, but 
terms of their hereditary titles -- namely, keturunan raja, keturunan 
tengku, and keturunan tuan said. This implies that the territorial 
rights of the latter were relatively unlimited, at least in theory. 
After all, despite the toponymic labelling, whether or not the hamba 
raja were indeed territorially bound in this way is quite another 
matter. As I have mentioned above, the Galang and Gelam people are 
found over a wide territory. This is also true of the other sukus. 
The toponymic label should therefore be regarded merely as an 
ideological statement, rather than as an accurate description of the 
relationship between people and place. 
What is particularly significant about at least some of the 
toponymic labels is that they are semantically associated with the 
particular suku's kerahan. For example, gelam is the name of 
a seashore tree, Melaleuca leucodendron, with bark (~ 
gelam) used for caulking boats. 
(Wilkinson 1959:337). 
As I have mentioned above, boat-building was indeed the kerahan of the 
suku Gelam. Similarly, the word galang denotes the following: 
framework supporting a boat in a slipway; cf. bergalang (to 
be in dock); galangkan perahu (to lay up a boat for 
repairs); and galang gemalang (to be constantly in dock). 
(Ibid.:320). 
As mentioned above, the suku Galang's kerahan was indeed to launch the 
ruler's boats. The semantic connotations of these toponyms indicate 
that the kerahan assigned to a particular suku probably preceded its 
10 
toponymic labelling. 
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But while the rulers may have had an interest in assigning 
kerahan to the different sukus, the latter may not necessarily have 
had an interest in complying with the farmer's assignment. A Bintan 
informant explained the word dikerah to me as meaning dipaksa 'to be 
forced'. He said that when they were dikerah 'summoned', a letter 
would be sent from Penyengat to the ketua kampung 'village elder', 
saying, for example, mau tujuh orang anak gadis yang cantik 'seven 
pretty unmarried females were required'. Jadi dipaksa pergi 'so they 
were forced to go'. My informant's late mother was one of the seven 
who were forced to go and serve at the wedding of the sultan's 
daughter to the sultan of Trengganu; this apparently occurred shortly 
before the abdication in 1911. My informant said his mother told him 
that it was very exhausting: 
Duduk salah sikit, orang marah -- kepalanya [yang marah]. 
(If she sat a little incorrectly, she would be scolded by 
the leader.) 
My informant said that it was up to the village elder to evade the 
kerahan. He could, for example, say that many of his people had died; 
or he could say that the people were stupid and did not want to go. 
Pandai dialah 'It was up to his wits'. My informant said that the 
elder had to protect his people. This informant is himself presently 
a ketua kampung 'village elder'. If such was the attitude of the 
highest ranking suku, we can well imagine what the attitudes of the 
11 
lower sukus would have been like. 
In contrast to this view, however, my raja informants said that, 
of course, the hamba raja wanted to come to Penyengat to do kerahan. 
How else would they have been able to come and see the splendour of 
the capital, particularly during festive occasions, which were the 
times when their services were required? But such an inducement was 
evidently not considered sufficient by all the hamba raja. Indeed, 
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according to some informants, in the reign of the last sultan 
namely, Sultan Abdurrahman Maadlam Syah who had inherited his office 
matrifiliatively -- so few of the hamba raja were willing to come to 
the political centre to render kerahan, that he had to hire 'wage-
12 
labour' (orang upah) such as Boyanese labourers to row his boat. 
These hired labourers had to be given living quarters in a Kampung 
Boyan located on Penyengat itself. This is further evidence that when 
my informants talk about zaman sultan, they are talking about the 
sultanate in its heyday (that is, from 1722 to 1883), when the hamba 
raja were still willing to come to the political centre to render 
kerahan. 
5.5 Orang Galang and Orang Ladi 
According to my informants, the Galang people were notorious for 
their rebellion against the Bugis rulers. In Chapter Four, I have 
already mentioned their leader Raja Alang Laut as an example of a 
charismatic raja gelaran. Apparently, the Galang people refused 
altogether to submit to the rule of the Bugis rajas; so they did not 
perform the kerahan that had been assigned to them. Instead, they 
13 
roamed about the archipelago as independent buccaneers. According 
to my Karas informants who say that they are the descendants of these 
Galang pirates, Raja Alang Laut's base was located in Galang Tua 'Old 
Galang', where he had a palace known as Gedung Melanua 'the Melanau 
Building'. After his death, the Galang pirates shifted their base to 
Karas island. 
My Karas informants told me that the Galang pirates used to raid 
places located outside the Johor-Riau area -- for example, Kedah, 
14 
Perak, and Patani. Captives were brought back to Riau, to a small 
uninhabited island called Pulau Penyabung, which was used as an arena 
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for gladiatorial combat. (Penyabung literally means 'a place for 
combat'.) The male captives were pitted against each other as 
gladiators. Those who won the fight were recruited into the pirates' 
gang and treated as peers, not as slaves. Those who lost were killed 
and tossed into the sea. 
According to my Karas informants, it was very unfortunate for a 
pregnant woman to be captured by the pirates. To quote an informant 
who was himself an old pirate: 
If a pregnant female was captured, the Galang warriors would 
place bets on her, guessing whether the child was male or 
female, then they would split her belly open to look at the 
child inside. 
15 (My translation). 
But female victims who were young, pretty and not pregnant were, to 
use an informant's words, dipelihara betul, jadi dikawinkan secara 
Islam, 'nurtured properly, then married in the manner of Islam'. 
Evidently there was a worse fate than to be made into an 
aristocrats' slave. My informants' accounts suggest that if the 
Galang pirates had been taaluk 'submissive' to the Y§mtuan muda's 
rule, then they would have surrendered their captives to the 
aristocrats on Penyengat to be made into slaves. This was apparently 
what the Ladi pirates did. The Galang pirates themselves had no use 
for slaves; they wanted the captives only as fighting recruits, as 
wives, and as the toys of cruel sport. 
As I have argued above, the creation and maintenance of a bottom 
derajat in the hierarchy is an issue of particular relevance to the 
orang bangsawan, because without that bottom, there is neither top nor 
middle. The ironic consequence is that although the hamba orang are 
ranked as the lowest of the low in the hierarchy, they seem to have 
co-existed with the orang bangsawan in the political centres, and to 
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have existed nowhere else in that capacity. So if one is to regard 
Penyengat island as the former capital of the yamtuan muda, then it 
seems that one must equally regard it as the former centre of 
16 
slavery. But, as I have illustrated above, it was perhaps better to 
be enslaved and alive, than to be captured by the Galang pirates and 
dead. 
According to my Karas informants, the raids of the Galang pirates 
were conducted almost for sport. Apart from kidnapping people from 
the villages they raided, they also accumulated coinage from the 
people they robbed. But the money was useless to them because there 
was nothing they could buy from each other. So the pirate chief 
merely doled out the coins as playthings to his followers, using a 
brass bowl as ladle. 
This story indicates that the Galang pirates were not integrated 
into the exchange economy, and so had nothing to buy with their loot. 
This gives us a clue to the advantage of being taaluk 'submissive' to 
the rulers. Trade -- and hence the exchange economy -- was centred in 
the political capital. Political submission may thus have been a 
means for the territorially peripheral hamba raja to gain access to 
the exchange economy. Such access may even have led to eventual 
integration with the community at the political centre. 
Indeed, this seems to have been the case with the Ladi people who 
were said to have been taaluk to the yamtuan muda. Apparently, they 
were located territorially near, and later at, the capital itself. 
According to my informants, Ladi is a place in Lingga, located near 
Daik, the former capital of the yamtuan besar. I have not been able 
to locate such a place in Lingga on the maps I have consulted; I have, 
however, found several places in Riau that are called 'Ladi'. When I 
questioned my informants about these places, they said that these were 
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secondarily named 'Ladi', because the Ladi people went and settled 
there. But the one original place called 'Ladi', they said, was in 
Lingga. 
As pointed out in Chapter Four, Lingga was the territory of the 
yamtuan besar; so one would have expected the Ladi people to be his 
hamba raja, rather than those of the ?amtuan muda. According to my 
informants, there was a migration led by one Datuk Kaya Mepar, also 
known as Datuk Kaya Montil. According to an informant who is of Ladi 
descent: 
Datuk Kaya Mepar, also called Datuk Kaya Montil -- he was 
the one who brought the Ladi people here. He settled here 
permanently; the Ladi people were his followers. From Daik 
of course. None went back to Daik; they all stayed here. 
17 (My translation). 
The 'here' mentioned by my informant is Penyengat island, where 
there is still a Kampung Ladi. Apparently, as a result of this 
defection, the Ladi people from Lingga came to be the hamba raja of 
the yamtuan muda instead. There is indeed a grave located in Kampung 
Ladi on Penyengat that has been identified to me as Datuk Kaya Mepar's 
grave. 
The name 'Mepar' in Datuk Kaya Montil's alternative title 
Datuk Kaya Mepar -- is significant, for Mepar is a place which is 
indeed located near Daik. (See Map 3.) This implies a connection 
between Mepar and Ladi, a connection which may be explicated thus. In 
his general report of 14 August 1826, Christiaan van Angelbeek noted: 
The two principal piratical chiefs of the Malay empire are; 
the Panghulu Hamba Raja of Mapar who is obeyed by all the 
so-called Rayats or Orang Laut of the islands situated in 
the waters of Linga; -- and the Rajah Lang, in the island of 
Bulang, under whom are all the Rayats of Gallang •••• 
(Quoted from Logan 1849:634). 
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So there is documentary evidence that there was indeed a pirate chief 
based in Mepar in Lingga, referred to as the 'Panghulu Hamba Raja' by 
Angelbeek, and as Datuk Kaya Mepar by my informants. Furthermore, 
Angelbeek said in his report that he had met him both at Riau and at 
Mepar, these meetings having been arranged by two of the leading 
18 
aristocrats of the time. (See ibid.:635.) 
Eighteen years after Angelbeek's report, the Governor General of 
India and the Governor of the Straits Settlements obtained 'positive 
proof' that some piracies in 1843 
had been promoted by Linga nobles, in particular by the 
Tomungong of Mapar, a descendant of the ancient kings of 
Linga. His son Inchie Montol had fitted out several prahus 
and had also made some voyages •. -.. Serious remonstrances 
were addressed to the Sultan of Linga, who at last delivered 
up these chiefs, and ten other famous piratical chiefs. 
(Logan 1850:743). 
If there is some accuracy to my informants' claim that it was 
Datuk Kaya Montil who had led the Ladi people in their migration from 
Lingga to the yamtuan muda's capital at Penyengat, the information 
from Logan (1850) allows us to date the event and to guess the reason 
for it. It would be quite plausible to speculate that the migration 
occurred in 1843/44, because 'Inchie Montol'/Datuk Kaya Montil wanted 
to escape from being delivered to the British by the yamtuan besar at 
Lingga. I suggest that because 'positive proof' had been obtained of 
his involvement in piracy, it would have been politic for him to re-
name his followers from Mepar, orang Ladi 'the Ladi people'. 
It is not clear what the word 'ladi' means or from where it is 
derived. However, according to the Indonesia Pilot (1975:I,82), there 
is a landmark on the north-east coast of Bangka island called Ladi 
Hill (Bukit Ladi), 200 metres high with 'a conspicuous tree on its 
summit'. A landmark that is so easily sighted from the sea that even 
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a single tree is noticeable, would surely have been known to the Mepar 
pirates in Lingga, located not so far away. (See Map 2.) It is not 
impossible that they took the name 'Ladi' from this hill on Bangka. 
Significantly, according to my informants, Bangka was not part of the 
Riau-Lingga sultanate. On the contrary, it was one of the foreign 
parts where the pirates went raiding. So 'Ladi' would have been a 
foreign name that could not have been traced to any area within the 
sultanate. This implies that those places in Riau that are now known 
as Ladi acquired this name only after the migration of the Mepar 
19 
pirates from Lingga to Riau. 
The reconstruction given above derives primarily from my 
Penyengat informants, particularly those who claim Ladi descent. 
However, I subsequently met an informant in Daik, Lingga, who said 
that he is a direct descendant of Datuk Kaya Montil, and who has a 
written genealogy to prove it. (See Genealogical Chart 6.) Indeed 
this informant is himself known to the people of Daik, including the 
tengkus and tuan said there, as Datuk Kaya Mepar or Datuk Kaya Mohamad 
Isa. According to him, Datuk Kaya Montil is buried in Mepar, but his 
son Datuk Kaya Awang is buried in Kampung Ladi, Penyengat. The 
latter's son, Datuk Kaya Abdul Kahar, then moved back to the Lingga 
archipelago, where he died at Senayang. Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa is 
himself the son of Datuk Kaya Abdul Kahar. 
So his suggestion is that it was not Datuk Kaya Montil who moved 
to Penyengat, but his son Datuk Kaya Awang. Unfortunately, my 
informant was unable to enlighten me about the Ladi people, beyond 
saying that he has no connections with them, although he still has 
connections with the Mepar people. Apparently, a process of 
segmentation has been going on, such that the one community has become 
two, each located in a different area, with a different ethnonym. 
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The contrast between the Galang people and the Ladi people is 
that although both were pirates, the former were independent 
buccaneers, whereas the latter were, more literally, hamba raja who 
20 
raided on behalf of the aristocrats. So the aristocrats could keep 
their hands clean, because the dirty work was done by the hamba raja. 
Willingness to do dirty work for the rulers was thus one way for the 
hamba raja to have expressed their political submission. It was 
apparently this that the Galang people were not willing to do. If 
there was any dirty work to be done, they were going to do it for 
themselves, it seems, and not for the aristocrats at the political 
centre. In other words, their objection was not to the doing of 
violence, but to the doing of it for others. 
Therefore, although the Galang people were defined as hamba raja 
by the rulers, they evidently refused to play that designated role. 
In contrast, the Mepar/Ladi people were apparently willing to do so, 
possibly because they were given a larger share of power, to the 
extent that they were allowed to establish a settlement at the 
political centre itself. So it seems that whereas the latter went 
along with the idea of hierarchy because they felt that they had some 
upward social mobility, the latter denied hierarchy because they 
wanted equality with the aristocrats. This contrast is evident in the 
different ways their captives were treated. The Mepar/Ladi pirates 
offered them up as slaves to the aristocrats so that they themselves 
would obtain even greater social rewards, whereas the Galang pirates 
either recruited them or killed them, there being no room for slaves 
in an egalitarian context. 
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5.6 Violence and Legitimation 
Even though the aristocrats kept slaves, they were nevertheless 
able to present themselves as the arbiters of civilised adat 'custom', 
because in comparison to the brutality of the Galang pirates, slavery 
could be construed as positively humane. The basis of the sultanate 
would thus appear to be not brute force, but rather, sublimated 
21 
violence. In this context, the role of the hamba raja seems quite 
crucial. As mentioned above, the aristocrats could keep their hands 
clean, because there were others to do their dirty work for them. 
Apart from distancing themselves physically from brute force, the 
aristocrats also had to be able to claim that any force that was 
exerted on their behalf was legitimate, and that any other kind of 
unsanctioned violence was illegitimate. In this regard, there is a 
significant myth that my raja informants tell about the Galang pirates 
and Islam. According to them, the Galang pirates hated the tuan said. 
(As mentioned in Chapter Four, the tuan said are Arabs who are reputed 
to be the descendants of the Prophet Muhamad.) One day, they happened 
to capture a tuan said called Syeikh Saipol Hady Lah. They brought 
him to Pulau Penyabung and ordered him to fight the other prisoners 
there. He refused. So he was killed by the pirates. But before he 
died, he cursed them, and the whole island caught fire. His curse 
stipulated that for seven generations, the pirates and their 
descendants could not go to Mecca, and that their territory could not 
become a negeri 'state'. His grave then 'manifested itself' 
(menjelma) on the island. Since then, the pirates could no longer use 
the island as their arena. My raja informants say that the island 
still catches fire spontaneously every so often. 
So according to this myth, the brutal practices of the Galang 
pirates were stopped by a curse pronounced by a descendant of the 
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Prophet Muhamad. Furthermore, he prohibited them from fulfilling the 
Islamic prescription of going on the pilgrimage, thereby preventing 
them from becoming good Muslims. Lastly, he ensured that Galang could 
not become an alternative state to the existing one. In short, this 
myth implies that the violence of the Galang pirates was not 
legitimated by Islam, and therefore Galang could not become a state. 
So conversely, the sultanate was a state because the force it exerted 
was indeed legitimated by Islam. 
Although my Karas informants do know of this myth, they claim 
instead that the Galang pirates were 'very fond of' (~) the ~ 
said. Whenever a tuan said was captured, they did not make him fight 
as a gladiator. On the contrary, they asked him to teach them to read 
the Quran. Indeed, my Karas informants deny that there is a tuan 
said's grave on Pulau Penyabung or that the island periodically 
catches fire by itself. They even made it a point to stress that when 
the Galang pirates married the female captives they brought back, the 
marriage was conducted 'in the manner of Islam' (secara Islam). 
When a raja informant brought me to Pulau Penyabung to show me 
the place, we could not find the tuan said's grave. I was told that 
it is the characteristic of this grave to disappear at times or to 
manifest itself in different parts of the island. 
Even though my raja informants and my Galang informants have 
opposite views about whether the Galang pirates hated or loved the 
tuan said, they nevertheless seem to agree that Islam is the source of 
political legitimation. By telling me that the Galang pirates married 
their female captives in an Islamic manner, my Galang informants seem 
to imply that that somehow legitimated the other brutalities that were 
practised. 
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My informants generally describe the tuan said as suci 'clean, 
pure, holy'. To sucikan would be to cleanse, to purify, to sanctify. 
The use of Islam as political legitimation thus seems to involve the 
sublimation of violence, the cleansing of dirty work. In this regard, 
it is perhaps significant that when Angelbeek met the Penghulu Hamba 
Raja/Datuk Kaya Mepar, as he reported in 1825, one of the two 
aristocrats who had arranged and witnessed the meetings was a tuan 
22 
said -- Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad Zain al-Kudsi. Such an 
association possibly illustrates the legitimacy of this pirate chief 
in the context of the sultanate. 
Interestingly, Angelbeek did not seem to be aware of the 
aristocrats' implication in piracy. For example, he did not seem to 
realise that the hamba raja led by the Penghulu Hamba Raja were the 
rulers' hamba, and not those of the Penghulu himself. He even 
concluded a treaty with the Penghulu, on the assumption that the 
latter was an independent chief. It seems that he did not suspect the 
aristocrats' involvement because he was impressed by their 
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civilisation. For example, though Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad 
Zain was evidently associated with the Penghulu Hamba Raja, Angelbeek 
nevertheless lauded him for his 'zeal for the good cause' (ibid.), and 
elsewhere, 'praised him as a "civilised and clever man" who had great 
influence on the Malay princes and recommended him as an agent for the 
Dutch government' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:383). 
The discussion above indicates the basis on which Islam may be 
used as a means of political legitimation: that is, Islam provides an 
ideology of civilisation, covering the social reality of the moment 
with a veneer of cosmopolitan sophistication that can be appreciated 
even by a non-Muslim foreigner. Such a means of legitimation 
evidently became more important after the territorial division of the 
sultanate into Riau and Lingga as the respective zones of the yamtuan 
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muda and the yamtuan besar. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, it was during the reign of Yamtuan 
Muda Raja Jafar, Raja Hamidah's brother, that an Islamic revival was 
actively encouraged on Penyengat, to the extent that the island became 
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known as the regional centre for Islamic reformism. · It thus appears 
that the Bugis rajas made intensive use of Islam for the political 
legitimation of their power. To understand why they did this, we must 
recount the story of the Bugis presence in Riau. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the post-1722 sultanate was 
instituted through the military conquest effected by the five Opu 
Daeng brothers over Raja Kecik, who was then the ruler. Indeed, my 
raja informants justify their Bugis ancestors' entry into Riau in 
terms of their needed military prowess. But while this may have been 
initially the case, the situation of the Bugis in Riau evidently 
underwent an important change. The last Bugis raja to manifest 
military prowess seems to have been Raja Haji, who fought the Dutch 
both in Riau and at Melaka from 1782 to 1784. (See Raja Ali Haji 
1982:167-176; Matheson and Andaya 1982:366-368; Netscher 1870:189.) 
My informants are indeed very aware of Raja Haji's military exploits; 
they even claim that he was one of Indonesia's first revolutionaries. 
After Raja Haji died in June 1784 while fighting the Dutch in 
Melaka, the latter continued their military offensive against the 
sultanate, and in November 1784, sent a squadron to Riau. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, in the face of impending defeat, Raja Ali, 
who had succeeded Raja Haji as the yamtuan muda, fled from Riau and 
took refuge in Sukadana in Borneo, taking all his Bugis followers with 
him. This exodus ended the first phase of the Bugis presence in Riau. 
The second phase began after the British gave Riau back to Sultan 
Mahmud III in 1795. About 1800 he invited Raja Ali back to Riau to be 
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re-installed as the yang dipertuan muda. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, the sultanate was subsequently divided into the rajas' Riau and 
the tengkus' Lingga via the institution of Raja Hamidah's mas kawin 
Penyengat. Unlike the first phase, this second phase of the Bugis 
presence could not plausibly be justified in terms of military 
prowess, given the evidence of Dutch victory. And indeed my 
informants do not attempt to make any such justification. Raja Haji 
is the last of their ancestors that they remember as a military hero. 
After Raja Haji, the rajas considered worthy of attention are 
remembered not for any military prowess, but for religious piety or 
for literary achievement. As noted by Andaya and Matheson (1979), it 
is historically significant that it was the Bugis court on Penyengat, 
and not the sultan's court in Lingga, that became the centre of a 
religious and literary renaissance in the nineteenth century. I 
suggest that this renaissance may be understood as the establishment 
of a new justification for the Bugis presence in Riau. I suggest that 
deprived of the role of military saviours, the Bugis rajas now 
presented themselves in the role of the spiritual saviours of the 
sultanate, rescuing the people from moral decay. In short, moralism 
began when militarism ended. 
This mode of legitimation is evident in the Tuhfat, where Raja 
Ali Haji cites as examples of the perfect ruler, not any of the 
indigenous sultans, but his own Bugis forebears, such as Opu Daeng 
Kemboja and Raja Haji. He asserts that it was Allah himself who had 
appointed the Bugis rajas to guide their subjects towards him, for 
such divinely appointed rulers were able to set a holy example for all 
to follow. (See Andaya and Matheson 1979:117-118). This implies that 
the Bugis rajas were to mediate through example; they were to guide 
their Muslim subjects towards Allah by presenting themselves as 
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exemplars of good Muslims.· 
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This holier-than-thou stance was evidently more than just 
rhetoric; it took on political substance in October 1857 when, in 
collusion with the Dutch, the Bugis rajas deposed of Sultan Mahmud IV 
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(1823-1864) on the grounds that he was an un-Islamic playboy. (See 
Genealogical Chart 1. Also see Matheson 1972; Andaya and Matheson 
1979:124-126.) And their justification? -- they were simply complying 
with the commands of Allah Almighty who gives sovereignty and takes it 
away, with the implication that anyone who would be a good Muslim must 
necessarily obey these same commands. 
I paraphrase below a significant remark made to me by a Penyengat 
raja with regards to the deposition of Sultan Mahmud IV: 
What is true? Who knows? Those who are keturunan Melayu 
would no doubt tell their side of the story. But I am 
keturunan Bugis; so of course I tell the Bugis side of the 
story. 
This informant is certainly aware that one's view is relative to one's 
situation. Indeed, another informant in a different situation did 
present the story of the deposition in quite other terms: In his 
book, Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abubakar (1972:22), who is the deposed 
Sultan Mahmud's brother's son's son's son, portrayed his great-grand-
uncle as an anti-colonial hero, an 'enfant terrible' (to use his 
words), who was persecuted by the Dutch, because he showed an interest 
in the system of administration that prevailed in Singapore under the 
British. This is a very different picture from the Bugis description 
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of Sultan Mahmud as an un-Islamic playboy. (See Chapter Four on the 
identity of Tengku Ahmad.) 
The point is, once Islam was used as the basis for political 
legitimation, then it became possible to declare that if Islam 
legitimates, then lack of Islam de-legitimates. The means of 
legitimation can thus become the very basis of power itself. In this 
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context, the collaborating role of the tuan said would have been quite 
crucial. The Bugis rajas actively sought to recruit them to 
Penyengat, and 'in the 19th century there was a steady stream of 
religious teachers attracted to Riau' (Andaya and Matheson 1979:110). 
Despite their importance, however, no political office was 
institutionalised for them. This omission may have been an attempt to 
limit the role of the tuan said to legitimation, without allowing them 
to extend to the actual assumption of power. After all, if the tuan 
said were regarded as being capable of legitimating power, then in 
comparison with the raja and the tengku, they should have at least 
equal, if not greater rights to political office. 
What is more, the very office of sultan 'ruler' is itself based 
on Islamic legitimation, for the sultan is supposed to be the imam 
'guide' of the total jemaah 'congregation' that constitutes his 
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polity. That being the case, would not a tuan said with berkat 
'God's blessing' be a better imam and hence a better sultan? The 
political use of the tuan said as legal legitimator thus seems to have 
been a double-edged sword. This danger of being outranked by the tuan 
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said seems to be an issue that my raja informants are well aware of. 
The use of Islam as political legitimation thus contains the seed 
of symmetrical schismogenesis. To paraphrase Bateson, if more Islam 
is the reply to Islam, then there is the danger of the breakdown of 
the whole system, to the advantage of the Islamic legitimator, who can 
thereby assume political power himself, by cutting out the previously 
legitimated and hence less Islamic political ruler. In other words, 
instead of merely teaching Islamic lore to a ruler and thereby 
legitimating his power, a tuan said could accuse the ruler of being 
un-Islamic and assume power himself. The absence of a political 
office pertaining to the tuan said as a derajat may thus be 
interpreted as a restraining factor instituted to prevent such an 
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eventuality developing. Without the institution of a corporate 
political office, the charisma of any one individual tuan said could 
not be routinised. 
Despite this institutional depoliticisation, the tuan said were 
nevertheless classified as an aristocratic derajat on the hierarchy. 
Unlike the rajas and tengkus, however, the basis of their aristocracy 
was not the corporate possession of any political office, but their 
reputed descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Following Siddique 
(1979:7), I would argue that the tuan saids' claim to power rested on 
berkat, which 'derived from their status as direct descendants of the 
Prophet, and constitutes a sort of spiritual inheritance.' She 
variously explains berkat (ibid.) as 'God's blessing', 'spiritual 
force', 'a gift from God', 'a special blessing', and a 'blessing' that 
can be both acquired and inherited. The concept will be more fully 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
My informants explained berkat to me as mediation between God and 
human being, such that human desires can be attained through this 
mediation. The 'blessing' that Siddique speaks of, may thus be 
interpreted as the power to mediate between God and human being, a 
power that is bestowed by God, and hence is not an achievement but a 
blessing. I would thus argue that the power of the tuan said in the 
sultanate rested on berkat, on their reputed capacity to mediate 
between God and human being. Since in Islam the Prophet Muhammad was 
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the one great mediator between God and human beings, who could be 
better living mediators than his reputed descendants? Since the 
sultanate was constituted as a religious kingdom wherein political 
power was legitimated through reference to a particular body of 
religious doctrine, the presence of the tuan said as mediators between 
God and human beings would have symbolised that particular doctrine of 
legitimation. 
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Significantly, according to my informants, the tuan said who came 
to Riau resided only at the capitals and nowhere else. The 
localisation of the tuan said at political centres still seems to be 
the case at present. All my tuan said informants in Riau reside 
either in Penyengat, the former capital, or in Tanjungpinang, the 
present Indonesian administrative centre. I encountered not one tuan 
said in the politically more peripheral communities where I also did 
fieldwork. But my informants in these communities did tell me of a 
few individual tuan said who had visited them in the past to mengajar 
ugama 'teach religion'. These, however, appear to have been temporary 
visits by tuan said who were normally resident at the political 
centres. The permanent presence of the tuan said at the political 
centres was thus a vivid representation of political legitimation. 
Indeed so integrated, apparently, were the tuan said, that one 
non-Arab informant took pains to tell me that they were not what the 
Dutch called freemde Oosterlingen 'foreign Orientals'; they were 
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inlanders 'natives'. The reason, he said, is because the tuan said 
have been present ever since the sultanate began. In the sense that 
the kingdom had been Islamised since the era of Melaka, it is true 
that the Arab presence is not a recent phenomenon. But although there 
are still many Penyengat people of tuan said descent, there is hardly 
any who can speak Arabic or who can trace kinship links to living 
people in Arabia. The descendants of the tuan said have been 
integrated fully into the community, perhaps in order to incorporate 
their berkat as well. 
This integration is indicated by the specification of a fixed 
amount of mas kawin for the derajat of tuan said. As I have pointed 
out in Chapter Four, although Islamic law prescribes payment of the 
mahr as an essential part of the marriage contract, it does not 
specify the amount. So it is also an extension beyond Islam for the 
/ 
tuan said to have a fixed amount of mas kawin specified for all of 
them. 
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In Chapter Four, I raised the following question: if the tuan 
said rank second in the hierarchy, then why do they have only the 
meagre sum of 25 ringgit specified as their mas kawin? This may be 
explicated thus. To begin with, the term tuan said refers only to 
males. The discussion above concerning the tuan said as political 
legitimators is solely about the males. The female syarifah does not 
have a share in this. For example, whereas there are sacred graves of 
tuan said, there seems to be no female equivalent. Whereas there are 
tuan said who are said to be famous religious teachers, there seems to 
be no syarifah known as a religious reacher. The derajat of tuan said 
is thus sexually more differentiated than the derajat of raja and 
tengku. 
Indeed, some of my informants stress to me that in the old days, 
it was quite impossible to see the face of a syarifah, because it 
would be veiled; this is described as something that is hebat 
'terrible, awe-inspiring'. One of my older informants gave me a 
graphic description of what it was formerly like to visit the home of 
a tuan said on Penyengat. According to him, when one arrived, the 
only person one saw was the male host himself. After receiving the 
guest, the host would clap his hands, and food would be laid out in 
another room, to which the male host and male guest would go to share 
a meal by themselves. During the entire visit, the guest would 
neither hear nor see any of the female members of the household. Not 
even his refreshments would be served directly by a female. And in 
the presence of the guest, the host would himself communicate with the 
hidden female members of his household only by means of hand-claps. 
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There was evidently such a distinct sexual division of social 
spheres that the males monopolised the public sphere, and all the 
females were relegated to the domestic sphere. It is perhaps this 
gross disparity between male and female that may explain why it is 
that only the meagre sum of 25 ringgit has been specified for the 
derajat of tuan said. As mentioned in Chapter Four, this is an 
exception to the correlation between derajat and mas kawin, according 
to which, the higher the derajat ranks, the larger would be the amount 
specified as mas kawin. I have also argued above that mas kawin may 
be interpreted as a contractual settlement, the acceptance of which 
signifies the agreement of the bride not to transmit derajat to the 
child. 
But what if the female is not even considered as part of the 
derajat? Whenever my informants list the hierarchy of derajat, they 
always use the term tuan said for the derajat in question; never do 
they say tuan said dan syarifah 'tuan said and syarifah'. There seems 
to be indeed a sound historical reason for such usage, for the Arab 
migrants who came to Southeast Asia were all males; Arab women did not 
migrate (Sharon Siddique: personal communication). So the daughter of 
a tuan said in Riau was patrilineally Arab but matrifiliatively 
Melayu, and who could certainly not transmit any Arab descent to her 
children herself. As my informant cited above had said: 
If we follow Islam, it is the male who carries keturunan; 
the female does not carry it •••• 
In the case of the derajat of tuan said this idea seems to be so 
strictly adhered to, that it even becomes questionable whether the 
syarifah are members of the derajat. That being the case, it would 
hardly be necessary to settle a large amount of mas kawin on the 
syarifah, so as to contract her into not transmitting derajat to her 
offspring. Moreover, if Islam was used to legitimate the 
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patrilineality of keturunan, and the male monopoly of political 
office, and if the tuan said were the living symbols of Islam qua 
political legitimation, then it would make sense to institutionalise 
the maleness of this derajat by means of devaluing the mas kawin 
allotted to the syarifah. 
What seems particularly significant in this context is my 
informants' mention of Madzhab Shafi'i as the justification for the 
male monopoly of political office (see Chapter Four), for it was the 
founder of this school al-Shafi'i (died A.D. 820), who 
more than any other jurisprudent ••• left the most telling 
impact on the development of Islamic jurisprudence on the 
basis of the Qu'ran and Hadith. 
(Farah 1970:191). 
So my informants' reference to Madzhab Shafi'i as the justification 
for male dominance may be understood as an attempt to give a legal 
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validity to such dominance. Islam thus seems to have constituted the 
basis of legality, legitimating and sustaining the various 
institutions of male dominance, including mas kawin, patrilineality, 
and the male monopoly of political office. 
5.7 Orang Pertengahan 
In the discussion above, I have attempted to show how a pattern 
of domination-submission may be transformed into legal governmental 
authority through legitimation by a body of religious doctrine. Once 
such a transformation has been effected, the particular pattern of 
domination-submission from which government authority is derived, 
should no longer be disturbed. For example, it should no longer have 
been questioned whether the office of yamtuan muda was desirable, 
whether it should have belonged to the Bugis faction, whether 
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political office should have been occupied only by males, whether 
political office could be matrifiliatively transmitted, whether the 
hamba raja should have performed corvee for the rulers, and so on. 
Yet, as we have seen, these questions have been and are still asked. 
This indicates that governmental authority in the sultanate was not 
very strongly institutionalised. The situation was fluid enough to 
allow the basic pattern of domination-submission to be disturbed and 
changed. 
In this context, Bourdieu's (1977:159-171) idea of doxa, 
orthodoxy, and heterodoxy is relevant to our discussion. By doxa he 
refers to the universe of the undiscussed and therefore the 
undisputed; this contrasts with the universe of discourse or argument, 
wherein there is a field of opinion ranging from orthodoxy to 
heterodoxy. 
The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the 
limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken 
for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in 
defending the integrity of doxa or, short of this, of 
establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect 
substitute, orthodoxy. 
(Ibid.:169). 
It seems to me that in the situation in Riau, a doxa could not be 
imposed, and the dominant ranks had to try to establish the next best 
thing, orthodoxy, in the face of the competing claims of heterodoxy. 
To consider why this was so, we must discuss the middle ranks of the 
hierarchy -- that is, the orang pertengahan 'people in the middle'. 
As shown above, the purest form of domination-submission that had 
existed in the sultanate was the relationship between the very top and 
the very bottom of the hierarchy -- that is, between the rulers on top 
and the slaves at the bottom. The former owned the latter bodily and 
was thus in a position of total domination vis-a-vis the latter. 
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However, as we have seen, even the relationship between the ruling 
aristocracy and the second lowest derajat -- the hamba raja -- was 
already much more complicated. The latter related to the former not 
as isolated individuals but as territorial groupings -- for example, 
the orang Galang and the orang Ladi. So unlike the bodily-owned 
slaves who were kept in the homes of the aristocrats at the capital, 
such groupings were territorially located outside the political 
centre. They were thereby far from direct political control and had 
to be ruled through mediation. The people who performed this role of 
mediation were thus crucial to the body politic. Without them, the 
political centre would have lost its periphery and would hence no 
longer be a centre. As we have seen above, this did indeed happen in 
the case of Raja Alang Laut who led the orang Galang, not on behalf of 
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the ruling aristocracy, but independently of them. 
I suggest that it was the middle ranks who mediated between the 
top and the bottom of the hierarchy -- these were, namely, the encik 
datuk, encik keturunan, and orang biasa. Let us first consider the 
encik datuk. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the term encik was an 
honorific prefixed to 'the names of persons of good position' 
(Wilkinson 1959:303). The 'good position' in question appears to have 
been a situation of some authority within the government. Wilkinson 
(1959:269) explains the term datuk as denoting: 
Head of family; elder •••• Used (i) as a term of 
relationship to or of a grandfather ••• ; (ii) as a term of 
distinction to or of any great non-royal Chief •••• 
Therefore the term encik datuk may be understood to mean someone 
appointed to exercise governmental authority in the capacity of a 
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grandparent. This implies a peculiar mixture of formal structure 
and informal interaction, of politics and kinship, and of the supra-
local and the locally communal. Such a mixture would seem to derive 
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from the mediative role played by the encik datuk. 
The use of the idiom of kinship is further evidenced by the term 
for the followers of the encik datuk that is, anak buah, 
(literally: 'children of the fruit'). The asymmetry of the pairing 
-- datuk anak buah 
grandparent children --
indicates perhaps that the kinship idiom was really used for what was 
essentially non-kinship-based politics. 
The people who were the anak buah of the various datuk were the 
hamba raja. Apart from Datuk Kaya Mepar and the orang Ladi mentioned 
above, there was apparently also a datuk appointed over the orang 
Bintan. According to my Penyengat informants, the last of the Bintan 
datuks was called Datuk Kaya Indrajaya. Significantly, my Penyengat 
informants were able to provide more details about the Bintan datuk 
than were my Bintan informants themselves. 
Four, the datuk-ship was non-hereditary. 
As mentioned in Chapter 
Even if the son of a datuk 
was also appointed datuk, as in the case of Datuk Kaya Monti!, for 
example, that was considered a new appointment, and not inevitable 
inheritance. In the case of the Bintan datuk, the one preceding Datuk 
Kaya Indrajaya was evidently not related to him at all. According to 
my Penyengat informants, the penultimate Bintan datuk called Datuk 
Kaya Sang Ir was drawn from among the orang Bintan. The last Bintan 
datuk, however, was an orang kaya angkatan 'a person of means through 
appointment', and not a Bintan person himself. 
It is clear that the number of encik datuk that even my Penyengat 
informants could tell me about were very few indeed. There were 
apparently only a few individuals who mediated between the ruling 
ranks on top and the subject ranks at the bottom. This may be because 
towards the end of the sultanate, only a few of the hamba raja groups 
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were still willing to perform corvee for the rulers. As mentioned 
above, the last sultan even had to hire foreign labourers to row his 
boats. It is thus significant that the two datuk-ships mentioned by 
my informants were the datuk of the Ladi people and the datuk of the 
Bintan people. These two groupings seem to have been among the last 
that remained faithful to the aristocracy to the very end. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the encik datuk were individuals 
promoted from their own lower derajat to that of encik datuk. The 
title was conferred by the rulers and not inherited through descent. 
However, although the datuk-ship was non-hereditary, the children of a 
datuk were nevertheless respected as encik keturunan 'encik through 
descent'. The honorific encik was applied to them not as an 
indication of office, but merely as a matter of courtesy to 
acknowledge the status of their father. 
As my Penyengat informants explained, encik tidak ikut keturunan 
'the title encik does not follow descent'. In their opinion, whereas 
a datuk's son would still be termed an encik, a datuk's son's son 
would not have been termed as such, unless either he or his father 
were independently appointed datuk. So from my Penyengat informants' 
perspective, there is no keturunan encik 'encik line of descent' in 
the same way as there are keturunan raja, keturunan tengku, and 
keturunan tuan said. 
From this description, it looks as if the establishment of a 
separate derajat consisting of the children of the encik datuk was 
meant to express the idea that the appointed power of the encik datuk 
was not hereditary. The datuk's children and grandchildren each 
dropped one successive rank. So in the absence of further 
appointments, the encik datuk's children became encik keturunan 'encik 
by descent', and the encik keturunan's children became orang biasa 
275 
'ordinary people'. The implication is that both ascent and descent 
through the ranks of the hierarchy were processes that had to be 
strictly regulated. 
The power of the datuk-ship was thus limited by its non-
hereditary nature, for it remained merely an appointment to office 
that was assigned by the ruling aristocracy. On termination of the 
datuk's occupation of office, its power reverted to the rulers until 
it was again delegated to another appointed datuk. So far as I 
understand, these appointments were for life and termination was 
through death. I have not heard of any resignations or expulsions, 
though that would seem to have been theoretically possible. 
The non-hereditary nature of the datuk-ship and the regulated 
descent of the datuk's children and grandchildren through the ranks 
indicate that there was an uneasy tension between the central 
authority of the rulers and their decentralised mediators in the 
political periphery. On the one hand, the loyalty of these mediators 
had to be sustained through the bestowal of sufficient rewards, such 
as status and respect. On the other hand, these mediators had to be 
prevented from building up alternative power bases that would 
eventually threaten the centre. 
Interestingly, this picture of the datuk-ship that I obtained 
from my Penyengat informants was contradicted by an alternative 
picture presented by my informant who is the great-grandson of Datuk 
Kaya Montil, the nineteenth-century leader of the orang Mepar/Ladi. 
According to him, the encik datuk were orang bangsawan, orang yang 
berbangsa 'aristocrats, people who were of noble stock'. He said that 
the encik datuk was known as datuk kaya 'rich datuk' for the following 
reason: 
Dia kaya orang, bukan kaya uang. 
35 (He was rich in people, not in money.) 
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That is to say, the datuk kaya had many followers -- anak buah. The 
implication is that so long as he kept his following, he remained a 
datuk kaya. So according to this interpretation, the datuk-ship was 
not an office imposed fom above, but rather, a position of leadership 
that was supported from below. However, this informant admitted that 
the datuk was both a menteri 'official' and a kepala suku 'head of his 
division'. Thus even he recognised the mediative role of the datuk 
between the rulers and the subjects. As mentioned above, the datuk 
~a's followers were the hamba raja. They were also known as rakyat, 
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a term which essentially means 'subject'. 
At this stage of our discussion, we can perhaps recast the 
hierarchy in terms of the following categories: 
rulers (raja, tengku) 
legitimators (tuan said) 
mediators (encik datuk, encik keturunan, orang biasa, 
keturunan Bintan) 
subjects (hamba raja I orang kerahan I orang persukuan I 
rakyat) 
slaves (hamba orang). 
Interestingly, among some of my informants who are the 
descendants of hamba raja, the word hamba is still used as a first-
person singular, sometimes pronounced as ambo. This implies a wider 
generalisation of what was a particular relationship of domination-
submission, to the extent that all I-You interaction can be 
interpreted in such terms. In such usage, the 'I' of hamba is paired 
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with the 'You' of encik, datuk and tuan. 
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To demonstrate the significance of this generalisation of hamba, 
let me contrast it with two other first-person singulars: sahaya or 
saya, and beta. The word sahaya/saya is the first-person singular 
used by my informants who are not keturunan hamba raja. As Wilkinson 
(1959:999) points out, a sahaya ranked higher than a hamba. Who then 
were these sahaya? From what I understand, they were the orang 
pertengahan 'people in the middle' and that included all the ranks 
below the tuan said and above the hamba raja. These were, namely, the 
encik datuk, the encik keturunan, the prang biasa, and the keturunan 
Bintan. Wilkinson (ibid.) claims that the Europeans were the ones who 
regularly used sahaya as a first-person pronoun. This implies that 
they learnt the language from the people belonging to these middle 
derajat, rather than from the top or bottom derajat, especially since 
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this was a pronoun that was considered 'polite but not obsequious'. 
Beta is explained by Wilkinson (1959:132) thus: 
As a pronoun beta is used only by people of rank (beta = I; 
sahabat beta = you) writing to one another as equals; whence 
membeta (to use the word beta) was an offence when done by a 
commoner under the old regime. 
While I cannot say whether the pronoun beta is still used in private 
correspondence between my aristocrat informants, its reported 
existence in former times suggests the possibility of distinguishing 
interaction between the aristocrats themselves, from the other modes 
of interaction. This may be illustrated in the following way: 
orang bangsawan 
'aristocrats' 
orang pertengahan 
'people in the middle' 
orang hamba 
'serfs and slaves' 
EQUAL SELF 
beta 
DOMINANT OTHER 
tuan 
SUBSERVIENT SELF 
sahaya 
DOMINANT OTHER 
encik, datuk 
SUBMISSIVE SELF 
hamba 
EQUAL OTHER 
sahabat beta 
Figure 5 The Hierarchical Interaction of Self and Other 
The hierarchy was thus expressed linguistically in the personal 
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pronouns for 'I' and 'you'. In this prominal hierarchy, the pairing 
of hamba 'slave' for 'I' and tuan 'master' for 'you' illustrates most 
clearly the underlying pattern of domination-submission. Apart from 
these hierarchical pronouns, there are also the egalitarian ones 
aku 'I' and engkau 'you'. But these are generally considered as crude 
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precisely because they are non-hierarchical. 
In this hierarchy, the orang pertengahan 'people in the middle' 
were located in an ambivalent position, for they were supposed to be 
submissive to the aristocrats, but dominant over the serfs and slaves. 
The English word 'subservience' seems to be particularly apt for 
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describing the role of the orang pertengahan in the hierarchy. The 
'Panghulu Hamba Rajah of Mapar'/Datuk Kaya Mepar seems to have been 
subservient in this sense, for he apparently mediated between the 
domination of the orang bangsawan and the submission of the hamba 
raja. Raja Alang Laut apparently refused to be subservient in this 
sense, preferring to attribute dominance to himself, and therefore to 
work for his own ends, rather than be someone else's instrument. So 
he was a raja gelaran 'raja by designation', whereas the 'Panghulu 
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Hamba Rajah of Mapar'/Datuk Kaya Mepar/Tomungong of Mapar' seems to 
have had the various titles of penghulu, datuk, and temenggung. 
Significantly, when my informant Datuk Kaya Mohamad gave me his 
genealogy, he prefixed all his patrilineal ancestors' names with the 
word eek, which is the shortened form of encik. Both the encik datuk 
and the encik keturunan were thus encik. As my informants had 
explained, to be an encik was to be a pegawai pemerintah 'instrument 
of administration', in contradistinction to the hamba raja who were 
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milik pemerintah 'government property'. 
According to Wilkinson (1959:887) the word pemerintah is derived 
from the root form perintah, which has the basic meaning of 'sway, 
direction'. A directionality is implied, passing from source via 
instrument to goal. The domination of the top and the submission of 
the bottom was thus mediated by the subservience of the middle ranks 
of the hierarchy. However, it seems to be the case that the 
association of the term encik with the middle ranks was a gradual 
development. According to the Tuhfat, Opu Daeng Marewah's son and 
granddaughter prefixed their names with the term encik. (See 
Genealogical Chart 1; Raja Ali Haji 1982:30.) Since Opu Daeng Marewah 
was the first yamtuan muda, this implies that at that time, encik was 
considered a title lofty enough for the ruler's own son. It is 
possible that the term encik later came to be associated with the 
middle ranks, because the people in these ranks were supposed to serve 
the rulers, as sons would their fathers. 
If the subservience of the middle ranks was so crucial, then it 
would have been politic to institutionalise it in some way. The 
amounts of mas kawin specified for the two encik ranks are 
significant. In the list of mas kawin given above (see Chapter Four), 
different amounts are specified for these two ranks thus: 
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DERAJAT MAS KAWIN 
encik datuk 101 ringgit 
encik keturunan 
mak inang 88 ringgit 
dayang, khadam 66 ringgit. 
The mas kawin for the daughter of an encik datuk was thus 101 ringgit, 
significantly higher than that for the daughter of an encik datuk's 
son who was not himself an encik datuk. However, the two different 
amounts specified for the daughters of the encik keturunan need to be 
explained. 
To do so, we must first explicate the terms mak inang, dayang, 
and khadam. These terms refer to various female attendants of the 
aristocrats. The mak inang was the duenna of a young female raja or 
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tengku; the 9ayang was a female court attendant, and the khadam was 
a female domestic in the palace. The implication is that these female 
posts were the prerogative of the daughters of the datuk. Indeed when 
my Penyengat informants told me about the last Bintan datuk, they also 
took care to mention his two daughters, Bedah and Halimah, who were 
encik keturunan. At least some of the mak inang, dayang, and khadam 
seem to have become the wives of the aristocrats. While I was 
collecting the genealogies of my aristocrat informants, I found that a 
significant number of their female ascendants were these encik 
keturunan. 
Since derajat is transmitted patrilineally, that would mean that 
the children of a female encik keturunan would be aristocrats. 
Furthermore, an affinal relationship would be set up between her 
aristocrat husband and her encik brother. In short, an inter-derajat 
marriage alliance would be established. Through this asymmetrical 
marriage alliance between the ruling aristocracy and the ~ ranks, 
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the loyalty of the latter to the former could be institutionalised 
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through kinship and thereby ensured. The honorific encik thus 
carried not only the connotations of being a chief or a chief's child, 
it also implied the status of being an affine of a ruling aristocrat. 
Significantly, in this context, my Penyengat informants told me 
that when the hamba raja came to the political capital to perform 
their obligatory services, they had to be addressed as encik so as not 
to make them feel 'insulted' (dihinakan). But these people were 
merely 'called' (dipanggil) encik, my informants said, so that they 
would not use their ilmu sihir 'sorcery' on the aristocrats in revenge 
for being insulted. But being called encik apparently did not move 
them up to the derajat of encik datuk'or encik keturunan; they 
remained where they were on the hierarchy. Interestingly, my 
Penyengat informants seem to have the idea that those who were members 
of the higher ranks had to be extra polite to the hamba raja who might 
otherwise feel insulted: kerahan seems to have been regarded as so 
much an insult that it had to be disguised with undue courtesy on the 
part of those for whom kerahan was performed. 
This extended usage of the term encik may be understood as an 
example of what Bourdieu (1977:191) calls 'euphemisation': 
When domination can only be exercised in its elementary 
form, i.e. directly, between one person and another, it 
cannot take place overtly and must be disguised under the 
veil of enchanted relationship, the official model of this 
is presented by relations between kinsmen •••• 
So when the hamba raja came to the capital to do corvee for the 
aristocrats, the pattern of domination-submission normally mediated by 
the encik ranks, suddenly became nakedly blatant, and had to be 
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euphemised by calling the hamba raja 'encik', pretending that they 
were just affines who had come visiting. 
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However, no matter what term of courtesy was used for the hamba 
raja, there was a crucial difference between them and the ~· The 
latter were 'free people' (orang merdeka), whereas the former were 
hamba, people in bondage. Even though unlike the hamba orang 
'slaves', the hamba raja 'serfs' were not bodily owned, their services 
were nevertheless claimed by the ruling aristocracy. So what the 
orang merdeka were free of was slavery on the one hand and corvee on 
the other. But within the hierarchical structure, what that freedom 
seems to have rested on was the willingness to serve as the instrument 
of the rulers in the enslavement and bondage of others. 
5.8 Orang'Biasa 
Apart from the encik, there was another category of 'free 
people'. These were the orang biasa 'ordinary people' -- an odd name 
for a derajat in a highly differentiated hierarchy. What was the 
character of this supposed 'ordinariness'? Apparently, anyone who was 
not a member of any of the other derajat would be an orang biasa, 
which implies that this derajat was a social rag-bag to which 
extraneous individuals could belong. The use of the word biasa 
'ordinary' in this context thus seems somewhat ironic. I have already 
mentioned above that a datuk's son's children would be orang biasa, if 
they were not themselves also appointed to office. However, these 
were not the only type of recruits to the derajat of orang biasa. 
From what my informants say, it appears that there were three other 
types of recruits: 
those descendants of the hamba raja who managed somehow 
to erase from public knowledge all memory of their 
original keturunan; 
the bekas hamba -- that is, freed slaves and their 
descendants; 
and significantly, foreign migrants employed by the 
government of the sultanate. 
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There appear to have been a loose assortment of individuals 
employed for specific jobs by the aristocrats. Apparently, these 
individuals could be recruited from almost anywhere. So capable 
individuals among the hamba raja were potential candidates; so too 
were capable foreign migrants such as Chinese, Indian, Javanese, 
Bugis. The latter included also people from other sultanates such as 
Asahan in Sumatra Utara. 
For example, my informants said that during the reign of the 
tenth yamtuan muda, Raja Muhamad Yusuf, there was a man called Yakob 
from Asahan who was hired to train some military volunteers. A 
Javanese man was also hired to take charge of the royal gardens on 
Penyengat, it seems. And much earlier on, there was, during the time 
of Raja Hamidah, a kapten Cina 'Chinese captain' who was apparently 
ordered by her to build the tomb of Habib Syeikh Syakaf, a prominent 
Arab of the time. The last sultan's Boyanese boat-rowers were also in 
this category. 
In my informants' discourse about the orang biasa 'ordinary 
people' and the orang hamba 'people in bondage', it is striking that 
one difference between these two categories is that the former is 
territorially undefined, whereas the latter is indeed so defined. As 
I have mentioned above, this territorial base, usually located far 
from the political centre, allowed the hamba raja the possibility of 
being independent of the centre. In contrast, the orang biasa have no 
such territorial base, and were instead dependent on the employment of 
their capability by the aristocrats. 
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This suggests that the character of 'ordinariness' had to do with 
the Marxian idea of the freedom to sell one's labour power. It would 
seem to be the case that the so-called 'ordinary people' constituted 
what Giddens (1971:32) calls 'a "floating", mobile group, separated 
from their means of production, and thrown onto the market as 'free' 
wage-labourers'. 
The types of recruits to the derajat of orang biasa suggest that 
'ordinariness' was associated with the loss of rank. A datuk's son's 
children who were not themselves appointed to office, would have had 
to earn a living through employment for specific jobs -- for example, 
playing in the sultan's band. A descendant of a hamba raja who 
managed somehow to erase from public knowledge all memory of his or 
her keturunan, would necessarily have had to lose membership in the 
original territorial group, thereby losing access to the original 
means of production and becoming dependent on paid employment. A 
liberated ex-slave would no longer have been fed and clothed by the 
master, no matter how poorly. A foreign migrant moving into the area 
without property or territory would have had to depend on paid 
employment for his livelihood. The dependence on paid employment thus 
seems to have been the common element in these different types of 
recruits to this particular derajat. 
But why was the word biasa 'ordinary' used as a label? It seems 
to me that there is an implicit opposition in this case between biasa 
'ordinary' and luarbiasa, literally, 'outside the ordinary' -- that 
is, extraordinary. To explicate this, let me examine the ways in 
which the recruits to this derajat became orang biasa. The datuk's 
son's children did not inherit the power of the datuk; they thus 
became 'ordinary' by virtue of their non-inheritance of power. The 
descendants of the hamba raja who managed to erase public memory of 
their keturunan became 'ordinary' by virtue of their public loss of 
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descent. The ex-slaves were set free from their original derajat and 
thereby became 'ordinary'. The foreign migrants came in from the 
outside, and became a peripheral part of the sultanate, thereby also 
becoming 'ordinary'. 
These processes seem to be exactly the reverse of those that were 
operative for the aristocrats, who were supposed to inherit power, 
whose keturunan was public knowledge, who remained in their original 
derajat, and who were supposed to be the integral core of the 
sultanate itself. By describing the reversals as biasa 'ordinary', 
the implication is that the aristocrats were luarbiasa 
'extraordinary'. 
Such an opposition derives from the very nature of hierarchy. As 
Dumont (1972) has pointed out, hierarchy is the perception of people 
as being essentially different, whereas equality is the perception of 
them as being essentially similar. Consequently, in a hierarchical 
mode of perception, the concern is with the classification and ranking 
of what are considered inherent differences, whereas in an egalitarian 
mode of perception, the concern is the elimination, or at least 
minimalisation, of existing differences. With regards to the implied 
opposition between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary', the two modes of 
perception yield different evaluations. In an egalitarian mode of 
perception, what is 'ordinary' would be considered as the norm in 
relation to which the 'extraordinary' is but a rare deviation. In a 
hierarchical mode of perception, however, one begins with the premise 
of difference. So one accepts that both the 'ordinary' and the 
'extraordinary' necessarily coexist. The task then is to rank them in 
terms of their relative superiority and inferiority. I suggest that 
in such a situation, the extraordinary is more likely to be ranked as 
superior. 
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This would relate directly to Weberian ideas of charisma and 
charismatic authority. As discussed in Chapter Four, the 
charisma of Opu Daeng brothers who had founded the Bugis rajas' line 
of descent, was routinised through the establishment of a specific 
political office and through marriage alliances contracted with the 
yamtuan besar's line. The political authority that ensued from this 
routinised charisma remained nonetheless charismatic, albeit 
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routinised. I would thus suggest that the maintenance of the 
routinised charisma of the Opu Daeng brothers was supported by a 
process of labelling. By this means, the loss of keturunan and hence 
~erajat was labelled 'ordinary', in contradistinction to which the 
preservation of keturunan and hence derajat was deemed 'extraordinary' 
and therefore charismatic. The derajat of orang biasa seems, in this 
light, to have been established as a class of not-bangsawan, to 
contrast with the aristocratic orang bangsawan. 
This may perhaps give us a clue as to why the same figure of 44 
ringgit has been specified for the three derajat of orang biasa, 
keturunan Bintan, and hamba raja. It may be because they are all 
categorised as orang kecil 'small people', who can have no claim to 
any charisma, be it spontaneously generated or inherited through 
descent. 
5.9 Keturunan Bintan 
Before we close this chapter, we must discuss an ambiguity that 
has appeared in the pages above. As shown in Chapter Four, the 
amount of mas kawin specified for the keturunan Bintan is 44 ringgit + 
~ 1 paha. Paha, it seems, was a measurement of weight, equivalent 
to approximately 1/4 tahil, which was in turn equivalent to the weight 
of half a Spanish dollar. (See Wilkinson 1959:744,1149.) But 
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nowadays, this too is sebutan saja 'just an utterance'. Nevertheless 
why is there this utterance of an additional ~ 1 paha when the mas 
~ specified for the hamba raja is 44 ringgit only? This implies 
that the keturunan Bintan ranks higher than the hamba raja. Yet they 
too performed kerahan, and are therefore, by definition, hamba raja. 
My informants are indeed aware of this ambiguity. For example, a 
Pangkil informant said: 
Keturunan Bintan dan encik kurang lebih, tapi keturunan 
Bintan dipakai raja, encik tidak. 
(The keturunan Bintan were more or less the same as the 
encik, but keturunan Bintan were used by the raja, whereas 
the encik were not.) 
Another informant, a Penyengat raja said: 
Keturunan Bintan boleh masuk ke dalam istana, tandanya 
selepang kuning. Tapi dia pun sebagai orang kerahan. 
(The keturunan Bintan could enter the palace, their mark of 
status being a yellow shawl. But they too were a category 
of the people of the corvee). 
Interestingly, my Bintan informants themselves referred to the former 
kerahan of their derajat, as penjawatan 'office, post'. They said 
that only the keturunan Bintan had this penjawatan; the other orang 
kerahan were merely under suruhan 'orders, commands'. Only the 
keturunan Bintan wore yellow shawls and could sit near the throne, 
whereas the other orang kerahan could not even enter the balai 'hall 
of assembly'. They said that all this showed that the keturunan 
Bintan were dimuliakan 'honoured'. 
So the implication is that on the one hand, special privileges 
were given to the keturunan Bintan, such that they were 'more or less 
the same as the encik', but on the other hand, like the hamba raja, 
they were nevertheless still obliged to perform kerahan for the 
aristocrats. The keturunan thus seems to have constituted an area of 
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overlap between the orang pertengahan 'people in the middle' and the 
orang hamba 'people in bondage'. 
But why were they singled out for such special treatment? To 
explicate this, we must consider another aspect of the keturunan 
Bintan that my informants often mention. It is said that if anyone 
who is of the Bintan line of descent, were to go to Kota Tinggi in 
Johor, they would immediately vomit blood and die. The cause for 
this, my informants say, is the Laksamana Bintan. The most detailed 
account I have of the story was given by my tengku informant from 
Lingga, Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abubakar: 
This is the story of the Bintan people. There was a Bintan 
person who was a hamba raja, under the raja. Laksamana Megat 
Seri Rama was his name. Well then, this is also the story 
of the Sultan Mahmud. Sultan Mahmud -- he belonged to the 
keturunan sultan which had come from Palembang, yes, and 
then gone to Johor, to Melaka, then back to Johor. Sultan 
Mahmud had no child. He had a wife, but he did not like to 
sleep with her, preferring to seek the company of the orang 
halus [literally: 'delicate people'-- that is, a class of 
invisible beings who can make themselves visible and pass 
for human beings]. 
Well then, Megat Seri Rama mentioned just now had a wife. 
(Yes, the title megat means 'military leader' who guards 
kingdom and all the seas, like a warrior.) One day this 
megat's wife was pregnant, and she craved to eat some 
jackfruit. At the back of the ~aja's house was a jackfruit 
tree. So when the keeper of the garden saw that the raja 
was still sleeping, he gave a bit of a rotten jackfruit to 
the megat's wife. Then the ~aja woke up from his afternoon 
nap; the palace servant -- that is, the keeper -- presented 
some jackfruit. But he said, 'Just now there was one that 
was rotten, which I gave to the megat's wife, because she is 
pregnant and wants to eat jackfruit.' Then the raja angrily 
said, 'Before I have eaten, you have given the food to 
people. Call that person; I want to see whether the child 
in the belly is really eating the jackfruit.' So he really 
had the woman summoned, and he really split open her belly, 
to see whether the child within was really eating the 
jackfruit. 
This is a Melayu story. If madam does not believe, ask 
about it. Everyone will tell you. 
So the megat was of course angry. He had returned from sea, 
where he had all the pirates in his charge. He was angry to 
this degree: If all be well, then rest content; but if 
things are vile, then rest not for an instant. The meaning 
is: If we want to be good, then let us be truly good; but 
if we want to be bad, then be bad all at once, and do not be 
good again. So he said in the following manner, 'I have 
been good to the raja by ensuring the peace, but the raja 
repays me in this way. Therefore, the good I've done is of 
no value to the raja. Therefore, let me be bad at once.' 
So the megat returned, found that the raja had killed his 
wife, and said, 'Just let there be one occasion, and I will 
kill this one that is raja.' Because of this, the raja 
became very cautious. For going to Friday prayers, he had 
himself carried aloft. Then, on arrival, when the raja had 
descended in order to pray, the megat took a keris and 
stabbed the one that was raja. He was finished. But the 
one who was raja was able to take out the keris and throw it 
at the one who was megat. He died. Then the one that was 
sultan swore, 'The Bintan people -- for seven generations, 
they are not allowed to come to Johor; if they reach Johor, 
they will vomit blood and die.' 
True, madam. But now I don't know if it is still so. 
the native Bintan people went to Johor, 
in Kota Tinggi, because the grave is in 
called Makam Tauhid (Tomb of God's One-
Ten years ago, if 
they would vomit 
Kota Tinggi. It is 
ness]. 
So that was the end of the keturunan sultan from 
Melaka, madam; do you know? That was the true, the real 
sultan, who had descended from generation to generation, 
from grandfather, to child, to the child of one's 
grandchild •••• Well then, in the time of this sultan, he 
had not one child. All he had was a bendahara [treasurer]. 
According to the kanun [canonical law] about succession as 
raja, take me for example; it was also the child of a raja 
who became bendahara, but from a different father; it's not 
the same. Now if I did not have a child, it is only then 
that the succession moves to the bendahara. And if the 
bendahara did not have a child, then the succession moves to 
the temenggung. This is the rule, according to the 
canonical law. So at that time, the bendahara also was of 
raja descent but he did not inherit it strongly; do you 
understand, madam? So that which had descended and 
descended, from Melaka, from what, from Bukit Si-Guntang, 
from Palembang, so now this had turned aside, madam, to one 
who could become raja, but whose inheritance was not that 
strong. So at that time, Sultan Mahmud had no child, and 
the sucession moved to Abd al-Jalil. At that time he was 
the bendahara. 
46 (My translation). 
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I have cited this informant's account at such length because, as 
mentioned in Chapter Four, he is himself a direct descendant of Abd 
al-Jalil, the bendahara, to whom the succession had moved. (See 
Genealogical Chart 4.) So what had started as a relatively objective 
story about the suku Bintan and Megat Seri Rama and Sultan Mahmud, 
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eventually developed into one of direct personal interest to my 
informant himself. From his perspective, the story is about how his 
own keturunan came to power. If there had not been a cruel sultan, if 
he had not killed the megat's pregnant wife, if the angry megat had 
not killed him in revenge, and most importantly, if he had not been 
childless, then the bendahara and his keturunan would not have risen 
in power. 
So from the point of view of the bendahara's keturunan, the 
assassination of Sultan Mahmud marked a shift from less power to more 
47 
power. And one particular person evidently played a pivotal role in 
this shift namely, Megat Seri Rama, for by killing the childless 
sultan, he made the throne lawfully gvailable to the bendahara. It is 
noteworthy that my informant stressed the legality of the bendahara's 
succession to the throne. Although he acknowledged that Sultan Mahmud 
was the 'true' and 'real' sultan because he belonged to the keturunan 
sultan which had originated from Bukit Si-Guntang and Palembang, the 
story also implied that the abrupt end of this keturunan was to be 
blamed on Sultan Mahmud's own wickedness which incited the megat to 
kill him, and what is more, his own refusal to sleep with his wife and 
his penchant for the 'delicate people', which resulted in his 
childlessness. 
The accounts I obtained from other informants do not differ 
significantly from that of my tengku informants; if anything differs, 
it is that they are less detailed and are focussed on explaining why 
it is that the keturunan Bintan cannot go to Kota Tinggi, rather than 
on explaining why Sultan Mahmud was killed. This brings us to a 
significant discrepancy between my various informants' accounts on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, the various written accounts, both 
indigenous and Dutch. 
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Not once did my informants mention the word derhaka 'treason, 
betrayal', which is a word that figures importantly in the written 
accounts. According to Andaya (1975:49), derhaka committed against 
the ruler was supposed to be so serious an offence 'that transgressors 
received unusual punishment from a special force surrounding kingship 
(timpa daulat).' In the 'Siak Chronicles' and the Tuhfat, the killing 
of Sultan Mahmud by Megat Seri Rama is described as derhaka; the 'Siak 
Chronicles' further describes Megat Seri Rama's death as timpa daulat 
'being struck by the power of kingship'. Not only that, according to 
this latter source, the megat's death was tortuous and prolonged: 'a 
wound inflicted on the foot of the traitor remains unhealed for four 
years and grass grows in the wound itself' (quoted from Andaya 
1975:49). 
None of all this was ever mentioned by any of my informants. 
Indeed, when I naively mentioned the word derhaka in this context 
(because I had previously read Andaya 1975), I met with either an 
embarrassed silence or a direct denial -- itu bukan derhaka, itu 
kerana sumpahan 'that was not treason, that was because of a vow, a 
curse'. That initially confused me until I eventually realised that 
the point of my informants' accounts was to explain the taboo against 
the keturunan Bintan going to Kota Tinggi. Even my tengku informant's 
account, for example, started with the words, ini cerita suku Bintan 
'this is a story of the Bintan people'. And instead of describing the 
megat's action as derhaka 'treason', my informants described it as 
repaying jahat 'evil' with jahat 'evil'. Moreover, in my informants' 
interpretation, this repayment of evil for evil was initiated by 
Sultan Mahmud himself who 'repaid' (balas) evil for the 'good' (baik) 
that the megat had done for him. Nor did my informants described the 
megat's death as timpa daulat; instead it happened merely because the 
sultan was still sempat 'able, had the time' to pluck out the ~ 
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and throw it at him. 
Significantly, my informants even use the term keturunan Bintan 
interchangeably with the term keturunan Laksamana Bintan, the 
'Laksamana Bintan' in question being none other than Megat Seri Rama. 
What is striking is that when my informants talk about how the 
keturunan Bintan would vomit blood if they went to Johor because they 
are descended from the Laksamana Bintan who killed Sultan Mahmud, they 
do not do so in an incriminatory fashion. On the contrary, the taboo 
against going to Johor is used as proof in identifying someone as 
keturunan Bintan. 
For example, one of my raja informants told me, almost with 
pride, that his wife and her family dare not set foot in Kota Tinggi, 
Johor, because they are keturunan Bintan. This raja's wife is not an 
orang bangsawan; her derajat thus ranks below his. Nevertheless, by 
claiming that she and her family cannot go to Kota Tinggi and are thus 
keturunan Bintan, my raja informant was trying to make it clear that 
she is an orang pertengahan and not an orang hamba. 
This was not an isolated case. Indeed the overall impression 
that I received from my informants is that for a non-orang bangsawan, 
it is a desideratum to claim fear of going to Kota Tinggi and thereby 
to claim keturunan Bintan. Some informants even told me that a few 
years back, two young men from Riau went to Kota Tinggi, without 
knowing that they were of Bintan descent. When they reached Kota 
Tinggi, it seems that they vomited blood and died; and it was only 
after their death, that their relatives in Riau discovered that they 
were keturunan Bintan after all. A Karas informant who claimed to be 
keturunan raja Bugis nevertheless said that he was hampir-hampir 
keturunan Bintan 'very nearly keturunan Bintan', and because of that, 
dares not go to Kota Tinggi. To this informant, keturunan Bintan 
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seems to rank only slightly lower than keturunan raja Bugis. 
Significantly, despite his claim, he does not bear the title of raja. 
Expressing a fear of going to Kota Tinggi thus seems to be almost the 
next best sign of high rank. 
It seemed odd that so many of my informants were willing -- nay, 
even eager -- to claim descent from a regicide. I therefore tried to 
discover why it was a desideratum to be keturunan Laksamana Bintan. 
My enquiries along this line led me back to the mas kawin specified 
for the keturunan Bintan, comprising not only 44 ringgit but also ~ 
1 paha. 
My informants said that this mas kawin was a mark of the high 
status of keturunan Laksamana Bintan. To explain the origins of this 
high status, my literate informants referred me to the founding myth 
of the Melaka dynasty told in the Penurunan. In that text, it is 
stated that on the day that Wan Empuk and Wan Malini climbed up Bukit 
Si-Guntang and discovered the three brothers who had magically 
appeared there, they also 'saw that their padi had golden grain, 
leaves of silver and stems of gold alloy' (Brown 1970:14). 
According to my informants, the one paha's weight in gold 
specified in the mas kawin of the keturunan Bintan is meant to 
represent the padi which had turned to gold as a result of the magical 
appearance of the three brothers. In addition to this, my informants 
said that the nasi adab-adab 'ceremonial rice' displayed at the 
wedding of a keturunan Bintan must have on its puncak 'peak', 
setangkai padi mas 'a stalk of rice made of gold', as further 
representation of Wan Empuk's and Wan Malini's golden padi on Bukit 
Si-Guntang. So all thl.s gold, my informants said, is to remind them 
of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini on Bukit Si-Guntang. 
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This implies that the keturunan Bintan are supposed to be the 
descendants of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini. Indeed, my informants 
explicitly say as much: they claim that the present keturunan Bintan 
are not the descendants of the original Bintan inhabitants, but 
rather, keturunan pendatang dari Palembang 'descendants of the 
migrants from Palembang'. These informants also identify the migrants 
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from Palembang as orang penaung 'people who give shade or shelter'. 
To explicate this complex of elements, we must turn to the 
founding myth itself. As noted in Chapter One, there are several 
textual versions of this myth. Bowen (1983) has compared and traced 
the genealogical differences between a pre-1699 and a post-1699 
version of the Penurunan. Whereas in'the former, the relationship 
between the king and the bendahara is depicted as a marriage alliance, 
in the latter version, it is depicted as siblingship, with the 
bendahara as 'junior royalty by descent, rather than as a pre-eminent 
subject by alliance' (ibid.:171). The purpose of this shift, he said, 
was to provide the bendahara with 'a textual basis for a claim to the 
royal daulat' (ibid.). I suggest that the complex of elements in my 
informants' discourse on Bintan may indeed be understood in terms of 
the strategy of legitimation used by the bendahara's descendants after 
their ascent to power in 1699. 
The details of their account tally significantly with the post-
1699 version of the Penurunan edited at the Riau court. (See 
Shellabear 1967:20-40.) In that version, the founding myth is as 
follows. In the upstream area of the Melayu river, there lived two 
women called Wan Empuk and Wan Malini. They had a rice-field on the 
hill Bukit Si-Guntang. One night, they saw from their house that the 
hill was aglow as if on fire. They climbed the hill the next morning 
to investigate. Upon arrival they saw three youths, one seated on a 
white cow, the other two standing beside him, holding the sword and 
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spear of kingship. When Wan Empuk and Wan Malini asked who they were, 
the three youths said that they were the descendants of Alexander the 
Great and that their names were Nila Pahlawan, Kerishna Pandita, and 
Nila Utama. Wan Empuk and Wan Malini asked what proof they had of 
their claims. And the youths answered that their crowns were the 
proof, as well as the padi on the hill which had been transformed into 
grains of gold, leaves of silver, stems of gold alloy, with the soil 
itself turned into a golden colour. So Wan Empuk and Wan Malini 
believed the youths and brought them back to their house. The two 
women then harvested the padi and became very rich, as a result of the 
prince Nila Utama whom they named Sang Sapurba. 
When the ruler of Palembang, Demang Lehar Daun heard of how Wan 
Empuk and Wan Malini had met the three princes, he went to meet them 
in order to pay homage. He was honoured by Sang Sapurba. The other 
rulers of Sumatra also went to pay homage to the prince. After this, 
Sang Sapurba wanted to marry. He married the daughters of the 
Sumatran rulers. But whenever he slept with one of them, she would 
become afflicted with chloasma, whereupon he would cast her aside. 
Wan Empuk and Wan Malini then told Sang Sapurba that Demang Lehar 
Daun, the ruler of Palembang, also had a daughter by the name of 
Sendari. He commanded them to approach her father on his behalf. 
Demang Lehar Daun responded by saying, 'If the Lord takes my daughter 
to wife, she will surely be afflicted with chloasma. However, if the 
Lord will make a covenant with me, then will I surrender my daughter 
to him.' 
When Sang Sapurba asked what Demang Lehar Daun had in mind, the 
latter said: 'All my descendants are willing to be hamba submissive to 
you the Yang Dipertuan, if they are treated well by your descendants. 
And if they do wrong, no matter how grave the wrong, do not disgrace 
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and insult them with evil words. Even if their crime is punishable by 
death, that should be dealt with according to the laws of the 
Syariah.' Sang Sapurba agreed to this condition and set one of his 
own in return: 'Let it be until the end of time that your descendants 
should never commit treason against my descendants, even if any one of 
my descendants is unjust and evil.' Demang Lehar Daun in turn agreed 
and said, 'So be it, Lord. But if your descendants were to break this 
covenant first, then my descendants will break it too.' Sang Sapurba 
agreed, swearing that whosoever were to break this promise, would have 
his house uprooted. 
After this covenant had been firmly established, Demang Lehar 
Daun's daughter, Wan Sendari, and Sang Sapurba married, without the 
former becoming afflicted with chloasma. They had four children, one 
of whom was a son named Sang Nila Utama. 
Subsequently, Sang Sapurba set off on a journey with his fleet, 
eventually reaching Bintan, which was at that time ruled by a female 
queen by the name of Permaisuri Iskandar Syah. She adopted Sang 
Sapurba as her brother, while his son, Sang Nila Utama, was married to 
her daughter, Wan Seri Beni. Sang Sapurba then left Bintan, leaving 
his son behind. Demang Lehar Daun stayed on in Bintan, because he was 
very fond of his grandson Sang Nila Utama. 
Sang Nila Utama eventually also left Bintan and founded a new 
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kingdom in Temasik/Singapore. After the death of Permasuri Iskandar 
Syah and Demang Lehar Daun, Sang Nila Utama appointed the latter's son 
as the ruler of Bintan, with the title of Tun Telanai. Tun Telanai's 
descendants were the ones who subsequently bore the title of Telanai 
Bintan, and who had the right to eat rice and betel-nut in the 
sultan's audience-hall, while wearing a silk kerchief. 
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In the context of this version of the founding myth, at least two 
details of my informants' discourse on Bintan are significant -- the 
remembrance of the golden padi of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini on Bukit 
Si-Guntang, the special privileges accorded to the keturunan Bintan 
and the claim that they are descended from Palembang migrants. What 
further amplifies this significance is that my informants refer to the 
Palembang migrants as orang penaung 'people who give shade or 
shelter'. As mentioned above, in the founding myth told in the 
Penurunan, Wan Empuk and Wan Malini did indeed provide shelter for the 
three princes they encountered on Bukit Si-Guntang. Furthermore, they 
became rich through harvesting the padi that had been turned into gold 
by the three princes. This suggests a reciprocal exchange of shelter 
for gold, and vice-versa. The remembrance of the golden padi of Wan 
Empuk and Wan Malini may thus be interpreted also as a reminder of the 
shelter that they provided for the three princes. 
As my tengku informant had put it, kalau baik berpada-pada, kalau 
jahat jangan sekali, a saying which he interpreted thus: if all is 
well, then rest content; but if things are vile, then rest not for an 
instant. This reciprocity of good for good and evil for evil is made 
explicit in the founding myth told in the Penurunan -- that is, 
through the covenant established between Demang Lehar Daun and Sang 
Sapurba. The former's descendants are to submit to the latter's 
descendants, on condition that they are never to be abused. 
Furthermore, Demang Lebar Daun specifically states that if Sang 
Sapurba's descendants were to break this covenant first, then so will 
his own descendants. 
The claim that the keturunan Bintan are descended from the 
Palembang migrants thus implies that it was their ancestor who had 
established the covenant with Sang Sapurba, the founding ancestor of 
the Melaka dynasty. This further implies that when the Laksamana 
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Bintan rebelled against Sultan Mahmud and assassinated him in 1699, he 
was only repaying the latter's perfidy for breaking the covenant 
first. It was thus quite plausible for the bendahara's descendants to 
legitimate the bendahara's succession in terms of a combat between 
Sultan Mahmud and Megat Seri Rama, which had resulted from the 
farmer's breach of the social contract. My informants' discourse on 
Bintan may thus be interpreted in the context of a strategy of 
legitimation based not on descent alone, but also on a covenant, a 
social contract that had been established between ruler and subject in 
50 
Palembang. 
But the question arises: why were the keturunan Bintan singled 
out as the focus of such a strategy? ·I do not know whether there is 
any historical validity to my informants' identification of Sultan 
Mahmud's murderer as an orang Bintan. None of the written sources 
seems to have recorded this. Indeed, according to the Dutch 
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Governor's missive to Batavia concerning this event, most of the 
orang kaya were involved, and although one particular brang kaya 
launched the attack, thirty to forty other armed men followed by 
stabbing the sultan to death. Not only that, according to this 
source, it appears that the bendahara was himself implicated in the 
plot. 
In contrast, both the indigenous sources and my informants 
describe the event not even as the work of a solo assassin, but 
rather, as a one-to-one combat between 'the one who was raja' and 'the 
one who was megat'. But even tpe indigenous sources do not mention 
that the megat was an orang Bintan, or that the keturunan Bintan are 
not allowed to go to Kota Tinggi. That detail comes only from my 
informants. The evidence thus suggests that the identification of 
Sultan Mahmud's murderer as an orang Bintan was a singling out that 
was done post facto, so as to accord with the attempt to legitimate 
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power in terms of a social contract supposedly established on Bukit 
Si-Guntang. 
The construction of such a justification would have required a 
detailed knowledge of the founding legend told in the Penurunan. 
Indeed, my aristocrat informants are the ones who can trace most 
explicitly the intricate linkages in this myth. Significantly, since 
the amount of mas kawin specified for each derajat was a matter that 
was decided upon by customary law, this suggests that the one paha's 
weight in gold and a stalk of golden grain were intended by the rulers 
who were the bendahara's descendants, to figure as a vivid 
representation of the social contract enacted in Palembang. 
But would this intended message have been correctly interpreted 
by the mostly illiterate orang kebanyakan 'masses' of the time who had 
no access to the written sources? Another detail I have been told by 
my informants suggests that certain practices were deliberately 
institutionalised to amplify the message of legitimation through 
social contract. Various informants told me that unlike other people 
elsewhere, the keturunan Bintan were dimuliakan (in Bintan 
pronunciation, demelia) 'honoured' by the rulers through the bestowal 
of special privileges such as the right to enter the istana 'palace', 
and the right to wear a yellow or white tetampan 'an embroidered 
kerchief of silk worn ceremonially on the shoulder by court attendant' 
or selepang 'shawl thrown on and over the shoulder'. Yellow and white 
are considered royal colours that were the prerogative of the orang 
bangsawan in zaman sultan; yellow was the colour of the keturunan raja 
and keturunan tengku, and white was that of the keturunan tuan said. 
These privileges are particularly significant in the context of the 
founding myth. As mentioned above, the post-1699 version of the 
Penurunan specifically states that Demang Lehar Daun's son Tun Telanai 
and his descendants were privileged to eat rice and betel-nut in the 
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sultan's audience-hall, wearing a tetampan. 
Another bestowed right of the keturunan Bintan was, to use my 
informants' term, mati berjulang 'to be borne aloft on death'. This 
was explained to me in the following way: after death, the corpse of a 
keturunan Bintan can be borne aloft with the bearers stretching out 
their arms high. In other words, the stretcher on which the corpse 
lies, is not merely carried on the shoulders of the bearers, but is 
lifted higher, at the height of outstretched arms. As my informants 
said, raja baru boleh berjulang 'only rulers had the right to be borne 
aloft in this way'. In the context of Sultan Mahmud's murder 
supposedly by a Laksamana Bintan, this bestowed right is particularly 
significant, because the murdered sultan's posthumous title is Mangkat 
Dijulang 'He Who Died While Being Borne Aloft', a title by which he is 
still referred to at present. (See Winstedt 1979:50.) 
A kind of structural symmetry may thus be discerned between 
Sultan Mahmud's mangkat dijulang and the keturunan Laksamana Bintan's 
mati berjulang. This is a symmetry of opposite movements: The 
posthumous title implies that Sultan Mahmud died while being borne 
aloft, and consequently fell from his lofty perch. Mati berjulang, 
however, means that the keturunan Laksamana Bintan die and are then 
lifted up on high. Thus the sultan fell downwards, while the 
keturunan Bintan are lifted upwards. The symmetry between mangkat 
dijulang and mati berjulang may thus be read as a symbolic statement 
on the supposed events and consequences of 1699. I say 'supposed 
events' because although there is relatively firm evidence that Sultan 
Mahmud was indeed murdered, there is no firm evidence that it was by a 
Laksamana Bintan. 
Whether or not the murderer was a Laksamana Bintan in historical 
fact, in mythological interpretation at least, there seems to have 
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been an upward social move for the keturunan Bintan after 1699. In my 
tengku informant's account given above, for example, he started out by 
identifying Megat Seri Rama as a 'hamba raja, under the raja'. But by 
the end of his account, he was referring to itu raja 'the one who was 
raja' and itu megat 'the one who was megat', speaking of them as equal 
opponents in a one-to-one confrontation. The logic of gladiatorial 
combat implies that the megat who killed the raja should have become 
the new raja; but in the story, this logical outcome is forestalled by 
the megat's own death. Nevertheless, this implication seems to have 
been worked out among his keturunan, who appear to have been socially 
uplifted. Indeed some informants rank the keturunan Bintan as a 
higher derajat than the encik. Others even say: 
Keturunan Bintan bukan raja tapi hampir raja. 
(The keturunan Bintan are not raja but are very nearly 
raja.) 
Perhaps it is now clearer why so many of my informants were 
willing and even eager to claim descent from a regicide. To make such 
a claim is to acknowledge the relative power of the keturunan Bintan, 
as inherited from an orang kuat 'strong person' who was able to kill a 
raja. As a Seking informant said about kekuatan 'strength': 
Kalau zaman dulu, siapa yang lebih kuat bunuh yang kurang 
kuat. 
(In former times, whosoever was the stronger killed 
whosoever was weaker.) 
This statement is comparable to that made by my Karas informant cited 
above: 
Kalau zaman dulu, siapa yang kuat menang; siapa yang kalah 
mati. 
(In former times, whosoever was strong would win; whosoever 
that lost would die.) 
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The underlying logic is: to kill is to win, to lose is to die. So the 
megat and the raja killed each other; therefore they both won and 
lost. This implies that they were equally kuat. 
However, both died. So even though the keturunan Bintan may have 
been 'very nearly raja', they were nevertheless not so. Instead, they 
had to remain subject to the third party to whom the throne went --
namely, the bendahara. Therefore the special privileges bestowed on 
the keturunan Bintan merely served the purpose of lifting them into an 
h~norary position of being orang pertengahan, which was apparently 
only an honorary position, because in spite of being so uplifted, the 
keturunan Bintan were still treated as a suku to whom was assigned a 
specified kerahan. So those who tried but failed to be raja must 
still remain hamba. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
1. Bateson (1973:42) gives the following example of symmetrical 
schismogenesis: 
••. If boasting is the reply to boasting, ••• each group 
will drive the other into excessive emphasis of the 
pattern, a process which if not restrained can only lead 
to more and more extreme rivalry and ultimately to 
hostility and the breakdown of the whole system. 
2. Bateson (1973:42) gives the following example of complementary 
schismogenesis: 
•.• It is likely that submissiveness will promote further 
assertiveness which in turn will promote further 
submissiveness. This schismogenesis, unless it is 
restrained, leads to a progressive unilateral distortion 
of the personalities of the members of both groups~ which 
results in mutual hostility between them and must end in 
the breakdown of the system. 
3. Wilkinson (1959:391) translate; the term ~ in the following 
way: 
Slave; unpaid servant. Of slaves of all sorts. Hamba 
berhutang: debt-slave •••• Hamba raja: debt-slaves of the 
ruler •••• Hamba tebusan: bought slaves. Hamba yang 
~: domestic slaves. Hamba sahaya: slaves generally. 
4. The other 'blessed things' from Mecca included: 
a carpet from Istanbul; two rings set with large stones, 
one a glowing emerald and the other a rich ruby; a 
Turkish rifle chased with gold and two or three bolts of 
cloth to be made into jackets ••• and various kinds of gold 
brocade from Mecca the Exalted, as well as water from the 
well of Zamzam, toothpicks and even dried camel meat. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:256). 
The term that Matheson and Andaya (1982:256) have translated as 
'blessed things' is berkat. Wilkinson (1959:128) translates it 
as 'God's blessing working through his favoured ones'. This 
concept will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
5. Although Islam certainly does not advocate slavery, it does 
nevertheless recognise its existence. As noted by Muhammad Ali 
(1973: 543): 
Slavery was an institution recognised by all people 
before Islam. To Islam belongs the credit of laying down 
principles which, if developed on the right lines, would 
have brought about its ultimate extinction. But it was 
not the work of a day, and therefore, as long as the 
institution remained, provision had to be made for slaves 
which should make them as good citizens as the free men. 
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There are indeed many injunctions in the Quran about how slaves 
should be treated; see, for example, Chapter 24, verses 32 and 
33. A. Yusuf Ali (1983:906) notes: 
The law of slavery in the legal sense of the term is now 
obsolete. While it had any meaning, Islam made the 
slave's lot as easy as possible. A slave, male or 
female, could ask for conditional manumission by a 
written deed fixing the amount required for manumission 
and allowing the slave meanwhile to earn money by lawful 
means and perhaps marry and bring up a family. Such a 
deed was not to be ref used if the request was genuine and 
the slave had character. Not only that, but the master 
is directed to help with money out of his own resources 
in order to enable the slave to earn his or her own 
liberty. 
6. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976:230) explains the word 
'corvee' as denoting a 'day's work of unpaid labour due by 
vassals; labour done in lieu of taxes; onerous task'. This is 
quite close to the meaning of the Malay word kerahan. 
7. This accords with Wilkinson's (1959:565) translation of the word 
kerah as 'calling people together for public service; corvee; 
conscription'. Sopher (1977:90) also explains kerahan as the 
provision of 'traditional service to the Malay lords' in lieu of 
a head-tax, which he describes (ibid.:269) as: 
the system by which the Orang Laut of the Riouw-Lingga 
Archipelago and the adjacent coasts and islands are 
arranged in feudally organised territorial groups, sukus, 
with various kinds of obligations of service, kerahan. 
Such feudal clans were most characteristic of the Riouw-
Lingga Archipelago, but the same pattern of social 
organisation was found among the Sekah of Billiton, 
though not of Bangka, and among most of the boat people 
on the east coast of Sumatra. In the Pulau Tujuh, the 
suku organisation had become very much blurred, but each 
island group had kerahan obligations to the local ruler, 
who was himself a vassal of Bintang or Lingga. This 
geographic area corresponds with that in which the title 
of batin is in use among the Orang Laut. 
8. Wilkinson's (1959:391) own elaboration of the term hamba seems to 
be supportive of such a connotation: 
Also of Indian convicts (hamba kompeni, benduan); and 
(fig.) of the humble generally, as God's slaves or God's 
poor (hamba Allah). Descriptively of birds that seem to 
work for others, e.g. the drongo as the monkey's 
attendant (hamba kera), the osprey that warns the 
shellfish when the tide is coming in (hamba siput), etc. 
Of humble service generally with no direct suggestion of 
slavery; cf.: kehambaan yang khas (services entailing no 
dishonour) ••• ; the knave (hamba) at cards; the first 
person singular as "your humble servant"; and an offer 
of marriage (minta perhamba) as a promise of devoted 
service. 
9. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:391): 
The Pekaka people on Bulang numbered about 1,050. 
[They] •.. were known as pirates, although they also 
carried out some fishing. 
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Significantly, Terong is indeed in the Bulan area. (See Map 3.) 
10. My analysis of the importance of kerahan is supported by Logan's 
(1847:336) description of what he terms 'the ethnology of the 
Johor archipelago': 
This archipelago, embracing several hundreds of islets, 
besides the considerable islands of Battam, Bintang, 
Krimun, Gampang, Gallat, Linga and Sinkep, is thinly 
inhabited by several interesting tribes •••• The more 
important tribes are those termed collectively Orang Pe-
suku-an, literally the people divided into tribes. They 
are all vassals of the King. Those of the highest rank, 
to whom distinct services are appropriated when the King 
goes to sea or engages in war, are the Orang Bentan under 
an Ulubalang, the Orang Singgera, under a Batin, the 
Orang Kopet under a Jinnang, the Orang Bulo and the Orang 
Linga. The other tribes, some of the land and some of 
the creeks or sea, are the Orang Gilam, Orang Bekaka, 
Orang Sugi, Orang Muro, Orang Tambus, Orang Mantang, 
Orang Kilong, Orang Timiang, Orang Mnau, Orang Pulo Boya 
and Orang Silat. Besides these, there are some wild 
tribes in the interior of the larger islands. 
As we can see, some of the names listed by Logan in the 
nineteenth century are still mentioned by my informants: 
the 'Orang Bentan'/suku Bintan 
the 'Orang Kopet'/suku Kopit 
the 'Orang Gilam'/suku Gelam 
the 'Orang Bekaka'/suku Pekaka 
the 'Orang Mantang'/suku Mantang 
The words orang and suku are indeed used interchangeably by my 
informants in this context. Apart from the abovementioned, they 
also talk about the orang/suku Moro, the orang/suku Temiang, and 
the orang/suku Selat, which are on Logan's list. Significantly, 
Logan says that the 'Orang Bentan' and the 'Orang Kopet' were of 
a higher rank than the others such as the 'Orang Gilam', the 
'Orang Bekaka', and the 'Orang Mantang'. This description is not 
unlike the impression I have derived from my informants. 
Furthermore, Logan mentions that the highest sukus were those 
engaged in expeditions and war. This supports my argument that 
the higher-ranking sukus were also the more powerful ones. 
11. A letter by Captain Francis Light written in 1790 contains the 
following passage: 
Among the Various Modes of imposing Taxes on the people, 
there is none the Malays will so readily Comprehend and 
Submit to as a Capitation Tax, or to call it by a name 
more agreeable to a British Ear, a Royal or General Tax, 
by which the Subject is released from all feudal Service. 
By frequent Conversations with the Malays, I learn that 
the Services required by the King are attended with much 
grievance, from the great loss of time, & the Vexatious 
extortions of his inferior officers. They would gladly 
compound to pay 4, or even 6, Dollars per annum for their 
freedom. 
(Factory Records, Straits Settlements 4, 1790-91:40-41). 
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12. These Boyanese were migrants from the island of Bawean, off the 
north coast of Java. Since my informants use the term orang 
Boyan, rather than the term orang Bawean, I shall follow their 
usage. See Vredenbregt (1964) on the migration patterns of this 
island population. 
13. According to nineteenth-century European records, the Galang 
people were indeed known to be highly active pirates. (See, for 
example, Logan 1849:584-585; and Begbie 1967:270-272.) Moreover, 
it was noted by Christiaan van Angelbeek, head of the Dutch 
Bureau of Native Affairs, in his general report of 1825 that one 
of 'the two principal piratical chiefs of the Malay empire' was 
'Rajah Lang, in the island of Bulan·g, under whom are all the 
Rayats of Gallang, of Bulang and some other islands situated at 
or near to the entrance of the straits of Malacca' (Logan 
1849:634). So there is documentary evidence that there was indeed 
a Raja Alang Laut who led the Galang people, as claimed by my 
informants. In the context of the power struggle between Engku 
Muda's faction and Raja Ali's faction, as described in Chapter 
Four, it is possible that Raja Alang Laut was a follower of the 
former, especially since his territory evidently lay within the 
temenggung's purview. (See note 42 in Chapter Four.) 
Indeed, Sopher (1977:105) even suggests that 'a half-brother of 
the Viceroy, Tengku Long of Bulan', with whom Raffles negotiated 
about Singapore, was 'possibly a relative of the notorious Raja 
Lang of Bulan, who came into prominence a few years later as 
panglima of the rayats of Galang'. This Tengku Long was, of 
course, none other than the Tengku Long who became Sultan Husain 
Syah of Singapore. He was the half-brother of Komeng/Tengku 
Jumat who became Sultan Abd al-Rahman. (See Genealogical Chart 
1.) As mentioned in Chapter Four, my raja informants claim that 
Raja Alang Laut belonged to Sultan Sulaiman's keturunan. If that 
were so, then he would indeed have been related to Tengku Long. 
It is significant that Raja Alang Laut apparently rose to 
prominence a few years after Raffles' negotiations with Tengku 
Long. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, under the terms of 
the London-Dutch treaty of 1824, the Galang and Bulan areas were 
transferred from the temenggung to the yamtuan muda in Penyengat. 
Such a foreign-imposed act evidently met with resistance among 
the Galang people. 
14. Interestingly, in a letter written from Kedah in 1787, Captain 
Francis Light had noted that that part of the Malay Peninsula was 
'very thinly inhabited ••• [with] only 5 or 6 villages situated 3 
or 4 miles from the sea shore; between the villages and the sea 
is thick jungle, left to prevent the Malay pirates from making 
incursions to their habitations' (Factory Records, Straits 
Settlements 2 1786-87:545). 
15. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Kalau dapat orang betina yang ngandung, panglima Galang 
bertaruh sama dia, sangka anaknya jantan atau betina, 
jadi dia belah perut orang perempuan itu, nengok anak ada 
perut. 
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This is not standardised Malay syntax, but is literally what was 
said. 
16. Logan (1848:360), for example, noted the number of slaves kept by 
the Riau aristocrats at that time. 
17. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Datuk Kaya Mepar, jugak dipanggil orang Datuk Kaya Monti! 
-- dia yang bawa orang Ladi ke sini. Dia netap sini; 
orang Ladi anak buahnya. Dari Daiklah. Tidak ada yang 
balik ke Daik; semua tinggal sini. 
18. Apparently, this Penghulu Hamba Raja, a title which may be 
translated as 'Chief of the Ruler's Vassals', and his brother, 
the Orang Kaya Lingga, were the leaders of the pirates in Lingga. 
These offices were not inherited and were given at the 
ruler's discretion. • •• The then Orang Kaya of Lingga was 
an opium addict and left most of the government of the 
orang laut to his brother. 
(Matheson and Andaya 1982:391). 
The two leading aristocrats who arranged the meetings between 
Angelbeek and the Penghulu Hamba Raja were, respectively 'Tunku 
Said Mahomad Zein' or Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad Zain al-
Kudsi, and 'Ibrahim, the Selawatang of Lingga' or Suliwatang 
Ibrahim. (See Logan 1849:635; Raja Ali Haji 1982:328; Matheson 
and Andaya 1982:383.) 
19. One such place is located in the northern entrance of Riau 
Strait, the main trade route of the area. This is Malang Ladi, 
which is 'a group of rocks always above-water' (Indonesia Pilot 
1975:I,133). Another is Pulau Ladi, which is located off the 
southern extremity of Bulan island. (See ibid.:151 and Map 3.) 
20. Concerning the organisation of these government-sponsored raids, 
Matheson and Andaya (1982:391) have noted: 
These ••• chiefs supplied ammunition and provisions 
to .•• captains who actually commanded the pirating 
expeditions. After a successful raid the profits were 
shared among the various chiefs with a large percentage 
allotted to the Sultan. 
21. The relationship between violence and the state has been 
commented upon by Weber (1919): 
'Every state is founded on force', said Trotsky at Brest-
Litovsk. That is indeed right. If no social 
institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then 
the concept of 'state' would be eliminated •••• The 
relation between the state and violence is an especially 
intimate one .•.• A state is a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory •••• The right 
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions 
or to individuals only to the extent to which the sta~e 
permits it. The state is considered the sole source of 
the 'right' to use violence. 
(Quoted from Gerth and Mills 1958:78). 
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22. This was Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad Zain al-Kudsi. He was 
the anak gundik of an Arab, Abd al-Rahman al-Kudsi, and a Siamese 
slave • 
••• He had been born at Palembang but had moved to Lingga 
as a young man because of his commercial interests. He 
became very wealthy and with Sultan Mahmud's permission, 
married Tunku Saripa, the daughter of another Arab, and 
whose mother was Sultan Mahmud's cousin or niece •••• 
After her death, he married her half-sister. 
(Matheson and Andaya 1982:383). 
23. In his report of 1825, he made a comparison between the pirates 
and the aristocrats, referring to the former as 'Rayats' or Orang 
Laut, and the latter as 'Orang Malayu': 
The Rayats or Orang Laut do not appear to belong to the 
Malay race; there is, at least, a great difference 
between an Orang Malayu and a Rayat. The language is, 
with trifling exceptions, the same; it is in the 
character of these two people that the principal 
difference is found. This fact may be explained by 
saying that this arises from the Orang Malayu having 
attained a higher degree of civilisation •••• 
(Quoted from Logan 1849:634-635). 
(Rayat is the old spelling of rakyat 'subject'.) 
24. As pointed out by Andaya and Matheson (1979:110): 
It was Penyengat, the seat of the Yamtuan Muda, which 
provided Riau with its religious and secular leadership, 
and it was Penyengat, rather than the sultan's residence 
on Lingga, which was the real heart of the kingdom. 
25. This Islamising attitude is also evident in Raja Ali Haji's 
Thammarat al-Mahammah 'The Benefits of Religious Duties' which, 
according to Andaya and Matheson (1979:116), 
bears a close resemblance to al-Ghazali's Nasihat al-
Muluk (Counsel for Kings), the [Persian theologian's] 
famous treatise on Islamic statecraft. Both works 
reflect the view that the function of the state, and the 
principal duty of society, is to provide a climate 
conducive to proper observance of religion, so that every 
man can fulfil his spiritual obligations and prepare 
himself for the Day of Judgement. For this reason God 
has appointed kings, who are to set an example of 
righteous behaviour and assist men in their preparations 
for the world to come. Rulers have a special 
responsibility in the maintenance of religion, for they, 
above all others, have been granted knowledge and the 
capacity to use it. Able to differentiate between right 
and wrong, it is they who set the standards for society's 
moral conduct. 
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26. Concerning this deposition, Raja Ali Haji wrote in his Tuhfat: 
This action was in accordance with the command of Allah 
Almighty in the glorious Koran. 'Thou givest sovereignty 
unto whom Thou wilt and Thou withdrawest sovereignty from 
whom Thou wilt. Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt and Thou 
abasest whom Thou wilt. In Thy hand in the good. Lo! 
Thou art able to do all things.' [from the Quran, Surah 
3-25.] 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:294-295). 
The deposition of a reigning sultan evidently of fended many in 
the sultanate. A rebellion on behalf of the deposed Sultan 
Mahmud broke out in Retih, but it was quickly and bloodily 
quashed by the Bugis rajas who fought side by side with the 
Dutch. (See Map 1.) As Andaya and Matheson (1979:125) have 
pointed out, there is probably a direct link between Sultan 
Mahmud's deposition in 1857, the Retih rebellion in 1858, and 
Raja Ali Haji's Thammarat al-Mahammah which was completed in 
1859. I suggest that this link may be understood in terms of the 
Thamarat being a Bugis justification for deposing Sultan Mahmud 
and quashing the Retih rebellion. 
27. Significantly, my informant Tengku Ahmad gives a contrary view of 
this event in his book by totally ignoring the role of the Bugis 
in dethroning Sultan Mahmud IV, instead putting the blame 
entirely on the Dutch. (See Appendix 7.) 
28. This identity between political and religious leadership began 
with the Prophet Muhammad and was institutionalised after his 
death in the form of the caliphate, from which the sultanate 
later derived. (See Farah 1970:154; Rauf 1964:56,68,76.) 
29. My informants still talk about the sultanate of Siak as an 
object-lesson illustrating how kuasa kerajaan jatuh kepada tuan 
said 'political power fell to the tuan said'. This 'fall' is 
mentioned repeatedly in the Tuhfat, one such mention being the 
following: 
••• the kingdom of Siak fell into the hands of Sayid Ali, 
son of Uthman, son of Syahab who was of another race, the 
Lord Sayids. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:134). 
According to the Tuhfat, Sayid Ali's appropriation of political 
office was achieved through treachery and deceit. (See 
ibid.:207-210). 
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30. In Islam the Prophet Muhammad may be regarded as a mediator in 
that God's message to humanity was revealed through him. Indeed, 
conversion to Islam involves the public recognition of Muhammad's 
role as the sole messenger of God. (See Chapter Seven.) 
31. These were categories that the Dutch colonial government .had used 
to differentiate the coloured population; whites could not, by 
definition, be either of these. Under Dutch classification, the 
Arabs were generally lumped with the Chinese and the Japanese as 
freemde Oosterlingen. (See Anderson 1983:112.) 
32. The Syari'ah 'Islamic law' is therefore basically Shafi'ite in 
character. And the political leader of an Islamic community, 
such as the caliph, sultan or amir, is supposed to govern the 
community according to the tenets of the ~ari'ah. (See Farah 
1970: 194.) 
33. With regards to this phenomenon of mediation, the Weberian 
analysis of traditional states is relevant: 
Political organisations in traditional states are of an 
'estate' character, in which the means of administration 
are controlled by the officialdom. But such 
decentralised systems of poli~ical power typically exist 
in an uneasy balance with the centralised administration 
of an overlord or monarch. The monarch normally attempts 
to consolidate his position by creating a staff which is 
materially dependent upon him, and by the formation of 
his own professional army. The greater the degree to 
which the ruler succeeds in surrounding himself with a 
propertyless staff responsible only to him, the less he 
is challenged by nominally subordinate powers. 
(Giddens 1971:180). 
34. Although Wilkinson (1959:269) has translated the word datuk as 
'grandfather', in my informants' usage, the term is not gender-
specific, a further qualification being needed to differentiate 
between datuk laki-laki 'male grandparent' and datuk perempuan 
'female grandfather'. My informants generally do not use the 
term nenek for 'grandmother'. Indeed Wilkinson (1959:802) 
derives nenek from the Minangkabau ninik and the Javanese nini. 
35. Milner (1982:28) has observed that in the nineteenth century, 
wealth implied 'political influence in the form of a sizeable 
personal following'. And Anderson (1826:268) noted that in East 
Sumatra, a man was 'accounted rich or respectable according to 
the number of his followers'. 
36. Wilkinson (1959:955) explains the word rakyat thus: 
Arabic: = "herd at pasture', i.e. the subjects of a 
shepherd or king ..• peasant; private soldier; the humbler 
people in a state .••• the masses; the plebs. In a 
military sense rayat means militia or conscripted troops 
in contrast to professional soldiers (hulubalang). Orang 
yakyat are also specifically the Proto-Malayan subjects 
of a Malay Chief or Sultan, in contrast to his own 
civilised Malays. They rank, however, higher than his 
orang Sakai or non-Malayan 'aborigines', except in the 
Riau Archipelago where all are Proto-Malayan and are 
styled sakai and rayat, 'Sakai' being the higher. 
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But my informants use the term sakai only for a Sumatran 
community of jungle-dwellers. (See Chapter One.) They are, 
however, acquainted with the word rakyat as a synonym fo! the 
hamba raja/orang kerahan/orang persukuan. But it is rarely used 
in this sense, probably because in the present context, the word 
rakyat is used more frequently to refer to the Indonesian masses. 
37. Wilkinson (1959:391) has noted: 
As a pronoun of the first person hamba is in common use 
among Malays who are on friendly but not familiar terms. 
It is more formal than aku; less respectful than hamba-
enche' , !:g1mba-dato' , haffii)8°-tuan; less ceremonious than 
di-perhamba; and not as specialized as beta, kita, 
sahaya, patek, pachal, kerichal. 
38. Wilkinson (1959:999) translates sahaya thus: 
Humble servant; follower; domestic; your humble servant; 
I (in polite but not obsequious language). Usually 
pronounced sahaya or saya. In regular use among 
Europeans as the pronoun of the first person. Cf. also 
sahaya tuan and sahaya data' (your lordship's servant). 
As a slave a sahaya was a household worker and ranked 
higher than a hamba who worked in the fields. Hamba 
sahaya (serfs and slaves) represented slaves of all 
sorts; ••• sahaya permerdehekaan (libertinus, freed 
slave) .•• ; 
39. In this context, it is significant that the sultan was usually 
addressed as tuanku 'my master', with the implication that he was 
the master of each individual subject, irrespective of the 
latter's rank. It seems to me that the various terms used for 
the aristocrats were derived from tuanku - for example, ~ngku, 
engku, and wan. Of these, tengku is phonemically closest to 
tuanku, and indeed the aristocrats bearing this title were 
regarded as a little higher that the other aristocrats, for they 
had the right to become sultan. The loss of the 't' in engku may 
be linguistically significant. As Benjamin (1984:46-47) has 
argued, 
Insofar as [the verbal prefix] ~- cancels the sense of 
'in-progress', it possesses the 'perfected-state' meaning 
that Winstedt saw as underlying its varied uses. 
I suggest that the contrast between tengku and engku is the 
result of a backformation which treated the 't' in tengku as if 
it were a ter-. When I questioned my informants about the 
difference between tengku and engku, my _raja informants said that 
the presence or absence of a 't' is insignificant but my tengku 
informants in Lingga stressed that only they had the right to be 
called tengku. Indeed, despite my raja informants' disclaimer, 
they do not ever use the term tengku for themselves. 
As for the term wan, this too seems to have resulted from the 
loss of the 't' in tuan. This makes sense since ~is used as a 
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term of address for the tuan said. Significantly, the -ku 'I' 
suffix is missing. This implies that whereas the tuan said may 
be tuan 'masters' in a general sense, they were not specifically 
themasters of each individual subject in the realm. 
40. To be subservient is to be 'serving as means, having merely 
instrumental relation, (to); subordinate to' (The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary 1976:1150). 
41. According to Wilkinson (1959:861), the word pegawai denotes a 
tool, an instrument, a 'person who carries out a duty'. 
42. The term khadam may also be applied to a male palace domestic. 
But the male khadam is irrelevant in the context of mas kawin. 
43. In his analysis of the Raffles MS.18 recension of the Penurunan, 
Bowen (1983:165-166) states: 
The chapters of the text present the creation of the 
Malay polity as the union of a sacred line of kings with 
an indigenous people. The mediator of this union, the 
local Malay chief, is, I believe, the prototype for the 
later office of Bendahara, which thereafter preserved by 
an alliance with the royal line the original compact 
between rulers and subjects •••• From the generation of 
Iskandar Syah to the time of the kingdom of Johor, the 
relation between the royal descent-line and the line of 
the Bendahara is portrayed as an asymmetrical marriage 
alliance. 
I would like to suggest that this asymmetrical marriage alliance 
was not limited only to the king and the bendahara, but that it 
constituted a general pattern of relations between the ruling 
aristocracy and the ruled lower ranks. 
44. The prefix encik does not seem to be used at all in Riau at 
present, probably because there are no longer appointments to 
good positions within the sultanate, since there is no longer any 
sultanate. Interestingly, in contrast, in Malaysia, where there 
are still Melayu sultanates, the word encik is in regular use as 
a polite honorific for almost anyone. When I first arrived in 
Riau, I was asked by my Pangkil informants what they should call 
me; so I said just the normal would do. When they asked what 
that was, I said that in Malaysia and Singapore, we call everyone 
encik. To my subsequent embarrassment, I became the only person 
that they called encik. Fortunately, I learnt enough about the 
intricacies of derajat in time to save myself from making the 
same mistake with my other informants. However, it appears that 
during the time of the former sultanate, the term encik was 
widely applied in extended usage, almost in the way that is still 
used in Singapore and Malaysia. It appears that the term encik 
is applied in extended usage only when its proper usage does 
exist in the first instance. In other words, it seems to be the 
case, at least in Riau, that only when there really are encik 
datuk and encik keturunan, that one can apply the term to others 
who are really non-encik, and by such extended application, 
accord to them the courtesy of treating them as if they were 
encik indeed. This would perhaps explain why the term encik is 
no longer used by my informants, even if in the past, the term 
itself could be used in an extended sense: there is now no 
original to extend from. 
45. To use Giddens' words (1971:162): 
Charisma may ••• be treated as a quality which is passed on 
through heredity, and is consequently possessed by the 
closest relatives of the original bearer •••• When 
charismatic domination is transmuted into a routine, . 
traditional form, it becomes the sacred source of 
legitimation for the position of those holding power; in 
this way charisma forms a persisting element in social 
life. While this is 'alien to its essence', there is 
still justification, Weber says, for speaking of the 
persistence of 'charisma', since as a sacred force it 
maintains its extraordinary character. 
46. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Ini cerita suku Bintan. Ada satu orang Bintan, dia itu 
hamba raja, dibawah raja. Laksamana Megat Seri Rama 
.!!_amanya. Jadi, ini cerita Sultan Mahmud juga. Sultan 
Mahmud -- dia itu ke~urunan sultan dari Palembang, ya, 
sampai ke Johor, sampai ke Melaka, balik lagi ke Johor. 
Sultan Mahmud dia tak ada punya anak. Dia ada isteri, 
tapi dia tidak suku tidur sa~a isteri, dia suka cari 
orang halus. 
Jadi, Megat Seri Rama yang tersebut tadi, dia ada isteri. 
(Ya, itu megat macam panglimalah, menjaga kerajaan, 
menjaga laut-laut semua sekali, macam perwiralah.) Jadi 
pada satu hari isteri Megat mengandung, ingin mahu makan 
nangka. Di belakang~~unya rumah ada pohon nangka. 
Jadi penjaga kebun dia tengok raja lagi sedang tidur, itu 
ada nangka busuk, kasi sikit sama isteri Megat. Jadi, 
raja bangun dari tidur siang itu; orang istana, yang 
pengkebun itu, dia sembahkan nangka. Tapi dia bilang, 
'Tadi ada satu yang busu_!s~~a kasi sama isteri Megat 
kerana isteri Megat itu mengandung, mahu makan nangka.' 
Jadi raja marah bilang, 'Aku belum makan, engkau kasi 
sama orang. Panggil orang itu, aku mahu lihat anak dalam 
perut, betul tak itu makan nangka.' Jadi dia panggil 
betul-betul dia belah perut isteri Megat, lihat betul 
anak didalam perut itu makan nangka. 
Itu cerita Melayu. Kalau nya tak percaya, tanya itu; 
semua orang bilang. 
Jadi Megat tentulah marah. Dia balik dari laut; dia jaga 
perampok-perampok itu semua. Dia marah begitu macam: 
kalau b~ik berpada-pada, kalau jahat, jangan sekali. 
Artiny_f!.Lkalau kita baik, baik betul-betullah; tapi kalau 
mau jahat, jahat satu kali, jangan bikin baik lagi. 
Jadi, dia bilang begitu macam, 'Aku baik sama raja jaga 
keamanan, tapi raj~ balas macam ini juga. Kalau begitu, 
baik aku baik percuma apa~-~~_raja; kalau begitu, aku 
jahat satu kali.' Jadi Megat balek, dia tahu raja sudah 
bunuh ister,inya, dia bilang, 'Satu kali aku mesti bunuh 
sama ini raja.' Jadi itu raja sudah ragu. Hari Jumaat 
pergi sembahyang, raja itu pergi pakai julang. Kemudian 
dah tu raja sudah turun pada semba~ng. Jadi Megat 
ambil keris tikam itu raja. Rabis. Tapi itu raja sempat 
ambil itu keris; dia lempar kena itu megat. Megat 
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matilah; jadi itu sultan sumpah, 'Itu orang Bintan, 
sampai tujuh keturunan tidak boleh pergi ke Johor; kalau 
naik ke Johor, muntah darah, mati.' 
Betul, nya. Tapi kalau sekarang saya tak tahulah. Tapi 
kalau sepuluh tahun dulu orang Bintan asli, kalau pergi 
Johor, muntah -- Kota Tinggi, sebab dia punya makam i'ni 
ada Kota Tinggi. Makam Tauhid itu. 
Jadi habis keturunan sultan dari Melaka, nya; tahu? !tu 
yang betul-betul 'real' punya sultan itu, turun turug 
dari datuk, anak, anak cucu •••• Jadi masa sultan ini, 
tidak ada satu anak. Dia ada satu bendahara. Kalau 
dalam kanun yang jadi raja, umpama saya; anak raja juga 
jadi bendahara, tapi bapak lain, tak sama. Tapi kalau 
macam saya punya anak tidak ada, baru boleh pindah sama 
bendahara. Kalau bendahara tidak punya anak, baru pindah 
sama temenggung. !tu aturan, itu menurut dia punya 
kanun. Jadi waktu itu, bendahara dia keturunan raja 
juga, tapi dia tidak waris kuat, tahu nya. Jadi ini 
turun turunan dari Mela~~~ari apa, dari Bukit Si-
Guntang, dari Palembang_,_jadi sekarang ini sudah 
menyimpang, '!Ya, boleh jadi raja tapi dia punya waris 
tidak berapa kuat. Jadi waktu itu Sultan Mahmud tidak 
ada anak, pindah sama Abdul Jalil. Waktu itu dia 
bendahara. 
314 
47. There is documentary evidence to indicate that the killing of 
Sultan Mahmud was an actual historical event. The following is 
Andaya's (1975:186) translated summary of a missive from Gov. van 
Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia (17 Oct. 1699, fols. 126-7): 
In October 1699 a Moor recently arrived from Johor told 
the Dutch at Malacca that Sultan Mahmud had been murdered 
with the complicity of most of the Orang Kaya in Johor. 
The main reasons given by the Johorese for the 
assassination of the ruler were his unbearable tyranny, 
his growing numbers of arbitrary murders, and his 
outrageous behaviour towards the wives of the Orang Kaya. 
His practice of forcing the wives of the Orang Kaya to 
come to him and then mistreating them horribly finally 
provoked one of the Orang Kaya to commit derhaka 
[treason]. With the assistance of thirty to forty armed 
men and the acquiescence of the other Orang Kaya, this 
person attacked Sultan Mahmud one morning when he was 
riding through the market on the shoulders of his 
servant. Sultan Mahmud offered little resistance and fell 
to the ground after being stabbed by this Orang Kaya. He 
was then descended upon by the other men who stabbed the 
sultan to death. The corpse was dragged naked to the 
front of the Bendahara's balai where the body lay exposed 
until the afternoon. After the Bendahara had been 
proclaimed ruler with the consent of the assembled 
populace, he ordered that Sultan Mahmud's naked corpse be 
draped with eight ells of linen and taken away. The body 
was then perfunctorily buried with little ceremony. 
This event is also mentioned by Captain Alexander Hamilton 
writing in 1727. (See Winstedt 1979:49-50.) Andaya (1975:3-
17,186-191) n6tes that the post-1699 indigenous texts 
substantiate tfie European reports of Sultan Mahmud's murder. 
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Indeed, the account given by my tengku informant accords 
essentially with the descriptions given in the Tuhfat al-Nafis 
and in the eighteenth-century text that Andaya (1975) calls the 
'Siak Chronicles'. 
When Tengku Ahmad told me the story, it was in the context of a 
wide-ranging conversation which covered many other topics; and he 
certainly was not referring to any text at that moment. Indeed, 
before he told me the story, he even checked with me to see if I 
had heard it already from others. If so, he said, there was not 
much point in his repeating it. I had to convince him that 
although I knew something of the story, I wanted to hear him tell 
it. So it is interesting that an oral account that was told on 
the spur of the moment should accord so well with written 
accounts of the same event in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
indigenous texts. 
48. See note 11 in Chapter One. 
49. According to this post-1699 version of the Penurunan, Sang Nila 
Utama had two sons. The older one, Raja Kecil Besar, married an 
Indian princess, while the younger one, Raja Kecil Muda, married 
a grand-daughter of Demang Lehar Daun. After Sang Nila Utama 
died, Raja Kecil Besar became the king, while Raja Kecil Muda 
became the bendahara. 
The myth continues with such events as the fall of 
Temasik/Singapore and the founding of Melaka. But in the context 
of our present discussion, the section above will suffice. Bowen 
(198~:171) points out that only in the post-1699 version of the 
Penurunan, is the first ever bendahara portrayed as the younger 
brother of the ruler: 
The Bendahara now figured as junior royalty by descent 
rather than as a pre-eminent subject by alliance, and 
thus had a textual claim to the royal daulat [sanctity]. 
The later sections of the post-1966 text also consistently imply 
that the line of bendaharas derived from Bukit Si-Guntang. (See 
ibid.:172.) Moy (1975:vol.48,p.68) notes that in the Tuhfat, the 
first bendahara is also described as the brother of the ruler: 
He was, therefore, the vital source of royal blood for 
the Bendahara lineage, ranking it second to the rulers' 
line. This is particularly significant when we recall 
that it was a Bendahara who succeeded the childless 
Mahmud II in 1699 A.D. 
SO. As Andaya (1975:190-191) has pointed out, 
The overt act of regicide in 1699 with the participation 
of the Orang Kaya meant not only the death of a ruler, 
but the demise of a set of values which had been 
maintained with regard to the sacredness of the ruler, 
the depth and extent of loyalty which should be accorded 
him, and the special nature of his position within the 
society. If the ruler were no longer 'the sacred 
lodestone' around which the community evolved and gained 
its meaning and purpose, he was then just a primus inter 
pares secure in his position only with the mutual consent 
of the society and not by some supernatural force. Thus 
the relationship was valid as long as there was a 
recognition of the benefits accruing to the parties 
involved. 
51. See note 47 above. 
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PART 1HREE 
TRANSFIGURATIONS OF TI-IE EVERYDAY PRESENI': 
KERAMAT, MELAYU, .AND ISLAM 
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From my informants' perspective, the significance of the past 
lies in its effect upon the existent present. This effect may be 
understood as a transfiguration of the present in terms of the past, 
such that a particular figure may be perceived in the ground of 
everyday existence. But such a figure is not a Ding an sich; it is a 
perception that emerges from the ground only in the eye of the 
beholder. A figure is discerned as such when one can hold it in focus 
for some length of time. It is perceived as being relatively stable 
vis-a-vis the ground of everyday flux. Such a perception has to be 
maintained through the continual differentiation of multifarious 
elements into figure and ground. But a figure remains nevertheless a 
perception in the eye of the beholder, nebulously discernible and 
easily lost from sight. The perceived stability of a particular 
figure depends on the continuation of a particular mode of 
differentiation, such that the multifarious elements in one's total 
view can all be sorted out in the same way. The rear-view image of a 
constant and unchanging past can be used as a key to such a mode of 
differentiation. The result is the transfiguration of the existent 
present in at least three important aspects -- place, person, and what 
I shall term 'a social phantasy system'. 
In Chapter Six, I will try to show how time is translated into 
place through the gestalt of sacred graves where the there-and-then 
and the here-and-now are fused. Because each such grave is identified 
with a particular persona who had existed in the past, either 
historically or mythically, the events associated with that particular 
persona are thereby localised in that grave. Such graves are known as 
keramat 'blessed'. To make a ritual visit to a keramat grave is to 
move through time, as it were, to a spatially accessible past. 
If a keramat site may be regarded as a terresterial realisation 
of the past-in-the-present, then the non-keramat space in which one 
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dwells may be regarded as the present in an unchanging past, localised 
in an unchanging terra firma. This is expressed particularly in the 
toponymic identification of people, whereby each person is identified 
as belonging to a particular place, and different places are 
associated with different segments of the past. This will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven, where I shall be concerned with my 
informants' concepts of 'indigeny' and 'purity' as ways of identifying 
and evaluating people in Self-Other interaction. The concept of 
'indigeny' refers to the connection of people to place, primarily 
through descent, and secondarily through birth. If one has no such 
connection to any place outside Riau, then one may be considered 
Melayu asli 'Melayu by origin'. If, however, one's origins from 
places outside Riau are known and remembered, then one is considered 
dagang 'foreign'. This usage of the concept of 'indigeny' is found 
particularly among my lower-ranking informants. 
My higher-ranking informants use instead the concept of 'purity', 
by which is meant the fulfilment of three criteria -- Islam, 
prescribed custom, and standard speech. Thus one may be considered 
Melayu murni 'pure Melayu' if one can demonstrate that one is Muslim, 
polite, and well-spoken. Those who fail to meet such criteria are 
regarded as being in varying degrees of 'impurity'. 
The concepts of 'indigeny' and 'purity' thus stabilise the 
perceptual and interactional flux of Self and Other in two different 
ways: People are identified as 'indigenous' or 'foreign' to Riau, and 
thereby evaluated as close or distant in Self-Other interaction. 
Alternatively, people are identified as 'pure' or 'impure' in their 
being, and thereby evaluated as desirable or undesirable in Self-Other 
interaction. 
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In Chapter Eight, I will discuss two opposite modes of 
orientation -- centripetalism and centrifugalism, as expressed in 
Self-Other relations. In the centripetal mode of orientation, one's 
focus of attention shifts away from one's immediate local context to a 
supralocal centre located at a distance. From the perspective of 
those at the supralocal centre -- in this case, Penyengat -- people 
who are orientated away from the centre are centrifugal. 
Centripetalism leads to the construction of a social phantasy system 
shared by a supralocal imagined community. Within the local 
community, however, the interactional basis of this social phantasy 
system is the bond of siblingship. Others may also be drawn to 
participate in the imagined community; new members may be recruited 
through adoption. Such recruitment is a desideratum from the 
perspective of the centre, for centripetalism is seen as good and 
centrifugalism as evil. 
In Chapter Nine, I will show how centripetalism and 
centrifugalism are expressed through Islamisation and witchcraft 
accusations. Islamisation in Riau occurs in at least two distinct 
contexts -- the local umat 'congregation', and the worldwide umat. 
Penyengat may be perceived as the religious centre of the local 
context; it is thus the supposed centre of religious centripetalism. 
Witchcraft accusations are directed against those who are perceived as 
being centrifugal -- that is, those who do not acknowledge the 
centrality of Penyengat. Such accusations are plausible because they 
are shared. The communality of such perceptions may be understood as 
collusion. This can lead to a close bonding of insiders and, 
conversely, a paranoid anxiety towards certain outsiders who are 
regarded as apostates. 
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But there is a centripetal attraction in converting to Islam. 
This attraction derives from the civilising process, which is an 
historical pattern engulfing the entire world. Consequently, 
notwithstanding the witchcraft accusations of the Penyengat people 
towards certain people who are perceived as centrifugal, Islamisation 
is occurring even in the periphery. I will end this study by 
discussing Islamisation in Galang to illustrate how the shift in 
orientation from the local to the supralocal may be understood in 
terms of the civilising process. 
CHAPTER SIX 
KERAMAT GRAVES: THE TEMPORAL PAST IN THE SPATIAL PRESENT 
6.1 The Keramat Gestalt 
6.2 Royal Graves 
6.3 The Graves of the Tuan Said 
6.4 Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini 
6.5. Keramat 03.tuk Bujuk 
6.6 Place and Persona 
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6.1 The Keramat Gestalt 
The temporal past is spatially realised and thus rendered 
existent in the present. From this perspective, the different places 
in Riau may be regarded as the spatial realisations of different times 
and events. As mentioned in Chapter One, even my informants in 
Pekanbaru associated Melayu with tempat sejarah 'historical places' 
that is, sites of 'palace ruins' (bekas istana) and 'royal graves' 
(makam raja-raja). It is the latter that is of particular 
significance to my informants in island Riau. These graves are known 
as keramat. As Endicott (1970:93-94) has pointed out for keramat 
graves in general, the person in such a grave is considered not really 
dead. I suggest that the idea of this living death is indeed the very 
means whereby the temporal past can be spatially realised in the 
existent present. The keramat grave may thus be understood as a 
1 
spatial symbolisation of the past-in-the-present, of death-in-life. 
In her study of keramat graves in Singapore, Siddique (1979:7-8) 
says that these graves are considered to have particular power because 
they contain the bodies of certain individuals who are regarded as 
having been specially blessed by Allah, when they were alive. These 
'special blessings' (berkat) are supposed to remain with their bodies 
when they die; so their graves become powerful sites from which people 
can obtain blessings. 
2 
My informants explained berkat to me as mediation, intercession. 
In the words of a Pangkil informant, the linkage between berkat and 
keramat is as follows: 
If we ask people to help us attain our wishes, and if our 
wishes are thereby realised, that is berkat. Berkat comes 
from God via people. So we express our wishes at keramat 
graves, because those who are keramat are nearer to God. 
3 
(My translation). 
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From my informants' perspective, keramat graves are considered as 
an Islamic phenomenon to be understood in religious terms. Thus 
Penyengat, the most Islamic of the communities I studied, has the 
highest incidence of keramat graves. In his analysis of the keramat 
phenomenon in the Malay Peninsula, Endicott (1970) explains it in 
terms of a non-Islamic animism. In the case of Riau, however, such an 
explanation seems to be more applicable to puaka 'habitat of a local 
spirit', rather than to keramat. As we shall see below, keramat and 
puaka are not unconnected phenomena. However, for the moment, we 
shall consider keramat primarily in Islamic terms. In her analysis of 
keramat graves in Singapore, Siddique (1979) regards such graves as 
derived from Islamic folk-religion, which are therefore viewed 
negatively from the perspective of orthodox Islam. In the context of 
Riau, however, I shall follow my informants in viewing keramat graves 
as derived from canonical Islam. 
Such a perception seems to be canonically quite justifiable. 
According to Dusuki (1976:168) the word keramat denotes 
extraordinary things which happen to Allah's servant who are 
faithful to him and obedient to His commandments. Such 
people are also able to perform extraordinary deeds. 
Nevertheless such people cannot claim to be God, His 
Prophet, or God's representative. 
(My translation from Malay). 
Wehr (1976:822) translates the original Arabic word karama thus: 
Nobility; high-mindedness, noble-heartedness; generosity, 
magnanimity; liberality, munificence; honour, dignity; 
respect, esteem, standing, prestige; mark of honour, token 
of esteem, favour; ••• miracle (worked by a saint) •••. 
We shall see below how the basic meaning of 'generosity' has been 
expanded to denote 'miracle'. 
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In my informants' usage, keramat evidently refers to a process 
with three phases to which the word berkat seems to be equally 
applicable. In the first phase, 'special blessings' (berkat) are 
bestowed upon certain individuals by Allah. In the second phase, 
these specially blessed individuals have the 'power to mediate' 
(berkat) between ordinary people and Allah. In the third phase, 
through such intercession, the ordinary people are able to achieve the 
'attainment of their wishes' (berkat). A keramat person is thus one 
who manifests a blessed state, power to mediate between ordinary 
people and Allah, and the willingness to help the former attain their 
wishes. 
Such an interpretation is not dissimilar to Gellner's (1969:74) 
discussion of agurram and baraka among the Berbers of Morocco, where 
an agurram is 'visibly a recipient of divine blessing, baraka' and is 
4 
thus able to mediate between human beings and God. This comparison 
is not as arbitrary as it may seem at first sight. There is a common 
element -- Sufism, which has been historically important both among 
5 
the Berbers of Morocco and the Southeast Asian Muslims. Moreover, 
Penyengat itself was a well-known centre of Sufism in the nineteenth 
6 
century. Hence it is more than a coincidence that the Berber agurram 
and my informants' keramat should seem so similar. 
In the Sufi tradition, the word karama is used as a religious 
term to denote a favour from God. Subhan (1960:109-112) gives a 
detailed discussion of karama, as one of four types of extraordinary 
7 
events known in Sufism. Karama apparently is the manifestation of 
the 'divine power which a saint has acquired through his union with 
God' (ibid:l09). Al-Attas (1963:46-48) also explains keramat in the 
8 
context of Sufism, particularly as it was practised in Malaya. 
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However, even if the Berber agurram and my informants' keramat 
share a common historical origin in Sufism, there is nevertheless a 
striking difference between the two terms. Whereas the former denotes 
a living person, the. latter usually denotes a non-living yet existent 
persona in a grave. The application of the word keramat to a living 
person is not unknown to my informants. Such a person would be known 
as a keramat hidup 'living keramat'. Without the qualifying adjective 
hidup 'living', the unmarked term keramat invariably refers to a 
grave. 
However, unlike the Berber situation as reported by Gellner, my 
informants evidently do not regard any living person at the present 
time as keramat. Van Papendracht (1924:22) notes that Raja Haji who 
died in 1784 fighting the Dutch in Melaka, had been regarded as a 
keramat hidup even in his own lifetime. My raja informants also say 
that he was indeed so regarded when he was alive. However, the last 
keramat hidup known to them is one Raja Tua, also called Engku Yod, 
who had lived in Penyengat. He was the last sultan's father's 
9 
brother. He gave charms to people for warding off evil. 
The absence of any keramat hidup in Riau at the present time is 
interesting. The implication is that the manifestation of berkat was 
a phenomenon pertaining specifically to the past, and therefore can 
exist in the present only as the past-in-the-present. Such an 
implication seems to be borne out by the case of the tuan said. In 
Chapter Five, I stated that in the rear-view image of the past, the 
tuan said served as political legitirnators on the basis of the berkat 
they had inherited as the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. At the 
present time, however, although there are still living people who bear 
the titles said (for males) and syarifah (for females), none of them 
seems to be regarded, either by themselves or by others, as the 
possessor of berkat and hence a keramat hidup. Nevertheless, there 
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are many keramat graves in Riau which contain tuan said with berkat. 
Indeed the only tuan said who are considered keramat are those in 
graves. 
What is even more noteworthy in the Riau case is that keramat is 
a quality that pertains not only to the descendants of the Prophet 
Muhamad, but also to individuals who had belonged to the top three 
derajat of the hierarchy. Apart from the tuan said, these include the 
rajas, the tengkus, and the encik datuk. Indeed some of my commoner 
informants said quite explicitly: 
Kalau orang bangsawan, semua kuburnya boleh jadi keramat. 
(In the case of the aristocrats, all their graves can become 
keramat.) 
This suggests that keramat is a quality that is regarded as 
pertaining not only to certain individuals, but also to a certain 
class of individuals -- that is, those who had occupied dominant 
positions in the hierarchical structure of the sultanate. This does 
not mean, however, that the grave of every individual in that class is 
keramat. So while the graves of all individuals in that class may 
have the potentiality of becoming keramat, only a few have that 
potentiality realised. It is therefore important to understand which 
particular individuals have been (to coin a word) 'keramatised', and 
why so. 
Before we consider specific keramat graves, however, let us first 
discuss the keramat gestalt in general. To begin with, how does one 
tell between a keramat grave and an ordinary one? Although a few 
keramat graves are particularly long and are hence known as keramat 
10 
panjang 'long keramat', most are of the same length as ordinary 
graves. Like ordinary graves, keramat graves are placed in the proper 
Islamic orientation -- that is, in such a way that the corpse which is 
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laid on its side, can face the kiblah -- that is, the direction in 
which Mecca lies. (See Wilkinson 1959:597.) Since Mecca is to the 
west of Riau, this means that all Muslim graves in Riau are aligned 
lengthwise along a north-south axis, so that the corpse laid on its 
side faces west. 
An Islamic grave is marked by either one or two nengsan 
11 
'gravestones'. If only one is used, this is placed at the head of 
the corpse. The gravestones are referred to as kepala 'head' and kaki 
'foot', according to their respective location in relation to the 
corpse. Although keramat graves may sometimes have big elaborate 
gravestones, this is not always the case. Nor is it the case that all 
graves with big elaborate gravestones are thereby keramat. 
What marks a keramat grave from an ordinary one is, quite simply, 
12 
labelling: a keramat grave is that which people regard as keramat. 
Such labelling is primarily an artefact of discourse which is not 
necessarily manifest in the physical structure of the grave as such. 
The fundamental difference is in the attention that people pay to a 
keramat grave, relative to an ordinary one. Sometimes, although it is 
not necessarily so, this attention is made manifest in elaborate 
structures built around the keramat grave. 
I stated above that my informants view keramat graves in Islamic 
terms. This is quite evident in their ritual behaviour at the sites 
of such graves. They say that they berniat or bernazar at keramat 
graves. The expression of this niat 'wish' or~ 'vow' is 
expressed through the chanting of certain verses of the Quran and 
13 
certain set prayers. A selection of these may be chanted in a 
sequence; for example, the surah yassin, the doa arwah, and the 
14 
tahlil form a sequence frequently used by my informants. 
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But an individual's niat or~ is not articulated in the words 
of these set verses and prayers. One is supposed merely to think of 
one's wish or vow while chanting. So it remains an unspoken thought 
that one merely harbours but does not articulate. The terms berniat 
and bernazar may thus be interpreted semantically as middle-voice 
inflections meaning 'to be wishful', rather than 'to make a wish', and 
15 
'to have a vow' rather than 'to make a vow'. 
This form of ritual behaviour applies in particular to my 
Penyengat informants. But since the keramat gestalt is associated 
most with Penyengat, the implication is that in Riau this is generally 
considered the proper mode of ritual conduct at grave-sites. A 
comparison with ritual behaviour at keramat graves elsewhere will 
illustrate just how Islamic is the Penyengat mode of ritual conduct. 
Mohamad Nahar Ros (1985:39-45) gives a detailed description of what he 
terms 'keramat worship' in Singapore: For example, it includes making 
such offerings as bunches of bananas, turmeric rice, eggs dyed in red, 
and limes, as well as releasing or symbolically slaughtering animals, 
and burning incense. All these non-Islamic elements are absent in the 
Penyengat mode of ritual conduct. 
Instead there is only the chanting of certain Quranic verses and 
set prayers, which are not just arbitrarily chosen but are 
specifically those that had been recommended by the Prophet and later 
religious leaders for recitation at grave-sites. In my informants' 
discourse on keramat, they explicitly locate the phenomenon in the 
context of ziarah 'the visiting of graves', which is a sunnah 
16 
'recommendation' of the Prophet himself. 
However, this sunnah is not based on concepts of keramat and 
berkat. In canonical Islam, the purpose of visiting a grave and 
chanting verses and prayers at its site is not for the attainment of 
one's own niat or ~· On the contrary, it is for the purpose of 
making supplications to Allah on behalf of the dead and thereby 
17 
earning Allah's forgiveness for one's own sins. So ziarah 'the 
visiting of graves' is a perfectly proper act in canonical Islam in 
general, and is not just peculiar to Sufism alone. 
Significantly, making supplications to Allah on behalf of the 
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deceased is referred to in canonical Islam as niya (in Arabic) or niat 
18 (in Malay). Such a niya or niat to benefit the dead is a purely 
subjective intention that is borne in the mind of the doer. It does 
not change the objective actions of the deed as such: the very same 
verses and prayers are chanted in the very same way, whether they are 
intended for oneself or for the benefit of the dead. The difference 
lies only in intention. 
At this stage of our discussion, we can see why my Penyengat 
informants locate the keramat gestalt in the context of Islam. All 
the essential canonical elements are there: the recommendation to 
visit graves, the recommendation of certain verses and prayers to be 
chanted at the graves, the recommendation to make supplications on 
behalf of the dead, and the recommendation to make such supplications 
through 'intention' (niat). To shift from the ziarah recommended in 
canonical Islam to the berniat in the keramat gestalt requires only a 
very subtle adjustment in niat, from an intention on behalf of the 
dead to a wish for oneself. Such a shift is essentially subjective; 
19 
the objective behaviour need not change at all. 
My informants visit graves for both purposes. On the one hand, 
they perform ziarah in the sense of visiting the graves of their near 
kin in order to make supplications on behalf of the dead. And on the 
other hand, they also berniat in the sense of visiting the graves that 
are regarded as keramat in order to express their own wishes. 
331 
Sometimes, both purposes can even be combined, especially if the grave 
of one's kin is considered keramat. As we shall see below, this is 
often the case for my raja and tengku informants. 
But the point is: from the observation of ritual behaviour alone, 
it is not possible for an outsider to tell whether the visitor at a 
grave is doing ziarah in the canonical sense or berniat in the keramat 
sense. Such a differentiation can be discerned only through 
discourse, and then only if the person concerned is willing to reveal 
her/his intention. Some of my informants articulate the difference in 
the following way: In the case of ziarah, they 'chant prayers to 
bestow mercy so that the dead would feel comfortable' (baca doa 
memberi rahmat, untuk mayat merasa sedap). But in the case of berniat 
at a keramat grave, my informants say that although they also say the 
same prayers, it is the persona within the grave who transmits their 
prayers to Allah: yang berkat mendoa untuk kita 'those who are berkat 
pray for us'. It is through such intercession that their 'wishes can 
be fulfilled' (niat dapat sampai). 
Apart from the chanting of the set verses and prayers, my 
informants carry out two other ritual actions at the sites of graves, 
both keramat and non-keramat graves. One involves pouring water on 
the grave, and the other involves wrapping cloth on either or both of 
the gravestones. (See Plate 5.) These two ritual actions are not 
specified in canonical Islam, but are evidently only customary 
practice. My informants explain the water as 'mercy for the dead' 
(rahmat untuk mayat), and the cloth as a 'sign of our intention' 
(tanda niat kita). 
The practice of pouring water seems to be derived from the idea 
of the grave being a hot place. Mariam Mohamad Ali (personal 
communication) told me that this is an idea common even in Singapore 
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Plate 5. Raja Jantan and Raja Haji Abdul Rahim are wrapping a piece 
of white cloth around the 'head' gravestone of Raja Ali Haji, the 
author of the Tuhfat al- Nafis. The two of them are not, however, 
his direct descendants, and are instead his brothers' descendants . 
(See Genealogical Charts 3 and 5.) But Raja Ali Haji's grave is not 
generally regarded as keramat, so few people berniat there. The ni.at 
that was being signified by the cloth pertained to me, because of the 
length of time! had taken over the thesis. My informants felt that 
having been a writer himself, Raja Ali Haji would understand , So 
they recited a doa 'prayer' and wrapped the cloth on my behalf. 
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and Malaysia, and that there is at least one Malay movie which 
portrays a corpse drinking the water that was being poured on its 
grave. She also suggests that the cloth wrapped around the gravestone 
of a non-keramat grave is often interpreted by Muslims in Malaysia and 
Singapore as indicative of the filial piety of the children of the 
deceased, because it is a sign that the grave is visited and that the 
deceased is prayed for by the anak yang saleh 'pious children'. 
However, since one can have a niat for the benefit of either the 
deceased or oneself, what niat that cloth is supposed to represent, is 
a matter between God, oneself, and the persona in the grave. 
My raja informants on Penyengat visit their family graves 
regularly. The following is my description of one such ziarah. Raja 
J, his daughters, and their children set out at subuh 'dawn', about 5 
a.m., arriving at their family graves at about 6 a.m. On arrival the 
first thing that Raja J did was to water the graves; he did this by 
pouring some water he had brought for this purpose on the foot of each 
gravestone. The whole party then sat beside the grave of Raja J's 
wife. (See Plate 6.) 
There are some thirteen graves, laid out in a row, all belonging 
to various deceased members of the family. All of them have the 
'head' gravestone located farther north than the 'foot' gravestone. 
The 'head' gravestone is also the one that is likely to be covered 
with white cloth. 
Raja J passed two prayer booklets to his daughters, retaining 
another one himself. The three of them started declaiming the prayer 
in the booklets. This was the surah yassin. The children sat on the 
low cement wall surrounding the graves; they watched the adults and 
chatted quietly among themselves. The three adults finished reciting 
the prayer. One of the two women, Raja D, left her prayer booklet at 
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the grave of her mother's brother's. (She later told me that her 
mother's brother had looked after her when she was a baby; so this 
gesture of leaving the booklet at his grave was to give comfort to 
him.) Raja J continued with another prayer, recited from memory 
namely, the doa arwah. This ended with the tahlil, which is the 
repeated declamation that there is no God but God. His two daughters 
join in the tahlil. When they ended, they held their hands out, palms 
up, in supplication to God. The children did this as well. The 
booklets were then collected, including the one left by Raja D at the 
grave of her mother's brother. 
The whole party left, stopping on the way home to pick some jambu 
air 'Eugenia jambos' from a tree. (See Plate 7.) For this particular 
family, the ziarah is a weekly event, but members who attend may 
differ from week to week; menstruating women, for example, do not come 
because menstruation is considered ritually polluting in Islam. 
During the ziarah, both kinds of niat can be combined: that is, 
one can say the prayers with a niat that they would benefit the dead, 
as well as with a niat concerning one's personal welfare. For 
example, Raja D mentioned above was worried that she might be pregnant 
again, because her menstrual period was late. So as she said her 
prayers, she had the niat that her menstrual period would come soon. 
She also 'made a vow' (bernazar) that if her niat were to be 
fulfilled, she would cover the gravestones with cloth. What this 
meant was that she would return to say some more prayers for the 
benefit of the dead. When her menstrual period did come eventually, 
she visited the graves again to pray, after which she wrapped cloth 
around the gravestones, both as an indication that her own niat had 
been realised and as a sign that prayers had been chanted on behalf of 
the deceased. 
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Plates 6 and 7 . These 
two pictures show a 
contrast in mood: the 
solemnity experienced 
at the recitation of 
prayers for the dead, 
gives way to the care-
free relaxation of 
trying to shake down 
some fruit from a tree. 
There is thus an easy 
modulation from the 
'key of death' to the 
'key of life'. 
Plate 7 
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This combination of a dual niat expressed at family graves is 
quite common on Penyengat. For example, another informant wanted to 
visit Batam. Being fearful of the journey, she visited her son's 
grave and said some prayers there, while harbouring the niat that she 
would be able to go and come back safely. She also 'made a vow' that 
on her return, she would visit her son's grave to pray for him and to 
cover his gravestone with cloth. This she duly did. 
In both these cases, the gravestones were covered as a kind of 
repayment for the realisation of one's personal niat. This may perhaps 
be understood in terms of an exchange of niat for niat. The 
fulfilment of a niat for the benefit of oneself is repaid by a niat 
for the benefit for the deceased. In such cases, covering the 
gravestone with cloth after the fulfilment of one's personal niat, may 
be understood as symbolising this exchange of niat for niat. 
However, this manner of repayment is not the same for all graves. 
In other cases, the gravestone is covered during the first visit while 
expressing one's personal niat. Whether one covers the gravestone 
before or after the fulfilment of one's niat seems to depend on the 
degree of trust one has in the capacity and willingness of the 
deceased to intercede with Allah on one's behalf. Significantly, in 
the two cases cited above, the graves in question were not considered 
very keramat, being graves of the informants' own kin. Indeed it is 
even questionable whether other, unrelated, people would have 
considered these graves keramat at all. 
In the cases of graves that are indeed considered keramat by 
everybody, the practice is to wrap the cloth during the first visit 
when one's niat is being expressed. In such cases, when one's niat is 
realised, repayment does not take the form of niat for niat, as 
described above -- that is, by returning to the grave to pray on 
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behalf of the deceased. Instead, one gives a feast at the mosque; 
this is referred to by my informants as a selamatan 'a religious meal' 
religious meal' or as a kenduri doa selamat 'feast for chanting the 
prayer of safekeeping'. 
To give a specific example of a selamatan, a bank employee in 
Tanjungpinang visited and prayed at a keramat grave on Penyengat, with 
a personal niat of his own. His niat was realised. So he presented a 
goat and some money to the Penyengat mosque, asking that a selamatan 
be prepared for the people praying there. The mosque officials duly 
made preparations, hiring some people in the village to cook the meal, 
the menu consisting of sop kambing 'mutton soup' and bread. On the 
20 
chosen evening, after the maghrib prayers , the worshippers at the 
mosque left the prayer hall and sat themselves in the two 'pavilions' 
(balai) outside. The men sat in one pavilion, while the children, 
both male and female, sat in the other. No adult woman was seated in 
the pavilions, although some women were ladling out the food in the 
kitchen of the mosque. One of the men read a statement that the donor 
of the feast was giving sedekah 'alms' (that is, the food) to the 
faithful, as an expression of thanks to God. The imam 'religious 
leader' started chanting the doa selamat, joined by the other men. 
After the prayer, they ate the mutton soup and bread. The women ate 
in the kitchen. (See Plates 8 and 9.) 
This form of repaying a niat by donating alms contrasts 
significantly with the other form of repaying niat for niat. 
Apparently, the reason one does not return to a keramat grave to pray 
on behalf of the deceased is because the persona in such a grave does 
not need one's prayers. In the case of non-keramat graves, it is the 
living who pray for the dead. In the case of keramat graves, however, 
it is the persona with berkat within the grave who transmits the 
prayers of the living to God. So in the latter case, the expression 
Plate 8 
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Plates 8 and 9. These 
two pictures show 
another contrast in mood: 
while the men, dressed 
in their ritual best, 
are sitting stiffly, 
waiting for their food, 
the women in the kitchen, 
who are dressed casually, 
are ladling out the food 
in a relaxed manner. 
The man in the background 
is waiting to serve the 
food to the men outside, 
as the women are not 
supposed to interact with 
men in the formal zone of 
the mosque. 
Plate 9 
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of one's gratitude takes the form of giving charity to others. The 
help of the keramat persona is gratis. 
In this context, the literal meaning of the Arabic word karama is 
significant. As mentioned above, it denotes such qualities as high-
mindedness, generosity, and munificence. So there seems to be an 
implication that these are the qualities that one would expect from a 
keramat persona. Interestingly, these are the very qualities that 
Gellner (1969:74) says that the Berber agurram is supposed to have: 
'an agurram ••• is uncalculatingly generous and hospitable.' Apparently 
like living people, the personae in graves differ in their generosity. 
In this regard, it is interesting that a derived form of the Arabic 
root-word karama has the meaning of 'competing with one another in 
being generous' (my translation from Mahmud Yunus 1972:372). This 
implies that the personae in the graves that are considered keramat by 
all, are those who have won this 'competition in generosity', so to 
speak, and are therefore unquestionably generous and hospitable. 
Therefore the appropriate way to express one's gratitude to such 
personae is to imitate them by giving alms to others. 
My usage of the phrase 'the keramat gestalt' is thus intended 
quite literally in the sense of Gestalt psychology -- that is, as the 
subjective perception of an object embedded in a larger field. In 
other words, one sees something not simply because it is there; but 
rather, the thing is there because one sees it as a figure emergent 
from the ground. Furthermore, the clarity of the figure is affected 
by the number of people who discern it. As Gellner (1969:74) has 
suggested in the case of the Berbers, the greater the number of people 
who share their perception of an agurram, the more definitely is that 
person one. Similarly, in my informants' case, the greater the number 
of people who consider a certain grave keramat, the more definitely is 
that a keramat grave. 
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Given that certain graves are perceived as more keramat than 
others, the question remains: how is it that the non-living personae 
within can neverthless help the living? As mentioned above, the 
person in a keramat grave is considered not really dead. So what is 
the nature of this living death? 
I mentioned above that there are a few especially long keramat 
graves known as keramat panjang. Some of my informants interpret this 
length as an indication that the persona within the grave is still 
existent and growing. Stories about other keramat graves also 
describe aspects of this living death within the grave. For example, 
with regards to a keramat grave on Pangkil, my informants say that the 
tuan said in that grave goes to Mecca to pray on Friday. So it is 
futile to berniat there on Friday because the grave would be vacant. 
Another example would be the grave of the tuan said who is said to 
have died at the hands of the Galang pirates, and whose grave is 
supposedly located on Pulau Penyabung. As I have mentioned in Chapter 
Five, it is difficult to find this grave; my informants say that this 
is because the grave manifests itself on different parts of the 
island. This supposed movement of the grave is imputed to the tuan 
said himself, who is thereby still existent. In the case of the 
keramat graves of Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Marewah and Sultan Sulaiman, 
these personae are said to be able to leave their graves and walk 
around. Furthermore, the sound of merry-making can sometimes be heard 
as they and their followers gather together for a feast. 
At first sight, it may seem that this idea of an existence in 
death is not quite Islamic. However, there is in canonical Islam an 
alam barzakh, which is the world intermediate in time and space, 
between alam fana, the finite this-world, and alam baga, the infinite 
other-world. When one dies, one leaves alam fana, but alam bafa will 
2 
not come into existence until hari kiamat 'resurrection day'. For 
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example, Al-Ghazali, the twelfth-century Sufi theologian, made quite 
categorical statements about this intermediate alam barzakh. (See Al-
Ghazali 1973:1065.) These words barzakh, fana, and baqa, have indeed 
become part of the Malay language and can be found in any standard 
Malay dictionary. (See, for example, Wilkinson 1959.) 
In canonical Islam the experience of existence in death in this 
intermediate world is known as siksa kubur 'the tribulations of the 
grave'. These, however, do not affect everyone equally. The degree 
of suffering depends on the moral worth of the person concerned. 
While the grave is purgatory for evil-doers, for the good it is a 
cradle from which they can even smell the fragrances of heaven. So 
for the good, the grave is not a torture-chamber, but a bedroom where 
22 
they can sleep and from which they can arise. There is, moreover, a 
tradition in Sufism that states: 
The saints of God die not, but merely depart from one 
habitation to another. 
(Subhan 1960:107). 
Therefore to regard a grave as keramat is indeed to give a moral 
evaluation to the persona within that grave. The implication is that 
these keramat personae can grow in their graves, leave their graves, 
walk around, have feasts, go to Mecca to pray, even move their graves 
about, precisely because they are good and saintly people who are 
blessed by Allah and who are thereby not shackled by their graves. So 
another manifestation of berkat seems to be freedom from the 
'tribulations of the grave'. One informant said explicitly: 
Keramat people die from the world but are still alive. 
However, we do not know where they are. They grave is one 
of their sites of habitation. Maybe there are houses below, 
but we do not know. 
23 (My translation). 
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So a keramat grave contains a persona who is, paradoxically, free 
of that grave. The degree to which that grave is considered keramat 
depends on the number of people who regard that persona as berkat. A 
grave that is definitely keramat is thus one at which many people 
berniat, not just the kin of the deceased. As a result of the number 
of visitors, its gravestones tend to be thickly wrapped in many layers 
of cloth, each being the sign of an individual's niat. While white 
cloth is generally used, yellow cloth may be used for royal graves, 
yellow being the traditional colour of royalty. 
Apart from having cloth wrapped around the gravestones, a keramat 
grave may also have a pavilion erected over it. In that case, it 
would no longer be referred to simply as kubur 'grave', but as ~, 
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an Arabic word meaning 'abode'. (See Wilkinson 1959:727.) This 
transformation of kubur into makam further implies that the persona 
within is free of siksa kubur, and dwells instead in a makam. I would 
say that while not all keramat graves are makam, all makams are 
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keramat. My Penyengat informants said that these makams were 
formerly so important that some people even gathered there for their 
Friday prayers. Apparently, this practice was put to a stop by the 
eighth yamtuan muda, Raja Ali, who reigned from 1844-1857, because he 
considered it un-Islamic. However, the pavilions built around these 
graves are still there and kept in constant good repair. In the rest 
of this chapter, I shall discuss some of the most publicly recognised 
keramat graves in Riau. 
6.2 Royal Graves 
As mentioned above, although my informants regard all royal 
graves as having the potentiality to become keramat, they do not 
actually treat all of them as keramat. Even among royal graves, some 
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are more keramat than others. In this section, we shall examine the 
reasons why. 
Perhaps the most important of all keramat graves in Riau, both 
royal and non-royal, is Makam Tuan Puteri Raja Hamidah 'Abode of the 
Master Princess Raja Hamidah'. This grave is evidently regarded as 
keramat not only by the Riau inhabitants, but even by other 
Indonesians from elsewhere. I was myself told of this grave almost 
immediately after my arrival by, of all people, the Immigration 
officer who stamped my research visa. It was almost as if it was part 
of his duty to advise me to minta izin 'ask permission' at her grave 
if I wanted to stay and do work in Riau. This Immigration officer was 
himself Javanese. 
He told me that it was the custom for any Indonesian official 
coming to take up duties at Tanjungpinang, the district capital, to 
minta izin first at the grave of the tuan daerah 'master of the area' 
-- namely, Tuan Puteri Raja Hamidah. He too did this when he first 
arrived. He even used Islam to justify the custom, saying orang Islam 
harus peFcaya kepada hal-hal yang ghaib 'Muslims must believe in 
occult matters'. He also said that although there is but one God, 
there are also hantu yang punya daerah-daerah 'spirits who own areas'. 
He told me about a Dutch couple who had recently died on Penyengat 
island, because they went and stayed there without first asking the 
permission of the tuan daerah. (I subsequently found out that there 
had indeed been a Dutch couple who had died on Penyengat shortly 
before I arrived.) The Immigration office even warned me against 
staying on Penyengat if I was not prepared to ask for the permission 
of the tuan daerah. 
So almost immediately after my arrival in Riau, I was told that I 
had to fit into my new social context through the authorisation of 
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Tuan Puteri Raja Hamidah. What is particularly interesting is that it 
was another newcomer, a Javanese Immigration officer working for the 
Indonesian Government, who told me this. So there we were, two 
outsiders to Riau society, talking about how to fit into our new 
social context through the authorisation of a keramat grave which I 
had not even seen at that time! 
Such a perception of Raja Hamidah is of course very significant 
in the context of our discussion in Chapter Four. As I have shown in 
that chapter, my informants say that Penyengat was given to Raja 
Hamidah as her mas kawin. I also stated that they still regard 
Penyengat as her personal property. I then raised the question how a 
dead person can still own an island. As we can see now, this is made 
possible by means of the keramat gestalt. So although Raja Hamidah is 
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known to have died long ago (in 1844, according to the Tuhfat), she 
is regarded as still existent though not alive in an everyday sense. 
It is thus as a persona in a keramat grave that she still owns 
Penyengat and is hence the tuan daerah of Riau. (See Plates 10 and 
11.) 
What is particularly significant is that such a perception has 
spread beyond the Penyengat rajas even to outsiders such as Indonesian 
bureaucrats from elsewhere. Although these outsiders may not know the 
reason why Raja Hamidah is the tuan daerah, they nevertheless consider 
her so, to the extent that they would go to minta izin 'ask for 
permission' at her grave. The implication is that even an Indonesian 
bureaucrat cannot administer the district without her authorisation. 
Apparently, other outsiders (like me, for example) are also supposed 
to be so authorised if they wish to work in the area. 
The act of asking for Raja Hamidah's permission takes the same 
ritual form as is performed at other graves. As I have described 
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Plate 10 
Plate 11 
Plate 10 and 11. According to my informants, Makam Engku Puteri 'Tomb 
of The Royal Daughter' used to have a tiled roof like that of a Chinese 
temple, because Chinese craftsmen were hired to build it. It has since 
fallen into disrepair and is now replaced by zinc. The plaque on 
Engku Puteri ' s grave inside the tomb states: 
Raja Hamidah (Engku Puteri) 
Died 12.7 . 1844 
Trustee of the Royal Regalia. 
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above, this involves the recitation of certain Quranic verses and set 
prayers. The request for permission is not articulated as such; it is 
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merely a niat that one harbours silently while praying aloud. As a 
sign of this niat, one usually ties a piece of cloth on one of the 
gravestones. Since this kind of niat is for the relatively long term, 
one can simply assume that permission has been granted if one can stay 
and work in Riau peacefully without the occurrence of any disaster. 
Another ritual act that outsiders are supposed to perform is to 
cast one gram of gold into the sea in the area of Pulau Paku, which is 
'a reef of sand and stones with some low bushes' located half a 
nautical mile south of the eastern end of Penyengat island (Indonesia 
Pilot 1975:I,131). Significantly, Pulau Paku is a landmark easily 
sighted from Raja Haji's grave on Penyengat. And indeed, according to 
my informants, the one gram of gold is a tanda niat 'sign of a wish' 
made in the presence of the persona of Raja Haji in his keramat grave. 
Apparently, when Raja Haji was still alive, he had once said that 
misfortune would befall those who come to Riau to trade without first 
getting his approval. Since the persona of Raja Haji in his keramat 
grave is considered existent even if not alive, his declaration is 
considered still valid. 
So outsiders such as Indonesian bureaucrats and traders from 
elsewhere perform this ritual act so that they would be able to take 
away with them the harta-harta 'wealth, goods' that they accumulate 
for themselves in Riau. Otherwise, my informants told me, some 
disaster may happen to these possessions when their owners try to 
bring them out of Riau. For example, they may catch fire or sink into 
the sea. 
It seems to me that the one gram of gold may be interpreted as a 
capital levy on the accumulation of wealth by foreigners in Riau. The 
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persona of Raja Haji in his keramat grave may accordingly be regarded 
as a mythical 'yamtuan muda' still governing Riau. Significantly, the 
ritual action directed towards the persona of Raja Haji is supposed to 
be performed not on Penyengat island, but at sea, at a distance of 
half a nautical mile from his grave. This apparently has to do with 
the ownership of Penyengat by the persona of Raja Hamidah, his 
daughter. The island is her mas kawin and is hence her personal 
property. 
Apparently, the boatmen often return to the spot where the 
outsiders have cast their gold to dive down and recover the gold. But 
my raja informants said that this does not matter: niatnya yang 
penting 'it is the intention that is important'. In other words, it 
is the subjective state of the person casting the gold that counts. 
From my raja informants' perspective, the subjective state 
concomitant with the ritual focus on these two keramat graves is one 
of submission. The willingness to 'ask for permission' to stay and 
work in Riau signifies an acknowledgment of the symbolic authority of 
the personae of Raja Hamidah and Raja Haji. Sultan Mahmud's bestowal 
of Riau upon Raja Hamidah and her siblings, 'the children of the late 
Raja Haji', in 1804 is thus regarded as still valid. (See Raja Ali 
Haji 1982:212.) By implication, the present-day descendants of Raja 
Haji are still the 'owners' of Riau. Indeed, many of my raja 
informants on Penyengat trace their ancestry to Raja Haji. 
As shown in Genealogical Chart 1, Raja Haji was born of a 
marriage alliance established between Opu Daeng Cellak, representing 
the Bugis faction, and Tengku Mandak, Sultan Sulaiman's sister. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the very name 'Riau' is said to be derived 
from the word riuh 'festive', which was supposedly the adjective used 
to describe their wedding. Raja Haji's descendants are thus also Opu 
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Daeng Cellak's descendants. Although my raja informants are indeed 
proud of being the latter's descendants, we see a marked difference in 
the attention paid to the graves of these two ancestors. The ritual 
attention paid to Raja Haji's grave seems to be in inverse proportion 
to the ritual neglect of Opu Daeng Cellak's grave. This is quite 
understandable. From my informants' perspective, the persona of Opu 
Daeng Celak is evidently perceived as pertaining to the pre-1804 
context, before Penyengat and Riau were given to the keturunan raja, 
whereas the persona of Raja Haji is evidently perceived as pertaining 
to the post-1804 context, after their ownership of Penyengat and Riau 
had been contractualised through Raja Hamidah's mas kawin. 
So if my raja informants wish to claim present 'ownership' of 
Riau, it would indeed make more sense for them to focus on the post-
1804 context, rather than on the pre-1804 context. The ritual complex 
focussed on the personae of Raja Hamidah and her father Raja Haji may 
thus be understood as a symbolisation of this claim. To the extent 
that outsiders such as Indonesian officials and traders from elsewhere 
are willing to accept the persona of Raja Hamidah as tuan daerah, and 
the persona of Raja Haji as 'yamtuan muda', to that extent at least 
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are my raja informants taken seriously. 
However, this does not mean that my informants are trying to. 
forget Opu Daeng Cellak altogether. On the contrary, as I have 
mentioned above, those who can claim to be his descendants are very 
proud of such a descent. They still tell stories about his charisma 
and prowess. But it appears that he figures more as a sumber 'source' 
that was important in the past, rather than as a keramat that is still 
existent in the present. 
This gives us a clue as to why even among royal graves, some are 
more keramat than others. It seems to be the case that keramat graves 
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belong to those individuals who played pivotal roles in the making of 
the present. That is to say, these are the people without whom the 
present would not be what it is perceived to be. So without Raja 
Hamidah and her mas kawin, Penyengat -- and hence Riau -- would not 
belong to the keturunan raja. And without Yamtuan Muda Raja Haji, 
there would not have been Raja Hamidah and all his other descendants 
to whom Riau is supposed to belong. 
Significantly, Raja Haji was neither the first nor the last of 
the yamtuan mudas. Indeed, he was not even alive at the time 
Penyengat was given to Raja Hamidah, having died in Melaka in 1784 
fighting the Dutch. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:368.) It was not 
even his son who succeeded him as yamtuan muda, but his brother's 
son's son, Raja Ali. It was only after 1804, after Raja Hamidah 
became the owner of Penyengat, that all the subsequent yamtuan mudas 
of Riau were drawn from Raja Haji's keturunan. (See Genealogical 
Chart 1.) As I have pointed out in Chapter Four, Raja Haji may thus 
be regarded as the node of a divergent keturunan branching off from 
the main line. Furthermore, this came about not through his own 
efforts but through posthumous recognition by the sultan. 
As noted above, Raja Haji had died in Melaka before Penyengat was 
given to his daughter Raja Hamidah. So how is it that his grave is 
located on Penyengat? According to the Tuhfat: 
Raja Haji's body was buried within the fort of Malacca, 
behind the Company's garden. That is how things were. 
Later his sons took it back to Riau and buried it on the 
hill on the southern side of Penyengat Island. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:176). 
Presumably Raja Haji's corpse was brought back to Riau only after 
1804, after Penyengat had been given to Raja Hamidah. He had died in 
1784. So for some twenty years or more, his descendants did nothing 
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about his corpse buried 'behind the Company's garden'. In this 
case, we see a clear example of a grave that has been deliberately 
'keramatised', since this was not even a grave that had previously 
existed on that site. 
To illustrate further my argument that keramat graves belong to 
those who are regarded as having played pivotal roles in the making of 
the present, let us consider the grave of Opu Daeng Marewah. As 
pointed out above, the ritual attention given to Raja Haji's grave 
contrasts with the ritual neglect of Opu Daeng Cellak's grave. But 
this does not mean that all the graves of Raja Haji's predecessors are 
also ignored. Opu Daeng Marewah's grave stands out as being 
significantly keramat. 
To appreciate the significance of this, let us compare the graves 
of Opu Daeng Marewah and Opu Daeng Cellak. The former's grave is 
enshrined as a makam 'abode', whereas the latter's grave is so 
neglected that it is surrounded by overgrown grass. Not only that, 
the first time my raja informants wanted to take me to see Opu Daeng 
Cellak's grave, they had to ask a Boyanese settler living in the area 
to guide us through fallen tree trunks and thick undergrowth, for fear 
of getting lost. 
Significantly, these particular informants were themselves 
descendants of Opu Daeng Cellak. Yet they were more familiar with the 
location of Opu Daeng Marewah's grave than they were with that of 
their own ancestor, Opu Daeng Cellak. To appreciate this contrast, it 
must be realised that these two graves are located quite near each 
other, indeed on the same site where the former capital of the yamtuan 
muda once was. According to my informants, this former capital was 
known as Kota Raja 'The Raja's Fort' or Kota Repah 'The Crumbling [?] 
Fort'. The burial titles of the two brothers indicate their grave 
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sites: Opu Daeng Marewah is Marhum Sungai Baharu 'He Who Died at the 
Baharu River'; and Opu Daeng Cellak is Marhum Mangkat Di Kota 'He Who 
Died in The Fort'. The fort referred to is Kota Raja/Kota Repah, 
which is located on the west bank of the Baharu river (which, 
according to my informants, was a canal leading off from the Riau 
river, that was dug by Opu Daeng Marewah). So the 'Sungai Baharu' in 
Opu Daeng Marewah's burial title and the 'Kota' in Opu Daeng Cellak's 
burial title both refer to the same area that is, upstream of Riau 
River, on the north bank of this river, and on the west bank of the 
canal known as the Baharu river. (See Map S.) 
This area is at present quite uninhabited. The land on which Opu 
Daeng Marewah's grave stands presently belongs to a Chinese merchant 
in Tanjungpinang, who has buried his deceased parents in the same 
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area. At the time of my first visit in 1980, the only inhabitants 
there were a couple -- a Chinese employee of this merchant, living 
there with his Melayu wife and tending a smallholding. The land on 
which Opu Daeng Cellak's grave stands does not seem to belong to 
anyone; it is in the middle of an abandoned rubber plantation, said to 
have belonged to the former penghulu 'headman' of the area. As 
mentioned above, there is a Boyanese settler there. 
It is therefore significant that of two graves both located in 
the same generally deserted area, my informants should be familiar 
with the one and not with the other. Their attitude implies a 
deliberate focussing of attention on the one and a deliberate neglect 
of the other, deliberate in the sense that it seems to be not the 
inadvertent outcome of geographical circumstance, but rather, the 
result of active choice. 
The appearance of the two graves is also strikingly different. 
Opu Daeng Marewah's grave is more than three and a half metres in 
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length, and sheltered by a wooden roof built over it, with a low 
cement wall surrounding the grave, and cement steps leading up this 
wall. The two tombstones at the head and foot of the grave are 
covered with white cloth, which have to be regularly changed to 
maintain their whiteness. Once a year, on the Friday before Ramadan, 
the fasting month, crowds of people come to visit Opu Daeng Marewah's 
grave, clean the place, chant prayers, and berniat. 
In contrast, very little ritual attention seems to be given to 
the grave of Opu Daeng Cellak. As mentioned above, it is surrounded 
by overgrown grass, and access to it is choked by fallen tree trunks 
and thick undergrowth. The grave itself is no more than the normal 
length -- that is, about two metres or less in length. It is not 
sheltered by any construction built over it, and so is exposed to the 
elements. The first time I visited it, which was in 1979, the 
gravestones were covered only with white plastic sheets, which already 
looked look old and faded, unlike the fresh and clean white cloth 
covering Opu Daeng Marewah's gravestones. The last time I visited Opu 
Daeng Cellak's grave, which was in 1984, the gravestones were 
completely uncovered. Evidently, very few people berniat at Opu Daeng 
Cellak's grave; so there are hardly any tanda niat 'signs of 
intention'. (See Plates 12, 13, and 14.) 
The difference between the two graves is all the more striking 
because Opu Daeng Marewah has apparently left no surviving keturunan 
in Riau. According to the Tuhfat, 'most of Daeng Marewah's 
descendants are in Selangor' (Raja Ali Haji 1982:30). Indeed in the 
course of my own field research in Riau, I encountered not one 
informant who claimed to be descended from Opu Daeng Marewah. All my 
raja informants in Riau belong either to Opu Daeng Parani's keturunan 
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or to Opu Daeng Cellak's keturunan. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) 
Plate 12 
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Plates 12 and 13. Mak am 
Y amtuan Muda Opu Daeng 
Marewah is a relatively 
recent construction. It 
is well-maintained and 
the weeds growing around 
the tomb are regularly 
cleared, as the man in 
red is doing in Plate 12. 
The many pieces of cloth 
covering the gravestones 
indicate the number of 
people who go there to 
berniat. 
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Plate 14. In contrast to Opu Daeng Marewah's grave ; Opu Daeng Cellak's 
grave lies in the open, unsheltered , The absence of even a single 
piece of cloth on the gravestones shows that hardly anyone goes there 
to berniat. In the background of the picture is one of the Penyengat 
rajas who had brought me there. 
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It thus needs to be explained why the grave of Opu Daeng Marewah 
is keramat. As I have argued, keramat graves belong to those who 
played pivotal roles. So Opu Daeng Marewah's grave is keramat because 
he was the first yamtuan muda. Even though he has no surviving 
keturunan in Riau, his grave is nevertheless 'keramatised' because of 
his pivotal position, in this case, between the pre-1722 context and 
the post-1722 context. As pointed out in Chapter Four, before 1722 
the Opu Daeng brothers were not even a part of the sultanate at all; 
they became part of the sultanate only after 1722 when they had fought 
their way in, chased Raja Kecik out, installed Sultan Sulaiman on the 
throne, and obtained the office of yamtuan muda as their political 
monopoly. Therefore the office of yamtuan muda may be understood as a 
symbol of the Bugis presence in Riau. So if my raja informants wish 
to claim to belong to Riau, it would make sense for them to focus 
their attention on the first yamtuan muda, regardless of whether he 
has any surviving keturunan. 
That the 'keramatisation' of Opu Daeng Marewah's grave is a 
deliberate action is evident in the following account. According to 
my informants, there was once a man who wanted to lessen the number of 
steps of the wall surrounding the grave; he wanted to reduce the steps 
from five to three. Why he wanted to do this, my informants do not 
know. Nor are they able to identify the man. In any case, they told 
me that when this man wanted to start work on reducing the number of 
steps, he felt that someone was behind him. When he turned around, 
there was no one there. In the end, he did not change anything. The 
point of this story, as I read it, is that no one should reduce the 
elaborate-ness of Opu Daeng Marewah's keramat grave, not even in so 
apparently trivial a matter as reducing the number of steps. In 
contrast, I never heard any story of anyone being punished for 
neglecting Opu Daeng Cellak's grave. 
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That the 'keramatisation' of a grave has to do with shifting 
contexts, rather than with surviving keturunan, may be further 
illustrated by the case of Opu Daeng Parani. Even though he still has 
surviving keturunan in Riau, my informants never mention his grave. 
According to the Tuhfat, he died in Kedah while fighting Raja Kecik 
(see Raja Ali Haji 1982:67-68); but not even this event is discussed 
by my informants, who do not seem to have any idea where his grave is 
located in Kedah. Nor is it just because the grave is located outside 
Riau that there is this lack of interest. 
The contrastive case is that of Raja Haji. Although he has 
received a secondary burial on Penyengat, my informants still talk 
about how he died fighting the Dutch in Melaka, how he was buried 
there, and how he was transported back to Riau. No one, however, has 
ever expressed any interest in looking for the grave of Opu Daeng 
Parani in Kedah, and giving him a secondary burial in Riau. His grave 
simply seems to be irrelevant. 
Again, as in the case of Opu Daeng Cellak, this is not to say 
that he is forgotten as the sumber 'source' of a transmitted 
keturunan; indeed his name is frequently mentioned in the recounting 
of genealogies. And some of my informants proudly claim to be 
keturunan Opu Daeng Parani, as opposed to others who equally proudly 
claim to be keturunan Opu Daeng Cellak. Yet it is the descendants of 
these two keturunan who revere the keramat grave of Opu Daeng Marewah, 
as well as those of Raja Hamidah and Raja Haji. 
The graves of Opu Daeng Marewah, Raja Hamidah, and Raja Haji are 
thus keramat because of shifts from one political context to another. 
The shift in all three cases involves moving from a context of 
relative powerlessness to a context of relative power. As pointed out 
above, the persona of Opu Daeng Marewah stands. in a pivotal position 
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between the pre-1722 context and the post-1722 context. Before 1722, 
the Opu Daeng brothers were not even part of the sultanate; so no 
matter how charismatic they may have been in terms of military prowess 
exercised elsewhere, they had no power in the context of the 
sultanate. Similarly, before 1804, although the office of yamtuan 
muda was in existence, Riau was not legally demarcated as pertaining 
to the yamtuan muda's faction. So in the context of Riau, there was, 
in 1804, an intensified concentration of what was previously a more 
diffuse form of power. 
But who are the people concerned with these shifts from less 
power to more power? They are the keturunan raja whose present 
position is inherited from the past. 1722 and 1804 are temporal 
benchmarks of significance to them in particular. (However, from the 
perspective of other parties such as the ~eturunan tengku, other years 
and other events may be of greater significance.) So the 
'keramatisation' of certain graves may be understood as a 
justification of the present in terms of the past. 
To apply once more the riverine metaphor used in Chapter Four, if 
keturunan is the downstream flow from past to present, then keramat is 
a large boulder in the river, the presence of which diverts the course 
of the flow from one direction to another. So if the present-day 
keturunan raja of Riau were to consider themselves simply as belonging 
to a downstream flow from past to present, then they would focus only 
on belonging to the keturunan transmitted from Opu Tendriburang Daeng 
Rilaga as the sumber 'source'. However, if they were to justify their 
present symbolically in the context of the sultanate, then they would 
focus on the various large boulders which have diverted the flow of 
their keturunan into positions of relative power. 
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But it should not be thought that the graves discussed above are 
the only keramat graves in Riau. They certainly are not; there are 
others even on Penyengat island itself. In a book published by one of 
my informants listing the historical sites on Penyengat, four makams 
are mentioned. (See Raja Hamzah Yunus n.d.(b):9-16.) These are, to 
use his words: 
Makara Engku Puteri Permaisuri Sultan Mahmud [Abode of 
the Royal Daughter, Queen of Sultan Mahmud]; 
Makara Raja Haji Marhum Teluk Ketapang [Abode of Raja Haji, 
He Who Departed at Teluk Ketapang]; 
Makam Marhum Jaafar, Yangdipertuan Muda Ke VI [Abode of the 
Departed Jaafar, the Sixth Yangdipertuan Muda] 
Makara Marhum Kampung Bulang [Abode of He Who Departed at 
Kampung Bulang]. 
The first two makams have been discussed above. It is significant 
that Raja Hamzah calls attention to Raja Hamidah's status as Engku 
Puteri 'Royal Daughter' and Permaisuri Sultan Mahmud 'Queen of Sultan 
Mahmud', and to the location of Raja Haji's death -- namely, Teluk 
Ketapang in Melaka. These aspects are indeed directly related to the 
'keramatisation' of their graves. In addition, Raja Hamzah mentions 
two other makams. One is that of Raja Hamidah's brother, Raja Jafar, 
who was the first yamtuan muda to rule from Penyengat as his capital. 
It is significant that Raja Hamzah should call attention to Raja 
Jafar's position as the sixth yamtuan muda of Riau. The other makam 
is that of Raja Abd al-Rahman. It is significant that Raja Hamzah 
does not mention even the name of this yamtuan muda, but instead calls 
attention to the site of his death -- Kampung Bulang. As he explains 
in the text (ibid.:14), this yamtuan muda was 'the builder of the 
mosque of the Riau Sultans, that is so beautiful and grand' (pembangun 
misjid Sultan Riau yang indah dan agung itu). It is rather ironic that 
this mosque should be referred to as 'the mosque of the Riau Sultans', 
when the sultan's capital was located mostly in Daik, Lingga, and 
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Penyengat was merely the yamtuan muda's capital, becoming the sultan's 
capital only during the brief reign of the last sultan. The mosque 
still stands as one of the major landmarks of Penyengat, located 
indeed in Kampung Bulang, where Yamtuan Muda Abd al-Rahman died. 
Apart from these, there are still other keramat graves on 
Penyengat. Each of them, however, is keramat for a different reason: 
each is a different pivot for shifting between different contexts of 
symbolic power. This argument applies even to royal graves that do 
not belong to the keturunan raja. As mentioned in Chapter Four, there 
is a complex of graves on the Riau river belonging to the keturunan 
tengku. Within this complex, the most keramat of the graves is that 
of Sultan Sulaiman, the first sultan of the post-1722 sultanate. (See 
Plate 15.) The graves of his son and grandson which are located 
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within the same complex are hardly ever mentioned by my informants. 
The significance of Sultan Sulaiman is quite clear: it was during his 
reign that the Bugis yarntuan mudas first established themselves in 
Riau. 
There is, however, a question about the royal graves left 
unanswered. Given that my informants regard the keramat gestalt 
primarily in Islamic terms, then why is it the case that all royal 
graves have the potentiality of becoming keramat? The clue to the 
answer is perhaps to be found in the name by which Raja Haji's grave 
is known: Makam Raja Haji Fisabilillah 'Abode of Raja Haji, Defender 
of the Faith'. (See Plate 16.) 
The key word fisabilillah is an Islamic term applied only to 
those who die in a jihad 'religious war'. (See Muhammad Ali 1973:450-
493.) Raja Haji's death in Melaka fighting the Dutch is thus 
interpreted in religious terms. Indeed the Tuhfat makes this quite 
explicit. It is said that Raja Haji was intent on going to fight the 
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Plate 15. The perception of Sultan Sulaiman's grave as keramat is 
evident in the structure built to shelter it, the pieces of cloth 
covering the gravestones, and the sheet of now-faded yellow cloth hung 
up to signify royalty , 
Plate 16. Raja Jantan stands outside the tomb of his ancestor 
Raja Haji Fisabillilah 'Raja Haji, Defender of the Faith'. 
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Dutch because, among other reasons, he had 'hoped for the merit which 
would come from waging a holy war in Allah's cause' (Raja Ali Haji 
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1982:172). According to the Tuhfat, he died with a dagger in one 
hand, and a holy book in the other. (See ibid.:175.) 
Th~ Quran (3:169) states explicitly: 
Think not of those who are slain in God's way as dead. Nay, 
they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their 
Lord. 
(A. Yusuf Ali 1983:167). 
So if Raja Haji was a f isabilillah who had departed from this world 
while fighting in defense of Islam, then he is, by Quranic definition, 
not dead but alive. Hence it is only logical to regard his grave as 
keramat. 
In Chapter Five, I discussed how Islam provided an ideology of 
legitimation for the Bugis rajas, particularly after 1804, when they 
could no longer use military prowess to justify their authority. I 
pointed out that Raja Ali Haji even claimed that it was Allah himself 
who had appointed the Bugis rajas as religious guides for their 
subjects. Also as mentioned above, in the Tuhfat, all the yamtuan 
mudas from Raja Haji onwards are described as pious and devout 
Muslims. (See Appendix 8.) As I shall show below, this claim to 
religious superiority is still held by my Penyengat informants, 
constituting a public proposition which others must either accept or 
reject. It is the acceptance of this claim, I suggest, that has led 
some of my commoner informants to say that all royal graves have the 
potentiality of becoming keramat. 
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6.3 The Graves of Tuan Said 
If Raja Haji is considered fisabilillah and hence keramat, then 
on what religious basis is Raja Hamidah keramat? As mentioned in 
Chapter Five, the Tuhfat makes no mention of Raja Hamidah's religious 
piety. However, my informants say she was the one who ordered that a 
tomb be built for Habib Syeikh Syakaf, a prominent Arab ulama 
'theologian' who had lived in Penyengat. Furthermore, they say that 
when outsiders go to Raja Hamidah's grave to ask for permission to 
stay and work in Riau, they should also visit Habib Syeikh's grave, 
known as Makam Ulama 'Abode of the Theologian'. This is the only 
keramat grave belonging to an Arab that is located on Penyengat. It 
is thus significant that it should be specially linked to Raja 
Hamidah's grave. The two graves are indeed located near each other. 
This linkage implies that the indubitable sanctity of the ulama's 
grave legitimates Raja Hamidah's grave as keramat. Indeed in 
justification of this linkage, a raja informant said: 
Habib Sheikh seorang ulama alim; dia hidup semasa dengan 
Engku Puteri. 
(Habib Sheikh was a learned theologian; he lived at the same 
time as Engku Puteri.) 
The linkage is thus based on coevality. 
According to the Tuhfat, there was such a historical person. He 
is mentioned as one of the religious teachers of Yang Dipertuan Muda 
Raja Jafar, Raja Hamidah's brother. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:279.) 
Interestingly, however, my informants link him not to Raja Jafar, the 
yamtuan muda who was his pupil, but to Raja Hamidah who, it seems, was 
merely his coeval. As mentioned above, Raja Jafar's grave is also on 
Penyengat and also considered keramat. It is noteworthy too that of 
the multitude of religious teachers who were evidently resident in 
Penyengat at that time (see ibid.), only Habib Syeikh's grave has been 
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singled out as keramat. My informants' reference to his grave simply 
as 'Abode of the Theologian' suggests that he may have been singled as 
the most representative of the company of theologians, because he may 
have been the most illustrious. 
This is indicated by his name and title. Syakaf indicates that 
he was a member of the al-Syakaf family from Hadhramaut in southern 
Arabia, which 'later became one of the wealthiest families in 
Singapore ' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:390). Habib was a title used in 
particular by the Hadhramaut tuan said, who had 'established a sort of 
religious aristocracy in southern Arabia' (Wilkinson 1959:386; also 
see Matheson and Andaya 1982:413). And syeikh indicates a leader in 
Sufi mysticism. (See Trimingham 1969:310.) 
As I have argued in Chapter Five, the presence of the tuan said, 
the reputed direct descendants of the Prophet, was a vivid 
representation of the Islamic legitimation of the sultanate. Such a 
role was evidently played by the tuan said, not only when they were 
alive, but even after they died. So it seems that in life Habib 
Syeikh Syakaf legitimated Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Jafar's rule, and 
in death he is still legitimating Raja Hamidah's grave as keramat. 
As mentioned above, Makam Ulama is the only Arab grave that is 
keramat on Penyengat. The other Arab graves that are keramat are 
located elsewhere, mostly as isolated single graves. One such grave 
exists on Pangkil -- or perhaps more accurately, off the island. 
There are two stones in the sea off Tanjung Keramat, the uninhabited 
southern end of Pangkil island. These are said to be the gravestones 
of a tuan said's grave. 
The establishment of this keramat grave was described to me in 
this fashion. About eighty or ninety years ago, a grave 'manifested 
itself' (menjelma) on the island; perhaps it came of its own accord, 
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or alternatively, it may have been built by the dewa-dewa 'celestial 
spirits'. There were three gravestones -- kepala 'head', pusat 
'centre' and kaki 'foot'. The middle one could be lifted out and 
placed somewhere else. The next day, it would return to its original 
position by itself. Two animals used to 'wait' (nunggu) at the grave: 
a 'three-legged tiger' (rimau kaki tiga) and a buaya katak 'frog-
crocodile' (that is, a broad-bodied variety of crocodile). When 
people approached the grave, these animals would disappear. When 
people left, they would reappear. Later on, because the land became 
'dirty' (kotor), due to the defaecation of people and animals, the 
grave moved itself to the sea. 
One day, a man from the village went to Tanjung Keramat to tap 
some nira 'palm-sap' for making gula melaka 'palm sugar'. When he 
returned that night, he had a dream. It was he who dreamt that the 
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orang keramat 'keramat person' was a tuan said known as Said Asin. 
In his dream he learnt that Said Asin was the son of Habib Noh (the 
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tuan said of a well-known keramat grave in Singapore), and that Said 
Asin was sailing from Daik in Lingga when his ship sank and he 
departed from the world. His arm floated on the sea until it reached 
Pangkil. So it was his arm that 'became' (menjadi) keramat. 
It was further dreamt that Said Asin is not in the grave on 
Fridays, for he goes to Mecca to pray. So people should not visit the 
grave on Fridays to berniat because there is no one there. Said Asin 
also revealed that he has a total of three graves -- one off Pangkil, 
another on Soreh, and the third on an islet off Pengujan. He moves 
between these three places. 
One day, there suddenly 'appeared' (jelma) a white chicken in 
that vicinity. On one occasion, this chicken was wounded and its 
blood was seen to be white. So people knew that this chicken was 
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keramat. It was then cared for by people until eventually, a raja 
from the Sulit area acquired it and took it away with him. He then 
became a dukun 'healer'. The acquisition was carried out by means of 
his throwing 100 ringgit (in coins) into the sea; this was belanja 
'expenses', macam kawin 'as in marriage'. 
The account I have presented above is translated almost verbatim 
from my informants' description. It is meant to illustrate how 
significantly different this tuan said's grave is from the other 
keramat graves discussed above. Whereas the other keramat graves 
belong to personae who were evidently historically real, not even my 
Pangkil informants claim that anyone knew this 'Said Asin' or that 
'he' had visited Pangkil when he was alive. Nor is it even his whole 
body that is in the supposed grave; only his arm is there, it seems. 
The stones in the sea that are purported to be his gravestones are, as 
far as I can see, only stones. They are underwater at high tide, and 
only just visible at low tide. 
Such being the case, it is perhaps more appropriate to treat my 
informants' account of this grave as a symbolic allegory, rather than 
as a realistic reconstruction of actual events. There are several 
noteworthy points. First of all, there is no claim that the grave was 
built by the islanders themselves. The grave is said to have 
'manifested itself' (menjelma) on the island. So it was originally 
not there, but appeared at a certain point in time, either of its own 
accord or built by the celestial spirits. The establishment of the 
grave is thus construed as an event of the past that happened to the 
people of the island, quite independently of their own wishes and 
actions. 
This grave had first manifested itself on land. From my 
informants' description, it did not appear to have been an Islamic 
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grave at this stage, since they suggest that it could have been built 
by the celestial spirits. Moreover, it had three gravestones instead 
of two, and it was guarded by two strange animals -- a three-legged 
tiger and a frog-crocodile. 
Later on, however, the occupant of the grave found the land 
dirty, and therefore moved his grave into the sea. It was not until 
then that he revealed his identity through a dream to one of the 
islanders. This revelation was thus also an event that happened, but 
this time to one member of the population. The islanders had 
evidently not sought to know the identity of the grave's occupant. It 
was up to the occupant himself to reveal to them that he was a tuan 
said. 
In the tuan said's revelation, connections are made to certain 
urban centres -- Singapore, Daik, and even Mecca. These connections 
demonstrate the tuan said's cosmopolitanism. However, the importance 
of the Pangkil grave is diminished by the revelation that only the 
tuan said's arm is in that particular grave. Apparently, he inhabits 
two other graves in the area where, presumably, some other parts of 
his body are located. Significantly, the graves are sited on three 
islands that are very near, if not adjacent, to Penyengat -- namely, 
Pangkil, Soreh, and Pengujan. So by implication, the parts of the 
tuan said's body are scattered westward of Penyengat in a line from 
Pengujan in the north, through Soreh in the middle, to Pangkil in the 
south. (See Map 4.) 
Also significant in the account is the manifestation of a keramat 
chicken with white blood. The phrase darah putih 'white blood' is the 
Malay equivalent of the English phrase 'born in the purple'. (See 
Wilkinson 1959:257.) In the allegory, the phrase is taken literally 
as signifying the colour of blood. At any rate, the message is that 
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the chicken was royal and hence keramat. However, the significance of 
this royalty is diminished by its manifestation in a mere chicken, and 
not a human person. 
Nevertheless it is a raja who ultimately benefits from the royal 
keramat chicken. But interestingly, this raja came not from nearby 
Penyengat, but from faraway Sulit in the western part of the 
archipelago. (See Map 3.) He bought the chicken by 'marrying' it; 
the 100 ringgit he threw into the sea constituted his wedding 
expenses, representing perhaps mas kawin. The chicken enables him to 
become a healer. 
My informants' date of eighty or ninety years for the grave 
locates it temporally around the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth. The suggestion is that it dates from the 
era when there was still a sultanate, yet is not ancient in 
provenance. I found this allegory particularly meaningful in the 
context of what my informants told me about Pangkil in zaman sultan. 
According to them, the island was formerly called Panggil --
literally, 'To Hail', because its hill was used by the Galang people 
as a sighting post from which to hail ships travelling along Riau 
Strait. These ships would be 'summoned' (diundang) to call at the 
port. Those which complied with the summons would be guided to the 
port, while those which refused would be raided. The port at that 
time was located in the Riau river. After Sultan Mahmud moved his 
capital to Lingga, however, this state of affairs changed. The Galang 
people then no longer summoned ships to port, but simply raided all 
ships that came their way. They continued with this indiscriminate 
piracy even after the Bugis rajas established their capital on 
Penyengat. 
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To protect the shipping along Riau Strait, the Penyengat rajas 
sent some 'military officers' (hulubalang) to 'take over' (ambil) the 
island Panggil. My informants identified Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah as 
the one responsible for this take-over; she is thus said to be the one 
who 'opened up' (buka) the place, and subsequently 'held' (pegang) it. 
After the takeover, the Penyengat rajas changed the name 'Panggil' to 
'Pangkil', by the simple device of dropping the dot from the Malayo-
Arabic letter ~:f"', thereby changing it to kaf '-"'. This change of 
name signified a break with the Galang past. From then on, there was 
a 'boundary' (batasan) between Pangkil and Karas, whereas Pangkil and 
Penyengat were 'regarded as one place' (dianggap sebagai satu tempat). 
Certain other changes also took place. Raja Hamidah had a 
'palace' (istana) built on the island as her 'place for relaxation' 
(tempat kelah), which she visited from time to time. The hill on 
which this palace stood is hence known as Bukit Puteri 'Hill of the 
Royal Daughter'; certain stone remains on there have been identified 
by my informants as belonging to the ruins of her palace. 
The coast to the west of Bukit Puteri became known as Pangkalan 
Besar 'The Big Landing Point', because that was where Raja Hamidah 
landed to get to her palace. Furthermore, Pangkil was used as a 
checkpoint for examining the ships that were bound for Penyengat 
macam bea dan cukai 'like customs and excise', my informants said. 
Apparently, only after the ships had been checked at Pangkil could 
they proceed to Penyengat. The harbour of this checkpoint was located 
in Tajur Kait (see Map 4); certain remains of poles in the sea in that 
area are said to have been used for mooring the ships which called in 
at Pangkil. The name Tajur Kait 'Hook Reefs' refers specifically to a 
line of reefs off the southeastern coast of the island, which runs 
into the sea in a hook-like shape. As my informants said, dia tangkap 
kapal 'it traps the ships': that is, the ships being checked could not 
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easily slip away. Furthermore, as my informants explained, the ships 
could not dock close to shore, because of the karang 'coral bank'; so 
they had to berlabuh di laut 'be moored at sea'. Tajur Kait was thus 
merely an anchorage and not an alternative port. The anchored ships 
were checked by the hulubalang 'military officers' who had been sent 
to take over the island. 
Pangkil was thus 'taken over', 'opened up' and 'held'. What is 
particularly interesting about the image of this process is that the 
place so described was already considered territorially part of the 
polity. Such a process may perhaps be understood as the internal 
colonisation of an existing territory. In other words, what my 
informants seem to be talking about in this case is not the conquest 
of a foreign place, but rather, the re-ordering of a relationship 
between centre and periphery, such that the previously peripheral 
place comes under the direct control of the centre. 
It is significant that it was Raja Hamidah who was identified as 
the 'holder' of Pangkil, for she was also the owner of Penyengat, 
having received it as mas kawin from her husband, Sultan Mahmud. 
Interestingly, however, whereas my informants say that she 
'owned/owns' (punya) Penyengat, they merely say that she 'held' 
(pegang) Pangkil. As I have shown above, my informants still regard 
as the 'owner' of Penyengat, the persona of Raja Hamidah manifested 
through her keramat grave. In contrast, in the case of Pangkil, my 
informants listed a succession of five rajas who were said to have 
'held' the island. The names they mentioned were: Engku Puteri Raja 
Hamidah, Engku Besar Raja Sitti, Raja Dollah, Raja Hitam, and Raja Ali 
Sambang. 
I have not been able to discover any documentary evidence to 
confirm or refute this story of Pangkil. So there is little choice 
370 
but to take it at face value. In any case, it is what my informants 
believe did happen, and as such it represents their attempt to present 
a realistic reconstruction of actual events. If we map the symbolic 
allegory of the tuan said's grave onto this realistic reconstruction, 
the results are interesting. 
To begin with, the location of the grave off the southern end of 
the island is significant, because immediately south of Pangkil is 
Karas where the Galang pirates were said to have been based after they 
were driven out of 'Panggil'. As my informants said, after Pangkil 
was taken over by the Penyengat rajas, there was a 'boundary' Cbatasan) 
between Pangkil and Karas. I suggest that the tuan said's grave in 
the sea symbolises this boundary. 
The movement of the grave from the land to the sea may perhaps be 
interpreted as an allusion to the changing roles of the island. At 
first, its hill was used as a sighting post for the purpose of hailing 
ships. Later, its harbour became important as an anchorage for ships 
going to Penyengat. 
In the symbolic allegory, during the period that the grave was on 
land, it was not an Islamic grave. It had three gravestones, with the 
third non-Islamic gravestone in the middle referred to, significantly, 
as pusat 'centre'. Furthermore, my informants said that this 'centre' 
could be lifted out and placed elsewhere, but it would always return 
to the grave. Two strange animals also 'waited' (nunggu) at the 
grave. 
It is perhaps not too far-fetched to interpret this part of the 
allegory as an allusion to Pangkil island itself before it was taken 
over by the Penyengat rajas. It was then non-Islamic, it had its own 
'centre' (pusat), it had Galang pirates lying in wait for their prey. 
And no matter how far the pirates roamed, they always returned to 
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Panggil as their centre. 
After that, in the allegory, the occupant of the grave found the 
land dirty and moved his grave to the sea. He then revealed his 
identity as a tuan said. The sudden prominence given to the occupant 
of the grave at this point may perhaps be interpreted as an allusion 
to the occupation of the island by the Penyengat hulubalang 'military 
officers'. The grave, which may be taken as a symbol for the island 
itself, now becomes an Islamic habitation. The forcible take-over of 
Pangkil by military officers suggests violence and bloodshed. The 
pollution of the land in the allegory may have been an allusion to 
this. 
In the allegory, the tuan said reveals his cosmopolitan 
connections to Singapore, Daik and even directly to Mecca itself. 
This may be interpreted as an allusion to the cosmopolitan ties of 
Penyengat, and perhaps even to the direct control of Pangkil by 
Penyengat the centre. Whereas previously on land the grave had its 
own pusat 'centre', it now had only two gravestones. Its centre had 
apparently shifted to Mecca where the tuan said still goes every 
Friday to pray. 
However, important though the grave was, it contained only the 
arm of the tuan said. I interpret this as an allusion to the 
secondary role that Pangkil played in relation to Penyengat. It was 
an anchorage for ships going to Penyengat, but not a competing 
alternative port. So Pangkil was an 'arm' of Penyengat, equivalent to 
other 'arms' located in Pengujan and Soreh. The parts of the ~ 
said's body thus inhabit three strategically located islands that 
could have guarded entry to Penyengat. As pointed out above, these 
three islands are located just west of Penyengat, constituting a line 
from Pengujan in the north, through Soreh in the middle, and Pangkil 
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in the south. This may perhaps be interpreted as Penyengat's line of 
defense against the Galang pirates, since the latter's territory did 
indeed span westward of that line. 
The allegory then makes an allusion to royalty in the form of a 
chicken with white blood. This chicken is identified as female, 
because a male raja. from the Sulit area comes and 'marries' it, giving 
100 ringgit as 'mas kawin'. The significance of this part of the 
allegory may be explained thus. 
As mentioned above, in the realistic reconstruction of Pangkil's 
past, five rajas were said to have held the island. The first two 
were female -- namely, Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah and Engku Besar Raja 
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Sitti. We have already discussed the importance of Raja Hamidah's 
mas kawin. According to the Tuhfat, Engku Besar Raja Sitti was Raja 
Hamidah's younger sister. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982.) The royal 
chicken with white blood may perhaps be interpreted as an allusion to 
the female rajas who held Pangkil. 
As to why female royalty should be symbolised by a chicken, we 
may perhaps refer to an animistic fowling ritual in the Malay 
Peninsula discussed by Skeat (1900:132-141), where he points out that 
the fowl to be snared must be called puteri 'princess'. Although I 
did not come across such a ritual in Riau, it is quite possible that a 
similar practice did exist and perhaps still does in certain parts. 
In the allegory, the raja from the Sulit area becomes a dukun 
'healer' by 'marrying' the royal chicken. If it is plausible to 
interpret the chicken as a symbol of the female rajas from Penyengat 
who had held Pangkil, then this would imply that the Sulit raja who 
had also originated from Penyengat, married a female raja from within 
37 
his own keturunan. As shown in Chapter Four, Yang Dipertuan Muda 
Raja Jafar's authority in Riau rested upon the mas kawin of his 
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sister, Raja Hamidah. 
In this context, the figure of 100 ringgit mentioned in the 
allegory may be significant. It constitutes one quarter of the 400 
ringgit that is specified as the ~as kawin of the derajat of raja. 
Penyengat, and hence Riau, was given to Raja Hamidah as mas kawin in 
1804. But at that time, 'Riau' did not include the Karimun-Kundur 
area. As shown in Chapter Two, that area did not become part of 
'Riau' until after the London Treaty of 1824. Prior to that, it had 
come under the temenggung's purview. So Raja Hamidah's mas kawin did 
not include the Karimun-Kundur area. I suggest that the 100 ringgit 
that the raja from Pulau Sulit is said to have thrown into the sea may 
be interpreted as an addition to Raja Hamidah's mas kawin -- namely, 
Riau. 
If it is valid to interpret the symbolic allegory concerning the 
tuan said's grave by mapping it onto my informants' realistic 
reconstruction of Pangkil's past, as I have done above, then the 
question arises: since they do make the attempt to present a realistic 
reconstruction of actual events that had occurred in the past, why 
should they bother to mystify these events by shrouding them in a 
symbolic allegory focussed on a tuan said's grave? I would answer 
that the realistic reconstruction is about the past, whereas the 
symbolic allegory is about the present. The _tuan said's grave exists 
in the present. Pangkil may have once been a non-Islamic 'Panggil' 
which was subsequently Islamised by the Penyengat rajas. That was an 
event of the past. But the tuan said still goes to Mecca every 
Friday, and the present-day living people of Pangkil still berniat at 
his grave any day of the week except Friday. The implication is that 
so long as Pangkil has the keramat grave of a tuan said, it will 
surely not slip back into being a non-Islamic Panggil. 
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The tuan said's grave of Pangkil thus symbolises the extension of 
political control by an Islamic and Islamising centre. Although one 
may date Islamisation as a historical event of the temporal past, it 
is nevertheless also an ongoing process which needs to be located in 
the spatial present. What Islam represents in this context is not 
just a canonical religion pure and simple. It is, as argued above, a 
means of religious legitimation which converts raw power into legal 
authority. 
The tuan said's grave of Pangkil is thus very similar to the tuan 
said's grave of Penyabung discussed in Chapter Five. Both these tuan 
said seem to be purely fictitious personae, deliberately constructed 
for the purpose of political legitimation. Both their 'graves' -- one 
under water and the other invisible -- seem to symbolise the outward 
spread of religiously legitimated political authority from Penyengat, 
both in the past and in the ongoing present. 
In this light, it is interesting that whereas my Galang 
informants deny the existence of a tuan said's grave on Penyabung, as 
mentioned in Chapter Five, my Pangkil informants fully accept the 
existence of their tuan said's grave. This indicates the relative 
degree to which they accept Penyengat's authority over them. If such 
is the use of keramat graves -- that is, as symbols of political 
legitimation -- then it is understandable indeed why my Penyengat 
informants regard the keramat gestalt in Islamic terms and why they 
keep the mode of ritual conduct at such graves as Islamic as possible. 
To permit animistic practices at keramat graves would defeat the very 
purpose of 'keramatisation' as legitimation. 
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6.4 Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini 
Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini in Bintan seems to be a clear 
example of legitimation through 'keramatisation'. This is a keramat 
complex located on a low hill called Bukit Batu. There are six grave~ 
on the sites, all Islamically laid out with the proper orientation of 
gravestones -- that is, in a direction from which the corpses within 
can face Mecca. According to my informants, the personae within these 
graves are: 
Dang Pok Dang Marini, also known as Wan Empuk and Wan Malini; 
Orang Tua Besar 'The Great Elder'; 
Puteri Melor 'Royal Daughter Of The Jasmine'; 
Puteri Cempaka 'Royal Daughter Of The Cempaka Tree'; 
Datuk Hilir 'The Datuk Located Downstream'; 
Datuk Telanai 'The Datuk with the title Telanai'. 
The name 'Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini' highlights that 
particular grave over the others. Significantly, my informants 
identified Dang Pok Dang Marini as synonymous with the Wan Empuk and 
Wan Malini who figure importantly in the founding legend of the Melaka 
dynasty. According to my informants, the other personae in 'Keramat 
Dang Pok Dang Marini' also figure importantly in this founding legend. 
Thus, Orang Tua Besar has been identified to me as the female ruler of 
Bintan in that legend; the two Puteri were identified as her 
daughters, and the two Datuk identified as ministers of Bintan. 
Furthermore, my informants identified Dang Pok Dang Marini and Datuk 
Telanai as orang penaung, and the others as orang Bintan. We shall 
see the significance of this identification in the discussion below. 
I have shown in Chapter Five how relevant the founding legend 
told in the Penurunan is to the keturunan Bintan. It is thus all the 
more significant that there should be a keramat complex built around 
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the characters in that legend. There are, however, some significant 
discrepancies between this keramat complex, and the founding legend 
told in the Penurunan. My informants themselves seem to be quite 
aware of these discrepancies. 
These discrepancies may be understood, I suggest, in the context 
of the attempt to legitimate Sultan Mahmud's assassination in 1699 in 
terms of a social contract established in Palembang. (See Chapter 
Five.) Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini thus represents an ongoing 
attempt to legitimate the temporal past in the spatial present. Let 
us examine this proposition in detail by comparing the personae in 
Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini with those in the Penurunan, both in the 
earlier pre-1699 version and the later post-1699 one. 
First of all, the names and titles differ. 'Dang Pok Dang 
Marini' differs significantly from the names Wan Empuk and Wan Malini, 
as given in the Penurunan. My informants know both sets of names; 
they explain the former as the Bintan pronunciation of the latter. 
But what is even more intriguing is that whereas they would mention 
'Wan Empuk• and 'Wan Malini' as two separate names, they always 
pronounce as one name 'Dang Pok Dang Marini'. This suggests that 
'Dang Pok Dang Marini' is a singularisation of the two separate names. 
Moreover, there is only one grave for the two of them. My 
informants are aware that Wan Empuk and Wan Malini in the legend are 
two distinct people, but they could offer no explanation for the 
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single grave. This may be taken as further evidence of the 
singularisation of the two otherwise distinct identities. 
But why have Wan Empuk and Wan Malini been singularised in name 
and site, such that there is but one grave 'Keramat Dang Pok Dang 
Marini' for the two of them? In Chapter Five, I argued that Wan Empuk 
and Wan Malini played the role of penaung 'protector' to the three 
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Indian princes who appeared on top of Bukit Si-Guntang. I further 
argued that it was this role that has been highlighted in the attempt 
to legitimate Sultan Mahmud's assassination in terms of a broken 
social contract -- hence the special mas kawin of the keturunan Bintan 
to remind them of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini on Bukit Si-Guntang. It 
seems to me that Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini is yet another variation 
on the same theme but spatially realised. 
The interest in this case is not in the two distinct identities 
of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini. What is highlighted instead is their 
common role as the penaung of the raja. Both versions of the 
Penurunan make it quite clear that the two women shared a house and 
that it was to this house that they brought the Indian princes. I 
have shown above in the section on the keramat gestalt that in my 
informants' view, keramat people are not dead but still existent; an 
informant even stated explicitly that the keramat grave is merely a 
place of habitation, perhaps even a house. In this light, I would 
interpret the single grave of Dang Pok Dang Marini as representing the 
single house of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini, which was the naung 
'shelter' of the raja. The singular form of the name 'Dang Pok Dang 
Marini' thus represents their shared single role of penaung. 
The second point concerns the title Orang Tua Besar 'The Great 
Elder' which my informants use to refer to the female ruler of Bintan. 
But in both versions of the Penurunan, she is referred to as Raja 
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Besar 'Great Ruler'; the title Orang Tua Besar does not appear. My 
informants, on the other hand, do not refer to her as Raja Besar. 
The term orang tua (literally, 'old person') denotes 
head of the family; adult in contradistinction to child; a 
member of the senior generation; parent. 
(Wilkinson 1959:1237). 
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In the pre-1699 version of the Penurunan, the female ruler of Bintan 
adopts the Indian prince from Palembang as her son. (See Winstedt 
1938:59.) In the post-1699 version, she first adopts him as her 
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younger brother, and then becomes his co-parent-in-law , when her 
daughter Wan Seri Beni marries his son Sang Nila Utama/Seri Teri 
Buana. (See Shellabear 1967:31-32.) It thus appears that it is her 
role as parent that is highlighted in the keramat grave in Bintan. So 
instead of being referred to as Raja Besar 'Great Ruler', as in the 
text, she is referred to as Orang Tua Besar 'Great Parent'. The 
implication is that she was the 'great parent' of a 'great child' 
namely, Sang Nila Utama. 
What is even more intriguing is a detail offered by my informants 
about a related persona whose grave is not in the keramat complex. 
This is Orang Tua Besar's husband who, they say, was called Laksamana 
Raja Andak, also known as Asykar Ayah. The suggestion is that the 
Laksamana Bintan who murdered Sultan Mahmud in 1699 came from a long 
line of such laksamanas, beginning with Orang Tua Besar's husband. In 
the post-1699 version of the Penurunan, the female ruler of Bintan was 
a widow by the time the Palembang prince reached Bintan. So her 
deceased husband could not possibly have played a parental role to 
Sang Nila Utama/Seri Teri Buana. There is no mention in the text 
about the identity of her husband. But it seems that my informants 
have taken it upon themselves to fill in that detail. The name or 
title Asykar Ayah may be translated literally as 'Father-Soldier'. So 
even in this case, there is an allusion to a parental role, however, 
in relation not to Seri Teri Buana himself, but to all those who later 
became laksamana and asykar. So if Orang Tua Besar was the adoptive 
parent of Sang Nila Utama/Seri Teri Buana, and her husband Askar Ayah 
was father to the laksamana line, then by implication, Laksamana 
Bintan was structurally related to Sultan Mahmud as 'sibling'. It is 
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thus understandable why the female ruler of Bintan is referred to as 
Orang Tua Besar and not as Raja Besar. 
In the post-1699 version of the Penurunan, there is a Tun Telanai 
who was the son of the former Palembang ruler, Demang Lebar Daun, and 
who was 'made ruler' (dirajakan) of Bintan after the death of its 
female ruler. (See Shellabear 1967:37.) The pre-1699 version does 
not mention any Tun Telanai in this context; its first mention of a 
Tun Telanai crops up in the context of Melaka. (See Winstedt 
1938:98.) Nor does this latter version mention who succeeds the 
female ruler of Bintan; it does, however, state that she 'died, 
leaving two grand-daughters: they were married to the two sons of Sri 
Tri Buana' (ibid.:20). Although in the post-1699 version there is a 
Tun Telanai who was made raja of Bintan, the Datuk Telanai whose grave 
is in Bintan is, however, identified by my informants not as a raja 
but as a menteri. 
However, it is significant that my informants do not mention that 
Datuk Telanai was 'made raja' (dirajakan); instead they referred to 
him as menteri 'minister'. If he was merely a minister, then that 
implies that someone else was raja. As mentioned above, in the post-
1699 version of the Penurunan, Tun Telanai is described as Demang 
Lebar Daun's son. Demang Lebar Daun was the Palembang +aja who had 
established the social contract between ruler and subject with Sang 
Sapurba, one of the three Indian princes who had appeared in Bukit Si-
Guntang. As mentioned in Chapter Five above, this was done through a 
marriage alliance between Sang Sapurba and Demang Lehar Daun's 
daughter Wan Sendari. This version of the Penurunan goes on to relate 
that after the marriage ceremony was fully completed, Demang Lehar 
Daun abdicated his throne in favour of his son-in-law and instead 
became mangkubumi 'prime minister'. In contrast, in the pre-1699 
version, Demang Lehar Daun abdicated first, and then as minister, 
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established the social contract through marriage alliance. 
The subtle difference is that in the post-1699 version, Demang 
Lehar Daun's demotion from raja to mangkubumi hinges entirely on the 
social contract he had established with Sang Sapurba. If the latter 
had not agreed to the terms of the contract the former had proposed, 
no marriage alliance would have taken place and Demang Lehar Daun 
would not have abdicated his throne. In the pre-1699 version, since 
he had abdicated his throne first, the social contract served merely 
to consolidate an already existing relationship of ruler and subject. 
In the context of the post-1699 version, my informants' stress on 
Datuk Telanai's role as menteri rather than raja, implies the social 
contract set up by his father, on which the relationship between raja 
and menteri was based. This would seem to be the relevant textual 
context indeed, since as pointed out above, the pre-1699 version does 
not even mention any Tun Telanai or Datuk Telanai in Bintan. 
This discussion of the three main personae in Keramat Dang Pok 
Dang Marini demonstrates that what is being highlighted through 
'keramatisation' is the social contract between ruler and subject, 
even though the figure of the ruler is conspicuously absent from the 
keramat complex itself. But what have the personae of Datuk Hilir and 
the two Puteri, who are not mentioned in the Penurunan, to do with the 
social contract? 
Another discrepancy between the keramat complex and the founding 
legend is that there is no mention of a Datuk Hilir of Bintan in 
either version of the text, yet his grave is in the keramat complex. 
With regards to the title Datuk Hilir 'The Datuk Located Downstream', 
I suggest that the significance lies in the word hilir 'the lower 
reaches of the river'. The river in question is Sungai Bintan. In 
the Penurunan it is said that when the Palembang fleet was in the 
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vicinity of Bintan, the female ruler sent out two of her ministers to 
meet the Indian prince and to guide him to Bintan, a journey that 
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seems to have involved going upriver. 
I suggest that the Datuk Hilir in the keramat complex is a 
representation of the two Bintan ministers sent to guide Sang Sapurba 
up Bintan River. The direction of this journey is made all the more 
evident by the location of Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini itself, which 
is not in the hilir, but is fairly far upstream at Bukit Batu. (See 
Map 6.) According to my informants, the site of the keramat complex 
was the habitation site of the keramat personae when they were alive. 
The presence of a Datuk Hilir's grave in this upstream keramat complex 
thus symbolises an upriver journey -- in particular the guided journey 
of the Palembang prince. 
The Penurunan does not mention that the female ruler of Bintan 
had two daughters. The pre-1699 version states that Wan Seri Benian 
had two grand-daughters who were married to Seri Teri Buana's two 
sons. In the post-1699 version, the female ruler Permaisuri Iskandar 
Syah had only one daughter, Wan Seri Beni, who married Sang Nila 
Utama/Seri Teri Buana. Wan Seri Beni and Seri Teri Buana then begot 
two sons, one of whom married an Indian princess, and the other a 
grand-daughter of Demang Lehar Daun, who was Tun Telanai's father. 
Yet in the keramat complex in Bintan, there are two graves said to 
belong to the two daughters of the female ruler of Bintan. 
I suggest that they symbolise the wives that Bintan provided for 
the ruling house. As mentioned above, in both the pre-1699 and the 
post-1699 versions of the Penurunan, the Bintan females married the 
male rulers from Palembang. This is significant indeed in the context 
of the social contract established in Palembang, which was based upon 
the marriage alliance between Sang Sapurba and Demang Lehar Daun's 
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daughter. If that social contract was validated by a marriage in 
which Demang Lehar Daun played the role of wife-giver to Sang Sapurba, 
then by implication, a similarly valid social contract holds for the 
Bintan people who were wife-givers to the ruling house. What further 
strengthens this argument is that in the post-1699 version, it is 
mentioned that Seri Teri Buana's son married a descendant of Demang 
Lebar Daun, thereby repeating the marriage pattern initiated by his 
grandfather Sang Sapurba. (See Bowen 1983.) 
In the context of the discussion above, it is significant that 
the informants who could provide me with the greatest detail about 
Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini were not my Bintan informants living in 
the immediate area, but my raja informants in Penyengat. These latter 
were the ones familiar with the legend as told in the Penurunan and 
who therefore referred me to that text. (See Plate 17.) While my 
Bintan informants did appear to know the founding legend, they said 
that they 'did not know very much and were not able to organise the 
story' (tak tahu sangat, tak boleh susun ceritanya). Most of my 
Bintan informants are illiterate and none has read the Penurunan; so 
that source of information is closed to them. What they know about 
the founding legend seems to be what has been condensed into the 
gestalt of Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini. Even if they cannot, as they 
said, 'organise the story', this keramat complex is for them very much 
a part of the ongoing present. 
Every year, on the twenty-seventh day of the Islamic month Rejab, 
people from Bintan and other parts of Riau come ramai-ramai 'in 
crowds' to Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini to pray and berniat. Rejab is 
the seventh month of the Islamic calendar and is, significantly, a 
month in which war is prohibited. (See Dusuki 1976:280.) It is 
perhaps ironic that a month of peace has been chosen to commemorate a 
keramat complex that legitimates the assassination of Sultan Mahmud 
383 
Plate 17. Raja Hamzah of Penyengat recites a prayer for the occupants 
of the graves at Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini. 
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II. Perhaps even more interestingly, Rejab is commonly called bulan 
kawin 'the month of weddings', because it is considered an auspicious 
time to get married. (See Coope 1976:228.) This is significant 
indeed in the light of a social contract that was established through 
a marriage alliance. 
6.5 Keramat Datuk Bujuk 
There is another keramat complex in Bintan that is of relevance 
to us. This is known as Keramat Datuk Bujuk and is located in Kota 
Kara. (See Map 6.) There are four graves in this complex, located in 
an enclosure fenced by low bushes. My informants identify all four 
graves as pertaining to Datuk Bujuk, without a further individuation 
of the graves in terms of different personae. The stones marking the 
graves are big, crude, irregularly shaped, granite blocks, quite 
unlike any other gravestone that I have seen in Riau, or even 
elsewhere, for that matter. The position of these un-Muslim looking 
gravestones is also quite telling. Two pairs of the gravestones are 
placed along a north-south axis, such that it is possible for the 
corpses within, if there are indeed any, to have their faces 
orientated towards Mecca. The other two pairs of gravestones are, 
however, placed in such random positions that there is no possibility 
that the corpses are facing Mecca. 
Rather incongruently, however, a Muslim informant in Bintan, the 
ketua 'elder' of Bukit Batu, told me that Kota Kara in Bintan was 
originally supposed to be 'Mecca'; the kiblah was supposed to be 
located there. But later, the tuan said came, he said, and moved 
'Mecca' to tanah Arab 'Arab-land'. As mentioned above, the kiblah is 
the direction where Mecca lies, towards which all Muslims must 
orientate themselves when they pray and when they die. (See Moulavi 
1978:42,107). Significantly, in Malay the word kiblah may also be 
used in a general sense for 'goal' or 'aim' (Coope 1976:143). 
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In the context of Islam, what my Bintan informant said may simply 
be considered wrong. In the context of semantic analysis, however, we 
may discern a particular significance in what he said. If we 
translate his usage of the word 'Mecca' as 'centre', and kiblah as 
'orientation', we may perhaps interpret his statement thus: Kota Kara 
in Bintan was originally the centre towards which people were 
orientated; later, after the Arabs came, people became orientated 
towards the Mecca that is in Arabia. Since this informant was himself 
speaking from the perspective of Bintan, it would appear that he was 
referring to a shift in orientation in the history of the Bintan 
people -- that is, from an inward orientation towards Bintan itself to 
an outward orientation towards a centre located far from Bintan. 
According to this informant and several others, Kota Kara was a 
tempat raja 'raja's site', a negeri 'city' which pre-dated the 
founding of Bukit Batu, which is where Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini is 
located. The raja of Kota Kara and the raja of Bukit Batu were said 
to be lain-lain 'separate and different'. My informants described 
Kota Kara as being so big that the cats and the birds could not finish 
circling it in one month! They also said that during the time of Kota 
Kara, there was an iron-working foundry located on Sungai Dua, where 
one may still find tahi besi 'bits of scrap iron' (which I did find 
indeed). Koboh was mentioned as the tempat penjagaan 'site for 
defense', and Kopak as the pelabuhan 'anchorage'. (See Map 6.) In 
the absence of any archaeological evidence, I cannot say whether there 
was indeed an ancient kingdom located at Kota Kara, but my informants' 
statements suggest such a possibility. Not only that, they imply that 
it was a pre-Islamic kingdom. 
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The site at Kota Kara is also referred to by the name 'Bujuk', 
about which there is a story. The following account is from the 
penghulu 'headman' of Bintan: 
Concerning the name Bujuk, it is the name of a fish. Well 
then, in that bygone era, so the story goes, there was a 
raja there. His son asked for an image, an image of a fish, 
a fish of gold. When this was done, the child played with 
it in a pool; mysteriously, the image was transformed into a 
[real] fish. The fish was a bujuk 'freshwater murrel'. The 
name of that fish is the reason why the place is named 
Bujuk. That bujuk, it began as an image, but after it was 
played with, it became a fish of gold. 
42 (My translation). 
This legendary fish seems to be regarded as the genius loci of the 
place, terus sampai sekarang 'continuously up to the present'. The 
Datuk Bujuk 'Grandparent Bujuk' in the complex of keramat graves thus 
refers to this fish. So the site in Bintan that is said to have been 
the original 'Mecca' where the kiblah was to have been, is marked by a 
complex of un-Islamic looking graves that is associated with a genius 
loci who is a golden fish transformed from an image made for the 
raja's son. 
The penghulu also told me that the raja who built Kota Kara had 
originated from Palembang and that the present-day Bintan people are 
descended from the Kota Kara population. He estimated that twelve 
generations separate the present from the time of Kata Kara. The 
penghulu went on to say that while contact between Bintan and 
Palembang was maintained during zaman raja 'in the era of the raja', 
there is no longer any such contact at present. 
So a Bintan-Palembang connection is also associated with Keramat 
Datuk Bujuk. The difference is that, in this case, there is no 
reference whatsoever to the founding legend of the Melaka dynasty. 
Instead the picture that is presented is relatively simpler: the 
Palembang raja came to Bintan with his followers, established a 
settlement at Kota Kara, and the present-day Bintan people are 
descended from that founding population. 
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Significantly, whereas my raja informants in Penyengat were the 
most knowledgeable about Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini, the views I 
have presented concerning Kota Kara and Keramat Datuk Bujuk have been 
derived, not from the Penyengat rajas, but from my Bintan informants 
themselves. And whereas my Bintan informants had said that they could 
not 'organise the story' of Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini, in the case 
of Keramat Datuk Bujuk, my Penyengat informants were the ones who 
claimed ignorance. 
In this light, it is perhaps significant that the ketua of Bukit 
Batu and the penghulu of Bintan were among my informants who told me 
about Kota Kara as a political centre. For if there were still a 
centre at Kota Kara, then, logically, the 'elder' and the 'headman' 
would be power-holders at this centre. Therefore, for my Bintan 
informants to claim that they are descended from the Palembang raja 
who built Kota Kara, is to imply that they are themselves of raja 
descent and thereby deserving of political authority. In contrast, if 
they were to claim a Palembang descent via Keramat Dang Pok Dang 
Marini, then the implication would merely be that they are of penaung 
'protector' descent, relative to someone else who was raja. It is, of 
course, more prestigious to be raja, than to be merely a 'protector' 
of the raja; consequently, it is more ambitious to claim raja descent 
than to claim penaung descent. 
Another important point of contrast is that whereas people from 
outside Bintan also visit Keramat Dang Pong Dang Marini, Keramat Datuk 
Bujuk seems to be attended to only by the people of Bintan. In the 
case of the latter, the annual pilgrimage takes place in the Muslim 
month of Syawal, which begins with hari raya puasa 'the great feast at 
the end of the fast'. It is perhaps significant that Syawal is the 
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month from which commences the period of the haj to Mecca. In the 
context of my informant's claim that Kota Kara in Bintan was the 
original 'Mecca' where the kiblah was to have been located, it would 
appear that the annual pilgrimage of the Bintan people to that area in 
Syawal is a temporal enactment of such a claim. 
6.6 Place and Persona 
The keramat gestalt in Riau has certain ramifications which need 
to be explicated. As shown above, the existence of certain keramat 
graves in particular places contextualises those places in particular 
time-frames. For example, the existence of the keramat graves of Raja 
Hamidah and Raja Haji on Penyengat contextualises Penyengat itself in 
a post-1804 time-frame, spanning from the bestowal of the island as 
mas kawin. Similarly, the existence of Opu Daeng Marewah's keramat 
grave in Sungai Riau contextualises that place in a post-1722 time-
frame, spanning from the arrival of the Bugis adventurers. The 
existence of the tuan said's grave off the southern coast of Pangkil 
contextualises Pangkil itself in a time-frame that spans from the time 
of its takeover by the Penyengat rajas. The existence of Keramat Dang 
Pok Dang Marini in Bukit Batu, Bintan, contextualises that place in a 
time-frame that spans from the first establishment of the social 
contract between ruler and subject in Palembang. The existence of 
~eramat Datuk Bujuk in Kota Kara, Bintan, contextualises that place in 
approximately the same time-frame, but alternatively interpreted in 
terms of a migration from Palembang to Bintan in a pre-Islamic era 
when Kota Kara was supposedly the original 'Mecca'. 
If the temporal past is spatially realised, then it is also the 
case that territory is temporally contextualised. The distance 
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between different territories is thus to be reckoned not just in 
spatial terms, but also in temporal ones. For example, the spatial 
distance between Penyengat and Bintan approximates the distance 
between Penyengat and Pangkil. (See Map 4.) In temporal terms, 
however, Penyengat and Bintan are much farther apart than Penyengat 
and Pangkil which are located basically in the same time-frame. The 
relative temporal distances between these places are indicated by the 
degree of social interaction between their respective communities. 
Social interaction between the Penyengat and Pangkil communities is 
much denser than that between the Penyengat and Bintan communities. 
Indeed only a few of my Penyengat informants have ever been to Bintan, 
whereas many of them frequently visit Pangkil and even marry the 
people there. 
If a keramat grave contextualises a place in a particular time-
f rame, then what is the temporal context of places without keramat 
graves? Such places are contextualised, I suggest, in the immediate 
present. The most prominent example of such a place is Tanjungpinang, 
the urban centre. So it is not just the temporal past, but also the 
temporal present, that can be spatially realised. It is thus possible 
to move through time in space, as it were, by passing from Bintan as 
the most ancient past, to Penyengat and Pangkil as the more recent 
past, to Tanjungpinang as the current present. So these are not just 
place-names but also time-names. 
Bintan and Penyengat, in particular, are regarded as tempat 
sejarah' historical places'. Indeed they abound with keramat graves. 
However, whereas Penyengat has keramat graves of rajas, Bintan only 
has those of datuks. In this context, it is noteworthy that the 
Penyengat grave of Datuk Kaya Mepar, the leader of the Ladi pirates, 
is not regarded as keramat, but is treated like any other ordinary 
grave. (See Chapter Five on Datuk Kaya Mepar.) I suggest that this 
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is because Penyengat is the territory not of the datuks, but of the 
rajas as symbolised most prominently in the personae of Raja Hamidah 
and Raja Haji. It would therefore have been quite inappropriate to 
'keramatise' a mere datuk in such a situation. 
Bintan, on the other hand, is evidently regarded as the territory 
of the orang pertengahan 'the people in the middle' and is thus 
symbolised by the personae of various datuks. Apart from those 
mentioned above, there are several others such as the following: 
Datuk Pandai Bergendang 'The Datuk Skilled at Drumming' 
Datuk Panta 'The Datuk at Panta' 
Datuk Uka 'The Datuk at Uka' 
Datuk Serah 'The Datuk Who Surrendered'. 
There is even a keramat grave of a slave in Bintan known as Budak 
Kecik 'The Small Slave'. 
On the one hand, the keramat grave contextualises the place in 
which it is located. On the other hand, the grave itself is 
identified in terms of the particular persona who inhabits it. This 
implies that places are not just temporally contextualised, they are 
indeed symbolically personified. For example, Bukit Batu in Bintan is 
not just the place associated in abstract terms with the Palembang 
social contract; it is much more vividly identified as the place of 
Dang Pok Dang Marini and the other personae in that keramat complex. 
So the temporal past is not just spatially realised; it is brought to 
life, so to speak, by particular personae who are symbolically 
existent in graves. 
It is the existence of these keramat personae that enables the 
living people of the present-day to relate directly to the temporal 
past. For example, Raja Hamidah personifies the post-1804 time-frame 
which contextualises Penyengat. Yet a living person of the present 
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time can still communicate a personal niat to her in her grave. No 
niat is too mundane or too trivial to bring to her attention. In this 
way, the temporal past is experienced not just as a vague abstraction, 
but as a concretised reality relevant to the everyday present with all 
its mundaneness and trivialities. 
The personification of a place in this manner is not Islamic. It 
is one thing to regard a persona in a keramat grave as existent 
because he or she has been so blessed by God. As we have seen above, 
one can indeed find a canonical basis for such a perception. It is 
quite another thing, however, to then regard the keramat persona as 
the tuan daerah, the symbolic lord of the place where his or her grave 
is located. In terms of canonical Islam, the latter perception can 
even be considered syirik -- that is, to believe in more than one God. 
(See Muhammad Ali 1973:121-128.) This is canonically the most serious 
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of sins. 
Yet it is logically very easy to slip from the first Islamically 
acceptable perception of keramat graves to the second Islamically 
unacceptable perception. My informants themselves are aware of this 
slippage. When talking to me about keramat graves, the more Muslim of 
them always take care to note that everything ultimately comes from 
God, even if it is mediated by keramat personae. This indeed points 
towards the crucial difference between the two perceptions. In the 
first perception, the keramat personae are merely mediators who 
facilitate the prayers of ordinary people to God. In the second 
perception, they are more than mediators, assuming instead the role of 
independent spirits. The first is a more passive role, the second a 
more active one. But the shift from the one to the other is very 
slight and subtle indeed. 
392 
Furthermore, such a shift of perception is plausible in the 
context of an indigenous animism which pre-dates the coming of Islam. 
This indigenous animism is still very much alive in Riau. Indeed, to 
turn the argument around, we may say political legitimation through 
the 'keramatisation' of strategic graves succeeds precisely because of 
a pre-existing local animism. There are many similarities between the 
animism indigenous to Riau and the animism of the Malay Peninsula. 
(See Skeat 1900 and Endicott 1970.) 
In the context of animism in Riau, every place is inhabited by a 
genius loci, referred to alternatively as puaka, jembalang puaka, 
angkar, hantu tanah, or penunggu. The usage of a particular term 
depends on the aspect to be highlighted. The terms puaka and angkar 
tend to be used for the particular places which the spirits inhabit. 
One can say, for example, pokok itu puaka 'that tree is puaka', 
meaning that that tree is the habitation of a genius loci. A 
jembalang puaka refers to the spirit that inhabits a puaka. Such a 
spirit, however, belongs to a larger category of spirits, including 
those who are free-ranging; so the term hantu tanah 'earth spirits' 
differentiates the localised ones from the free-ranging ones such as 
the hantu penyakit 'spirits of sickness'. The term penunggu 'the one 
who waits' refers to the potential harm that the genius loci can do to 
those who trespass on its territory. A precaution my informants take 
when they are passing through uninhabited territory is to call out: 
Baik, Datuk, anak cucu nak lalu. 
(Hail, Grandparent, your descendant wishes to pass.) 
A similar greeting, with the appropriate change of verb, is used if 
one wishes to bathe, urinate or defecate in uninhabited territory. 
Such a precaution is taken even by the more Muslim of my informants. 
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The use of the word datuk 'grandparent' in this animistic 
context is significant. As we have seen above, there are keramat 
graves such as those of Datuk Telanai and Datuk Hilir, where the word 
evidently refers to a rank on the hierarchy. On the other hand, the 
word also carries an animistic connotation such that it becomes a 
double entendre, referring on the one hand, to a rank on the political 
hierarchy, and on the other hand, to an animistic genius loci. 
Both references are, however, quite compatible. In the animistic 
context, the way to neutralise the potentially harmful penunggu lying 
in wait is to set up a quasi-kin relationship of 
datuk anak cucu 
grandparent descendant 
Such a relationship parallels that between the political datuk on the 
hierarchy and his anak buah, as discussed in Chapter Five. It is 
perhaps the case that the keramat graves of datuks were historically 
derived from this semantic parallelism. In other words, a datuk who 
is an animistic genius loci can be converted into a datuk inhabiting a 
keramat grave, with the implication that the latter was once a living 
datuk on the political hierarchy and who is now buried in that grave. 
I suggest that Keramat Datuk Bujuk in Kota Kara, Bintan, is indeed an 
example of such a conversion, especially since my informants could 
give no detail about the inhabitants of the four graves or the datuk 
as an historical personage. 
Moreover, it seems possible that a datuk who is a genius loci can 
be converted not just into a datuk keramat, but even into a tuan said. 
The tuan said's grave off Pangkil seems to be a case in point. In my 
informants' allegory, it is said that there were formerly two strange 
animals who 'waited' (nunggu) at the grave. They were thus the 
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penunggu 'the ones who waited'. In the allegory; however, they are 
portrayed as relatively harmless, for they disappeared whenever human 
beings approached. Indeed they disappear altogether from the story 
after the grave is revealed as the habitation of a tuan said. Hence 
they are not portrayed as datuks 'grandfathers' to whom living people 
related as anak cucu 'descendants'. It seems to me the reason why the 
genius loci of Pangkil has been converted into a tuan said and that of 
Kota Kara into a mere datuk keramat is that Pangkil is more Islamised 
and is indeed generally regarded as more alim 'pious' than Bintan. So 
there is a keener awareness among my Pangkil informants of the 
difference between the keramat grave of an Arab tuan said and that of 
an animistic local datuk. 
~~-
The conversion of a genius loci into a keramat persona also 
implies a change in the perception of time. An animistic genius loci 
inhabiting a territory is as old as that territory itself. In other 
words, the spirit of the place has always been in existence. Its 
origin is not a problem. It simply exists. In contrast, a keramat 
grave contains a persona who was once a living person in alam fana 
'the finite this-world' and who is now existent in alam barzakh 'the 
intermediate world'. There is thus an irreversible temporal passage 
from the one state of existence to the other, a passage from past to 
present. The ahistorical immediacy of the animistic genius loci thus 
becomes, on conversion to a keramat grave, an historical persona who 
had lived in the past but is now still existent in the grave. The 
'keramatisation' of animistic genii loci thus involves a shift in 
orientation from the perception of time as the always present, to the 
perception of time as a linear and irreversible flow from past to 
present. 
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I would therefore argue that keramat graves are essentially 
inter-contextual pivots, which enable one's perception to shift 
between contexts, whatever those contexts may be. Perhaps a musical 
metaphor may be used to elucidate the meaning of an inter-contextual 
pivot. In harmonic progression, there are pivot chords which 
facilitate the modulation from one key to another. Their pivotal role 
derives from their occurence in more than one key, such that there is 
an inherent ambiguity through which one key can slip smoothly into 
another. 
At the most basic level, the keramat graves are the pivotal 
points between the 'key of life' and the 'key of death', to borrow 
Levi-Strauss' terms (1966:194). At another level, they are the pivot 
through which the past modulates into the present. At yet another 
level they allow a shift from animism to Islam. At another level 
still, they are the fulcrum of a change in orientation from temporal 
immediacy to temporal linearity. 
396 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 
1. This concern with the dead may be understood as part of Southeast 
Asian animism. As Reid (1984:15) has pointed out, the most 
striking feature of Southeast Asian animism is 'the continuing 
involvement of the dead in the affairs of the living'. He 
further argues (ibid.:16) that in this context, 'Islam 
demonstrated to the Southeast Asians that it had its own ways of 
ensuring that the spirits of the dead were at peace and even of 
invoking those spirits for the well-being of the living'. 
2. Wehr (1976:54) translates the original Arabic word baraka thus: 
••• To kneel down ••• to invoke a blessing ••• to bless ••. to 
be blessed. Tabaraka ••. God bless ••• ! 
3. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Kalau kita minta orang nolong kita sampai niat, jadi 
kalau niat tiba, itu berkatlah. Berkat datang dari Tuhan 
melalui orang. Jadi, kita berniat di kubur keramat, 
kerana yang keramat lebih dekat Tuhan. 
4. Gellner states (1969:74): 
Ideally, an agurram is one who is descended from the 
Prophet, .•• and is thus a sherif, is visibly a recipient 
of divine blessing, baraka, mediates between men and God 
and arbitrates between men and men, dispenses blessing, 
possesses magical powers, is a good and pious man, 
observes Koranic precepts ••• , is uncalculatingly generous 
and hospitable and rich, does not fight or engage in 
feuds ••• , hence turns the other cheek. 
5. My comparison of my Riau informants with the Moroccan Berbers is 
not without anthropological precedent. Geertz (1968) compared 
'religious development in Morocco and Indonesia'. His 
comparison, however, is primarily between Islamised Javanese 
mysticism and what he terms 'Moroccan maraboutism', both of 
which, he notes (ibid.:48), can be accomodated under the rubric 
of 'Sufism'. He argues (ibid.): 
Despite the otherworldly ideas and activities so often 
associated with it, Sufism, as an historical reality, 
consists of a series of different and even contradictory 
experiments ••• in bringing orthodox Islam (itself no 
seamless unity) into effective relationship with the 
world, rendering it accessible to its adherents and 
rendering its adherents accessible to it. 
According to Geertz (ibid.), this underlying Sufi aim of 
realising Islam in the experiential here-and-now is manifest in 
different ways in different places, but nevertheless is still the 
same motivation. Such an underlying theme may indeed be 
discerned in the different practices of Sufism in Morocco and 
Southeast Asia. 
The presence of Sufism in Southeast Asia is well-documented. 
See, for example, Johns (1957,1961), Al-Attas (1963), and Reid 
(1984). 
6. See Andaya and Matheson (1979:110), and Raja Ali Haji 
(1982:212,285,297,300) on Sufism in Penyengat. 
7. As Subhan (1960:110) has shown: 
A close examination of Sufism shows that the thaumaturgic 
element in it belongs to the period of its later 
development, and that it has been introduced by the 
followers of different religious orders in their attempts 
to vie with one another in proving the superiority of the 
saints of their respective orders. 
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The other three types of extraordinary events are: mu'jiza (that 
is, miracles worked by prophets), ma'unat (that is, wonderful 
works by mere accident), and istidraj (that is, the amazing deeds 
of the magician). The difference between mu'jiza and karamah is 
that the former is supposed to be exhibited by a prophet as a 
demonstration of his prophetic office, whereas the latter is 
immanent in a saint simply as a result of his union with God. 
(See Subhan 1960:109.) 
8. Al-Attas notes (1963:48) that the leaders or syaikh of the 
various Sufi orders known as tariga were almost all characterised 
by the possession of keramat: 
The workers of miraculous feats are known generally to 
Malay Muslims and to the disciples and followers of the 
Shayks of the Tariqahs as keramat. The word keramat is 
derived from the word -- karamah -- which is identical in 
meaning with the charismata of the early Christian 
Church. It means 'the exhibition by Allah of His 
generosity, favour, or grace' -- God's gift or grace to 
whom He favours. 
The Arabic word karama is thus cognate with the Greek root charis 
meaning 'favour, grace'. Interestingly, the English word 
'charisma' is indeed derived from this root. (See the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary 1976:167.) 
9. According to my informants, this last keramat hidup was known as 
Raja Tua 'The Old Raja' or as Engku Yod. It was his practice to 
give out charms called surat, on which he had written out the 
Quranic verse known as ayat nasrun. These charms were given to 
Penyengat people during the month of Safar, which is the second 
month of the Islamic year. On the last Wednesday of this month, 
the mandi Safar 'Safar bath' ritual was conducted by those who 
had received the charms. The surat was 'soaked' (direndam) in a 
big pail of water, which was then used for the ritual bath. The 
purpose was to 'avert disaster' (tolak bala) by 'protecting 
oneself' (selamatkan diri). 
10. According to my informants, there are two famous keramat panjang 
'long graves' in Riau: one is on Pengujan, the other is in the 
Karimun area. 
11. Gravestones for female corpses are flat in shape and hence known 
as nengsan pipih 'flat gravestones'. Gravestones for male 
corpses are tubular in shape and hence known as nengsan bulat 
'rounded gravestones'. 
12. Interestingly, Gellner (1969:74) says of the Berber agurram: 
An alternative outsider's definition must be offered: An 
agurram is simply he who is held to be one. One attains 
agurramhood by being held to possess it. Agurramhood is 
in the eye of the beholder. But that still isn't quite 
right: agurramhood is in the eyes of the beholders all 
of them squint to see what is in the eyes of other 
beholders, and if they see it there, then they see it 
also. 
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So even though the Berber agurram denotes a living person and my 
informants' keramat denotes a grave, the process is evidently 
similar. What is agurram/keramat is that which is labelled as 
such. 
13. These include the surah yassin, surah al-fatihah, surah al-
ikhlas, surah al-falag, surah an-nas, ayat al-kursiy, the doa 
arwah, the doa selamat, and the tahlil. 
14. The tahalil or tahlil is the act of 'praising God by repeating 
the first words of the Creed, la ilaha illa Allah [there is no 
god but God] •••• This may be chanted either as a hymn of 
praise ••• or, as a mystic exercise' (Wilkinson 1959:1149). As the 
latter, the tahalil is also known as zikir; the prescribed number 
of times it is to be chanted, both aloud and silently, is 
evidently of numerological significance. (See Al-Attas 1963:46.) 
Reid (1984:18) notes that in Southeast Asia, the tahalil is often 
used as a chant for the dead. 
15. See Benjamin (1984:39-42) on the prefix her-. 
16. As noted by Hughes (1896:713): 
Although it is held by Wahhabis and other Muslim puritans 
that the Prophet forbade the visitation of graves for the 
purposes of devotion, the custom has become so common, 
that it may be considered as part of Muhammadan 
religion •••• We see, therefore, no reason to doubt the 
genuineness of the following traditions, which we 
translate from a manuscript of the Mishkat, belonging to 
the Library of the India Office (Arabic MSS., No.2143, 
New Catalogue 154), and which the compiler of that work 
has taken from such authorities as Muslim, Ibn Majah, at-
Tirmizi, &c • 
••• Ibn 'Abbas related: The Prophet passed by some graves 
in al-Madinah, and he turned his face towards them and 
said: 'Peace be upon you, 0 ye people of the graves; may 
God forgive us and you; ye are the van of us and we 
(following) in your steps.' ••• Ibn Mas'ud related, the 
Apostle of God said: 'I had forbidden you to visit the 
graves, but now ye may visit them, for they detach for 
this world and remind of the world to come' (Ibn Majah). 
(Also see Salim Bahreisj 1979:484). 
17. The following tradition is also found in the Mishkat (see note 16 
above): 
Muhammmad ibn Nu'am related, the Prophet said: 'He who 
visits the grave of his father and mother, or of either 
of them, on every Friday, his sins are forgiven, and he 
is written down as one pious' (Baihaqi). 
(Hughes 1896:714). 
18. According to Moulavi (1978:206): 
It is a sunnah, for a doer of such charity for a deceased 
person, to intend (i.e. to do a niyyah) about that 
charity being done for the deceased, for instance, for 
his parents, for Allah will then reward his parents and 
He will not reduce anything from his ([the] doer's) own 
reward. 
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But niya has a wider meaning which extends beyond the visitation 
of graves. As stated in the Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(1936:III,930): 
The acts of ceremonial law, obligatory or not, require to 
be preceded by a declaration by the performer, that he 
intends to perform such an act. This declaraton, 
pronounced audibly or mentally, is called niya •••• The 
niya is required before the performance of ••• washing, 
bathing, prayer, alms, fasting, retreat, pilgrimage, 
sacrifice. 'Ceremonial acts without niya are not valid', 
says Ghazali •••• Further the niya must immediately 
precede the act, lest it should lose its character and 
become simple decision ('azm). It must accompany the act 
until the end •••• Its seat is the ••• intellect and 
attention. Lunatics, therefore, cannot pronounce a valid 
niya. 
19. Such a shift in niat is not a unique innovation on the part of my 
informants: 
As in other aspects of Sufi thought and practice there is 
an essential difference between the way in which the 
genuine Sufi approached a saint's tomb and the practice 
of the people. The mystic carries out a ziyara for the 
purpose of muraqaba (spiritual communion) with the saint, 
finding the material symbol an aid to meditation. But 
the popular belief is that the saint's soul lingers about 
his tomb and places (maqams) specially associated with 
him whilst he was on earth or at which he had manifested 
himself. At such places his intercession can be sought. 
(Trimingham 1971:26). 
Reid (1984:17) has pointed out that this form of a 'holy-man 
Islam' was very prevalent in Southeast Asia: 
The seeking of the berkat of holy men at their tombs has 
of course been a very marked feature of Southeast Asian 
Islam in modern times, wherever a stricter spirit of 
modernism has not taken root. 
20. The term maghrib literally means 'the west', thus denoting sunset 
time. This is when the maghrib prayers are held. There are five 
prayer-times in a day, following the path of the sun: 
waktu subuh 'the dawn interval' 
wakta zohor/lohor 'the midday interval' 
waktu asar 'the afternoon interval' 
wakta maghrib 'the evening interval' 
waktu isya 'the night interval'. 
The precise time of these waktu, in terms of hour and minute, 
varies from place to place and is hence determined by some 
religious authority. Plate 18 show the prayer-times that have 
been determined for Riau. 
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21. However, this is not the only interpretation of the after-life in 
canonical Islam. For example, fana can also be interpreted as 
the end of an individual's life and baqa as eternity through 
union with God; in this case, there is no barzakh. The 
implication is that upon the good live on for ever as part of 
God, whereas the evil become extinct. (See for example, Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr 1965:77.) In another tradition, that of Sufi 
mysticism, the consequences of death can be pre-empted in this 
life through tariqah 'the path of self-cultivation'. This 'path' 
passes through several 'stations', leading one finally to fana --
that is, mystic union with God while still in this life. 
22. There are religious books in Malay which give graphic 
descriptions of the contrastive experiences of good people and 
evil people in the grave. In one such book, for example, it is 
said that when a good person dies, two angels will come and say 
to this person, 'Sleep you then the sleep of the newly wed.' 
Then they will enable the deceased to see its former home, as 
well as its place-to-be in heaven. (See M. Ali Chasan Umar 
1981:63.) 
23. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Orang keramat mati dunia tapi hidup. Tapi kita tak tahu 
dia di mana. Kubur satu tempat tinggalnya. Barangkali 
di bawah ada rumah, tapi kita tak tahu. 
24. According to Trimingham (1971:307), in Sufism the Arabic term 
magam means: 
(a) stage or degree on the Sufi path ••• ; 
(b) place of manifestation where a saint has revealed his 
occasional presence and at which he can be communicated 
with. 
25. In Singapore, the erection of such structures have been forbidden 
by the central Islamic body, the Majlis Ugama Singapore. See 
Siddique (1979:14). 
26. The Tuhfat records that Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah died on a 
Monday morning, 28 Rajah in the year 1260 -- that is, 5 August 
1844: 
Her brother Engku Haji Ahmad and his family buried her in 
her Fort and a vault was made. 
According to Begbie (1967:80), she had been living in Melaka in 
the last years of her life. 
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27. Non-Muslims like me who are unable to recite the Quranic verses 
and set prayers can request Muslims to do so on their behalf. 
28. Perhaps as an indication of this, the Penyengat people do not 
seem to pay property tax on their houses to the Indonesian 
government. 
29. The Hikayat Abdullah confirms that the grave had remained at the 
back of the Dutch Company's garden in Melaka for twenty or thirty 
years before it was transferred to Riau. (See Hill 1970:60.) 
Maxwell (1890) discusses several reports concerning the positive 
identification of Raja Haji's body before its burial in Melaka, 
thereby indicating that there was some doubt about the 
authenticity of the body that was subsequently re-buried on 
Penyengat. 
30. According to my informants, after the sultan's abdication in 
1911, a court secretary by the name of Muhammad Medar was left in 
charge of the tanah lelohor 'ancestral land' in Hulu Sungai Riau, 
where the graves of Opu Daeng Marewah and Opu Daeng Cellak are 
located. Towards the end of the Second World War, however, he 
abused this trust and sold the land to a Chinese merchant in 
Tanjungpinang. My informants said that the land was certainly 
not his to sell; he was merely the trustee holding it for all the 
keturunan raja. Anyway, they said, any land with kuburan lelohor 
'ancestral graves' cannot be sold. To do so is to mengarak daka 
'march on top of the burial ground' -- that is, oppress the dead. 
Such an act will 'bring misfortune' (membawa sial). My 
informants said that this was indeed what happened to Muhammad 
Medar: all the money he had obtained from the sale of the land 
became worthless after the war because it was in Japanese 
currency. Moreover, one of his sons was eaten by a crocodile in 
Riau River. 
Since then, the land has been inherited by the son of the Chinese 
merchant who had bought it from Muhammad Medar. The graves of 
this merchant and his wife are also located there, by the river, 
not too far from Opu Daeng Marewah's grave. But people who want 
to berniat at the royal graves on the site can go freely. The 
Chinese family themselves are respectful of these keramat graves. 
31. Trocki (1979: 11-12) refers to Opu Daeng Parani 's keturunan as 
'the lesser of the two lines', and Opu Daeng Cellak's keturunan 
as 'the more illustrious line', presumably because the latter 
produced more yamtuan mudas. However, as I have pointed out in 
Chapter Four, Sultan Mahmud's presentation of Riau to 'the 
children of the late Raja Haji', established a divergent 
keturunan emanating from Raja Haji. The last five yamtuan mudas, 
as well as the last sultan, were drawn from this divergent 
keturunan, which was also the keturunan transmitted from Opu 
Daeng Cellak, because Raja Haji was his son. So the greater 
'illustrious-ness' of Opu Daeng Cellak's line really derived from 
the posthumous establishment of Raja Haji's divergent keturunan. 
32. Buried in the same complex are Raja di-Baroh Abd al-Jalil and his 
son, Sultan Ahmad. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982 for their 
biographical details.) 
33. In the Tuhfat, the following description is given of Raja Haji's 
battlefield conduct: 
••• He constantly recited devotional texts from the Koran 
and unceasingly read the holy work, Indications of 
Virtues, which was never out of his hands. Nor did he 
fail to celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad every 
Thursday night, just as if he were not living under 
difficulties. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:174). 
34. Significantly, the Malay word asin means 'salted', rather an 
appropriate name indeed for a tuan said whose grave is in the 
sea. 
35. See Siddique (1979:8-10) on Keramat Habib Noh in Singapore. 
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36. The third raja to hold Pangkil was male -- namely, Raja Dollah. 
The name 'Dollah' is a diminutive form of 'Abdullah'. The 
identity of this raja is perhaps best clarified in terms of a 
genealogical chart that was drawn for me by an informant himself. 
(See Genealogical Chart 4.) On this chart, there are two Raja 
Abdullahs: one was the ninth yamtuan muda, Raja Abdullah bin Raja 
Jafar, and the other was Raja Abdullah bin Raja Haji Ahmad, 
described by my informant as yang buka Tanjungbalai Karimun 'he 
who opened up Tanjungbalai Karimun'. Significantly, the latter's 
descendants are said to be found still in that area, especially 
on the islands in the Sulit strait. (See Map 3.) 
According to the Tuhfat, the Raja Abdullah who became the ninth 
yamtuan muda, was also associated with that part of the 
archipelago -- that is, the Karimun-Kundur area. The whole of 
Karimun and half of Kundur was apparently given over to Raja 
Abdullah by his brother Raja Ali who was then the yamtuan muda. 
(See Raja Ali Haji 1982:286-287.) 
However, my informants' reference to a Raja Dollah is suggestive: 
their usage of a diminutive form of the name 'Abdullah' implies 
that it was the lesser Abdullah who held Pangkil. The mention of 
a raja from Pulau Sulit coming to Pangkil may thus be interpreted 
as an allusion to a connection between the two places as a result 
of Raja Dollah/Raja Abdullah. 
37. According to the Tuhfat, Raja Abdullah bin Raja Haji Ahmad did 
indeed marry his cousin Raja Zubaidah, daughter of Yang Dipertuan 
Muda Raja Jafar. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:37.) 
38. Islamic injunctions about burial are clearly about placing only 
one corpse in each grave. (See, for example, Hughes 1896:44-47.) 
It is therefore questionable whether it is Islamically 
permissible to have two corpses in one grave. 
39. In the pre-1699 version of the Penurunan, she is Wan Seri Benian, 
also known as Permaisuri Sakidar Syah. (See Winstedt 1959:59.) 
In the post-1699 version, the female ruler is Permaisuri Iskandar 
Syah who had a daughter called Wan Seri Beni. (See Shellabear 
1967:31.) 
40. The relationship between co-parents-in-law is known as besan. 
This is a relationship which is supposed to be marked by alliance 
and mutual support. 
41. The journey is described thus in the pre-1699 version of the 
Penurunan: 
Maka Sang Sapurba pun berangkat-lah ka-Bentan. Sa-telah 
datang ka Bentan, lalu masok ka-dalam negeri. 
(Shellabear 1967:31). 
(Thereupon Sang Sapurba set out for Bintan. Upon 
reaching Bintan, he then entered the interior of the 
country.) 
(My translation). 
42. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Soal nama Bujuk itu nama ikan. L~i, zaman dulu itu, 
kata cerita itu, itu raja ada situ. Anaknya minta gambar 
patung. Gambar ikan itu ikan mas. Habis, anak dia main-
main di kola!!!_t tak tahu macam mana agaknya, jadi ikan --
ikan itu ikan bujuk. Nama ikan bujuk itu sebab dinamakan 
Bujuk itu, gambar mula, tetapi dia sudah dimain-main, 
menjadi ikan mas. 
43. To quote Muhammad Ali (1973:434): 
Shawwal, Dhi-qa'd and ten days of Dhi-1-Hijjah are 
particularly spoken of as months of hajj •. , so that a man 
can enter into the state of ihram [purity] for hajj only 
in these months, while the actual devotions of hajj are 
limited from the 8th to the 13th Dhi-1-Hijjah. 
44. The Quran (4:48) states: 
God forgiveth not that partners should be set up with 
Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to whom He pleaseth; 
to set up partners with God is to devise a sin most 
heinous indeed. 
(A. Yusuf Ali 1983:195). 
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But some kind of syncretism seems to have occurred in the context 
of the formation of Islam. Even in so sacred a ritual as the 
haj, there are discernible elements of pre-Islamic animism. As 
Long (1979:5) has argued: 
••• There appears to be sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the principal rites of the Hajj -- ritual 
purifications, circumambulation, vigil, feast, and 
sacrifice -- all had their origins in pagan cults 
practiced in Makkah from very early times and that some 
of them go back to ancient Semitic practice. 
Perhaps because of these syncretistic origins, there seems to be 
an implicit ambiguity in Islamic rituals which allow people to 
interpret them one way or another. An informant told me that 
when he went on the haj, he was very moved when he saw the Kaabah 
that is, the stone structure in the centre of the Haram Mosque 
in Mecca. The reason, he said, was because he finally saw what 
he was supposed to have been facing, when he said his prayers all 
404 
through the years of his life. (The Kaabah marks the point 
towards which all Muslim are supposed to face when they pray.) 
My informant went on to say that he was not the only one to feel 
this way. Everyone around him was also overcome by emotion. 
They all rushed forward to touch the stone. But there were Arab 
guards with whips, beating away the crowd, shouting 'syirik, 
syirik' -- that is, 'idolatry~ idolatry'. 
45. As mentioned in note 34 in Chapter Five, in my informants' usage, 
the word datuk is not gender-specific. This applies even to 
spirits. 
Plate 18. This board in the Penyengat mosque shows that the five prayer-
times in a day. The times are to be read from top left to top right, 
then from bottom left to bottom right. So the first prayer-time 
according to this reckoning is the midday interval -- zohor/lohor or, as 
spelt on the board, zuhor. And the last prayer-time is the dawn 
interval -- subuh or, as spelt on the board, shubuh. The sixth hour 
shown on the bottom right-hand corner -- syuruk or squruk -- is the end 
of the subuh prayer-time. According to a Muslim informant, prayers are 
not supposed to be done at the precise moment of sunrise or sunset. So 
if a Muslim were to wake up late -- that is, after 6.05 a.m. -- then she 
or he would have missed the subuh prayer-time. The other words on the 
board say: 
Penyengat Mosque, Tanjungpinang 
The Schedule of the Five Prayer Intervals 
Donation from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Tanjungpinang. 
(The Nahdlatul Ulama is a nation-wide Muslim organisation.) 
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7.1 Melayu Asli versus Melayu Murni 
Melayu is a term that my informants use for the identification of 
themselves and others. Although they are by no means agreed among 
themselves about what the term means or should mean, they generally do 
identify themselves as belonging to Suku Melayu 'the Melayu Division', 
in contradistinction to other such Sukus -- for example, Suku Bugis 
'the Bugis Division', Suku Minang 'the Minang Division', Suku Batak 
'the Batak Division', Suku Jawa 'the Javanese Division', Suku Bali 
'the Balinese Division', or Suku Flores 'the Florese Division'. These 
1 
are quite evidently 'divisions' of the Indonesian population. So it 
is quite clear that my informants see themselves as constituting one 
particular ethnic 'division' in Indonesia. 
But within Suku Melayu itself, there are internal differences. 
In a conference paper I wrote in 1979 (see backpocket), I had put 
forward the following classification: 
the people of Penyengat and Pangkil were Melayu yang totok 
'pure Melayu'; 
the people of Karas were Melayu yang tidak totok 'impure 
Melayu'; 
the people of Galang had baru masuk Melayu 'just entered 
Melayu-dom'; 
and the orang sampan 'boat people' were bukan Melayu 'not 
Melayu'. 
When I returned to the field after the conference, I showed this paper 
to two informants who could read English; both were Penyengat rajas. 
They objected to my identification of the Galang people and the orang 
sampan as not quite Melayu. They said that these people were the 
indigenes of Riau and were hence Melayu asli 'indigenous Melayu'. So 
being already Melayu, they could not possibly masuk Melayu 'enter 
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Melayu-dom', as I had claimed in my paper. My two critics said that 
only those people who were not Melayu to begin with, could 'enter 
Melayu-dom'; these included, for example, the Chinese, Javanese or 
Florese. As for the Minang people, it seems that if they want to call 
themselves Melayu, nobody can bantah 'deny' them this right. My 
informants felt that because Minang history has been intertwined with 
Melayu history, the Minang people can, with justification, call 
2 
themselves Melayu. 
Significantly, however, my two informants did not object to my 
identification of the Penyengat and Pangkil people as Melayu yang 
totok 'pure Melayu'. On the contrary, they confirmed this by offering 
further examples of people who were not as totok or murni 'pure' as 
themselves. For example, they pointed out to me how ancient were the 
origins of the Bintan people, going back as far as the time of Sang 
Nila Utama. The Bintan people are thus to be regarded as 
unquestionably Melayu, evidently by virtue of indigeny alone. But be 
that as it may, they are not regarded by my raja informants as Melayu 
murni 'pure Melayu'. 
Why is this so? To quote one of the two rajas: 
Orang Bintan pun masuk kerahan, walaupun dia bukan suku 
sampan. Tugasnya jaga balai, bawa tepak, bawa lilin. Kalau 
orang kerahan, dia bukan orang Melayu murni, ada sikit lain. 
(The Bintan people were also included in corvee, even though 
they were not a division of the boat people. Their duties 
were to guard the audience-hall, and to carry the sireh-
boxes and the candles. As people of the corvee, they are 
not pure Melayu; there is some difference.) 
The duties cited above by my informant were meant to illustrate the 
high rank of the Bintan people. (See Chapter Five.) The point was, 
no matter how highly they ranked, they were not orang Melayu murni, 
because they were orang kerahan. This implies a mutual exclusivity 
between these two terms. Nevertheless, the Bintan people are regarded 
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by my Penyengat informants as Melayu asli 'indigenous Melayu', because 
they are indigenous to the area. 
So the implication is that Suku Melayu contains two sub-
categories -- the Melayu murni 'pure Melayu' and the bukan Melayu 
murni 'impure Melayu'. The latter are 'impure' because they are orang 
kerahan 'people of the corvee'. Nevertheless they are Melayu asli 
'indigenous Melayu'. This inner differentiation of Suku Melayu is not 
unique to my raja informants alone. 
For example, in Sembur Laut in the Galang area (see Map 4), I was 
told that when the nomadic ~uku sampan 'boat division' people come on 
land to get fresh water, villagers there would call out to them: Awak 
Melayu apa? 'What kind of Melayu are you?' This was explained to me 
as meaning the same as awak suku apa 'what division are you in'. But 
awak Melayu apa is used, apparently because it is considered a more 
polite form of questioning. It seems that the Melayu Oyol/suku Oyol 
and the Melayu Tambus/suku Tambus are the kinds of 'boat people' who 
3 
go most frequently to Sembur Laut. 
Indeed my informants in the Galang area use the word Melayu as a 
synonym for ~ not only for identifying others, but also for 
identifying themselves. They refer to themselves as suku Galang or as 
Melayu Galang. These informants are not nomadic 'boat people', but 
settled land-dwellers. The synonymous use of Melayu/suku is thus 
applicable also to settled communities, other examples derived from my 
Galang informants being Melayu Rempang/suku Rempang and Melayu 
Temiang/suku Temiang. 
If it is the case that in my Galang informants' usage, suku = 
Melayu, then how do they identify the Penyengat people? Are those 
Melayu Penyengat/suku Penyengat? No. My Galang informants refer to 
the Penyengat people as Melayu dagang 'foreign Melayu'; this term is 
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also applied to the Pangkil people. As one Galang informant in Karas 
put it, Melayu dagang bergaul dengan kota .'the foreign Uelayu mix 
socially with the town', the town in question being Tanjungpinang. 
The Melayu dagang are thus perceived as different from the Melayu/suku 
who are identified in terms of such place-names as Galang, Rempang and 
Temiang. The latter are not Melayu dagang, they are Melayu asli 
'indigenous Melayu'. 
At this stage, we can set up an equation between the two points 
of view discussed above: 
GALANG VIEW 
Melayu dagang 
Melayu/suku + place-name 
[or] Melayu asli 
PENYENGAT VIEW 
Melayu murni [or] 
Melayu totok 
bukan Melayu murni [or] 
orang kerahan [or] 
Melayu asli 
Figure 6 The Galang View and the Penyengat View 
The two sets of terms arise from the two points of view. From my 
Penyengat informants' point of view, they are themselves Melayu murni, 
in contradiction to the bukan Melayu murni, the latter being orang 
kerahan, who are yet Melayu asli. From my Galang informants' point of 
view, however, the Penyengat people are not murni 'pure' but dagang 
'foreign', in contradistinction to themselves, the Melayu asli, who 
are differentiated into Melayu/suku of distinct places. 
Melayu asli is the one term common to both sets. This indicates 
that the indigenous origin of the Melayu asli is indeed not in doubt. 
What is debated, however, is the evaluation of indigeny as superior or 
inferior. From the Galang point of view, the Melayu asli are 
implicitly regarded as superior to Melayu dagang, because the former 
are native to the various parts of Riau, whereas the latter are 
pendatang 'newcomers' associated with the town. 
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Indeed my Galang informants joke about the manners of the Melayu 
dagang, which they said make no differentiation between familiars and 
strangers. As some of them said: 
Semua dia pun pakai wai-wai. 
(For everyone they use wai-wai.) 
They explained wai-wai to me as meaning awak 'you', which they said 
was a pronoun one should use only for strangers. So one can say awak 
Melayu apa 'what kind of Melayu are you', when one does not know that 
person's identity at all. But when one has made the acquaintance of 
that person, one should no longer 'use wai-wai'; one should use 
4 
instead either a kin term or a birth-order name. Although my 
informants did not explain how awak translates into wai-wai, it seems 
possible that wai-wai is derived from wahai 'ho there', a relatively 
formal greeting which marks the term of address used in conversation. 
(See Wilkinson 1959:1276.) As for the word awak, its root-meaning is 
'body; trunk of body' which, as a pronoun, can be used either for 'I', 
'we' or 'you' (ibid.:53). So a literal translation of awak Melayu apa 
5 
would be 'what kind of Melayu body would this be'. 
So it seems that my Galang informants view the Melayu dagang's 
usage of 'town manners' (~aulan kota) as stilted, in contrast to 
which their own 'village manners' (pergaulan kampung) are said to be 
macam satu keluarga 'like within one family'. The implication is that 
the Melayu asli belong, whereas the Melayu dagang do not. Indigeny is 
thus seen as conferring a sense of belonging whiSh 'newcomers' do not 
share. My Galang informants' reference to the people of Penyengat and 
Pangkil as Melayu dagang thus implies that the latter do not really 
belong to Riau. 
As shown by Wilkinson (1959:246), the word dagang does 
6 
essentially mean 'foreign, alien'. To call someone dagang is thus to 
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indicate that he or she is of foreign origin. Such an appellation is 
indeed apt for the Penyengat rajas, since their keturunan is Bugis-
derived. However, that Bugis derivation dates from 1722, more than 
two hundred and fifty years ago. By now there is hardly any Bugis-
ness left in the Penyengat rajas, except for keturunan. Nobody on 
Penyengat knows the Bugis language; nobody there has any~contact of 
even the most superficial nature with Sulawesi. So even if my Galang 
informants object to the Penyengat people's use of wai-wai, that 
objection is nevertheless made with reference to the latter's Malay 
speech and not to any foreign language that they may speak. In other 
words, essentially the only aspect of the Penyengat rajas that is 
dagang is their keturunan. 
As I have shown in Chapter Four, keturunan may be understood as 
patrilineal descent flowing from founding ancestor to present-day 
descendant. This principle seems to be accepted even by my Galang 
informants. They thus consider the Penyengat rajas as Bugis and hence 
dagang, because the founding ancestors of their keturunan were indeed 
Bugis. Even the commoners in Penyengat and Pangkil are labelled 
dagang because their ancestors were mostly people working for the 
Bugis rajas in one capacity or another. Furthermore, as I have 
pointed out in Chapter Five, many such employees were themselves of 
Bugis or some other 'foreign' origins -- for example, Javanese or 
Balinese. So it is keturunan, one's· patrilineal descent from the 
past, that determines whether one is Melayu dagang or Melayu asli in 
Riau. 
By the same logic, it is keturunan that determines whether one is 
Melayu murni or bukan Melayu murni. According to my raja informants, 
the orang Bintan are bukan Melayu murni because they are orang 
kerahan. But kerahan is a thing of the past; no suku still comes to 
Penyengat to perform corvee. As I have mentioned in Chapter Five, by 
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the reign of Sultan Abdurrahman Maadlam Syah (1883-1911), kerahan was 
already on its way out. According to some of my informants, the very 
last performance of kerahan took place shortly before the sultan's 
abdication in 1911, at the wedding of his daughter to the sultan of 
Trengganu. 
So a temporal distance of some seventy years separates the last 
known performance of kerahan and the present time. Yet when my raja 
informant said that the suku Bintan are not orang Melayu murni because 
they are orang kerahan, he was referring to the living present-day 
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people of Bintan, who have certainly never guarded an audience-hall, 
nor carried sireh-boxes and candles for anyone. So the only sense in 
which the present-day people of Bintan are orang kerahan is through 
keturunan. That is to say, they are orang_kerahan only because their 
ancestors were so. 
The idea of kerahan seems to be significant not only among the 
Penyengat rajas, but even among those who are orang kerahan through 
keturunan. As mentioned above, my Galang informants consider the 
question awak Melayu apa as a more polite form than awak suku apa. 
Why is this so? I suggest it is because that in zaman sultan, a suku 
'division' was established on the basis of the specific duty assigned 
by the court. (See Chapter Five.) The word suku thus implies 
kerahan, which in turn implies submission. In contrast, the word 
Melayu carries no such connotation. To be identified as a Melayu 
person of a particular place merely indicates that one is an indigene 
of that place. So it appears that whereas the Penyengat rajas 
emphasise kerahan through keturunan, the people who would be so 
labelled de-emphasise it by opting for an alternative label -- namely, 
Melayu + place-name. 
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Even though there are two sets of words arising from two points 
of view, as we have seen above, there is basically one mode of 
perception of the same phenomenon. It is, rather, the difference in 
perspective that accounts for the difference between the two views. 
In other words, the view of my Penyengat informants is a view from the 
top, whereas the view of my Galang informants is a view from the 
bottom. But top and bottom are nevertheless part of the same social 
reality -- namely, the hierarchy of inherited ranks. 
So from the Galang perspective, it is a desideratum to be Melayu 
asli, because that implies the right of indigeny, the native's right 
of belonging to Riau. From the Penyengat perspective, however, it is 
not a desideratum to be Melayu asli, because that implies kerahan 
'corvee', which in turn implies the obligation of the dominated to 
serve the dominant. So there is a debate about which is the more 
desirable condition of being Melayu. 
There are certain implicit questions of identity stirred up by 
this debate. Is it sufficient to be Melayu simply by being native to 
Riau? Is it good enough to claim that one is Melayu because one 
belongs? An affirmative answer would be given to such questions by my 
informants who are indeed indigenes of Riau. Indeed my Galang 
informants say explicitly: 
Kalau Melayu asli, dia Suku Melayu sejati. 
(The Melayu asli are the true-born Suku Melayu.) 
So for them, it is quite enough simply to be born Melayu. 
From the Penyengat perspective, however, this congenital 
condition of being Melayu is insufficient. Indeed, as we have seen 
above, using congenital keturunan as the basis of their identity would 
lead them not into Melayu-dom in Riau, but rather, out to the land of 
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their ancestors' origins -- namely, Sulawesi. On the one hand, their 
claim to aristocracy is based on keturunan. On the other hand, that 
keturunan is of foreign origin. 
Bateson's (1973:178-179,242-249) concept of what he terms a 
'double-bind situation' is relevant to our analysis in this context. 
In such a situation one is subjected to two mutually conflicting 
negative injunctions. One is damned if one does, and damned if one 
doesn't. So to apply this logic, the Penyengat rajas would lose their 
claim to aristocracy if they were to give up their keturunan. On the 
other hand, by keeping their Bugis-derived keturunan, they lose their 
claim to belonging as indigenes of Riau. 
My raja informants seem quite aware of their situation. As one 
of them said to me: There are two kinds of Melayu in Riau -- the 
Melayu asli and the keturunan Bugis. But this keturunan Bugis, he 
said, is 'a thing of the past' (dulu punya). He also noted that the 
'recent newcomers' (pendatang baru), who include Bugis, Butonese, 
Javanese, and Florese, are not to be considered Melayu. On the 
contrary, they are of 'other stocks' (bangsa lain). When I asked him 
how it is that the keturunan Bugis are Melayu whereas the pendatang 
Bugis are not Melayu, he said that the former are regarded as Melayu 
because their ties with Sulawesi have been 'broken' (putus). But then 
he went on to say: 
Bukan putusnya macam mana: bahasanya Bugis pun tak ada lagi. 
(It is not a complete break, however: it is just that their 
Bugis language is no longer used.) 
Bateson (ibid.) argues that if escape from a double-bind 
situation is blocked, schizophrenia can develop. However, if escape 
is possible, one can transcend the double-bind and attain a higher 
level of innovation. In the case of the Penyengat rajas, I would 
argue that escape to a higher level is possible for them. That is 
indeed what 'purity' is about. 
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If the Melayu asli are Melayu by virtue of being born indigenous, 
the Melayu murni are Melayu by virtue of moral superiority. The 
difference is, respectively, between being Melayu and doing Melayu. 
From the latter perspective, it is not sufficient for one to claim to 
be Melayu because one belongs as a native of Riau. Instead one must 
demonstrate that one is morally fit to be Melayu. So whereas the 
Melayu asli's claim to Melayu-ness rests on congenitality, the Melayu 
murni's claim to Melayu-ness rests on morality. There are thus two 
different claims to being Melayu: One says, 'We are Melayu because we 
belong'; the other says, 'You may be Melayu because you belong; but we 
are Melayu because we are 'pure', we are better.' 
Although the same word Melayu is used in both cases, there are 
actually two different types of Melayu-ness in question. The first 
type of Melayu-ness may be understood as 'indigeny' -- that is, a 
congenital state of existence, a passive state of being. The second 
type of Melayu-ness may be understood as 'purity' -- that is, a moral 
state of existence, an active state of doing. We shall see below what 
this latter process of doing Melayu involves. 
However, these mutually countervailing claims of 'indigeny' 
versus 'purity' comprise a single ongoing debate about what Melayu-
ness in Riau should mean. Both types of Melayu-ness co-exist and 
compete in the same field of communication, within a common social 
reality. The term Suku Melayu may be understood as referring to this 
larger context. My informants themselves seem very aware of this, for 
neither the Melayu asli nor the Melayu murni would deny the existence 
of the other as Melayu. So while the Melayu asli may claim that they 
are Suku Melayu sejati, they would also include the Melayu dagang as 
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part of Suku Melayu, albeit not sejati. Similarly, while the Melayu 
murni may claim that they are murni, they would also include the 
Melayu asli as Suku Melayu, even though they may be bukan Melayu 
murni. 
It is perhaps now clearer why my two raja critics reacted the way 
they did to my 1979 conference paper. I had evidently conflated the 
sub-category Melayu murni with the larger context Suku Melayu. I had 
thought that since the Galang people (including those of Karas) were 
considered less than murni by the Penyengat and Pangkil people, they 
were therefore also less than Melayu. Hence I had described them as 
'just entering Melayu-dom' (baru masuk Melayu). But this is 
apparently an inappropriate description, for to 'enter Melayu-dom' is 
to enter the larger context Suku Melayu from outside, and not just 
become more 'pure' within the context itself. 
7.2 Toponymic Identification and Territorial Connotations 
It is one thing to assert that the people of a particular place 
in Riau are 'pure Melayu' or 'impure Melayu', or alternatively, 
'foreign Melayu' or 'indigenous Melayu'. It is quite another, 
however, to identify a particular individual in such terms. To 
identify unique individuals, each with a different life-history, in 
terms of distinct Melayu types, an intermediate step must be taken --
namely, toponymic identification or the identification of individuals 
in relation to places. 
Lyons' (1977:13-14) explanation of the concepts 'type' and 
'token' is relevant to our discussion at this juncture: 
The relationship between tokens and types •.• [is] ... one of 
instantiation; tokens ••. instantiate their type .•.. Tokens 
are unique physical entities, located at a particular place 
in space or time. They are identified as tokens of the same 
type by virtue of their similarity with other unique 
physical entities and by virtue of their conformity to the 
type they instantiate. 
The relationship of a particular token to a particular type thus 
depends on pattern-imposition. Since the perception of any such 
pattern is a phenomenon in the eye of the beholder, the type-token 
relationship is necessarily ambiguous. (See ibid.:15-16.) As a 
consequence of this, the token-token relationship is also ambiguous. 
In the context of our discussion, the unique physical entities 
perceived by my informants as particular tokens instantiating 
particular types, are themselves and other people around them. The 
particular types they are concerned with are the various types of 
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Melayu-ness -- 'pure' and 'impure', 'indigenous' and 'foreign'. But 
there is an inherent ambiguity in trying to determine which particular 
individual instantiates which particular Melayu type. Such ambiguity 
is a cognitive threat, for unless one can fix individuals as 
particular instances of particular types, the whole typology may be 
scrambled, leaving oneself dislocated and unplaced. 
The toponymic identification of individuals is thus an important 
means of fixing their identity as instances of particular Melayu 
types. As shown above, the Penyengat and Pangkil people are 
considered 'pure Melayu' or, alternatively, 'foreign Melayu', and the 
people of Galang and Bintan are considered 'impure Melayu' or, 
alternatively, 'indigenous Melayu'. Such being the case,.in order to 
identify an individual as Melayu in those terms, that individual must 
first be toponymically identified in relation to the places in 
question. In other words, a person must be identified as an orang 
'person' of a particular place -- that is, an orang Penyengat 
'Penyengat person', an orang Pangkil 'Pangkil person', and so on --
before he or she can be identified in terms of Melayu-ness. So the 
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Melayu-ness of an individual can be determined only if he or she is 
first identified as a member of a specific Melayu community localised 
in a particular Melayu place. This process of toponymic 
identification is necessary for determining the Melayu-ness not only 
of others, but also of oneself. 
There are certain criteria for such identification. Keturunan 
has been mentioned above. Indeed one can inherit membership in a 
local community through keturunan. For example, if one's father is an 
orang Penyengat, one can also claim to be an orang Penyengat, even if 
one were born elsewhere. This implies an expectation that one should 
belong to the same place as does one's father. Given that marriages 
in Riau are customarily uxorilocal, this further implies that 
endogamous marriages within the community are preferred, as indeed 
they seem to be. However, one's claim to identity as an orang 
Penyengat would be much stronger if ~eturunan were to be confirmed by 
two other criteria -- birthplace and residence. Indeed, if birthplace 
and residence do not accord with keturunan, one's identity can be 
regarded as ambiguous. 
To give a specific example, one of my informants in Penyengat is 
sometimes identified by others as an orang Pulau Tujuh 'Pulau Tujuh 
person', because he was born on Midai, one of the islands in that 
archipelago. (See Map 2.) However, this informant himself rejects 
such an identification, considering it a detraction of his status. 
His counter-claim is that his father is an orang Penyengat of Raja 
Haji's keturunan, and that he himself grew up on Penyengat, even 
though he happened to be born somewhere else. So, for these reasons, 
he identifies himself as an orang Penyengat. 
Different criteria of identification are being used in this case. 
My informant himself uses keturunan and residence as the criteria of 
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toponymic identification, whereas his detractors use birthplace as the 
criterion. But why should it be considered a detraction to be 
identified as an orang Pulau Tujuh rather than as an orang Penyengat? 
To answer this, let us consider the relative ranking of Penyengat and 
Pulau Tujuh as places. 
My informants generally regard Penyengat as a tempat sejarah 
'historical place', the former pusat kerajaan 'political centre' of 
the yamtuan muda. In contrast, Pulau Tujuh is associated with various 
groupings of orang laut 'sea people', who were under the authority of 
seven datuks hence the place-name Pulau Tujuh 'Seven Island-
Groups'. These 'sea people' of Pulau Tujuh were divided into 
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different sukus, each with a different kerahan. According to the 
logic of keturunan as discussed above, the present-day descendants of 
these orang kerahan are also regarded as orang kerahan and hence not 
Melayu murni. So to be identified as an orang Penyengat is to be 
associated with the political centre of zaman sultan where the 'pure 
Melayu' dwell, whereas to be identified as an 9rang Pulau Tujuh is to 
be associated with the political periphery where the 'impure Melayu' 
dwell. 
But it is not always the case that people wish to disown their 
birthplaces as the basis of identification. Another Penyengat 
informant was born in Benut, Johor. However, he is not ashamed of 
this Johor connection, apparently because the place-name 'Johar' is 
associated with the former pre-1722 sultanate before it was re-
constituted in Riau in 1722. (See Chapter Three.) In this case, the 
identity of this individual as an orang Penyengat is also ambiguous. 
But the ambiguity in this case seems to favour the person concerned, 
because it hints at an association with an earlier aristocracy, pre-
dating the arrival of the Bugis rajas. 
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A toponymic identification carries certain connotations that 
would apply to everyone similarly labelled. So the population of a 
place would tend to be homogenised in terms of these connotations. In 
other words, because different places symbolise different significant 
events and conditions of the past, the respective population of each 
place comes to be associated with those events and conditions. 
Toponymic labels such as orang Penyengat, 9rang Pangkil, orang Galang 
or orang Bintan, thus carry certain connotations as a consequence of 
what those places symbolise. 
As we have seen above, one's birthplace is an important criterion 
of toponymic identification. One is said to be the anak 'child' of 
one's birthplace which is, interestingly, referred to as tempat tumpah 
darah 'place where blood is spilled'. One is thus the child not only 
of one's parents, but also of one's birthplace. Accordingly, one's 
identity is derived not only from keturunan, but also from tempat 
tumpah darah. 
Indeed, an individual's identity may be understood as the 
intersection of time and space in terms of keturunan and birthplace. 
This is an effective way of fixing the identity of a person, for these 
criteria of identification can be perceived as immutable facts 
unaffected by the vicissitudes of life, such as aging, differences in 
material wealth, or migration. So at the moment of birth, one already 
acquires an identity derived from keturunan and based on one's 
birthplace. 
As shown above, one's identity is clearly defined if one's 
keturunan and birthplace coincide. Ambiguity arises when they are 
different. To clarify such ambiguity, residence may be used as 
another criterion of identification. For example, despite the 
ambiguous status of the two Penyengat informants cited above, the fact 
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that they are residents on the island would tend to reinforce their 
identity as orang Penyengat. However, even residence is not, by 
itself, a sufficient criterion of identification. Residence may be 
perceived as permanent or temporary. If one is resident somewhere 
other than one's birthplace, one's residence there may be considered 
less than permanent. Some of my informants who have lived for more 
than ten years in a place other than their birthplace, still say that 
they are 'squatting in someone else's place' (tumpang tempat orang). 
So the idea seems to be that one's birthplace and residence should be 
the same place. 
It is, however, difficult to expect that the three criteria of 
identification would always coincide. Apart from the two Penyengat 
examples mentioned above, there are many more such cases. For 
example, if people from outside Riau -- say, from Jawa or Sulawesi 
were to have children in Riau, how would their children be considered? 
Using birthplace as the sole criterion of identification, these 
children would indeed be regarded as anak Riau. Significantly, my 
informants have a particular term to describe such people: they are 
known as peranakan -- literally, 'in a state of being anak'. So there 
are, for example, peranakan Jawa, peranakan Flores, peranakan Cina, 
peranakan India, and most significantly, peranakan Bugis. The term, 
peranakan thus refers to someone who is born in Riau and is hence an 
anak Riau, but whose keturunan derives from elsewhere -- for example, 
8 
Jawa, Flores, China, India, and Sulawesi. 
However, my raja informants do not identify themselves as 
peranakan Bugis. They use that term to apply only to the children of 
recent migrants from Sulawesi -- for example, the people living in 
Kampung Bugis in Senggarang, with whom the Penyengat rajas have no 
connections. Instead, as we have seen above, my Penyengat informants 
describe themselves as Melayu murni 'pure Melayu' who are, however, 
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keturunan Bugis. 
In this context, it is significant that Raja Ali Haji writing in 
the nineteenth century differentiated between the raja-raja Melayu on 
the one hand, and the raja peranakan Bugis on the other. (See 
Matheson 1982:125.) For example, in his Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis dan 
Sekalian Raja-rajanya 'Genealogy of the Melayu and Bugis and All Their 
Rulers', there was a clear distinction drawn between the Mela~ and 
the Bu~, as indicated by the very title. Furthermore, in this text, 
there is a differentiation made between the Bugis yang jati and the 
Bugis~ng peranakan. (See Arena Wati 1973.) Wilkinson (1959:27) 
explains these terms as meaning 'Bugis born in Celebes' and the 'Bugis 
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born in Malaya'. The term Bugis yang jati may thus be translated as 
'true-born Bugis', whereas the term Bugis yang peranakan may be 
translated as 'foreign-born Bugis'. 
As mentioned above, the Melayu asli are identified as the Melayu 
sejati{jati 'true-born Melayu'. If we combine my informants' usage 
with Raja Ali Haji's usage, we would obtain the following 
distinctions: 
Melayu jati 
Bugis peranakan 
The link between the MelaY.1::!...Jati and the ~ugis jati would be the Bugis 
peranakan, who would thus be 'foreign-born' from both perspectives. 
From the perspective of the Mela_y_u jati in Riau, the Bugis peranakan 
would be a foreigner born in Riau. From the perspective of the Bugis 
i~ti in Sulawesi, the Bu~eranakan would be a Bugis born in a 
foreign land. 
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As noted above, the word peranakan is still used by my raja 
informants, though not for referring to themselves, but for referring 
to the descendants of outsiders who have been born in Riau -- for 
example, Cina peranakan/peranakan Cina or Jawa peranakan/peranakan 
Jawa. The word-order seems to be reversible, depending on which 
aspect one wishes to emphasise for example, whether the person in 
question is a peranakan type of Chinese (Cina peranakan) or a Chinese 
type of peranakan (peranakan Cina). 
If a person of .an alien keturunan who is born in Riau can be 
considered an anak Riau, this implies that this person is also an anak 
of the particular place where he or she was born. This further 
implies that even a peranakan can be toponymically identified as an 
orang 'person' of a particular place, such as Penyengat, Pangkil, 
Galang or Bintan. If such a toponymic identification can be made, 
does it mean that even a peranakan can be considered as Melayu in one 
sense or another? 
From my ethnographic examples, this does indeed seem possible --
on condition, however, that such a person hilang keturunannya 'loses 
his or her descent'. In other words, for a peranakan Cina, a 
peranakan Jawa, or even a peranakan Bugis for that matter, to be 
regarded as Melayu asli, he or she must dispose of his of her 
keturunan from public knowledge and memory. We shall see below how 
keturunan may be disposed of. 
According to my informants, the worst insult one can use in a 
quarrel is to accuse one's opponent of being the keturunan of some 
non-Melayu origin: For example, one could say kau keturunan Cina 'You 
are of Chinese descent'; or kau keturunan Flores 'You are of Florese 
descent'; or kau keturunan Bugis 'You are of Bugis descent'. 
Apparently, such utterances are considered insulting because they 
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imply that the person so accused is really not Melayu at all, but an 
outsider to Melayu-dom. Interestingly, even my raja informants agreed 
that it was terrible to utter such insults. However, they dissociated 
themselves from the keturunan Bugis mentioned as an insult, by 
specifying that they are themselves not just keturunan Bugis, but 
' 
keturunan raja Bugis. Moreover, they stress that their Bugis 
ascendants came ever so long ago and that they themselves no longer 
have any contact with Sulawesi. 
So whereas the nineteenth-century rajas had identified themselves 
as raja peranakan Bugis or as Bugis yang peranakan -- that is, as 
foreigners born in Melayu-dom -- the present-day rajas now identify 
themselves as Melayu murni keturunan Bugis 'pure Melayu of Bugis 
descent'. This implies that a process of re-definition has occurred 
since the nineteenth century, such that the term Melayu has come to 
refer not just to origins, but to a certain standard of behaviour that 
may be morally adjudicated as 'pure'. So by this means, those who 
could formerly just claim to be anak Riau by virtue of birth, can now 
claim to be more than that. A door has been opened allowing those who 
were born merely peranakan to become Melayu murni. 
The Bugis rajas are apparently not the only ones to have entered 
Melayu-dom by openin~ up a door of 'purity'. As mentioned in the 
chapters above, there are also those who bear the Arab titles of said 
(for males) and syarifah (for females). Like the keturunan Bugis, 
these keturunan Arab have lost all ties with their place of origin, 
they no longer speak Arabic, and they are indeed Arab only in their 
claim to keturunan. As pointed out in Chapter Four, the titles said 
and syarifah denote putative descent from the Prophet Muhammad 
himself. Consequently, not only can the said and syarifah exhibit 
'purity' in behaviour, they can also claim an Islamically 'pure' 
descent. 
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This brings us to another aspect of the situation that deserves 
consideration. My Penyengat informants explicitly acknowledge that 
many of their female ascendants were Melayu. In my collection of 
informants' genealogies, I did indeed find this to be the case, not 
only for those claiming keturunan Bugis, but also for those claiming 
keturunan Arab. Thus they are patrilineally Bugis or Arab but 
matrifiliatively Melayu. 
It is significant that the keturunan Bugis and the keturunan Arab 
should choose to highlight their non-indigenous patrilineality, at the 
expense of their indigenous matrifiliation. The reason for such a 
choice becomes clear when we realise that most of the marriages 
between foreign men and indigenous women involved a higher-ranking man 
and a lower-ranking woman. The marriages are thus hypogamous for the 
man and hypergamous for the woman. In my informants' genealogies, 
apart from more-or-less isogamous (equal-ranking) marriages between 
the aristocrats themselves, there were many cases of male aristocrats 
marrying female commoners, in particular, women of the encik rank. If 
the child of an unequal marriage were to claim to be Melayu through 
matrifiliation, then he or she would be claiming the lower derajat of 
the mother, rather than the higher derajat of the father. It is 
therefore not just Melayu identity, but also derajat that is at issue. 
The distinction between filiation and descent is again important 
in this context. As I have noted in Chapter Four, filiation refers to 
the parent-child relationship operative primarily in the familial 
domain, and descent refers to the ancestor-descent relationship 
operative primarily in the extra-familial domain of political and 
jural institutions. The former pertains to egocentrically defined 
kinship categories, whereas the latter pertains to sociocentrically 
defined descent categories. 
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So my aristocratic informants' choice to remain keturunan Bugis 
and keturunan Arab through patrilineality may be understood as a 
preference to identify themselves in terms of an sociocentrically 
defined descent ideology that is operative in the extra-familial 
domain, rather than in terms of an egocentrically defined kinship 
ideology that is operative in the familial domain. Their choice is 
thus not between patrifiliation and matrifiliation, but rather, 
between descent ideology and kinship ideology. Such being the case I 
will restrict the use of the term 'ancestor' to their temporal 
predecessors in the context of descent ideology; I will use the term 
'ascendant' for their temporal predecessors in the context of kinship 
ideology. Since keturunan is defined by my aristocratic informants as 
patrilineal, their temporal predecessors who confer keturunan are 
ancestors, whereas those who do not confer keturunan are merely 
ascendants. 
So although the keturunan Bugis and the keturunan Arab in Riau 
are also anak Riau, who can indeed claim to be Melayu asli, they have 
evidently preferred to forego their claim to indigeny for the sake of 
preserving their claim to aristocracy, albeit foreign-derived. 
However, as mentioned above, despite their 'foreign-ness', they are 
nevertheless accepted as Melayu even by the Melayu asli, though only 
as Melayu dagang. The Melayu asli do not regard them as totally 
foreign, evidently because most of them were born in Riau, are hence 
peranakan, and furthermore, are residents of Riau. So in terms of 
birthplace and residence, most of the foreign-derived aristocrats do 
qualify as anak Riau, orang Riau. 
Keturunan, birthplace and residence are thus three independent 
criteria of identification, any of which may be highlighted over the 
others, depending on the advantage it confers. If a peranakan of 
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commoner rank wants to be identified as Melayu, his or her foreign 
keturunan would only be a hindrance and hence better disposed of. In 
this case, it is much better to highlight birthplace and residence 
while downplaying keturunan. On the other hand, keturunan is 
indispensable to an aristocratic peranakan. So the foreign keturunan 
has to be kept even though it contradicts one's claims to being 
Melayu. In that case, what one tries to do then is to re-define 
Melayu-ness in such a way that it would allow a native-born permanent 
resident of foreign descent to be considered Melayu. 
Interestingly, these criteria of identification -- descent, 
birthplace and residence -- are those that are normally used by the 
government of any state to classify its population into such 
categories as citizens by birth, naturalised citizens, permanent 
residents, foreign visitors, and so on. That gives us a clue as to 
what Melayu-ness in Riau is about. It seems to be about the 
classification of the Riau population, though not in the context of 
the existing Indonesian nation-state, but rather, in the context of a 
defunct Melayu sultanate. 
The debate between my informants about the different kinds of 
Melayu-ness may be understood as competing claims to symbolic 
citizenship in that bygone political order. There is thus a symbolic 
Melayu-dom to which one may belong as a citizen, a permanent resident, 
a foreign visitor, or even a new immigrant. However, as we have seen 
above, it is a matter of debate which type of Melayu constitutes, 
symbolically, a citizen, and which does not. 
From the Melayu asli point of view, the symbolic citizens would 
be those who are indigenous in terms of keturunan, birthplace and 
residence; the symbolic permanent residents would be the peranakan 
that is, those of foreign descent who are born and resident in Riau. 
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From this viewpoint, the way to convert one's symbolic status from 
permanent resident to citizen would be to lose one's foreign keturunan 
by expunging it from public memory. So according to this logic, the 
Penyengat rajas and tuan saids who are stubbornly clinging on to their 
foreign keturunan, would be peranakan and hence only permanent 
residents in a symbolic Melayu-dom that is so defined. 
From the Penyengat point of view, however, Melayu-dom has been 
re-defined in such a way that someone can be both peranakan and Melayu 
at the same time. As we shall see below, this is done through 
establishing standards of behaviour that are defined as 'pure'. 
Through this means, the foreign-derived aristocrats are able to 
maintain a Melayu identity that differentiates them from two other 
categories of Riau residents. On the one hand, it differentiates them 
from the Melayu asli who are indigenously Melayu in terms of 
keturunan, birthplace and residence, but whose behaviour falls short 
of 'purity'. On the other hand, it also differentiates them from 
other peranakan whose behaviour also does not meet the standards of 
'purity' and who are thus not Melayu in any sense at all. In a 
symbolic Melayu-dom that is so defined, the peranakan 'pure Melayu' 
would be first-class citizens, the indigenous 'impure Melayu' would be 
second-class citizens, while the other 'impure' non-Melayu peranakan 
would be permanent residents. According to this logic, the way for 
the second-class citizens and the permanent residents to become first-
class citizens would be to modify their behaviour so as to fulfill the 
standards of 'purity' established by the foreign-derived aristocrats, 
the peranakan 'pure Melayu'. 
The two perspectives thus generate two different conceptions of a 
symbolic Melayu-dom to which one may belong. Accordingly, there are 
two different modes of entry to full citizenship in Melayu-dom. The 
first mode involves fulfilling the criteria of birthplace and 
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residence, while expunging all traces of a foreign keturunan from 
public memory. The second mode involves fulfilling the standards of 
'purity'. There are thus two separate doors whereby one can masuk 
Melayu 'enter Melayu-dom' -- namely, the door of 'indigeny' and the 
door of 'purity'. 
7.3 The Door of 'Indigeny' 
As mentioned above, my informants generally regard the indigenes 
of Riau as Melayu asli 'indigenous Melayu'. But who is a Riau 
indigene? Obviously, a Riau indigene must be someone born in Riau and 
permanently resident there. As we have seen above, birthplace and 
residence are indeed important criteria of identification. 
But if birthplace and residence can be used as the criteria of 
identification, then anyone who was born in a particular place in Riau 
and who is permanently resident there, could be considered an anak and 
orang of that place. This would include even people of non-Melayu 
origins, such as the peranakan Cina and the peranakan Jawa. For 
example, someone of Chinese parentage born in, say, Galang, and 
permanently resident there could be considered an anak Galang, an 
orang Galang. Does this then mean that a peranakan Cina born and 
permanently resident in Galang could also come to be regarded as 
Melayu asli? As mentioned above, this is conditional upon the loss of 
one's foreign keturunan. We shall see below how this is done. 
When I was doing fieldwork in Karas in the Galang area, I found 
great difficulty in obtaining genealogies from my informants, because 
of a taboo some of them have against mentioning the names of ancestors 
beyond their grandparents' generation. The way this taboo works is 
very significant. 
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Let me illustrate with one particular ethnographic example. The 
following genealogy was obtained from a Karas informant Daud: 
'Saya tahu 
tapi saya 
tak boleh 
bilang' !* 
(Karas) 
Ake 
? ? 
(Karas) 
Siti 
(Karas) 
Gun tong 
(Karas) 
Daud 
EGO 
Figure 7 *'I know but I cannot say!' 
? 
? ? 
(Moro~ Karas) 
Putih 
(Karas) 
Muhammad Sah 
This was all that I was able to get from him, because when he wanted 
to tell me the names of Ake's parents -- that is, his noyang 'great-
grandparents' -- he suddenly started weeping. He said that he knew 
their names but was unable to 'utter' (bilang) them. 
This phenomenon of weeping when one wants to utter one's noyang's 
name is known as datang keturunannya 'the coming hither of one's 
descent'. (In Galang speech, keturunan is usually referred to as 
keturun.) As Daud put it, dia datang sendiri 'it comes of its own 
accord'. What the pronoun dia 'it/he/she/they' referred to, I could 
not get him to elaborate, particularly since he was on the verge of 
breaking into tears again. Nor could I get any other Karas informant 
to elaborate beyond simply saying datang keturunannya. Yet this 
phenomenon was of such significance to them that within the first hour 
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of my arrival on Karas, I was informed of its existence. 
But not all my Karas informants broke into tears when they tried 
to utter their great-grandparents' names. Among those who did not, 
there were some who simply said that they did not know their great-
g rand parents' names. Thus it looks as if ignorance may be one factor 
inhibiting 'the coming hither of one's descent'. What one does not 
know, one cannot even attempt to utter. There is thus no psychical 
conflict between knowledge and secrecy, and hence no impulse to 
resolve this conflict through traumatic weeping. 
This phenomenon of datang keturunannya is not unique to Karas. I 
also encountered it in Tembeling on the southern shore of Bintan Bay, 
which I visited briefly while doing fieldwork in Bintan. (See Map 4.) 
However, there seems to be one difference between the two 
manifestations of this phenomenon. My Karas informants said that when 
they experience datang keturunannya, although they weep, they are 
nevertheless 'still conscious' (masih sadar). In contrast, my 
Tembeling informants told me that when they are visited by datang 
keturunannya, they 'fall in a faint' (pengsan) and are 'not conscious' 
(tak sadar). Not surprisingly, my efforts to obtain genealogies in 
Tembeling were even more unfruitful. 
So what are we to make of this phenomenon called datang 
keturunannya? In this respect, the comments of some other Karas 
informants are relevant. Daud was the first such case I encountered. 
After that rather unnerving interview, I mentioned his weeping to two 
other Karas informants. Interestingly, they were rather surprised and 
started conversing between themselves. One said to the other, 'But 
he's not really Galang asli, is he?' The other replied, 'Of course, 
he's not. He's just pretending.' They then turned around and 
explained to me that only the orang Galang asli 'indigenous Galang 
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people' are visited by datang keturunannya'; others do not experience 
this. In their opinion, Daud was not an orang Galang asli; so they 
thought that he was just pretending to be indigenous by manifesting 
datang keturunannya. 
But who are these non-indigenous Galang people? As mentioned in 
Chapter Five, the present-day inhabitants of Karas say that they are 
the descendants of the Galang pirates who used to go raiding in far 
places, bringing back captives they had kidnapped. According to my 
informants, the 'non-indigenous' people of Galang are the descendants 
of the surviving captives who had been kidnapped from afar. The orang 
Galang asli are, however, the descendants of the original Galang 
pirates. 
Among my Karas informants, there is some tension concerning their 
individual identity relative to each other. The questions relevant to 
them are: Who is the descendant of an original Galang pirate and hence 
an orang Galang asli? And who is the descendant of a kidnapped victim 
and hence 'non-indigenous' to Galang? The former is evidently 
regarded as superior to the latter, because the former's ancestor was 
not a victim but a victimiser, and also because the former belongs to 
Galang as a native and is hence a Melayu asli of Riau. In this light, 
the latter would be merely a peranakan of foreign descent, though born 
and resident in Galang. 
So if my two other Karas informants were right about Daud's 
antecedents, then it would appear that he was trying to move himself 
from peranakan status to asli status in Galang, by means of 9.atang 
keturunannya. While he may have succeeded with me for the simple 
reason that I was totally ignorant of the subtleties of the situation, 
he evidently did not manage to convince his two compatriots who later 
heard about the event from me. Apparently, knowledge of his non-
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indigenous keturunan had not yet been expunged from public memory. 
The implication is that datang keturunannya is regarded as 
authentic only when it occurs among those whose antecedents nobody can 
remember. In other words, what is required is not positive proof but 
negative proof. An orang Galang asli does not have to prove that his 
or her ancestors were indeed orang Galang asli, since he or she is not 
supposed even to utter their names. What he or she needs is to have 
no known foreign antecedents. 
But not all my Karas informants claimed to be orang Galang asli. 
A number of them admitted to having non-indigenous antecedents, the 
place-names mentioned most being Perak and Kedah on the Malay 
Peninsula. For example, one informant stated explicitly that she was 
descended from the pirates' captives. She said that her ancestors 
were lucky to be looked after by the pirates macam anak angkat 'like 
adopted children'. According to her, on Karas the true descendants of 
the Galang pirates are few, whereas the descendants of the captives 
are many. She herself has a bit of Galang blood through some of her 
ancestors' marriages with the orang Galang asli. She felt that it was 
unnecessary for many of her fellow islanders to be 'ashamed' (malu) of 
their non-indigenous origins, because it is true that they are indeed 
not indigenous. Her noyang 'great-grandparent' joined the pirates as 
well. She said that once he even went back to visit his home village 
in Perak; his kin there did not want him to return to Karas. But his 
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wife and children were in Karas; so he returned. 
Such details of an individual's antecedents are likely to be 
known only within the community. Even though it may be generally 
known in Riau that some of the Karas people are the descendants of 
foreign captives, unfamiliar outsiders such as those in Penyengat or 
Bintan are not able to identify specific individuals in Karas, with 
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whom they are not acquainted, either as the descendants of Galang 
pirates or as the descendants of the pirates' captives. Such being 
the case, from an outsider's perspective, the descendants of foreign 
captives are lumped into the category of orang Galang. So where 
outsiders are concerned, the captives' descendants have successfully 
expunged knowledge of their foreign keturunan; they have become orang 
Galang and hence Melayu asli in Riau. 
If it is the case that my Karas informants weep to hide their 
descent from the non-indigenous captives of pirates, then what is it 
that my Tembeling informants are hiding when they faint at the thought 
of their ancestors' names? There is not the slightest hint that the 
Tembeling people have anything to do with piracy. The relevant 
difference in that context is apparently not between indigenous pirate 
and non-indigenous captive. Instead, what I found confusing during my 
brief visit there was trying to identify who was Chinese and who was 
Melayu. Several Chinese-speaking people I met there identified 
themselves as Melayu, and several non-Chinese-speaking people were 
said to be Chinese. Nor was I able to differentiate on the basis of 
physical appearance. 
Islam seemed to be the only reliable criterion, since all those 
who declared themselves Melayu were Muslim, and all those who declared 
themselves Chinese were non-Muslim. But even this was not a hard-and-
fast barrier, as several people in the community had evidently moved 
to and fro a few times across the barrier. For example, two Melayu 
women married Chinese husbands and therefore ikut Cina 'followed the 
Chinese'. After their husbands died, they balik Melayu 'returned to 
being Melayu'. Some of the children from these mixed marriages were 
Chinese, while others were Melayu. When I asked what was involved in 
being Chinese or Melayu, my informants, both Chinese and Melayu, pin-
pointed pork-eating as the single most important difference: the 
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Chinese eat pork, the Melayu do not. So the two Melayu women who had 
'followed the Chinese' apparently ate pork when they were Chinese, 
then abstained from pork when they 'returned to being Melayu'. 
Conversely, there were Chinese individuals there who had masuk Melayu 
'entered Melayu-dom' by converting to Islam and abstaining from pork, 
thereby becoming Melayu. So there were cases where, within the same 
family, some were Chinese and others Melayu. 
But why is there such a strong Chinese presence in a Melayu 
community? The clue to this puzzle is the location of Tembeling 
within what was an old Chinese kangkar -- that is, a plantation-cum-
11 
settlement -- where there were formerly many Teochiu workers. 
According to the penghulu 'headman', Tembeling has been in existence 
for only four generations. The penduduk asli 'indigenous inhabitants' 
were the Melayu asli who were formerly living on Ketir, the small 
island opposite Tembeling. (See Map 4.) In addition to these, 
however, there were many settlers from among the Chinese workers on 
the kangkar. Even though some of the latter have converted to Islam 
and thereby 'entered Melayu-dom', their non-indigenous origins are 
nevertheless known and remembered. So they remain peranakan Cina 
despite having become Melayu. 
This situation is not unlike that of Karas. Again in this case, 
there is a small core of indigenous inhabitants mixed with non-
indigenous migrants, in this case, those of Chinese stock. So the 
relevant difference in this situation is indeed between asli and 
peranakan -- that is, between the descendants of the 'original 
inhabitants' and the descendants of the non-indigenous settlers. I 
would thus suggest that, as in the case of Karas, whereas there are 
some who are willing to admit to their non-indigenous origins, there 
are others who are trying to move from a peranakan to an asli status. 
I would further suggest that the latter are those who faint at the 
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thought of their non-indigenous ancestors' names. 
Apart from weeping and fainting to hide one's non-indigenous 
keturunan, there is yet another way to lose it, and that is, by simply 
not taking it into account. Let me illustrate with a specific 
example. In Teluk Nipah in the Galang area, I have some informants 
who identify themselves as Melayu Budha 'Buddhist M,elayu', or 
alternatively, as Melayu Kong Hu Cu 'Confucianist Melayu'. They are 
people with Chinese fathers and non-Muslim Melayu mothers. The 
penghulu of the area explained the situation to me by saying: 
Sukunya ikut mak, ugamanya ikut bapak. 
(Their suku follows their mothers'; their religion follows 
their fathers'.) 
When I asked why these people had not inherited their fathers' Chinese 
keturunan, he said that when the marriage is not 'official' (sah), the 
child inherits the mother's keturunan. By 'official' he meant that 
these marriages were not registered either with the civil registry or 
the religious registry. 
There is, however, a more subtle point to this situation than the 
mere absence of a marriage certificate. Since the marriages are not 
Muslim, there was no transfer of mas kawin from groom to bride. As I 
have argued in Chapter Four, mas kawin may be interpreted as a 
contractual settlement, signifying the agreement of the bride not to 
transmit keturunan to her child. The penghulu cited above is himself 
a Muslim Melayu who does know of the institution of mas kawin. So his 
acceptance of the matrifiliative transmission of Melayu-ness in these 
non-Muslim marriages would make perfect sense in the logic of 
keturunan and mas kawin. So ironically, it is the non-Muslim Melay~ 
women who can transmit keturunan to their children, whereas the Muslim 
Melayu women lose this right through the institution of mas kawin. 
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What we see in this situation is a re-definition of keturunan, 
such that one can inherit keturunan from one's mother instead of one's 
father. The non-indigenous keturunan of one's father is thereby 
disregarded in favour of the indigenous keturunan of one's mother. 
According to this reckoning, the Melayu Budha and/or Melayu Kong Hu Cu 
of Galang are thus Melayu asli not only in terms of birthplace and 
residence, but also in terms of keturunan. 
But as I have mentioned above, not all my informants are eager to 
claim 'indigeny' in Riau. There are some who are quite willing to 
admit to non-indigenous origins -- for example, some of the captives' 
descendants in Karas and the peranakan Cina in Tembeling. There are 
also others who are proud of their non-indigenous origins because of 
the aristocratic status that such origins confer. Such people include 
the Bugis-derived rajas and the Arab-derived tuan said discussed 
above. There is another relevant example of the latter we can discuss 
-- that is, the orang Bintan who claim keturunan Palembang. 
The penghulu of Bintan volunteered the following statement to me: 
Penduduk asli tak ada lagi, tapi ada ada jugak, macam Mat 
Arsad, dia keturunan orang Bintan asli. 
(There are no longer any of the indigenous inhabitants, but 
there are nevertheless a few such as Mat Arsad, who is 
descended from the indigenous people of Bintan.) 
It seems that the original inhabitants of Bintan were afraid of the 
raja from Palembang. So they ran away; it is not known where. The 
raja that the penghulu was referring to was the raja of Kota Kara. 
(See Chapter Six.) He said that before that raja came to Bintan to 
build Kata Kara, it is possible that the indigenous inhabitants of 
Bintan lived in the forest, cari-cari 'by means of gathering'. 
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At the time of my fieldwork, the abovementioned Mat Arsad was no 
longer alive. I did, however, meet his son Awang Sah, who 
acknowledged that he was a descendant of the orang Bintan asli 
'indigenous Bintan people'. He pointed out that not everyone who is 
born in Bintan is considered an orang Bintan asli. He said that the 
orang Bintan asli were the first inhabitants of Bintan. They were 
satu suku 'one division of people' with their own language. But Mat 
Arsad no longer knew this cakap Bintan asli 'original language of 
Bintan'; perhaps not even his father knew it. Now there are only 
pendatang 'newcomers'. Even the keramat graves are keramat pendatang 
'the newcomers' keramat sites'; there is none of the orang Bintan 
~· 
Awang Sah said that the orang Bintan asli ran away during the 
time of Kota Kara because they did not want to be ordered about: 
Orang suruh ke sana, ke sini, orang Bintan asli diam aja, 
tak mau ikut orang bilang. 
(When people ordered them hither and thither, the indigenous 
Bintan people just kept quiet, refusing to follow what 
others said.) 
Awang Sah said that his father had told him that there were now no 
other descendants of the orang Bintan asli, except for their family. 
The others are said to have died out, though for what reason my Bintan 
informants did not elaborate. In this connection, it may or may not 
be significant that some of my Penyengat raja informants said that 
there are many kelip-kelip 'fireflies' in Bintan, because mungkin 
banyak orang dibunuh di sana 'many people may have been murdered 
there', fireflies being regarded as manifestations of murdered people. 
I was told this just before I left Penyengat for Bintan; and 
furthermore, I was warned by my Penyengat informants not to ask the 
Bintan people direct questions about these fireflies. 
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However, it is also possible that the orang Bintan asli may not 
have died out, and that apart from the late Mat Arsad's descendants 
who live in Kampung Bukit Batu, there may still be other orang Bintan 
asli elsewhere. According to the ketua 'elder' of Bukit Batu, there 
was, in his grandparents' generation, an orang Bintan asli called Mak 
Gewang 'Mother Mother-of-pearl', who occasionally came out of the 
forest to visit the village. Sometimes she was accompanied by her 
husband. The ~ said that since then there has not been any such 
visit by another orang Bintan asli. 
Awang Sah said that his father had told him: 
Orang Bintan asli tak mau langsung ceritakan ke anaknya 
asal-usulnya, kerana pantang. Kalau sendiri tahu, sendiri 
tahu aja. 
(The original people of Bintan did not want to tell their 
children explicitly about their origins, because it is 
taboo. What one knows, one keeps to oneself.) 
In contrast to this taboo, my other Bintan informants who claim 
Palembang origins say that they can trace their twelve generations of 
ancestors to the time of Kata Kara. However, when I tried to obtain 
their individual genealogies, I found that they were unable to go 
beyond their great-great-grandparents' generation -- that is, only 
four generations back. They explained this discrepancy by saying that 
they cannot each remember twelve generations individually, but 'only 
if there are a lot of people to remember together' (ramai-ramai baru 
boleh ingat). Unfortunately, no such communal occasion of 
genealogical tracing occurred during my stay in Bintan. Nor did I 
obtain any genealogy that mentioned either Palembang or Kota Kara as 
the birthplace or deathplace of any ancestor. 
So in Bintan we have once again a situation where a small group 
of indigenous inhabitants are mixed with more numerous inhabitants of 
non-indigenous origins. Also in this situation, the indigenes are the 
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ones who cannot tell of their antecedents, whereas the non-indigenes 
can. However, there is a crucial difference between the Bintan case 
and the other cases we have discussed above: in Bintan, the non-
indigenes are considered superior to the indigenes. In Karas, for 
example, the inhabitants of non-indigenous origins are said to be the 
descendants of pirates' captives, and hence symbolically inferior to 
the descendants of the indigenous pirates themselves. In Bintan, 
however, the indigenes are said to be the descendants of shy forest-
dwellers, and hence symbolically inferior to the descendants of the 
Palembang settlers at Kota Kara who had frightened them away. 
I suggest that this difference arises from derajat. As we have 
seen in Chapters Five and Six, the keturunan Bintan are a separate 
derajat in the political hierarchy, ranking above the hamba raja and 
hamba orang. As mentioned above, some of my informants, who are 
themselves not Bintan people, stated that the keturunan Bintan are 
'very nearly raja'. As I have shown above, this evaluation has to do 
with the 1699 assassination of Sultan Mahmud by the Laksamana Bintan 
and the legitimation of this act through reference to a social 
contract established in Palembang. I have also shown above how this 
Palembang-Bintan connection is spatially symbolised by Keramat Dang 
Pok Dang Marini and Keramat Datuk Bujuk. In this context, my Bintan 
informants' claim to Palembang ancestry fits as snugly as the last 
piece of a jigsaw puzzle. 
Again in the Bintan case, we can discern a difference between the 
insider's perspective and the outsider's perspective. Only those 
within the community know of the one family of orang Bintan asli, and 
the twelve generations which supposedly link the rest to the Palembang 
settlers who had established Kota Kara. From the perspective of 
unfamiliar outsiders, including the Penyengat rajas, the Bintan people 
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are considered the indigenous inhabitants of Bintan, even if it is 
generally known that there is some Palembang connection somewhere, 
since there is no knowlege of anyone else who is even more indigenous 
than they are. 
But who then are the one family of orang Bintan asli known only 
within the community? Despite the taboo on telling of one's origins, 
Awang Sah was nevertheless able to give his genealogy going as far 
back as his great-grandparents' generation, without weeping or 
fainting. (See Genealogical Chart 10.) In that genealogy, there are 
three ancestors whose birthplaces are unknown. Apart from one affinal 
connection with Tembeling, the others in the genealogy were all born 
in Bintan, either in Nau village or Bukit Batu village. 
Such a genealogy does not look so very different from those of 
other Bintan informants (see, for example, Genealogical Chart 9). All 
these genealogies have a combination of some ancestors immigrating 
from elsewhere and others born in Bintan. All of them show a 
combination of Islamic and non-Islamic names. Possibly the only 
appreciable difference is that in Awang Sah's genealogy, his 
patrilineal ancestors are the ones with non-Islamic names -- that is, 
Rejab, Ta'ang, Ajab, and Penoh. In the other Bintan genealogies, the 
non-Islamic names tend to appear among the informants' matrifiliative 
ascendants. Awang Sah himself stressed: keturunan ikut bapak 'descent 
follows the father'; he considers himself a keturunan orang Bintan 
asli only on the basis of his patri-line. 
I would thus suggest that there has been some mixing in the 
Bintan population between a relatively more Islamised sector and a 
relatively less Islamised sector. It is possible that the former were 
of Palembang derivation, while the latter were indigenous to Bintan. 
T ---·· 1 ,.l f' .. ~t-hnr cmoooc:f- t-h::it:. as in the case of the keturunan Bugis 
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and the keturunan Arab, the keturunan Palembang may be people who are 
patrilineally non-indigenous but who are matrifiliatively indigenous. 
So the factor that differentiates Awang Sah's family from the other 
Bintan people may be that the former are patrilineally indigenous, 
whereas the latter are only matrifiliatively so. 
In all other respects, there is little difference between Awang 
Sah and his family on the one hand, and those who claim Palembang 
descent on the other. Awang Sah and his siblings seem to be well-
integrated into village life in Bukit Batu. In whatever way their 
ancestors may have lived, Awang Sah and his siblings were certainly 
not living in the forest by means of gathering. In short, I could 
discern no detail of appearance, behaviour, or way of life that seems 
to set them apart for the other Bintan people. This is why I think 
the differentiation being made between the orang Bintan asli and the 
'newcomers' from Palembang should be understood more as an expression 
of descent ideology, rather than as a statement of actual difference. 
If such is the case, the Bintan situation would contrast 
significantly with the Teluk Nipah case in Galang, where the Melayu 
Budha/Kong Hu Cu have chosen to be indigenous through their 
matrifiliation, rather than be non-indigenous through their 
patrilineal Chinese keturunan. But the keturunan Palembang, like the 
keturunan Bugis and the keturunan Arab, seem to have chosen to be non-
indigenous through patrilineality, rather than be indigenous through 
their matrifiliation. Quite plainly, the reason for this difference 
is derajat. 
The Melayu Budha/Kong Hu Cu can claim no derajat at all through 
patrilineality; but matrifiliation does at least bestow the status of 
indigeny, even if it allows them only the derajat of hamba raja, which 
is the rank of the orang Galang. These informants do indeed show 
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awareness of such a situation. For example, one of them took pains to 
explain to me that he was descended from a panglima Galang 'Galang 
warrior', to the extent of tracing the genealogical connections all of 
which were, significantly, matrifiliative. (See Genealogical Chart 
11.) 
Given that such matrifiliative reckoning is considered as un-
Islamic by my more Islamic informants, it is noteworthy that the 
Bintan community is much more Islamised than the Teluk Nipah community 
in Galang. We shall see in Chapter Nine what Islamisation means in 
Riau. For the moment, however, suffice it to note that whereas my 
Bintan informants all declare themselves to be Muslim, my Teluk Nipah 
informants do not identify themselves as such. On the contrary, as we 
have seen above, they even claim allegiance to other religions --
namely, Buddhism and Confucianism -- following their non-indigenous 
Chinese fathers. 
The door of 'indigeny', like all Goors, is thus double-sided: it 
allows both entry and exit. In some cases, a non-indigene can enter 
this doorway and become indigenous. In other cases, an indigene can 
exit through this doorway and become non-indigenous. In yet other 
cases, someone with one foot in and one foot out -- that is, someone 
who is both indigenous and non-indigenous can choose simply to 
remain in the doorway without entering or exiting further. In other 
cases still, someone can enter and exit through this door several 
times -- that is, to masuk Melayu 'enter Melayu-dom', keluar Melayu 
'leave Melayu-dom', then balik Melayu 'return to Melayu-dom', as was 
the case with the two Tembeling women mentioned above. 
Before we leave this discussion, let me describe a phenomenon in 
Penyengat that is not unrelated to the datang keturunannya of Galang 
12 
and Tembeling. This is known as berkembar 'to twin' • The following 
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account was told to me by a female raja informant, whose late mother-
in-law was susceptible to 'twinning' (kembaran), especially when she 
was 'weak in spirit' (lemah semangat). When this happened, she would 
behave like a Bugis man. She crossed her legs. She ate raw eggs, 
which had to be washed clean. She would crack the egg a bit, then put 
the whole egg in her mouth, spitting out the shell later. She would 
also ask for minyak Makassar 'oil from Makassar'. However, she did no 
healing, unlike another female raja who was also susceptible to 
'twinning'. Of the three or four cases of 'twinning' that my 
informant knew about, only this latter did any 'healing' (mengubat). 
When this healer was in a state of 'twinning', three 'limes' (limau) 
would come out of her mouth, 'incense' (dupa) would come out of her 
ear, and when she pressed her fourth finger, there would be 'oil' 
(minyak). She would put on masculine clothes and behave mannishly. 
She would speak Bugis, with a 'translator' (jurubahasa) to mediate 
between her and her patients. The translator was a female commoner 
also from Penyengat. The translator would explain to the 'twinning' 
raja that the people in Penyengat 'were not clever in the Bugis 
language' (tak pandai cakap Bugis). The 'twinning' raja would get 
angry and scold the patients, but she would begin to speak in halting 
Malay, satu-satu 'word by word', like someone just learning the 
language. 
Interestingly, 'twinning' is said to have disappeared with the 
last generation. My raja informants say that they do not know of 
anyone living who is still susceptible to 'twinning'. Nor did I 
witness any such case myself. However, the translator mentioned above 
is still alive. And I have heard several different accounts of 
berkembar, of which the one given above is the most detailed. From 
these accounts, it is quite clear that 'twinning' was a phenomenon 
that was associated specifically with female rajas, especially when 
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they were 'weak in spirit'. But once 'twinning' occurred, they would 
behave like Bugis men who were not even able to speak Malay. 
My informants explained to me that the kembar 'twin' who entered 
the body of a 'weak' female raja was one of the Bugis ancestors. 
However, they were rather vague about the identity of such an 
ancestor. They would only say that these ancestors bore the title 
daeng. When I asked whether these were the five Opu Daeng brothers, 
my informants were non-cornrnital -- 'possibly', they said. What they 
were definite about was the intermittence of 'twinning'. Apparently 
the ancestral 'twin' was not present all the time; he would 'come' 
(datang) only when his female descendant was 'weak in spirit'. She 
then became him through 'twinning'. The other people present who 
wished to interact with her after she had 'twinned' would thereby be 
interacting with the Bugis ancestor manifest in her. 
In such an interaction, the attention of the people would have 
been orientated out of Penyengat where they were no longer 'clever in 
the Bugis language', towards Sulawesi where the Bugis-speaking 
ancestor came from. Indeed, my informants said as much when I asked 
about the identity of the 'twinning' ancestors; they hinted that the 
daeng in question were those even more ancestral than the five Opu 
Daeng brothers who had come to Riau. This gives us a clue to the 
reason why 'twinning' is no longer an occurrence in Penyengat: 
'twinning' implied an orientation out of Riau towards Sulawesi. 
Whereas such a centrifugal orientation may have befitted a Bugis 
peranakan, it does not befit a Melayu murni claiming cultural 
centrality in Riau. As I have pointed out above, my Eaja informants 
no longer refer to themselves as Bugis peranakan, a self-identifying 
label that we find in some nineteenth-century texts. I therefore 
suggest a correlation between the loss of the term Bugis peranakan as 
a self-identifying label and the disappearance of 'twinning' among my 
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present-day informants who now identify themselves only as Melayu 
murni. 
But why was it the case that 'twinning' was a phenomenon 
associated particularly with female rajas? I suggest that this has to 
do with the definition of keturunan as patrilineal. Although a female 
raja is also a descendant of the Bugis rajas, she is not able to 
transmit this descent to her children. Indeed, as mentioned in 
Chapter Four, some of my male informants interpret the non-
transmission of descent by the female as a sign of her weakness; as 
one of them put it: 
Keturunan dari bapak •••• Perempuan lemah. 
(Descent is from the father .••• The female is weak.) 
I suggest that 'twinning' may have occurred as an attempt by some 
female rajas to compensate for their structural weakness in the 
descent ideology, by becoming men -- and moreover, their own Bugis 
patrilineal ancestors -- even if only intermittently. What I find 
very striking is that even now, although the phenomenon no longer 
exists, my female ra ·ja informants would talk about it in a serious 
tone of voice, whereas my male raja informants tend to deride it, 
treating it as a hoax. For example, one of the latter said: 
Orang itu -- siang dia tak tahu cakap Bugis, malam baru dia 
tahu. 
(Those people -- in the day they did not know how to speak 
Bugis, only at night did they know.) 
But then neither does this particular informant know any Bugis 
himself. 
I mentioned above that berkembar is not unrelated to datang 
keturunannya. Indeed, in both cases, there is the coming hither of an 
ancestor. However, in the case of datang keturunannya, the ancestor 
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comes and forbids mention of his name, whereas in the case of 
berkembar, the ancestor comes and explicitly manifests his presence 
through speech and manners. But in both cases, it tends to happen to 
people who are in positions of structural weakness in the descent 
ideology -- that is, people who have to prove their keturunan one way 
or another. 
7.4 The Door of 'Purity' 
'Indigeny' is not the only door in and out of Melayu-dom; there 
is an alternative door -- that of 'purity'. As mentioned above, the 
difference between 1 indigeny' and 'purity' is between Melayu-ness as a 
congenitally derived identity and Melayu-ness as a moral condition 
derived from certain actions. Although there are ways and means of 
manipulating even a congenitally derived identity, as we have seen 
above, choice is nevertheless more overtly important in Melayu-ness as 
a moral condition of 'purity'. So whereas a Karas informant could say 
that there is no need to be ashamed of being non-indigenous because 
one cannot help it, it would be less plausible to put forward the same 
argument for being 'impure', precisely because 'purity' is supposed to 
be a state that one can attain through one's actions. It is 
furthermore implied in this logic that 'purity' is to be desired and 
'impurity' to be rejected. So when my Penyengat informants identified 
themselves as Melayu murni or Melayu totok, in contrast to others who 
were identified as bukan Melayu murni or Melayu yang tidak totok, that 
identification should be understood not as a neutral description, but 
rather, as a moral evaluation, with the implication that the latter 
somehow lack the sincerity or ability to choose to become 'pure'. 
Such a choice is, however, constrained by the given alternatives 
between which one can choose. As I understand from my informants, 
448 
there are certain criteria to be fulfilled if one is to be evaluated 
as Melayu murni or Melayu totok. These criteria may be presented in 
13 
the form of a Guttman scalogram thus: 
Criteria of 
'purity' 
Islam 
bahasa 
bukan Melayu murni 
or 
Melayu yang tidak totok 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 1 2 
Figure 8 Scale of Melayu types 
Melayu murni 
or 
Melayu totok 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 indicates fulfilment of a criterion; 0 indicates its non-fulfilment. 
The scale of Melayu types is derived from the cumulative scores 
resulting from the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the listed 
criteria. So Type 0 has not fulfilled any of the three criteria. 
Type 1 has fulfilled one criterion -- namely, Islam. Type 2 has 
fulfilled two criteria -- namely, Islam and adat 'custom'. Type 3 has 
fulfilled all three criteria -- namely, Islam, adat and bahasa 
'language'. We shall see further below who are the people perceived 
as tokens instantiating these four types. The scalogram above implies 
a certain order of priority in the fulfilment of the listed criteria, 
the most important being Islam, followed by adat, then bahasa. 
7.4.1 Islam 
If the door of 'indigeny' hinges upon keturunan, it would seem 
that the door of 'purity' hinges upon Islam, such that even those of 
non-indigenous origins can bypass keturunan as a criterion of Melayu-
ness and become Melayu by virtue of becoming Muslim. A non-indigene 
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who is not already Melayu can thereby 'enter Melayu-dom' through the 
portal of Islam. That gives us a clue as to who are the people who 
can 'enter Melayu-dom' by converting to Islam. They are indeed the 
non-indigenous, non-Muslim inhabitants of Riau -- that is, those who 
are dagang and peranakan, those of non-Melayu keturunan. 
In Islam there is a clear-cut division of people into believers 
and non-believers. As my Penyengat informants explained to me, a 
person is either a Muslim or a non-Muslim. They said that according 
to Islamic law, for a non-Muslim to convert to Islam, he or she must 
'pronounce the two statements of the testimonial creed' (mengucapkan 
14 
dua kalimah syahadat), in the presence of two Muslim witnesses. 
After that pronouncement, the person is already Muslim, 'officially 
so' (sah). Nothing more is needed. Even if he or she does not 
subsequently abide by Islamic prescriptions, he or she would still 
remain Muslim. As one informant put it, to eat pork or not to pray 
five times a day are simply 'sins' (dosa), for which one is personally 
responsible; but 'sins' do not turn a Muslim into a non-Muslim. Once 
a person has been converted to Islam, even if he or she were to die 
the day after conversion, he or she must be given a Muslim burial. My 
informants said that according to hukum negeri 'laws of the country' 
(that is, Indonesian law), new converts have to be registered at the 
Kantor Ugama 'Department of Religion'. But even without doing so, 
they said, the Department would recognise the conversion through 
'pronouncement of the creed' in the way they described. (See Appendix 
10 for a copy of the Department's certificate of Islamic conversion.) 
My Penyengat informants' explanation of conversion seems to be 
15 
Islamologically quite accurate. Such conversion can, however, occur 
only among discerning adults. According to a tradition in canonical 
Islam, 'every child is born with a pure nature, a Muslim' (Muhammad 
Ali 1983:280), for Islam is supposed to be the 'primordial religion' 
16 
of humanity (see Seyyed Hossein Nasr 1966:1-38). 
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This aspect of canonical Islam carries certain implications for 
my informants' usage of Islam as a criterion for being 'pure Melayu'. 
It implies that it is natural to be Muslim and un-natural not to be 
so. Since one must be Muslim in order to be 'pure Melayu', this 
further implies that it is natural to be 'pure Melayu' and un-natural 
to be 'impure Melayu'. 'Impurity' may thus be understood, in this 
sense, as a falling away from original grace, rather than as an 
original condition from which everyone begins. So the orientation may 
be described as anti-apostatic rather than as salvationist. That is 
to say, the concern is with safeguarding one's state of original 
grace, rather than with saving all from original sin. We shall see 
below how such an orientation is expressed in social interaction, both 
individually and communally. 
So important is Islam as a criterion of being 'pure Melayu', that 
the terms masuk Islam 'to enter Islam' and masuk Melayu 'to enter 
Melayu-dom' are often used by my informants as synonyms. It was this 
usage that initially confused me about the categories Suku Melayu and 
Melayu murni. Because many of the Riau indigenes are not Muslim, I 
thought that they were therefore not Melayu at all. Therefore in my 
1979 conference I described them as 'entering Melayu-dom' should they 
convert to Islam. However, as I have shown above, my Penyengat 
informants said that these Riau indigenes cannot masuk Melayu because 
they are already Melayu asli; they can merely masuk Islam. As I have 
also shown above, they are Melayu asli through keturunan. The 
synonymous usage of the terms masuk Islam and masuk Melayu is 
applicable only to the conversion of a non-indigene. 
Ironically, as a mode of entry which bypasses keturunan as a 
~riterion of Melavu-ness, Islam can create a situation where a non-
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indigenous Muslim would be placed further along the scale of 'purity' 
than an indigenous non-Muslim. The former would instantiate Type 1, 
whereas the latter would instantiate only Type 0. In a context where 
'purity' is regarded as natural and hence superior, and 'impurity' is 
regarded as un-natural and hence inferior, this would mean that a non-
indigenous Muslim would be perceived as being in a state of original 
grace, from which an indigenous non-Muslim would be excluded. The 
former would thus be morally superior to the latter. Such a logic 
makes perfect sense in the context of Islam being used as the 
legitimating basis of the Bugis rajas' authority, as discussed in the 
chapters above. 
7.4.2 Adat 
Once a person has entered the door of 'purity' through Islam, he 
or she can become more Melayu murni through adat 'custom' and bahasa 
'language'. The Arabic word adat means simply 'habit, custom' (Mahmud 
Yunus 1972:251). As a loan-word in Malay, however, adat covers a wide 
semantic range, including personal habits, social conventions, rules 
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and laws. In my informants' usage, adat refers more to prescribed 
custom than to law. It is not regarded as a uniquely Melayu 
characteristic that other non-Melayu people do not possess. As stated 
by my informants, lain bangsa lain adatnya 'people of other stocks 
have other kinds of adat'. So whereas every people is said to 
possess an adat of their own, there is a difference between adat that 
is Melayu and adat that is non-Melayu. Therefore, it is not the 
practice of just any old adat that would suffice as a criterion of 
being Melayu murni: only the practice of adat Melayu would do. 
An aristocrat informant explained adat Melayu by quoting the 
following sayings: 
Melayu bersendi adat. Adat bersendi kitab Allah. 
(Melayu-ness is framed by adat. Adat is framed by the book 
of Allah.) 
Ada raja, ada adat. Tiada raja, tiada adat. 
(Where there is a ruler, there is adat. Where there is no 
ruler, there is no adat.) 
Although adat Melayu is said to be framed by Islam, my informants 
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nevertheless differentiate between adat and ugama 'religion', with the 
implication that adat is not religiously prescribed. As the second 
saying implies, adat is prescribed by the ruler of the state; Islam is 
thus merely the framework within which such prescriptions are made. 
My informant said explicitly that the ruler was acknowledged as the 
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ketua adat 'elder of adat', who arbitrated if there was any dispute. 
If such is the case, now that there is no longer a sultanate in 
Riau, does that mean that adat Melayu is no longer extant? That does 
not seem to be my informants' perception. To them, adat Melayu 
evidently persists as traditional forms of behaviour inherited from 
the past. In other words, adat Melayu is not an open-ended phenomenon 
that can be arbitrated upon anew, since there is no longer an 
arbitrator. It is merely a closed stock of conventions that has 
already been decided upon in the past. So the implication is that the 
propriety of an act hinges not upon its rightness or wrongness as 
such, but upon its accordance with known convention. Any dispute that 
arises would hence be about the accuracy of one's knowledge of past 
ways. 
This means that the basis of adat Melayu is knowledge --
knowledge of fixed conventions and prescribed codes of conduct 
inherited from the past. Only those who know can behave in a manner 
that is 'in accordance with the conventions of adat' (menurut adat 
-·. 
453 
istiadat). Those who do not know must therefore be taught. For 
example, adat must be taught to children by adults, to juniors by 
seniors, and to the illiterate by the literate. Adat is what some of 
my informants voluntarily taught me, so that I would not embarrass 
them too much with my ignorance. A person whose conduct is considered 
unmannerly is said to be 'unschooled' (kurang ajar). So people are 
not expected to know by themselves how to behave in an approved 
manner. They are supposed to be taught by those superior in such 
knowledge. 
Significantly, among my informants, the Penyengat rajas were the 
most interested and most knowledgeable about adat. To indicate the 
importance of adat, some of them are fond of quoting the following 
proverb: 
Biar mati anak jangan mati adat. 
(Rather let your child die than let adat die.) 
Another version has mak 'mother' instead of anak 'child'. According 
to this saying, one should put in more effort to keeping adat alive 
than keeping alive one's kin. To my informants, adat thus seems 
important enough to maintain as an end in itself, as a self-sufficient 
justification. 
The underlying premise of adat is that there is a prescription 
for each detail of everyday life -- how to sit, how to eat, how to 
dress, how to greet each other, how to take leave, how to walk, what 
to say, and so on. One's behaviour is thus supposed to be completely 
regulated, down to the most minuscule specification. Everyday 
examples derived from my field experience illustrate that adat has 
much to do with social interaction between Self and Other, whether as 
host and guest, senior and junior, or as social equals. The list of 
do's and don'ts is practically endless, as the examples below will 
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illustrate. 
Among my informants, when visiting someone at home, it is 
considered adat to call out the greeting of assalamu 'alaikum 'peace 
be with you', while one is still outside the house; and it is adat for 
the host to respond from within with wa'alaikumus salam 'and with you 
be there peace'. This is known as beri salam. 
When two people greet each other, their relative rank and status 
must be taken into account. If both are of the same rank and status, 
they should greet each other with a simple hand-clasp: that is, one 
extends one's right hand to meet the right hand of the other party, 
then withdraws it to touch one's own chest lightly with the fingers of 
that hand. This is known as salam 'peace', to be differentiated from 
beri salam 'giving peace' as described above. 
When two people of unequal rank and status greet each other, the 
social inferior must show greater respect to the social superior in 
the following way. The former must assume a stooped position and 
clasp with both hands the latter's right hand. The former must then 
cium tangan 'inhale the fragrance of the hand' of the latter. This 
involves bringing the hand to one's nose, then withdrawing one's own 
hands to wipe one's face with a downward gesture. 
The above is a description of the full expression of respect. 
Partial respect may be expressed in various ways. For example, after 
cium tangan, the social inferior may simply touch his or her chest 
lightly with the fingers of both hands, instead of performing the 
wiping gesture. Alternatively, one may clasp the social superior's 
hand not with both hands, but only with one's right hand. One may 
then proceed with cium tangan, and after that, touch one's chest with 
the fingers, as in salam. 
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My informants have many other adat prescriptions for the 
regulation of public behaviour. When someone is espied walking past 
one's house, it is adat to call out: Nak ke mana 'Where are you 
going'? Tak singgah 'Not dropping in'? It is, of course, adat to 
respond to such greetings. 
It is adat to remove one's shoes before entering the house, so as 
not to bring dirt in. When sitting on the floor, it is adat for 
females to keep their legs together, bent at the knees and curved 
around one side of the body; this is known as bersimpuh. It is ~ 
for males to sit cross-legged with knees bent; this is known as 
bersila. It is not adat for anyone to sit with their legs out. 
When walking past someone who is sitting, it is adat to sidle through 
in a stooped position, with the right side of one's body forward, and 
one's right arm held stiffly at a forward slant as if to slice a path 
through with one's fingers. This is to tumpang jalan 'walk in 
somebody else's path'. 
When someone visits the house, it is adat for the host to serve 
refreshments consisting of 'pastries' (kuih) and a sweet drink. If 
there are no pastries in the house, it is adat for the host to 
apologise for serving only a 'solitary drink' (air bujang). It is 
adat to provide a finger-bowl and a hand towel together with any food 
that is served. It is adat for the person eating to dip the first 
three fingers of the right hand into the water and to dry them on the 
towel, before partaking of the food. After eating, it is adat to 
clean the right hand either by dipping it into the finger-bowl again, 
or by pouring some of the water over one's hand into one's plate. 
There is an opinion held by some people that pouring water into 
one's empty plate after eating is an auspicious act that would 
magically guard against putus rezeki 'losing one's livelihood', for a 
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completely empty plate would be the sign of such a loss. Other 
informants who are not inclined towards such a view explain the 
practice in terms of kindness to the person who has to wash the plates 
later: that is, the plate would not be coated with dried bits of food 
that would be hard to remove. 
It is adat for a guest not to partake of any food that has been 
served until the host says jemput 'you are invited' or silakan 'please 
help yourself'. It is adat for the guest not to refuse any food 
that has been offered once he or she has been invited to partake of 
it. My informant in Daik, Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa, is well-known with 
regards to this prescription. The story oft repeated by my other 
informants about him is as follows: If a guest has been invited 
thrice to partake of food that has been served, and if that guest is 
slow to do so, he, the erstwhile host, would rescind his invitation by 
having the food brought back to the kitchen. The implied moral of the 
tale is: non-adat may be repaid by non-adat. 
My informants said that a guest should not refuse any food that 
is offered: 
Kalau hi~~an ditolak, nanti kempunan. 
(If refreshments are refused, misfortune will come above as 
a result of frustrated desire.) 
For example, the guest may subsequently hurt himself or herself by 
falling down the stairs when leaving the house. Such an accident may 
occur due to a subconscious niat 'wish' to eat the food that was 
offered. As one of my Penyengat informants put it, kalau ada niat, 
harus sampai 'if one has a wish, one must realise it'. Otherwise, the 
wish may try to express itself in all sorts of ways beyond one's 
control.\ The involuntary expression of an unfulfilled wish is 
referred to as kempunan. This idea is explicitly expressed by my 
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informants when they offer food to their guests. They may say, for 
example, 'eat up; otherwise kempunan will arise'. 
Another adat prescription that has to do with hospitality is that 
if the host and guest are sharing a meal, it is adat for the host to 
re-fill the guest's plate before it is empty. It is adat for the guest 
to eat a second helping of rice. It is adat for the host to allow the 
guest to finish eating first. If the host has only one morsel of food 
left, that morsel must be moved around the plate until the guest has 
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finished eating. Only then can the host swallow his last morsel. 
Adat as the public display of codified manners is perhaps most 
evident during weddings when it is elaborated into a form of 
ceremonial theatre. The examples above indicate the concern with the 
interaction between host and guest. Such interaction is indeed the 
focus of attention at a wedding, including the interaction between the 
bride's family hosting the wedding and the bridegroom who comes as a 
guest to the bride's home. Significantly, the bridal couple are said 
to be raja sehari 'king and queen for the day', and are indeed dressed 
in lavish costumes that would be appropriate to such a status. (See 
Plate 19.) In this light, the coming of the bridegroom as a guest to 
the home of the hosting bride may perhaps be understood as a re-
enactment of the primordial marriage alliance, when a prince of 
foreign origins -- for example, Sang Nila Utama -~ comes and marries 
an indigenous princess. (See the Penurunan.) The ceremonial adat 
that prescribes for the behaviour of each and every participant at a 
wedding is too complex to describe here. So suffice it to note that 
the wedding constitutes a public occasion when the hosting family's 
knowledge and practice of adat can be communally judged. 
This is indeed the point of adat Melayu: it is supposed to be a 
universally applicable code of behaviour, on the basis of which all 
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may be judged as being well-mannered or ill-mannered. According to 
this logic, those whose manners fall short of such an etiquette cannot 
be considered Melayu murni. Since adat is supposed to be framed by 
Islam, the implication is that in Riau, those who are the most Islamic 
are also the most knowledgeable about adat. They are thus in a 
position to judge their less Islamic fellows as vulgar and uncouth. 
For example, my Penyengat informants make comments about how 
truncated and skimpy the weddings of other island communities are, 
because the people there do not know the proper wedding adat. 
According to these informants, the most barbaric are the Mantang 'boat 
people', who are said to practise a ceremony where the bridegroom 
chases the bride around a busut 'ant-hill' on the beach, then makes 
off with her in a boat. I have no evidence that this is indeed what 
happens. Nevertheless, such a description is significant simply as my 
Penyengat informants' perception of those who are less civilised than 
themselves. 
Apart from my raja informants on Penyengat, however, not all my 
informants are as favourably disposed towards adat. For example, one 
of them, a school principal in Tanjungpinang, said that in his 
opinion, adat Melayu is 'not spontaneous, too rigid' (tidak spontan, 
terlalu pasti); this induces people to be 'hard-hearted' (hati keras). 
According to him, this 'hard-hearted' interior is 'not exposed' (tidak 
terbuka), but is 'hidden' (sembunyi) by the codified manners 
prescribed by adat. 
7.4.3 Bahasa 
Let us now turn our attention to bahasa 'language', which is 
indeed connected to adat. There is a phrase used by my informants 
that illustrates this connection budi bahasa. Budi, it seems, is 
intention, and bahasa is the expression of this intention. I 
paraphrase below an informant's explanation of budi bahasa. 
Let's suppose you see on the road an old woman struggling 
with a heavy burden. You wish to help her. That wish is 
budi. But you cannot just rush forward to relieve her of 
the burden; she may think you are a robber. You must first 
greet her, saying: Mak Cik nak ke mana 'Where are you going 
going Auntie?' That is bahasa. Only after you have 
conversed with her may you then help her with her burden. 
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This informant went on to remark that although the word budi precedes 
the word bahasa in the phrase budi bahasa, in acting out budi bahasa, 
there must first be bahasa before there can be budi.. The implied 
moral of the tale is: even good intentions require proper forms of 
expression, and the proper forms are prescribed by adat. 
Among the examples of adat I have cited are some stock greetings 
and pleasantries (of which the abovementioned Mak Cik nak ke mana 
would be one example). The utterance of these adat idioms is 
generally referred to as bahasa. As my informants explained, bahasa 
is 'fine speech' (cakapan halus); 'coarse speech' (cakapan kasar) is 
not bahasa, because it is 'not beautiful' (tak molek), 'not pure' (tak 
totok). This implies that 'fine', 'beautiful', and 'pure' speech is 
speech that accords with adat, with the conventions of etiquette. It 
follows then that bahasa, like adat, is a prescriptive code designed 
to regulate behaviour -- in this case, speech behaviour. 
Bahasa may perhaps be compared to 'the Queen's/King's English', a 
term which refers to 'the English language as correctly written or 
spoken' (Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976:343). There are three 
significant points that may be drawn from this comparison. First, 
there is the idea that there is one particular form of the language 
that is 'correct'; the corollary to this is that all other forms are 
either less 'correct' or downright 'incorrect'. Second, there is the 
idea that there is some figure of authority controlling the 
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'correctness' of the language; the corollary to this is that those who 
are not in authority cannot possibly do this. Third, there is the 
idea that the 'correct' form may be both written and spoken, and that 
'correct' writing and 'correct' speech should mirror each other; the 
corollary to this is that speech which has no written equivalent is 
'incorrect'. (See Goody 1977 on the impact of literacy on 
consciousness.) 
Among those informants who identify themselves as murni/totok 
'pure', bahasa does indeed seem to be regarded as the one 'correct' 
form of the language. These murni informants indeed regard themselves 
as arbiters of the 'correctness' of the language. So if 'correct' 
English belongs, so to speak, to the British Queen or King, then 
'correct' bahasa belongs to the 'pure' Melayu, the Penyengat rajas in 
particular. Like the Queen's/King's English, bahasa is the raja's 
Malay. Furthermore, speech that has no written equivalent is regarded 
by them as 'coarse', 'ugly', and 'impure' -- hence not bahasa. There 
are certain words in Riau vocabulary which they often cite as the 
markers of non-bahasa; these are words not found in the written 
language. People who use these 'impure' words are themselves 
considered 'impure' -- hence bukan Melayu murni or Melayu yang tidak 
totok. As shown in the scalogram above, the line that divides the 
'impure' Melayu from the 'pure' Melayu may be drawn between the non-
fulfilment and the fulfilment of bahasa as a criterion of 'purity'. 
After one has fulfilled the other two criteria, one must cross the 
crucial threshold of bahasa: one must learn to speak as a literate. 
The words often cited as the markers of non-bahasa are listed 
below, together with their bahasa equivalents: 
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NON-BAHASA BAHASA 
auk ya 'yes' 
isak/ngan = tidak mau 'do not want' 
musak/kok ade'k = tidak ada 'no;. is not; do not have' 
ikeh ini 'this' 
ik~h ikak = kamu sekalian 'all of you' 
diko/mikak/ng~n = awak/engkau 'you' 
ambo = aku/saya 'I' 
seke = sini 'here' 
kian/k~kian = mari 'come here' 
kiun/kekiun = pergi ke sana 'go there' 
k~tok = air kering 'the tide is out' 
This word-list is relatively short, but nevertheless sufficient as a 
means of categorising people. Among my murni informants, one need 
only say orang sana pakai auk 'the people over there use auk', and 
those people may already be identified as 'impure'. The non-bahasa 
words listed above are derived from more than one community; my murni 
informants are quite aware of this heterogeneity. However, for them 
what counts is that the 'correct' bahasa forms are not being used, but 
replaced instead by certain 'incorrect' forms, whatever these latter 
may happen to be. So, while they may be aware, for example, that 
musak is used in Galang, and kok adek in Bintan, this difference is 
relatively insignificant to them; what is important is that both forms 
differ from the bahasa form and are hence 'incorrect'. Furthermore, 
there are many other words in Bintan and Galang speech, to use the 
same two examples, that are similar, if not identical, to the bahasa 
forms. But these are downplayed; instead the relatively few 
differences are highlighted. 
Of some sociolinguistic significance is my subsequent discovery 
(in December 1983) that in Lingga, even the tengkus use non-bahasa 
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forms such as auk and mikak in their everyday speech. They were aware 
that such forms might be considered 'impure' and consequently felt 
impelled to justify these words as pertaining to bahasa lama 'old 
bahasa'. In striking contrast to this, the Penyengat rajas never 
and I state that categorically use these non-bahasa forms in their 
own speech, even though they evidently know about them, to be able to 
cite them as markers of non-bahasa. 
On this basis, we may perhaps speculate that bahasa Riau was an 
historical creation of the Bugis rajas, who attempted and, to a large 
extent, succeeded in establishing new standards of 'correctness' in 
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the language, thereby becoming its new arbiters. By 'new' I mean 
post-1722, in contrast to the 'old' pre-1722 situation in Johar. 
However, if such was the case, then it may seem strange that the non-
bahasa forms are also not found in those texts which purportedly date 
from the pre-1722 Johar era, such as the Penurunan and Hang Tuah. 
At least two explanations are possible. First, there may have been 
indeed a difference betweeen writing and speech, but people then may 
not have felt the need to unify the two. This seems to be still the 
case in certain states in the Malay Peninsula -- for example, Kedah 
and Kelantan where people are evidently content to write in one way 
and speak in another. This implies that the innovation of the Bugis 
raj~ was to speak what was hitherto only written. The second 
explanation is that the copyists censored out the non-bahasa forms 
from the early manuscripts. To take the Penurunan as an example, 
Roolvink (1970:xvi) has pointed out that although the date of 1612 is 
found in one of the twenty-odd manuscripts of the text, 
yet we should bear in mind that almost all these manuscripts 
are late copies dating from the nineteenth century. 
And by then, bahasa Riau would have been well-entrenched. 
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However, as a criterion of 'purity', the focus of bahasa is not 
on writing but on speech, the crucial difference being between speech 
without writing and speech with writing. Writing itself is, by 
definition, bahasa; there can be no 'impure' writing, in the same way 
as there can be 'impure', or non-written, speech. Supportive of this 
argument is my Penyengat informants' attitude towards bahasa 
Indonesia, the Indonesian national language, which they regard merely 
as different, not 'impure'. The reason, I suggest, is because 
Indonesian is written as well as spoken: it is a literate language. 
Literacy is of course crucial to Islam, a self-proclaimed 
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religion of the Book. An illiterate individual may be able to learn 
some religious tenets and prayers by rote, if he or she were to belong 
to a community that is on the whole literate. There are indeed such 
individuals in Penyengat and Pangkil, where the communities are 
largely literate. But in wholly non-literate communities without 
access to canonical knowledge, what can the practice of Islam possibly 
mean? I shall attempt to answer that question in Chapter Nine. 
The three criteria of 'purity' discussed above illustrate that to 
be 'pure' is to adhere to a world religion (Islam), to have refined 
manners (adat), and to be literate (bahasa) -- in short, to be 
civilised. So the term Melayu murni refers not only to a kind of 
Melayu-ness, but to a kind of civilisation among the civilisations of 
the world. Unlike the door of 'indigeny', the door of 'purity' leads 
to Melayu-dom not through local connections, but through cosmopolitan 
links. In this context, the foreign derivations of the keturunan 
Bugis and the keturunan Arab may even be construed as an advantage. 
In Chapter Five, I argued that though the sultanate claimed the 
sole legitimate use of physical force, this force was sublimated by 
various means. In this chapter, we see the contents of this 
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sublimation in the form of 'purity' that is, a moral code of 
behaviour whereby all may be judged as 'pure' or 'impure'. Elias' 
(1978) discussion of 'the civilising process' is of relevance to our 
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analysis. His description (ibid.:50) of the bourgeoisie in 
eighteenth-century France seems applicable to the Melayu murni in 
present-day Riau: 
They see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished 
civilisation to others, as standard-bearers of expanding 
civilisation. Of the whole preceding process of 
civilisation nothing remains in their consciousness except a 
vague residue. Its outcome is taken simply as an expression 
of their own higher gifts ••.• And the consciousness of 
their own superiority, the consciousness of this 
'civilisation' .•• serves those .•• [who] ••. have become colonial 
conquerors, and therefore a kind of upper class .•. as a 
justification of their rule. 
7.5 The 'Pure' and the 'Impure' 
If it is the case that the Penyengat rajas see themselves as the 
standard-bearers of Melayu civilisation, then who are the uncivilised 
people who fall short of such a standard? Interestingly, in such a 
context, the focus is not on non-Melayu people such as the Javanese, 
Chinese or Europeans. Instead, the focus is on those who are Melayu 
but 'impure' -- that is, the Melayu asli who are bukan Melayu murni. 
As mentioned above, my raja informants identify the 'impure Melayu' as 
orang kerahan. Indeed in their discourse, derajat translates into 
Melayu-ness in a way that may be depicted thus: 
DERAJAT 
orang bangsawan: 
'aristocrats' 
orang merdeka: 
'free people' 
orang kerahan: 
'vassals' 
?rang hamba: 
'slaves' 
raja, tengku 
tuan said 
encik datuk 
encik keturunan 
2!:'.ang biasa 
keturunan Bintan 
hamba ra~ 
Figure 9 Derajat and Suku Melayu 
SUKU MELAYU 
Melayu murni 
type 3 
Melayu murni 
type 3 
bukan Melayu murni 
type 2 
bukan Melayu murni 
type 1, type 0 
non-existent at 
present 
So rank translates into type, at least from the perspective of 
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those who consider themselves murni. As shown in Chapter Four, these 
ranks pertain to a defunct sultanate, and as such, are not experienced 
in themselves. A keturunan raja living in the present is not 
experiencing the Life led by rajas in zaman sultan; indeed in many 
cases, there is hardly any difference in the physical quality of life 
led by, say, a keturunan raja and a keturunan hamba raja. There is, 
after all, no sultan, no court, no Riau-Lingga sultanate, no state 
revenue, no stipend for aristocrats, no state employees, no warriors, 
and no slaves. In other words, the material basis of rank is gone. 
Nevertheless, the sultanate is still extant as an ideology which 
enables the hierarchisation of Self and Other, at least for some of my 
informants. 
In the context of an institutionally extinct sultanate, how is 
one to identify people as pertaining to the different derajat, since 
the aristocrats no longer rule, the people in the middle no longer 
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mediate, and the vassals no longer serve? This is where toponymic 
identification figures importantly as a means of fixing the identity 
of individuals in relation to particular places in Riau. As a result, 
people are ranked in terms of the territorial connotations of their 
toponym. With reference to the examples given above, Penyengat was 
the yamtuan muda's capital in zaman sultan; it carries the connotation 
of being the place of the rajas. Its inhabitants, the orang 
Penyengat, are thereby associated with the derajat of raja, which in 
turn translates into Melayu murni. In contrast, Galang was the area 
of the Galang pirates during zaman sultan, who belonged to the derajat 
of hamba raja, albeit rebelliously so. The present-day inhabitants of 
the area, the orang Galang, are thereby associated with that derajat, 
which in turn translates into bukan Melayu murni. So the hierarchy of 
derajat derived from zaman sultan is being realised in the present 
through territoriality, whereby people are identified toponymically in 
terms of places, and places are ranked vis-a-vis each other. 
Consequently, the translation of derajat into Melayu-ness is 
extended to a hierarchisation of local communities, and thereby of 
people as members of these communities. From the perspective of my 
informants who identify themselves as orang Penyengat 'Penyengat 
people', the local communities in their immediate vicinity may be 
hierarchised thus: 
SUKU MELAYU 
Melayu murni 
type 3 
bukan Melayu murni 
type 2 
bukan Melayu murni 
type 1 
bukan Melayu murni 
type 0 
SOME INSTANTIATING LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
Penyengat 
Pangkil, Pengujan 
Bin tan 
Tembeling, Dompak 
Galang 
Figure 10 A Hierarchisation of Some Local Communities 
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It is significant that Tanjungpinang, which is just opposite 
Penyengat, is not included in this hierarchy. As the former Dutch 
base, and as the current capital of the Indonesian 'district' 
(kabupaten) and 'sub-district' (kecamatan), it is not regarded by my 
Penyengat informants as a Melayu locality. On the contrary, to call 
someone an orang Tanjungpinang is to indicate that she or he is not 
Melayu at all, but of some foreign origin outside Riau. In other 
words, my Penyengat informants do not view Tanjungpinang as part of 
Melayu-dom such as it is instantiated in present-day Riau. (The 
places listed above do not represents the full extent of Riau; see 
Chapter Two on the territorial extent of Riau.) Interestingly, some 
non-Melayu Indonesians in Tanjungpinang, for example, Javanese, have 
been known to say that they regard the Melayu of Riau as 'fanatics' 
(fanatik) -- that is, people living in a reality of their own. 
If it is the case that Melayu-dom in present-day Riau is founded 
upon the bygone sultanate of the past, then what is the relevance of 
the three criteria of 'purity' -- namely, Islam, adat, and bahasa? Is 
it not possible for someone associated with a low derajat to fulfill 
these criteria and thereby achieve 'purity'? After all, if 'purity' 
is not a congenitally derived identity but a moral condition derived 
from certain actions, then it is not an ascribed state but an achieved 
state. Yet to identify people in terms of territorial connotations is 
surely ascription. How is this contradiction to be resolved? 
The answer, I suggest, may be described as the ascription of 
actions to Self and Other. In other words, people are judged on the 
basis not of what they actually do, but of what one perceives them as 
doing. So what is matched against the criteria of 'purity' are not 
necessarily actual actions, but only perceived actions. For example, 
although my Penyengat informants perceive themselves as fulfilling all 
the three criteria, there are of course all kinds of actions in their 
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everyday life which do not accord with Islam, adat and bahasa. These 
actions are nevertheless ignored as irrelevant and therefore not 
affecting the 'purity' of the Penyengat people. In contrast, the 
actions ascribed to the 'impure Melayu' are never good enough to 
fulfill the criteria of 'purity', regardless of what their actual 
actions may be. We shall see in the following chapters what some of 
these actions are and how the ascription of actions to others can lead 
to witchcraft accusations. 
It must be realised that the Melayu types ranging from 'impure' 
to 'pure' exist only in the eye of the beholder. That is to say, if 
one is not concerned with categorising people in this way, then there 
would not be any such differentiation. So these should be understood 
primarily as categories in my informants' consciousness rather than as 
objective differences that are simply just so. However, categories of 
consciousness are socially real, even if only as ideology and not 
necessarily as institution. 
Although the ideology of 'purity' emanates from the vantage point 
of the Penyengat rajas, as we have seen above, it is not limited to 
them alone. Quite understandably, it is shared by others who would 
qualify as Melayu murni -- for example, the people of Pangkil and 
Pengujan. Not only that, even the bukan Melayu murni, the 'impure' 
23 
ones, can come to hold this view. 
Indeed, I have some informants who would view themselves from 
this murni perspective, even though in so doing, they would be 
adjudging themselves as 'impure'. This implies that they see 
themselves as an Other in relation to the Self of the Melayu murni, 
through a process of vicarious transference -- a sort of 'If I were 
murni, which I know that I am not, this is how I would view me.' The 
murni perspective can thus become a dominant ideology subverting the 
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consciousness even of the disadvantaged. It is in this sense that the 
gradation of Melayu-ness may be understood as a morality, an ideology 
of universally applicable values which can be adopted by all, 
including those adjudged 'impure'. We shall see in the following 
chapters why some people are willing to trade their self-respect for 
an Other-derived ideology, in which they may be evaluated as inferior. 
But as mentioned above, it is also possible for people to 
repudiate such Other-given rules. Thus, for example, the schoolmaster 
in Tanjungpinang who was critical of adat Melayu may be regarded as 
someone unwilling to fulfill this criterion and hence uninterested in 
the translation of derajat into a particular standard of 'purity'. 
However, this does not mean that he is forsaking Melayu-ness 
altogether. He is, after all, a Melayu asli with no foreign keturunan 
that needs to be offset by self-righteous 'purity'. Indeed, he was 
quite rude in his comments about the rajas, saying for instance: 
Kalau raja, walaupun darahnya murni, tapi otaknya kalah. 
(As for the rajas, even though their blood may be pure, 
their brains are inferior.) 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN 
1. See, for example, Koentjaraningrat (1975) on some of the sukus of 
Indonesia. 
2. The intertwining between Minangkabau and Melayu that my 
informants mentioned was a reference to at least two episodes in 
sejarah Melayu -- namely, the founding of Melayu kingship and the 
involvement between Johar and Siak. The myth of kingship in the 
Penurunan tells of how the three Indic princes each went his own 
way, each becoming the ruler of a different country. 
The eldest of the princes was taken by the people of 
Andelas to their country and was made Raja of 
Menangkabau •••• 
(Brown 1970:15). 
After the 1699 assassination, this myth seems to have been 
significant, for the pretender to the throne, Raja Kecik who 
claimed to be the posthumous son of Sultan Mahmud III, had the 
support of the Minangkabau court at Pagar Ruyung. Since Sultan 
Mahmud III was the last descendant of the line that had begun 
with the three Indic princes on Bukit Si-Guntang, the implication 
is that it was the duty of the Minangkabau royal house, as a 
collateral line, to continue the original Melayu line of kingship 
by sponsoring the assassinated sultan's posthumous son. After 
Raja Kecik was defeated by the Bugis adventurers, he founded his 
own kingdom of Siak. (See Andaya 1975:250-273.) 
3. Unfortunately, at the time I was there -- in the early part of 
1980 -- it was not the season for the 'boat people' to visit the 
Galang area; they were said to have gone to Pulau Buluh in the 
Bulang area. So I did not have the opportunity of witnessing 
such an exchange of question and answer. 
4. When addressing someone of the older generation, it is polite to 
call them pak +name (for males) and mak +name (for females). 
The use of these familial terms pak 'father' and mak 'mother' 
would imply that the interaction between the two parties is not 
between strangers but between kin. Indeed, in accordance with 
this logic, it is even more polite to address someone of the 
older generation as pak + birth-order name or mak + birth-order 
name. As one of my informants instructed me, when one addresses 
an older person in this way, that person would be pleased; and he 
or she would say, 'What a knowledgeable child this is!' The 
implication is that only someone intimate would know about such 
one's birth order within the family. (See note 6 in Chapter 
Eight on birth-order names.) The use of these kin terms extends 
also to those of one's generation -- for example, abang 'older 
brother', kakak 'older sister', and adik 'younger sibling'. 
5. This may be compared to the English usage of the word 'body' as 
meaning 'human being, person' -- for example, 'good sort of 
body', 'anybody', 'a home body'. (See the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary 1976:108.) 
6. As Wilkinson (1959:246) has explained the word dagang: 
foreign; alien. Usually of metics or resident aliens, = 
anak dagang or orang dagang; also of imports of foreign 
merchandise (dagang, dagangan). Etymologically, not 
necessarily of foreign traders ..•• But since foreigners 
and foreign things are associated usually with trade 
dagang has the secondary meanings of (i) merchandise •.• ; 
and (ii) the merchant himself. Still, the root-meaning 
is independent of trade; even a mystic is expected to 
berdagang, i.e. to travel, so as to get over his home-
ties. 
7. See notes 21 and 32 in Chapter Two. 
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8. Wilkinson (1959:27) explains the words anak and peranakan thus: 
Child; young (of animal); native (of a country); one (of 
a party, set or series); important component part; 
smaller of two •••• Peranakan (born, native) •••• For 
anak = 'native', cf. anak Melayu (Malay), anak 
Minangkabau (Minangkabau Malay). Anak implies Malay 
blood; peranakan Melayu means 'born in Malaya', 
especially of foreigners. Jawi peranakan: Malay of 
Indian descent. 
9. Wilkinson (1959) refers to this text as the Hikayat Bugis. 
10. This particular informant is interesting in that she belongs to 
an achieved gender, not an ascribed gender. What I mean by this 
is that she was born biologically male, rejected her ascribed 
gender of being male, and decided to become socially female, 
thereby achieving a different gender identity from her biological 
sex. She dresses in female clothes and identifies herself as a 
woman to the extent of adopting and bringing up a child who calls 
her mak 'mother'. Becoming female to such an extent may have 
helped her in coming to terms with her ancestry from pirates' 
captives. Since keturunan is both patrilineal and ascriptive, 
one may expect males who have remained males to be more concerned 
about this matter, as indeed they seem to be. 
There are enough individuals in Riau who want to move out of 
their ascribed gender to an achieved one, to render this 
phenomenon familiar and, at least to some extent, socially 
acceptable. However, there seem to be more males who want to 
become females than vice-versa. This imbalance may perhaps be 
explained thus. Since males generally have greater personal 
autonomy than females, it may be the case that males who want to 
change their gender have more opportunities to express such a 
desire, whereas females who harbour a similar wish in the 
opposite direction would have to suppress themselves. Such an 
unequal situation is evident in my informants' idiomatic usages. 
Males who express a desire to become female are called pondan, a 
word that seems to have no other meaning than 'effeminate male'. 
A female who expresses a wish to become male is, however, called 
budak, a term which generally means 'prepubertal child'. So 
whereas the farmer's desire is at least recognised, even if 
disapproved of, the latter's wish is not even recognised as such. 
11. The Teochiu people are speakers of a Southern Min dialect from 
Guangdong Province in China. For further details of the Chinese 
in Riau, see Ng (1976). See Trocki (1979:90-91) on the kangkar 
in Johor, which was derived from the earlier cultivation system 
in Riau. 
12. Wilkinson (1959:549) explains the word kembar thus: 
Forming a match or a pair. Not of two who supplement one 
another, e.g. bride and bridegroom; but of mere equality 
or similarity, e.g. of twin-children (anak kembar) or a 
twin-brother (saudara sa-kembar ••• ) or a worthy foe. 
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13. The Guttman scalogram 'is designed to ensure that there is only 
one (unique) combination of responses for each different scale 
score •••• [It] is cumulative in the sense that the combination 
of responses required to make a particular score includes the 
responses to all questions required to make the next lower score, 
plus the response to one additional question, in a stepwise 
fashion' (Bailey 1982:366). 
14. Farah (1970:103-104) explains the pua kalimah syahadat 'two 
statements of the testimonial creed' thus: 
The one prerequisite for becoming a Muslim is to profess 
the shahadah (open testimony): la ilaha illa'l-Lah ••• 
("there is no god but God") •••• The open profession of 
belief in one God ••• is accompanied by the second 
important pronouncement in the shahadah: wa Muhammadan 
rasul al-Lah ••• ("and Muhammad is the messenger of God"). 
By uttering the first part of the shahadah one becomes a 
muslim, submitter to God; but when he pronounces the 
second part of the same, he becomes a Muslim, an adherent 
to the religion of Islam. 
15. As stated by Muhammad Ali (1973:105): 
The dividing line between a Muslim and a kafir, or 
between a believer and an unbeliever, is confession of 
the Unity of God and the prophethood of Muhammad -- La 
ilaha ill-Allah Muhammad-un Rasulu-llah. A man becomes a 
Muslim or a believer by making this confession and as 
long as he does not renounce his faith in it, he remains 
a Muslim or a believer technically, in spite of any 
opinion he may hold on any religious question, or any 
evil which he may commit; and a man who does not make 
this confession is a non-Muslim or unbeliever 
technically, in spite of any good that he may do. 
16. To quote Muhammad Ali (1973:276): 
Every child that is born conforms to fitra ••• and it is 
his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a 
Magian. 
Fitra may be translated as 'primordial nature' (Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr 1966:17). 
17. According to Wilkinson (1959:5), 
adat covers: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
a man's personal habits ••• ; 
the ways of the world ••• , 
the conventions of society which decide what is 
proper ••• or rude ••• ; 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
(x) 
(xi) 
the operation of natural laws ••• ; 
rules governing games or sports ••• ; 
the laws of war ••. ; 
fines, fees and penalties fixed by custom ••• ; 
common law or customary law in general, whether 
local ••• , or as divided by Malay jurists into: 
the law of the autocratic sultanates (adat 
temenggong) ••. ; and 
the democratic adat perpateh or adat lembaga best 
known as the matriarchal law of Minangkabau. 
The term adat does not in its strict sense 
cover religious law (shara', hukum), statute-
law (undang-undang), conventions (muafakat) or 
European law •••• In theory, customary law and 
religious law were equally in force ••• ; in 
practice they often overlapped ••• ; 
loosely, all law •••• 
18. On the Malay Peninsula, the arbitration of adat was evidently 
also the prerogative of the ruler; see Hooker (1970;1972). 
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19. These detailed prescriptions for everyday behaviour are not 
without some Islamic foundations. For example, salam is a word 
'of frequent occurence in the Kor 1an as a salutation •••• Salam 
'alaikum 'peace be with you' is found ••• at the beginning of a 
message which the Prophet has to deliver to the believers •••• ' 
(Encyclopaedia of Islam 1934:IV,89). 
As shown in the text, among my informants, the word salam is 
extended in usage to apply to the hand-clasp. This mode of 
greeting is, however, generally limited to those categories of 
people who are Islamically permitted to touch each other. In 
other words, the hand-claps is supposed to be used only in same-
gender interactions and in interactions between people who are 
muhrim -- that is, Islamically unmarriageable. [The Arabic word 
muhrim means 'that is which is forbidden' (Wehr 1976:172).] (See 
Khadduri 1961:169-170 on the muhrim relationships.) So this is 
an instance of adat being framed by Islam. Interestingly, when 
my Muslim informants interact with non-Muslims, they may not 
observe the Islamic injunction against touching a non-muhrim. So 
they would treat the salam hand-clasp as a form of the Western 
hand-shake. 
Other connections between adat and Islam may be discerned, for 
example, in the 'manners for eating' that are prescribed in the 
Mishkat-Ul-Masabih (a compilation of al-hadis 'sayings of the 
Prophet'). (See Fazlul Karim 1939:119-166.) 
20. Such a development may be discerned, for example, in the literary 
output of Raja Ali Haji (c.1809-c.1870), who was the leading 
Penyengat writer of the period. (See Andaya and Matheson 1979.) 
He compiled the first known grammar in Malay of the language, the 
Bustan al-Katibin 'Garden of Writers', at the behest of his 
cousin Yamtuan Muda Raja Ali. 
Somewhat later, Raja Ali Haji commenced a dictionary of 
Malay usage, the Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa (Knowledge of 
Language), designed to guide those interested in 
improving their understanding of language, religion and 
correct behaviour. Unfortunately, this work was never 
completed, but it stands as evidence of Raja Ali Haji's 
desire to help his fellow men who wished to lead a 
righteous life and act according to Malay tradition 
[sic]. 
(Andaya and Matheson 1979:113). 
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The (sic] is added because it seems to me that there is no 
evidence that this so-called 'Malay tradition' was anything but 
Bugis inspired. In the Kitab, Raja Ali Haji advocated that the 
'language' (bahasa) should be modelled on Arabic syntax, and that 
it should be purged of all non-Arabic accretions, the importance 
of Arabic being that it was 'the chosen vehicle of God's ultimate 
message' (Andaya and Matheson 1979:122). As Andaya and Matheson 
(1979:110) have noted: 
•••• It is remarkable that the bulk of the literature 
coming from Riau during this period was written or 
sponsored not by the Malay Sultan and court on Lingga, 
but by members of the Bugis Yamtuan Muda family and those 
closely associated with it. 
21. As stated in the Quran: 
Those to whom We have sent the Book study it as it should 
be studied: they are the ones that believe therein: those 
who reject faith therein, -- the loss is their own. 
(A. Yusuf Ali 1983:51). 
22. Elias notes (1978:xvi) that the monopolisation of force by any 
state structure may be understood as the centralisation of social 
interconnections such that 'the whole apparatus which shapes the 
individual, the mode of operations of the social demands and 
prohibitions which mold his social makeup, and above all the 
kinds of fear that play a part in his life are decisively 
changed.' 
23. See Appendix 9 for a comparison with the situation in Malaysia. 
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8.1 Centripetal Transitivity and Centrifugal Disjunction 
In Chapter Seven, we discussed two doors to Melayu-dom 
'indigeny' and 'purity'. As shown in the discussion above, the 
relative sizes of these two doors differ. The door of 'indigeny' 
merely allows one to become a locally defined Melayu person belonging 
to a particular place in Riau. In contrast, the door of 'purity' is 
much broader: it allows one to become a civilised Melayu person with 
cosmopolitan links to the wider world. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, there is a certain 
implied morality in the latter: 'purity' is supposed to be a natural 
and hence desirable state of being, to which all should aspire. 
According to this logic, those who are not interested in doing so 
would be considered somewhat un-natural. Thus the terms Melayu murni 
and bukan Melayu murni refer not to static categories, but to a 
process of transitivity whereby an individual is supposed to transit 
from 'impurity' to 'purity'. Following Benjamin (1984:41), I use the 
term 'transitivity' to refer to 'the condition or process whereby 
something passes from one domain to another, especially when those 
domains are thought of as source to goal.' In the Melayu context, the 
'something' which passes from source to goal is, I suggest, the 
orientation of the people involved in this process. This passing from 
an 'impure' state as source to a 'pure' state as goal implies a uni-
directionality that may be described as centripetal. Let me explain 
this in the following way. 
As shown above, my Penyengat informants consider themselves 
Melayu murni, in contrast to the bukan Melayu murni who they defined 
as orang kerahan 'people of the corvee'. Such a definition is 
significant in this context. In Chapter Five, I suggested that the 
idea of kerahan implies the integration of political centre and 
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political periphery within Riau. To be dikerah was to be summoned 
from the political periphery where one normally lives, to go to the 
political centre to perform a specific duty for those at the centre. 
So if kerahan implies political integration, then a further 
implication is that this integration was effected through centripetal 
movement from periphery to centre. 
As pointed out in Chapter Seven, kerahan is an extinct practice; 
the labelling of present-day people as orang kerahan should thus be 
understood not as a statement of historical veracity, but as a 
1 
motivated form of mythical significance. The key word is 
'motivation'. When the Penyengat rajas refer to present-day people as 
orang kerahan, they are setting up a particular analogy between past 
and present, in order to express a particular motivation. They are 
presenting a motivated form wherein the bukan Melayu murni are related 
to the Melayu murni, as the orang kerahan were related to the rulers 
in zaman sultan. 
As evidence of this motivation, let me cite a conversation 
between two Penyengat ~ajas which took place in my presence. Raja A 
told Raja B that there was a proposal from the provincial government 
in Pekanbaru for the establishment of an additional sekolah menengah 
pertama (lengkap) 'junior secondary school (fully equipped)' in 
Kecamatan Bintan Selatan 'The Southern Bintan District.' As noted in 
Chapter Two, Penyengat is itself located in this district, with 
Tanjungpinang as its administrative centre. Raja B immediately 
suggested that they should try and lobby the district government at 
Tanjungpinang for the new school to be built on Penyengat. This 
seemed to be what Raja A had in mind himself, for he readily agreed 
and said that with such a school on Penyengat, the surrounding 
kepenghuluan 'headman-doms' such as Pangkil, Pengujan, Cata, Karas, 
and Bintan would be, to translate his words, 'orientated towards here' 
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-- orientasinya menghadap ke sini ('here' being of course Penyengat). 
The two rajas then discussed how to go about lobbying the district 
government. One raja proposed going to the surrounding kepenghuluan 
to get the support of the respective penghulus 'headmen' before 
approaching the district government. The other raja thought that this 
was a good idea, adding that the penghulus could go to Tanjungpinang 
to tell the district government that more children from their 
respective kepenghuluan would attend the new school if it were located 
in Penyengat rather than in Tanjungpinang, because these children 
could stay with 'family' in Penyengat. The two rajas went on to 
discuss the various penghulus, in terms of their allegiance to 
Penyengat. The penghulu of Pangkil was said to be all right, because 
he was orang kita 'one of us' (being himself a raja of Penyengat 
descent). The penghulu of Pengujan had a son married to a Penyengat 
raja and was thus considered to be amenable to persuasion. The 
penghulus of Cata and Bintan were thought likely to follow majority 
opinion. The penghulu singled out as the one likely to be 
uncooperative was the penghulu of Karas. 
The conversation took place in April 1980; at the time of writing 
this (in June 1985) there is still no 'junior secondary school' on 
Penyengat, though for what reasons I do not know. But that is not the 
point. The significance of the conversation reported above lies not 
in the mere building of a new school, but more crucially, in the 
explicitly expressed motivation to attract the orientation of the 
surrounding kepenghuluan towards Penyengat. The two rajas' assessment 
of the various penghulus' relative degree of allegiance to Penyengat 
is telling indeed. 
As I have shown in Chapter Six, during zaman sultan, Pangkil and 
Pengujan were evidently the outer 'arms' of the rulers at Penyengat. 
And as mentioned in Chapter Five, the Bintan people were one of the 
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last sukus to have continued coming to Penyengat for the performance 
of kerahan. Cata is located on the island of Rempang. (See Map 4.) 
Never having been there myself, I do not know why the penghulu of Cata 
should be perceived as being amenable to the persuasions of the 
Penyengat rajas. But the penghulu of Pangkil, who is indeed a raja 
from Penyengat, did once tell me that the penghulu of Cata was his 
friend. As for the penghulu of Karas, he is of course in charge of a 
major part of the Galang area. And as we have seen above, the Galang 
people have a long tradition of resistance against Penyengat rule. 
The contradistinction between the terms Melayu murni and the 
orang kerahan is perhaps more understandable at this point. The 
former see themselves as located at the centre, in relation to which 
the latter are peripheral. The present-day orang kerahan are thus so-
called, not because they still perform corvee, but because, as in 
zaman sultan, their centripetal orientation is still desired by those 
at the centre. Indeed, without such centripetal orientation, there is 
effectively no centre, in which case Penyengat would simply be a small 
insignificant island among the numerous islands of Riau. To identify 
oneself as central, others must be identified as peripheral. 
So whereas Penyengat is geographically only one island among many 
others, in ideological terms it presents itself as a supra-territorial 
centre, located on a higher level than the other places in Riau. As I 
have shown above, such an ideological presentation derives primarily 
from the perspective of the Penyengat rajas. The centripetal 
orientation of those in the periphery is thus merely attributed to 
them as a desideratum on the part of the rajas. But are those in the 
periphery willing to be centripetally orientated in this way? To 
answer this, let us consider the opposite orientation. 
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As I have shown in Chapter Seven, through the door of 'indigeny' 
people can become Melayu asli by belonging to a particular place in 
Riau. The crucial difference in this case is between those who belong 
as indigenes and those who arrive as newcomers. As mentioned above, 
the logic of 1 indigeny' implies the superiority of the former in the 
local context. This further implies an inward orientation whereby 
one's Melayu-ness can be justified by belonging to the place where one 
lives. 
For example, a Karas informant said to me: 
Pendatang baru ada Bugis ada Flores; yang asli hanya Melayu 
Galang. 
(The recent newcomers include Bugis and Florese; the 
indigenes consist only of the Melayu Galang.) 
As I have shown in Chapter Seven, there is a distinction in the Galang 
area between the descendants of the original Galang pirates and those 
of the captives. In the context of the quotation above, however, that 
was not the distinction my informant wanted to highlight; she merely 
wanted to tell me that there are recent newcomers to the area who do 
not belong as indigenes. In this case, her usage of the word 
pendatang baru 'recent newcomer' is not synonymous with the term 
Melayu dagang 'foreign Melayu', as discussed in Chapter Seven. For 
example, if a person who may be identified as Melayu Temiang were to 
settle in the Galang area, she or he would be regarded not as a Melayu 
dagang, but as a pendatang whose place of origin is Temiang. But if a 
Penyengat person were to settle in the same area, he or she would be 
regarded not only as a pendatang but also as a Melayu dagang whose 
antecedents derive from outside Riau altogether. So if a pendatang is 
considered alien to Galang, then a Melayu dagang in Galang would seem 
to be doubly alien. The connotations of these terms thus imply that 
what my Galang informants are concerned about is the inclusion of 
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certain people as insiders and the exclusion of others as aliens. 
From the perspective of the Penyengat rajas, such an inward 
orientation may be interpreted as centrifugal, a movement away from 
the centre to the periphery. In this connection, it is perhaps 
relevant to describe what was said to me by Raja X, who is the one 
Penyengat raja who has settled in Karas. He declared that Melayu is a 
Javanese word meaning lari 'to run'; therefore he was of the opinion 
that the orang Melayu were orang yang lari 'people who ran away'. To 
support his statement, he cited a Chinese term commonly used by the 
Hokkien and Teochiu people in Riau to refer to the natives of the 
area: this is the term hoan kian, which my informant translated as 
meaning orang yang takut 'frightened people'. The inference he drew 
from this is that the Melayu ran away because they were frightened. 
He then went on to say: 
The newcomers are better off economically than those who are 
native to this place, those who are Melayu. They progress, 
we stagnate. The Flores, Sumba, Java, or Bugis people --
they are all courageous. But the characteristics of the 
Melayu are selfishness, cruelty, jealousy, and envious 
hatred. 
2 
(My translation). 
I remember being surprised at the time by these spontaneously 
uttered statements, and what is more, the tonal intensity of the 
utterance. For example, the words hasad dengk~ 'jealousy and envious 
hatred' were pronounced more than once. Now from hindsight, I think I 
understand the significance of these statements. As a Penyengat raja 
in Karas, this informant was, in Galang terms, both pendatang 
'newcomer' and dagang 'foreigner'. His statements imply that his 
rebuttal to such an identification is to re-define the Melayu as 
frightened runaways who are selfish, cruel, jealous, and enviously 
malicious. So his further implication is: who wants to be Melayu 
anyhow?. Indeed, this informant did seem to speak of the Melayu as 
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though he were not one himself. Nevertheless, at another point in the 
conversation, he included himself as Melayu, which suggests that 
despite his attempted rebuttal, his own identity has remained 
ambiguous to himself. 
This raja's peers in Penyengat also regard his identity as 
ambiguous. As one of them put it, 
That Karas island is an island that pulls people there. 
Like Raja X, for example, he was pulled there, to the extent 
that he's married a Galang person. 
3 (My translation). 
Significantly, Raja X himself denies that his wife is an orang Galang, 
saying that she is ~eturunan orang Daik 'of Daik descent', and that 
her ancestors were encik-encik who went to Karas during zaman sultan. 
He explained encik-encik to me as an istilah Riau untuk pegawai-
pegawai sultan 'a Riau term for the sultan's retainers', a statement 
which indicated that he was well aware of the nuances of derajat. I 
should perhaps point out that it is by no means certain whether Raja X 
is in Karas wholly voluntarily; apparently he was first posted there 
more than ten years ago by the Indonesian district government to be 
headmaster of the local school, a post which he still holds. 
Before we leave Raja X, some comment should be made about his 
etymologising. / Raja X's mention of the Chinese term hoan kia!l derives 
from a southern Min word t 1-!- which may be literally translated as 
'barbarian children'. The term thus has a derogatory connotation 
~ 
which Raja X seems to have caught. However, he has confused kicP 11-
'children' with kian i: 1 to be frightened' .4 Raja X's mistake is one 
that no native speaker of southern Min is likely to make, since hoan kian 
meaning 'barbarian frightened' is not only non-existent, but 
not grammatical. This suggests that Raja X's etymologising of hoan 
kian is derived not from any Chinese informant, but from his own 
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effort to set up a motivated form -- that is, a myth. 
I have met with such folk-etymologising on several other 
occasions, the most notable of which was when a Javanese settler in 
Seking said that the Melayu are orang Jawa yang lari 'Java people who 
ran away' and that tanah Melayu 'Melayu-land' is where they have run 
to. In Javanese the root form layu does mean 'running pace' (Horne 
1974:324). But there is no evidence that the Malay word 'Melayu' is 
derived from this source. 
An alternative explanation of the word melayu came from an 
aristocrat informant. Speaking to me in English, he translated it as 
meaning 'humble'. He said that in the Javanese language, melayukan 
diri means 'to humble yourself'. He went on to say: Melayu people 
must thus sembah 'give obeisance' to somebody, even if it is 
ridiculous, theatrical; they must do it because that is their 
identity. But as a Malay phrase, melayukan diri would mean 'to make 
oneself Melayu'. I have found no evidence that it means 'humble 
yourself' in the Javanese language. Nevertheless, regardless of my 
informant's etymological accuracy, the point he was making was that 
the essence of Melayu identity is a centripetal orientation towards 
some higher authority. 
At this point of the discussion, we can perhaps abstract the 
patterns of two motivated forms, one derived from the Penyengat point 
of view, and the other from the Galang point of view. 
THE PENYENGAT VIEW: 
We 
Penyengat rajas 
at the centre 
THE GALANG VIEW: 
We 
Galang people as 
insiders 
centripetal 
transitivity 
centrifugal 
disjunction 
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They 
Galang people plus a 
plurality of others 
at the periphery 
They 
Penyengat people plus 
a plurality of other 
outsiders 
Figure 11 Centripetal Transitivity and Centrifugal Disjunction 
Whereas the Penyengat rajas are evidently concerned with drawing the 
centripetal orientation of others towards themselves, the Galang 
people seem to be concerned with the disjunction between insider and 
outsider so that they can disconnect themselves from Penyengat as a 
centre. The two views are thus diametrically opposed. In the rest of 
this chapter I shall be focussing on the polarity between these two 
views, with the implication that there are other views intermediate 
between these two extremes. 
As pointed out above, from a Penyengat perspective, the Galang 
orientation may be considered as centrifugal and hence a reversal of 
the right direction of transitivity. Centrifugalism is thus a 
reversed transitivity whereby orientation moves, wrongly, from goal to 
source. But source and goal are figures that emerge in the eye of the 
beholder. As mentioned above, Penyengat is geographically only one 
small island in the archipelago; it is only in ideological terms that 
it may be perceived as a supra-territorial centre surrounded by its 
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territorial periphery. The Galang area is much bigger than Penyengat 
alone. As mentioned in Chapter One, it includes the relatively large 
islands of Setokok, Rempang, Galang Senyantung, Galang Baru, Nguan, 
Abang, and Karas, as well as the many small islands nearby. (See Map 
4.) There is no a priori reason why the Galang area or one of its 
islands cannot also constitute the goal of centripetal orientation. 
Such a logical possibility would be quite acceptable to a 
disinterested observer. 
To interested actors such as the Penyengat rajas, however, this 
possibility poses a cognitive threat. If one's self is already 
located at what one has identified as the goal of centripetal 
orientation, to re-label this 'goal' as 'source' would be to re-locate 
oneself from goal to source. So if Penyengat were to be re-labelled 
as 'source' and Galang as 'goal', the implication would be that the 
Penyengat rajas should be centripetally orientated towards Galang. 
Galang would thereby become the supra-territorial centre, and 
Penyengat would become merely part of its territorial periphery. Such 
a reversal would have serious consequences indeed, for we should then 
be talking about the 'Galang rajas' and the 'suku Penyengat'! The 
logical possibility of such reversals is thus a danger to be socially 
guarded against by those who see themselves located at the goal. 
Indeed, with regards to Raja X of Karas, his peers on Penyengat seem 
wary of him for precisely this reason: they fear that he has been 
turned about 'to the extent that he's married a Galang person', an 
accusation which he denies. 
There is a moral implication in this evaluation of directionality 
as right or wrong. It is but one step further to identify right as 
good and wrong as bad. So a source-to-goal directionality may be 
evaluated as right and good, and a goal-to-source directionality may 
be evaluated as wrong and bad. Morality can thus be used as a 
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psychological inducement to maintain the desired directionality. 
Furthermore, good can be identified as safe, and bad as dangerous. So 
those of the periphery who accept such a mode of evaluation would have 
their choice made for them, if they were to accept such a mode of 
evaluation: their only logical choice of orientation would be 
centripetal transitivity as prescribed by the centre. 
This would be an impellent mode of morality, for it would impel 
the orientation of those at the periphery towards the centre, thereby 
generating the following patterns of transitivity: 
periphery ··············> centre 
source ··············) goal 
'impure' ··············) 'pure' 
undesired ··············> desired. 
Figure 12 Patterns of Transitivity 
For those located at the periphery, this would be an Other-centred 
morality, whereby the existing condition of Self at source would be 
considered intrinsically inferior and therefore to be despised. For 
those at the centre, this would be a Self-centred morality, whereby 
the existing condition of Self at goal would be considered 
intrinsically superior and therefore to be valued. What mitigates 
this Self-centredness would be a larger context wherein those at the 
centre would themselves be peripheral to another, higher, centre. I 
suggest that it is Islam as a world religion that provides this larger 
context; I shall discuss this in Chapter Nine. 
But it is also possible for those at the periphery to repudiate 
this Other-centred morality, establishing instead a morality that is 
derived from their own perspective. The Galang differentiation 
between 'indigene' and 'newcomer' may be considered a moral evaluation 
too, for it implies that 'indigeny' is superior and hence to be 
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valued, whereas alien-ness is inferior and hence to be despised. This 
would be an expellent mode of morality concerned with expelling from 
one's orientation elements of Other-centredness focussed elsewhere. 
Self is thus located in the local context which is both source and 
goal. So like the impellent mode of morality for those at the centre, 
this too is a Self-centred morality, but with the crucial difference 
that it does not seek to impel the orientation of others towards Self. 
In other words, unlike the Penyengat rajas, the Galang indigenes 
are not interested in trying to attract the centripetal orientation of 
outsiders. Whereas centre and periphery may be integrated through 
centripetal transitivity from the latter towards the former, 
centrifugal disjunction does not integrate the local context with any 
other place, either as centre or periphery: it merely marks out the 
local context from the rest of the world. 
So what we have is an opposition of moralities -- an impellent 
mode versus an expellent mode. But this is not an equally pitted 
opposition, for the odds are weighted against centrifugal disjunction. 
By turning inwards upon itself as a self-contained whole, Galang 
merely resists the pull of Penyengat; it does not compete with 
Penyengat as an alternative centre of Melayu-dom in Riau. My Galang 
informants offer no alternative scheme that would integrate the 
different local communities in Riau into a supra-territorial whole. 
It is precisely this that is the great strength of the Penyengat view: 
it offers the vision of a supra-territorial Melayu-dom, even if that 
is a vision very much biased in favour of Penyengat itself. Whereas 
the Galang people can merely talk about Melayu-ness in terms of 
separate local contexts -- for example, in terms of the Melayu Galang, 
the Melayu Temiang, the Melayu Bintan, and so on the Penyengat 
people can talk about Melayu-ness at a higher, more inclusive level. 
Consequently, the latter are the ones providing the challenge of 
488 
appropriation, in response to which the appropriated can only choose 
whether to submit willingly, accept grudgingly, evade elusively, or 
resist defensively. 
It is in this supra-territorial context that the rear-view image 
of zaman sultan is crucial. Without that image, all those who 
identify as Melayu in Riau would merely be, as my informants put it, 
penduduk di pelusuk-pelusuk 'inhabitants in remote corners'. Without 
' that image, there would be no integrating ideology to hold together 
the far-flung local communities as one Melayu whole. 
8.2 The 'Janus Effect' 
However, the Penyengat vision of Melayu unity and the Galang view 
of Melayu localism must both be considered in the context of 
Indonesia. After all, both the Penyengat rajas and the Galang people 
are Indonesian citizens. Their alternative views of Melayu-ness are 
framed by the larger context of Indonesian politics. Their position 
in that context is perhaps not unlike that of other Outer Islanders, 
such as the Minangkabau in West Sumatra. Kahn (1982:97), for example, 
notes: 
•.. In the period of the regional rebellions in the late 
1950s the solidarity of the Minangkabau was a constant theme 
of discourse •••• solidarity was directed against the 
cultural domination of the Javanese, as well as Javanese 
economic and political hegemony. In contrast to this it was 
the splits within Minangkabau, rather than ethnic 
solidarity, which received greater emphasis in the period 
leading up to the abortive communist uprisings of mid-1920s. 
But in contrast to Kahn's observations of Minangkabau ethnicity, 
my observations of the situation in Riau indicate that both solidarity 
and internal differentiation co-exist at the same time. On the one 
hand, the Penyengat view offers a vision of Melayu unity through the 
integration of centre and periphery. On the other hand, the 
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alternative view of Melayu-ness as 'indigeny' differentiates the Suku 
Melayu qua indigenes of particular places in Riau. How is this co-
existence of solidarity and internal differentiation to be explained? 
What Koestler (1967:65) has to say about 'parts' and 'wholes' is 
relevant to our discussion: 
A 'part', as we generally use the word, means something 
fragmentary and incomplete, which by itself would have no 
legitimate existence. On the other hand, a 'whole' is 
considered something complete in itself which needs no 
further explanation. But 'wholes' and 'parts' in this 
absolute sense just do not exist anywhere, either in the 
domain of living organisms or of social organisations. What 
we find are intermediary structures on a series of levels in 
an ascending order of complexity: sub-wholes which display, 
according to the way you look at them, some of the 
characteristics commonly attributed to wholes and some of 
the characteristics commonly attributed to parts ••.• The 
members of a hierarchy, like the Roman god Janus, all have 
two faces looking in opposite directions: the face turned 
towards the subordinate levels is that of a self-contained 
whole; the face turned upward towards the apex, that of a 
dependent part. One is the face of the master, the other 
the face of the servant. This 'Janus effect' is a 
fundamental characteristic of sub-wholes in all types of 
hierarchies. 
I suggest that the co-existence of solidarity and internal 
differentiation of Melayu-ness in my informants' usage may precisely 
be understood as a 'Janus effect', where the inward face is that of 
the master looking at subordinates, and the outward face is that of 
the servant looking at a larger encompassing whole. The Penyengat 
view of Melayu unity is thus the view of the master looking at 
centripetally orientated subordinates. However, each of these 
perceived subordinates is itself a sub-whole that is orientated 
ambifacially both inwards and outwards. Each is itself both master 
and servant. As shown above in the case of Galang, there is 
resistance to turning the servant's face towards Penyengat; instead 
attention is wilfully turned inwards to Galang itself as a self-
contained whole. 
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The 'Janus effect' is repeated at a higher hierarchical level in 
the context of Indonesia. As mentioned above, in my informants' 
usage, Suku Melayu contrasts as a 'division' of the Indonesian 
population with other 'divisions', such as Suku Jawa, Suku 
Minangkabau, Suku Bugis and so on. Such a usage is indeed compatible 
with the official ideology of 'unity in diversity'. So my informants 
see themselves as constituting one part of the larger whole, where 
Suku Melayu is but one of many other such Sukus. 
For its part, the Indonesian Government evidently regard the 
Penyengat rajas as the representatives of Suku Melayu. When foreign 
dignitaries visit Tanjungpinang, they are brought by officials of the 
regional government to Penyengat to be given a traditional reception 
by the rajas. When the Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 
'Department of Education and Culture' made a film on the traditional 
costumes of the different Sukus in Indonesia, the rajas' costumes were 
filmed. When teams from Jakarta come to Riau to do research on 
various aspects of Melayu tradition, their destination is Penyengat. 
When I myself began preliminary enquiries in Pekanbaru among 
university lecturers and government officials, it was to Penyengat 
that they directed my attention. (See Chapter One.) It is thus the 
Penyengat view of Riau that is the most effectively transmitted to the 
Indonesian Government and to other outsiders. 
In contrast, other perspectives on Riau -- such as the Bintan 
view or the Galang view -- are far less accessible to government 
officials and other outsiders, whose occasional visits to these other 
places are almost always arranged and conducted by the Penyengat 
rajas. (My first visits to many places in Riau were undertaken in the 
company of one raja or another; it was only for subsequent visits that 
I was able to make my own arrangements). As a consequence, an 
outsider visiting a place in Riau for the first time, is likely to 
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derive his or her superficial impression of the place, filtered 
through the interpretation of the raja guide. Since most outsiders 
visit these places only once, this superficial impression is likely to 
remain unchanged. By playing the role of guide to outsiders who are 
either from the the government or from a foreign country, the rajas 
are thereby able to project an image of themselves as mediators 
between Riau and the outside world. 
This mediative role is enhanced by the employment of many 
Penyengat rajas in the civil service of the regional government. The 
favoured departments are 'Customs and Excise', 'Education and 
Culture', 'Forestry', 'Health', 'Justice', 'Religion', and the police 
force; however, I know of no Penyengat raja, or any other Riau 
informant for that matter, who has joined the armed forces, even 
though there is a major naval base in the area. In my 1979 conference 
paper (19-20), I mentioned that my Riau informants were not very 
interested in participating in the politics and administration of the 
Indonesian nation-state, and that hardly any of them held high 
government positions. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, Riau in 
indeed peripheral in the Indonesian context, both geographically and 
politically. Such being the case, what interests my raja informants 
is how the resources of the Indonesian nation-state may be employed in 
ways that they, as mediators, consider beneficial to the Suku Melayu 
in Riau. For example, they pointed out that whereas the national 
government seems remote, the regional government is, in contrast, 
quite relevant, both at kecamatan 'district' and kabupaten 'regency' 
levels, because it is the regional government that takes charge of the 
day-to-day administration of Riau, the rajas' own patch, or so it 
seems to them. 
As pointed out in Chapter Three, the Riau archipelago was one of 
the last areas to become part of the Indonesian republic. After the 
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Second World War ended in 1945, Riau was re-occupied by the Dutch 
colonialists. As shown above, during this period, the Riau 
aristocrats made an attempt to re-constitute the sultanate, an attempt 
which failed because the Dutch handed over the occupied areas to the 
Republic of Indonesia in 1950. 
Although my informants do not make much reference to this 
episode, they are nevertheless aware of the still existing possibility 
of not being part of Indonesia. Such an awareness is voiced not only 
by my Penyengat informants, but even by others such as my Galang 
informants. Some say, for example, that they do not know what they 
are doing in Indonesia, when all their relatives and friends are in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Whereas many of them have been to Singapore 
or Malaysia at least once in their lives, either for trade, work, or 
leisure, hardly any has ever been to Jakarta or any other part of 
Java. When I asked the reason, they said that they have no reason to 
visit Jakarta, since they know no one there. Their radio and 
television sets are almost always tuned to programmes broadcast from 
Singapore and Malaysia, and hardly ever to the Indonesian programmes. 
This has brought about an awareness among my informants that the Malay 
language used in Singapore and Malaysia is more similar to bahasa kita 
'our language' than it is to Bahasa Indonesia. There is thus a sense 
of dissociation from the institutional reality of Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, such a sense of dissociation can be accomodated 
within the Indonesian ideology of 'unity in diversity'. As pointed 
out above, despite the dominance of the Javanese in Indonesian 
politics, in terms of the national ideology, political unity is 
construed of in non-ethnic terms. So the ideology of 'unity in 
diversity' allows the existence of a distinct Suku Melayu as part of 
the inherent diversity of the nation, without the necessity of 
governmental intervention in defining Melayu-ness as such. At the 
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same time, however, there is a constraint on the degree of 
particularity that Melayu-ness is allowed to develop: it must not 
threaten the third principle of the Pancasila -- namely, the 'one-ness 
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of Indonesia'. There is thus a fine distinction to be drawn between 
being part of the ethnic diversity of Indonesia on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, being a separable whole. The former involves a 
centripetal orientation, the latter a centrifugal orientation. In 
other words, as a sub-whole in the Indonesian whole, Suku Melayu 
manifests the 'Janus effect' - - that is, with the face of the servant 
turned outwards to the rest of Indonesia, and the face of the master 
turned inwards to Riau itself. 
The tension between the Penyengat view and the Galang view of 
Melayu-ness is thus located within the smaller context of Riau. The 
master's face of Penyengat that is turned inwards includes within its 
purview not only Penyengat itself, but also all the other places that 
were formerly in the jurisdiction of the bygone sultanate. What is 
perceived is thus a supra-territorial Melayu-dom. But the master's 
face of Galang is turned inwards to the Galang area itself, without a 
servant's face that is turned concurrently towards Penyengat. As we 
shall see in Chapter Nine, any servant's face that is displayed by the 
Galang people is orientated not towards Penyengat, but to some other 
centre elsewhere, including such possibilities as Singapore and Mecca. 
8.3 The Imagined Community 
The title of this section is borrowed from Anderson (1983); 
following his definition, in an imagined community, 
the members ••• will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion. 
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The people in a supra-territorial Melayu-dom do not have to know each 
other. But they each know that there are many of them, enough to 
constitute an imagined community that is larger than their own 
immediate local community. 
Significantly, Anderson (1983) uses the term 'imagined community' 
to refer to the sovereign nations of the present time. Although most 
of the nations he refers to are institutionalised as states with 
independent governments, he does extend his argument to include 
incipient nations that are not yet institutionalised as states. I 
suggest that the imagined community constituted by those who share the 
vision of a supra-territorial Melayu-dom, may indeed be regarded as 
just such an incipient nation, one that draws its inspiration from the 
golden age of zaman sultan. Such an inspiration is perhaps 
understandable, since the republican ideal has already been pre-empted 
by the Republic of Indonesia. Apart from the image of a bygone 
sultanate, another possible non-Indonesian image available for 
communality is that of the 'nation of Islam', the umat. As we shall 
see in Chapter Nine, these are indeed the two images relevant to those 
informants interested in belonging to an imagined community larger 
than the immediate local community that is, an alternative imagined 
community other than the Indonesian nation. 
My informants are aware of the political danger of trying to 
translate phantasy into reality, of turning imagination into 
institution. They said that even though it may be true that they view 
the Indonesian government as an external authority that is quite 
remote from them, they have no wish to 'rebel' (berontak). The 
institutional presence of Indonesia is recognised as an undeniable 
reality. This is, however, matched by its ideological absence which 
is replaced instead by my informants' own imagined community. There 
is an inverse relationship that may be illustrated thus: 
INDONESIA 
institutional presence 
imaginative absence 
vs. 
vs. 
ME1AYU-DOM 
institutional absence 
imaginative presence 
Figure 13 Indonesia and Melayu-dom 
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As noted above, this imagined Melayu-dom pertains to the 
Penyengat perspective, rather than to the Galang perspective. But 
even if it is the case that to my Penyengat informants, Indonesia is 
institutionally present but imaginatively absent, why should they find 
it necessary to replace it with an alternative imagined community? 
Why cannot they simply adopt the Galang alternative and concentrate on 
the immediacy of their own local Penyengat community? 
As mentioned above in this chapter, without the image of a bygone 
sultanate, all the Melayu in Riau would merely be 'inhabitants in 
remote corners' (penduduk di pelusuk-pelusuk), with the implication of 
being uncivilised tribals. Such an implication is evidently 
unacceptable in the context of a world where modernist civilisation is 
engulfing isolationist tribalism. In this context, if one cannot 
claim to be modern, one can at least claim to be civilised. According 
to this logic, isolationist tribalism is political weakness. For this 
reason, I suggest, it is insufficient for my Penyengat informants 
simply to concentrate on the immediacy of their own local community. 
For this reason they find it necessary to belong to an alternative 
imagined community other than that of the Indonesian nation. 
8.4 The Social Phantasy System 
But how can a community seem real in the absence of institutional 
props? One way is to locate it outside the present, thereby 
suspending the premisses on which everyday reality is founded. This 
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may be understood as 'phantasy', a term that Laing (1969:7) explains 
as 'an operation of mapping, from any domain of experience to any 
range of experience'. The rear-view image of zaman sultan is 
precisely located in a bracketed part of time, in a past-in-the-
present, whereby the imagined past is mapped onto the everyday 
present. The reality of zaman sultan is thus of a supra-mundane 
quality, sustained with virtuosity and leading to enchanting 
nostalgia. 
The reality of this phantasy is further enhanced by communication 
and sharing. This is no mere private phantasy, but a social phantasy 
system. People are thus drawn into what is essentially someone else's 
phantasy, in which they play given parts, losing their own perspective 
in the process. Those who resist being drawn in such a way pose a 
cognitive danger, for their intransigence threatens to 'de-realise' 
the phantasy, to expose its un-reality. (See Laing 1969:37-43.) This 
is precisely the significance of the social phantasy system. As Laing 
has noted (1969:42): 
The quality of reality experienced inside the nexus of 
phantasy may be enchanting. Outside it is cold, empty, 
meaningless, unreal. 
To remain within a phantasy, one must be constantly aware of one's 
stream of consciousness, which must not be allowed to wander off in 
random directions, but must be channelled towards the maintenance of 
that phantasy. Moreover, in a phantasy that is projected into a 
social phantasy system, one must also monitor the consciousness of 
others who share or are supposed to share that phantasy. When two or 
more persons think that they do indeed share the experience of a 
common phantasy, this can lead to a close bonding, a sense of 
belonging, a feeling of communal warmth. This warmth increases in 
heat to the extent that people participate in the phantasy. So the 
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more people there are involved in the phantasy, the colder it is for 
those individuals who stubbornly remain outside. Not only that, the 
more participants there are in a phantasy, the more grandiose and the 
more real does that phantasy become. 
But it is alright if outsiders to Riau, such as other Indonesians 
and foreigners, are not drawn into the social phantasy system. They 
are not expected to participate; the phantasy makes no claim on them. 
In contrast, those who are perceived as belonging to Melayu-dom in 
Riau are expected to share this phantasy of endogenous power, for 
without their participation there is no endogenous power, even if only 
in phantasy. In other words, for someone to experience as real the 
phantasy of being a raja, someone else must be willing to phantasise 
being a hamba raja. There is no domination without submission, even 
if only in phantasy. 
In the social phantasy system of zaman sultan, people are ranked; 
each rank translates into a Melayu type; and each type is instantiated 
by certain local communities. The phantasy is thus hierarchically 
distributed according to rank, type, and local community. In such a 
phantasy, it is only right that the Penyengat rajas should phantasise 
about Penyengat as the centre of endogenous power in Riau. But if the 
Pangkil people, for example, were to phantasise about Pangkil in such 
terms, they would, in Penyengat terms, be phantasising above their 
station, and would consequently upset the hierarchical order. This is 
indeed what the Galang people are perceived as doing. 
Significantly, some of my Karas informants claimed that formerly, 
when outsiders came to the island, they vomited blood on the beach and 
died. My informants attributed this to the daulat of the island. As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, daulat refers to 'the divine element of 
kingship'. So the implication is that Karas was a kingly centre. 
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There are thus at least two different social phantasies in operation: 
one emanating from Penyengat, and the other from the Galang area, 
specifically from Karas. 
It is striking that Karas is supposed to manifest its daulat by 
keeping away outsiders, in contrast to Penyengat which is supposed to 
manifest its daulat by attracting those in the periphery. As 
mentioned above, this difference may be couched, respectively, in 
terms of centrifugal disjunction and centripetal transitivity. These 
two social phantasy systems differ in a way that may be explained 
through a musical metaphor. The Galang (or more specifically, Karas) 
phantasy is monodic, whereas the Penyengat phantasy is contrapuntal. 
The former consists of only a single line, whereas the latter has a 
texture of different complementary parts. So the former is, as it 
were, a voice separated from the rest of the choir and singing by 
itself, whereas the latter is a choral whole where the separate voices 
sing their different parts together. The question is: who is to sing 
with whom? 
This is indeed a key difference between the Galang phantasy and 
the Penyengat phantasy. The scale is different: they are, to use the 
musical metaphor above, a lone voice and a chorus. The Penyengat 
phantasy extends beyond one particular local community to include 
other local communities, such that they may be considered as 
constituting a supralocal imagined community 
8.5 Siblingship and the Axiom of Amity 
In both social phantasies, there is a strong tendency towards the 
homogenisation of the local community. In the Galang phantasy, there 
is emphasis on people belonging to the Galang area as indigenes. In 
the Penyengat phantasy, there is emphasis on the local community as an 
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instance of a particular Melayu type and hence a particular rank. In 
both cases, similarity between co-members of the local community is 
perceived as a desideratum. 
I have discussed in Chapter Seven, how one acquires membership in 
a local community by being the anak 'child' of one's parents, and 
being the anak of one's birthplace. Ideally, this should enable one 
to belong to a generationally continuous set of similar members, 
sharing a common locality. However, as we have seen above, 
problematic cases of ambiguity can arise. It is thus important to 
decide who belongs and who does not. 
Significantly, someone who belongs is described as bukan orang 
lain 'not an other person', whereas someone who does not belong is 
described as orang lain 'other person'. For example, to indicate 
their close-ness to one another, my informants would say sini tak ada 
orang lain 'there is no other person here'; or to indicate how close a 
certain person is to them, they would say dia bukan orang lain 'she or 
he is not an other-person'. 
Such a terminology gives primacy to Other-ness, with Self defined 
as not-Other. Those who are close to one's self are hence bukan orang 
lain 'not-others'. In a world that is so divided into 'others' and 
'not-others', the question 'Who are we?' is answered by 'We are not 
they'. This may be illustrated thus: 
C orang lain 
'ego' bukan orang lain 
D orang lain 
Figure 14 Orang Lain and Bukan Orang Lain 
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As illustrated above, A and B are social intimates whose relationship 
is defined through the intermediacy of 'others', C and D. From the 
perspective of A, B's status is inherently ambiguous, being neither 
wholly Other nor wholly Self. Someone who is described as bukan orang 
lain is not an other, and yet also not one's own self. 
In my informants' perception, an ideal local community is one 
where there is no orang lain. Such a perception seems to be common to 
both phantasies. So 'others' (orang lain) should logically be those 
who belong to other local communities. In contrast, one's co-
residents should logically be 'not-others' (bukan orang lain) in that 
sense. 
If it is the case that one belongs to a set of similar members by 
virtue of being the child of one's parents and the child of one's 
birthplace, then the implication is that the co-residents of a place 
are siblings, both literally and metaphorically. Indeed, this is 
explicitly stated by my informant: the expression sini tak ada orang 
lain 'there is no other person here' is often followed by semua 
saudara 'all are siblings'. The archetypical bukan orang lain who is 
not an other and yet not oneself, is one's sibling, one's saudara. So 
generally is siblingship used as a paradigm for social proximity that 
if someone were to describe someone else as saudara, one would not be 
sure whether the usage was literal or metaphorical. To ascertain this 
one would have to ask whether this saudara was a 'true sibling' (adik-
beradik betul), a 'sibling of the same womb' (adik-beradik sekandung). 
Even when the answer to this question is negative, its negation 
is likely to be mitigated by a substitute kin term. For example, the 
answer might be dia bukan adik-beradik betul, dia pupuan saja 'she or 
he is not a true sibling, she or he is merely cousin-like'. When the 
word pupuan is used, it implies that the degree of kinship can no 
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longer be calculated. When the degree of cousinship is still known, 
then the answer might be dia saudara sepupu 'she or he is a sibling of 
the first-cousin degree' or dia saudara dua pupu 'she or he is a 
sibling of the second-cousin degree'. If the person described as a 
bukan orang lain is not related at all by kinship, then at the very 
least, she or he may be said to be macam saudara 'like a sibling'. 
According to my informants, siblings are said to be close because 
they are sepangkat 'of one generation or individual ranking'. As I 
have mentioned in Chapter Four above, the word pangkat refers, 
alternatively, to generation and to one's individual rank within a 
specific derajat. To signify their equality in such terms, siblings 
are often given similar sounding names. I give three sets of sibling 
names as examples in Figure 15 below. My informants say that siblings 
are given such similar sounding names so that everyone would know that 
they are siblings. 
The importance of siblingship is further highlighted through the 
use of birth-order names. My informants said that it is 'polite' 
(berbudi-bahasa) to address people by their birth-order names (or 
fratonyms), rather than by their personal names (or autonyms). They 
said that some people 'are reluctant to mention their own personal 
names, for fear that people may cast a spell on them' (payah nak sebut 
namanya, kerana takut dibikin orang). The implication is that 
personal names individuate the person, thereby singling him or her as 
alone and hence vulnerable in a crowd of strange others. In contrast, 
birth-order names label the person as a member of a sibling set who is 
6 
hence secure in the company of like-selves. 
What Koestler (1967:65) terms the 'Janus effect' seems to be 
evident in such a sibling relationship, with both turning their 
attention inwards to each other, yet at the same time defining their 
From Pangkil 
I I I I I I 1 1 
Talip Sarip Urip Tahip Usop (Yusuf) Garip Rukiah Rusnah 
1 l 
Boncoi Buncai 
From Penyengat 
l r -----1 
Halim ah Amin ah Habibah 
Figure 15. Similar Sounding Sibling Names 
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siblingship through the intermediacy of 'others'. This situation is 
strikingly similar to that described by Benjamin (1980:34) in his 
discussion of Malay kinship in the Malay Peninsula: 
The Malay social world is very Other-cathected; it is 
constituted primarily of 'they's, in opposition to whom the 
more intimate 'we' relations are defined •••• The basically 
conjunctive character of Malay siblingship helps to generate 
this structure, for it sets the siblings facing socially 
inwards away from the 'they' of the wider social world 
towards the 'we' of each other. 
The 'Janus effect' in Melayu siblingship is thus to be found not only 
in Riau, but also elsewhere in alam Melayu. (Also see McKinley 1981.) 
I suggest that at the most basic level, the social phantasy 
system is shared by siblings striving to be each other's equal. What 
Fortes (1969) refers to as the 'axiom of amity' in kinship is of 
7 
relevance to our discussion in this context. Among my informants, it 
is siblingship that is highlighted as the kin relation that is 
supposed to manifest amity. 
Siblingship figures prominently in mythology. For example, my 
Galang informants speak of the various places in Galang as adik-
beradik 'siblings'. To quote a Karas informant: 
Galang sebagai suku induk. Anak dia ada Galang Rempang, 
Galang Pecom, Galang Karas, Galang Sembor. 
(Galang is a 'mother division'. Her children include Galang 
Rempang, Galang Pecom, Galang Karas, and Galang Sembor.) 
The origin myth of Galang explains why these places are siblings 
to each other. The following is a version of this myth obtained from 
a Karas informant: The Galang people came from Kelang on the Malay 
Peninsula. However, they were not originally known as orang Galang. 
Only when they came to Galang did they become orang Galang. Before 
they came, Galang was uninhabited. There were seven 'siblings' (adik-
beradik) from Kelang. They divided the Galang area among themselves, 
with each sibling taking one portion: 
-- Bulang (including Pecom) 
Setokok (including Galang Rempang) 
Galang Kandap (also known as Pengalap) 
Galang Besar 
Temiang 
Daik 
8 
Senayang. 
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What had happened was that in Kelang, during the launching of the 
lancang kuning 'royal ship' (literally, 'yellow ship'), women who were 
pregnant for the first time were laid in its path as 'rollers' 
(galang). Because of this, the seven siblings, who were all warriors, 
felt that the raja was cruel. So they 'ran away' (lari) and came to 
Galang. My informant claimed that knowledge of these seven siblings' 
names and deeds would make one 'strong' (kuat) and 'invincible' 
(tahan). If their names are uttered, one's hair would stand on end. 
The 'descendants' (keturunan) of the seven siblings include the Galang 
Pekaka, the Galang Pesaka, the Galang Gelam, and the Galang Asli. 
Kelang was the place of origin, where the 'kingdom' (~erajaan) was 
located; even Johor was derived from Kelang. 
At least four themes are evident in this origin myth -- that is, 
centrifugalism, indigeny, siblingship, and keturunan. The seven 
siblings were described as runaways from a cruel raja in Kelang; 
Galang was the area they ran to. Galang was previously uninhabited; 
so the seven siblings were the first indigenes. They divided the area 
into seven portions, each belonging to one sibling. These seven 
portions are thus in a relationship of equality to each other. Their 
indigenous inhabitants are the keturunan 'descendants' of the seven 
siblings, and are thus also in a relationship of equality to each 
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other. As shown in Chapter Seven, the experience of trauma when 
uttering the names of one's ancestors is taken as evidence of one's 
indigeny in Galang. 
It is striking that there is not one mention of the name 'Riau' 
in this myth. Although the theme of centrifugalism is articulated, it 
is not Penyengat or the Riau river that is mentioned as a centre from 
which the seven siblings ran away. Instead, the postulated centre is 
a mythical kingdom in Kelang, which supposedly pre-dated even Johor, 
9 
which in turn, as all my informants know, pre-dated Riau-Lingga. 
Another striking feature is the mention of pregnant women being 
used as 'rollers' (galang) for the launching of the royal ship. As 
pointed out in Chapter Five, the ethnonyms of hamba raja were derived 
from their kerahan. So the orang Galang were thus named because their 
corvee duty was to provide 'rollers' (galang) for launching the 
ruler's ship. In the origin myth of Galang, however, women 'pregnant 
for the first time' (yang bunting sulong) were used as rollers. Why 
was there this special emphasis given to the destruction of such 
women? Why was there no inclusion of other pregnant women or those 
who were not pregnant or even men? 
To answer this, let us rephrase the quotation given above: Galang 
is like a mother, and her children are the various places in Galang. 
To destroy a woman pregnant for the first time is to destroy her as a 
mother and all the children who could otherwise have issued from her 
womb. If the mother of the seven siblings had been used as a galang 
in this way, they themselves would not even have existed. Thus, 
according to this interpretation, the orang Galang could be orang 
'people', because their mother was not used as a galang 'roller'. 
Interestingly, my raja informants have an alternative version of 
this Galang origin myth. According to one informant's version, there 
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was once a big ship being built for the ruler. When the carpenter was 
working on it, a boy came to play nearby. This made the carpenter 
angry. So he threw his axe at the boy, who ran away cursing: Kapal 
ini tak akan turun ke laut 'May this ship not descend into the sea'. 
Indeed, after the ship was completed, it could not be launched at all. 
No matter how many men pushed and pulled, it did not budge in the 
least. The carpenter then remembered the boy's curse and told the 
ruler about it. The boy was found and commanded to release the curse. 
He said that this was possible only if seven women who were pregnant 
for the first time were laid in the ship's path as galang 'rollers'. 
This was done and the ship was duly launched. After the launching, 
the seven pregnant women did not die but gave birth to seven sons, who 
grew up and became panglima Galang 'Galang warriors'. 
In the rajas' version of the Galang myth, the seven founding 
ancestors of the Galang people were used as galang 'rollers' while in 
their mothers' wombs. Furthermore, they were not related to each 
other as siblings, since each of them was a first-born child. In 
contrast to the Karas version of the myth, in the rajas' version, it 
was not the cruelty of the ruler, but the mischief of a boy in the 
local community, that had caused the pregnant women to be used as 
rollers. There is, moreover, no mention of Kelang as the site of an 
ancient kingdom or even of Galang as a place. Instead, the focus is 
specifically on the building and launching of the ruler's ship. So if 
the Karas version of the myth is concerned with expressing the 
equality of the orang Galang using the paradigm of siblingship, the 
rajas' version of the myth is concerned with defining the orang Galang 
not as a sibling-set, but as unrelated people sharing a common rank 
because of their common kerahan -- that is, as the launchers of the 
ruler's ship. 
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In explaining their own origins as a derajat, however, my raja 
informants use siblingship as a paradigm of equality. As pointed out 
in Chapter Four above, when tracing their individual genealogies, they 
invariably go back to the five Opu Daeng brothers as the founding 
ancestors. Strictly speaking, in terms of genealogical descent, it is 
not necessary for any individual informant to mention all five 
brothers as his or her ancestors, since he or she would be descended 
from only one of them -- for example, Opu Daeng Cellak or Opu Daeng 
Parani. Yet all five are always mentioned. I suggest that the 
purpose is to express the sibling-like equality of all rajas. In 
other words, as the descendants of a sibling-set, the rajas themselves 
constitute a sibling-set, if not literally so in all cases, at least 
metaphorically so. 
~erajat 'rank' is thus inherited through keturunan 'descent', but 
maintained through siblingship. Inequality between the different 
derajat is complemented by equality within any one derajat. The axiom 
of amity is thus supposed to be expressed within the sibling-like 
derajat. 
Among my informants, the idea of equality among siblings is 
supposed to be materially expressed. In terms of wealth, siblings are 
supposed to be equal. As an informant explained to me, if both 
siblings are equally well off, they feel at ease with each other. But 
if one is more successful than the other, then relations between them 
10 
are often bad. On the one hand, the less successful sibling would 
be shy of visiting the more successful sibling. On the other hand, 
the more successful sibling would find it difficult to help the less 
successful sibling without shaming him or her. 
I myself encountered several cases where serious quarrels broke 
out between unequally successful siblings. What is more, the sibling 
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who is more successful may even begin to worry that the less successful 
sibling may hire a bomoh 'magician' to 'fix him/her' (bikin dia). So 
if the more successful sibling were to fall ill, this may be blamed on 
a spell cast at the behest of a less successful and hence envious 
sibling. Such an assignment of blame may be undertaken even by others 
in the same community. 
For example, in one case I encountered, it was not the sick 
person herself who blamed sorcery as the cause of her asthma, but some 
other people in the community who took it upon themselves to blame it 
on a spell supposedly cast at the behest of her envious sister or 
sisters. Significantly, the sick woman was a commoner married to a 
relatively well-to-do raja. Her sisters who married less successfully 
were said to be angry with her because they felt that she had become 
'proud' (sombong). 
When two siblings are unequally successful, the more successful 
one is often perceived as 'proud' (sombong), while the less successful 
one is often perceived as 'ashamed' (malu). The equality of being 
sepangkat is thus upset. To restore the equality that is supposed to 
be, either the less successful one would have to be pulled up or the 
more successful one would have to be pulled down. As a raja informant 
said, it is difficult to help a less successful sibling. He added: 
Kalau kita nak tolong dia, nanti boleh jadi musuh. 
If I were to try helping him/her, we might end up being 
enemies instead. 
Indeed, the accusation of being sombong 'proud' is often levelled 
at a more successful sibling when he or she tries to help a less 
successful sibling. Such help is often perceived as patronage; and a 
patron-client relationship is not that of equals. Since it is 
difficult to pull up a less successful sibling without being accused 
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of patronage, the implication is that it might be somewhat easier to 
11 
pull down a more successful sibling through sorcery, or so it seems. 
The fear of sorcery by one's envious sibling indicates that the 
supposed equality between siblings is not a static given, but a 
dynamic situation that has to be constantly monitored by the parties 
concerned. In such inter-sibling interaction, one has to ask oneself 
such questions as: Would my behaviour be construed as proud? Am I 
making my sibling ashamed? Is he or she going to cast a spell on me? 
A certain morality is thus involved: siblings must strive to be equal. 
The desired equality of siblings has economic consequences. My 
raja informants pointed out that they are different from the Batak who 
have marga 'clans'. It is said that when a Batak man enters a certain 
section or department of the civil service, he will soon pull in his 
own clansmen until the entire section or department ends up by being 
staffed with people from that particular marga. It is apparently not 
so with my informants, who try instead to avoid being in the same 
department as their siblings. The reason is that they do not want to 
be in a situation of open rivalry with their siblings or in a 
situation where one sibling would be officially senior to another 
sibling. On the contrary, siblings try to be in different sections or 
departments, so that their supposed equality in office can be 
presumed, without too detailed a comparison. For example, if one 
sibling is in 'Customs and Excise' and the other is in 'Education and 
Culture', their equality in office may be presumed in that they are 
both civil servants, without bothering too much about their specific 
positions within their respective departments. It is, however, 
acceptable if a senior kinsman such as one's bapak saudara 'uncle' 
were to be one's senior at work: the combination of generation as 
pangkat and office as pangkat would be harmonic. 
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In their discussions of siblingship with me, my informants drew 
comparisons between their own economic behaviour and Chinese economic 
behaviour. A favourite topic for comment is the Chinese family 
business which has the eldest brother acting as boss. My informants 
regard such an arrangement as impossible for themselves, since it 
would immediately upset the equality of the siblings involved, lead to 
mutual ill-feeling, and result in the closure of the family business. 
Their observations of the Chinese are indeed valid, for Chinese 
siblingship is supposed to be disjunctive in character, with the elder 
sibling equated with parent and the younger sibling with child. (See, 
for example, Freedman 1957:60.) 
The stress on equality between siblings, however, threatens that 
all could be pulled down to the level of the lowest. If outstanding 
success upsets equality, then so does outstanding failure. For 
example, a raja informant told me that she was ashamed of her brother 
who she felt was living in a manner beneath his station. Nevertheless 
she found it difficult to make him change his ways. The only remedy 
she felt she could offer was to ask him to help himself to the 
coconuts in her share of the coconut grove inherited from their 
father. 
My other raja informants confirmed that almost the only way to 
help a sibling who was badly off was to allow him or her to pegang 
'hold' their shares of whatever kebun pusaka 'inherited plantation' 
they might collectively have. Such help seems to be acceptable 
because the 'inherited plantation' is received from one's parents, not 
from one's siblings. It is also arguable that to manage the 
plantation by 'holding' one's siblings' shares is to them a favour, 
since all plantations need some tending. Most of these are 'inherited 
plantations' of fruit trees such as coconut, durian, jackfruit, 
mangoes, rambutan, and so on. (See Plate 20.) As another raja 
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informant explained, the other siblings still have the right to go to 
the plantation to pick the fruits for their own consumption. But 
money from selling the produce belongs to the one managing the 
plantation. 
This informant also mentioned that it is not always the poorest 
sibling who gets to manage the plantation; sometimes it may be a 
matter of convenience. She gave me the example of an 'inherited 
plantation' managed by a woman who is rich enough to hire a number of 
employees. This woman distributes the money from the sale of the 
produce among her siblings. Those who are poor get more, those who 
are well-off get less. One rich brother in Pekanbaru does not get any 
of the money, but receives fruit from the plantation. This 
arrangement is apparently acceptable to all her siblings, since they 
regard this money not as a gift from her, but as their rightful 
inheritance from their parents. My informant who told me about this 
case said that this was the closest example she could think of that 
approximated a family business, but she also noted that it is not like 
a Chinese family business because the siblings are not actually 
working together. 
As the common inheritance of a sibling set, the kebun pusaka 
'inherited plantation' symbolises equality through the sharing of a 
common descent. However, I do not think that the sibling set thereby 
constitutes an agnatic descent group, for they do not own the 
plantation as a corporate group. Instead, they divide the plantation 
into individual shares, which may be disposed of according to the 
wishes of each individual sibling. So the plantation may not be kept 
as one whole in the next generation, because some parts of it may have 
been sold, other parts kept by individual siblings, and still other 
parts inherited by the siblings' children. Consequently, those of my 
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informants who have kebun pusaka, tend to have several plots, perhaps 
even on different islands. These plots would be the remnants of 
different shares of 'inherited plantations' which have passed down 
though various genealogical lines of descent. The largest plot would 
tend to be that established by their parents, and not those that their 
parents had inherited themselves. 
Another aspect of the 'inherited plantations' is that they are 
usually located some distance away from the residential area, perhaps 
even on an uninhabited island such as Terkulai, Basing, or Soreh. 
(See Map 4.) So to have the poorest sibling in the sibling set manage 
such a plantation is also to remove him or her from the local 
community for extended periods of time, thus saving the other, better 
off, siblings the daily embarrassment of inequality. 
My informants are of the general opinion that female siblings and 
cross-sex siblings get on better than male siblings. This may be 
because a greater ideological onus is placed on the maintenance of 
equality between brothers, since keturunan is essentially a male 
affair. So any inequality between brothers becomes more intolerable 
than between female or cross-sex siblings. Consequently, the former 
relationship is less easy-going than the latter: equality requires as 
much effort to maintain, as does hierarchy. 
If siblings are supposed to be equal, then it follows that their 
offspring are also supposed to be equal to one another. The children 
of two brothers are called sepupu kuat 'strong first cousins', because 
they share the same patrilineal keturunan and hence the same derajat. 
The children of two sisters or a brother and a sister are called 
sepupu lemah 'weak first cousins', because depending on who the 
sisters' husbands are, the cousins may not belong to the same 
keturunan or derajat. 
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So whereas equality between the 'strong first cousins' can be 
presumed, no such assumption can be made for the 'weak first cousins'. 
The words 'strong' and 'weak' are used in an ideological sense, to 
refer to the ideal state of cousinship. Ideally, two brothers' 
children should be 'strong first cousins' because they should have 
inherited their fathers' equal brotherhood. But, just as there is 
tension in the relationship between brothers, because of the 
ideological onus to maintain equality, so there is tension between 
'strong first cousins' for the same reason. As a result, 
relationships between 'weak first cousins' tend to be more relaxed. 
In this light, it is significant that marriage between 'weak first 
cousins' is preferred among my informants, particularly if the cousins 
belong to the same derajat. As an informant put it: 
Kalau sepupu kuat boleh kawin, sepu~u lemah lagi boleh. 
If the strong first cousins can marry each other, then the 
weak first cousins can do so even more. 
The implication is that marriage would confirm the equality of 
the 'weak first cousins', whereas the presumed equality of the 'strong 
first cousins' would need no such confirmation. As mentioned above, 
such cousin-marriages are more likely to occur if they are isogamous 
that is, if the 'weak first cousins' belong to the same derajat. 
In the case of hypergamy or hypogamy where two derajat are involved, 
cousin-marriage is more likely to occur if the male cousin is of the 
higher derajat. If it is the female cousin who is of the higher 
derajat, then cousin-marriage would result in a loss of rank for her 
offspring. In other words, cousin-marriage is preferred only if the 
match is isogamous or hypergamous for the female. 
Nevertheless, I do know of at least two cases where female rajas 
have married their commoner cousins. In both these cases, the female 
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rajas were significantly poorer than their other raja cousins. Their 
consent to marry down and have commoner offspring seems to have been 
influenced, at least in part, by their economic position which has 
apparently made them unacceptable to their raja cousins. This is 
another way whereby equality is maintained within the derajat: the 
women who are unable to meet the standard of equality being 
maintained, marry down and produce children for a lower derajat. In 
both cases of female hypogamy mentioned above, the female rajas left 
Penyengat to live in their commoner husbands' communities elsewhere. 
As a result, the richer cousins could quite happily maintain their 
local standard of equality. 
The principles underlying cousin-marriage may be extended beyond 
the first-cousin degree. The same informant cited above went on to 
say that it is important to marry fourth cousins in order to keep them 
as saudara: 
If [fourth cousins] are not married, they will be lost. 
Once you reach the degree of fifth cousins, they are no 
longer counted, they are already lost. The Melayu people do 
not like losing their saudara, they want to keep their 
saudara relations going, so that they would be able to 
remember. 
12 (My translation). 
This informant, a 'headman' of commoner status, was referring to 
isogamous cousin-marriages, which would thereby enable keturunan and 
derajat to be remembered through their realisation in an ongoing, 
intra-marrying cluster of cousins. 
But what one can try to remember, one can also try to forget. As 
I have mentioned in Chapters Four and Seven, my informants' 
genealogies show a number of inter-derajat marriages between male raja 
and female encik or even female hamba raja. The result of such a 
marriage is a cousinship spanning two derajat or more. Such a 
situation goes against the grain of equality. To remedy it, the 
cousins of the lower derajat are sloughed off through genealogical 
amnesia. 
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To give an example, I did not know that a particular raja 
informant was second cousin to some other commoner informants until 
the latter told me so. When the raja informant gave me his genealogy 
he omitted mention of such a relationship, even though they were all 
living near each other in the same community. When I subsequently 
queried him about this, he dismissed the matter by saying, itu sudah 
jauh, tak boleh kira lagi 'that [relationship] is already distant, it 
can no longer be counted'. Indeed, it was not until some years after 
this initial dismissal that in the presence of his second cousin's 
son, he was willing to admit to the relationship: the raja's mother's 
mother was a commoner, and the second cousins in question are the 
descendants of her brother. Evert so, this raja informant's other raja 
cousins do not seem to know about the relationship, or perhaps they do 
not want to recognise it, since that would implicate them as well. 
In this context, it is significant that an ideal marriage is one 
where husband and wife are like abang 'elder brother' and adik 
'younger sister' in relation to each other. The paradigm of 
siblingship as equality thus extends even to marriage. This fits in 
with the implication of the derajat as a sibling-set. If all within 
the derajat are equal to one another, as siblings are supposed to be, 
then the ideal marriage is one that occurs within the derajat. 
Indeed, in the case of an inter-derajat marriage, the paradigm of 
siblingship may not be used to describe the relationship of husband 
and wife, since that is patently an unequal relationship. To give a 
specific example, in a particular marital relationship between a raja 
husband and a commoner wife, he sometimes refers to her as anak 
'child' and she sometimes refers to him as bapak 'father'; he also 
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refers to her siblings as his anak buah 'followers'. This marriage is 
thus disjunctively structured, in contrast to that which is 
conjunctively structured on the paradigm of equal siblingship. 
The ideal is clearly to have intra-generational, sibling-like 
conjunction within the derajat and inter-generational disjunction 
between different derajat. If derajat is translated into local 
community, then this further implies conjunction within the local 
community and disjunction between different local communities. One's 
social world is thereby structured into a complementarity of equal 
selves and different others. This theme is common to both the Galang 
and the Penyengat phantasies. The contrast between them lies in the 
way difference is construed. In the Galang case, the essential 
difference is simply between insider and outsider. In the Penyengat 
case, this difference between insider and outsider is also relevant in 
the internal structuration of a local community, but with the added 
difference that the various local communities are related to each 
other hierarchically as superior and inferior. To translate this 
contrast into kinship terms, whereas conjunctive siblingship is the 
sole paradigm in the Galang case, in the Penyengat case, conjunctive 
siblingship is combined with disjunctive filiation to express the dual 
concern with intra-derajat equality and inter-derajat difference. 
Indeed, whereas Galang keturunan is an un-utterable secret and hence 
an implicit negation, the rajas' keturunan is an explicit affair, 
often drawn up on charts and displayed publicly. 
8.6 Recruitment through Adoption 
In the Penyengat case, the use of disjunctive filiation as a 
paradigm of connected difference is expressed through adoption of the 
children of orang lain 'other people'. Significantly, it was in 
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Penyengat that I found the greatest prevalence of such adoptions. To 
adopt is called angkat literally, 'to lift or elevate'. The word 
angkat is, interestingly, the root form of pangkat 'generation or 
individual ranking' (Wilkinson 1959:842). So an orang lain adopted as 
an anak angkat is someone granted honorary membership in the community 
through social elevation, with the implication that what has been 
lifted can also be dropped. The adopting parent 'lifts' (~ngkat), and 
the adopted child is 'lifted' (diangkat). 
A significant number of Penyengat rajas have adopted daughters 
who have been either sold or given away by their Chinese parents. My 
informants considered it a good thing to adopt these Chinese children 
because in so doing, one recruits new members to Melayu-dom. These 
adoptees are thereby said to have 'entered Melayu-dom' (masuk Melayu). 
But even though they have been adopted by rajas, the adoptees 
themselves remain commoners. They do not bear the title raja, as that 
is not their keturunan by birth. 
Since one can only lift what is low to start with, the 
implication is that the anak angkat is of inferior origins. So even 
if the anak angkat has been adopted from babyhood and has grown up 
with one's anak betul 'true children', the adopted child's implied 
inferiority remains right up to adulthood. Consequently, while my 
raja informants seem to regard the adoption of a Chinese daughter 
almost as a status symbol, the adopted daughter herself is usually 
reluctant to admit in public that she is adopted. The position of 
such an adoptee is thus ambiguous, for she grows up as a commoner in a 
raja family. She is a familiar orang lain, who belongs and yet does 
not belong simultaneously. So whereas the adoptee wishes to define 
herself as one who belongs by hiding the fact of her adoption, her 
raja family wish to define themselves as superior insiders in relation 
to her as an inferior outsider. 
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I know of at least one case where the adoptee has found this 
imposed ambiguity intolerable. Instead of trying to belong to the 
community by hiding the fact of her adoption, she took the opposite 
tack of proclaiming herself an outsider, an anak angkat keturuna~ 
Cina. So determined was she to dissociate herself from her raja 
family that she left Penyengat and made her way to Batara, where she 
found a job on which she was able to support herself. Her raja family 
consider her jahat 'bad'. When she met me, she said to me: 
Kita ugama lain, tapi darah sama. 
(You and I are of different religions, but the same blood.) 
She thus considers herself a Chinese Muslim, rather than a Muslim 
Melayu. 
The adoptive angkat relationship is thus inherently disjunctive, 
implying not just the inter-generational gap between parent and child, 
but also the inter-derajat gap between a high-ranking adoptor and a 
low-ranking adoptee. Indeed people of the same 4erajat generally do 
not angkat 'lift' each other's children; to do so would imply a social 
disjunction between them. This is particularly the case since all 
within the local community are supposed to be saudara 'siblings'. So 
it follows that the children of one's co-residents are one's anak 
saudara 'children of siblings' (that is, nieces and nephews), if not 
literally so, then at least metaphorically so. Since they are already 
anak in one sense, there is no further need to make them anak in 
another sense. To angkat one's anak saudara would be like trying to 
adopt one's own children; it would be a redundant and hence 
meaningless act. 
But this is not to say that children born into a local community 
are never brought up by adults other than their own parents. Indeed 
it is quite common to find that grandparents and parents' siblings 
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play important nurturant roles. However, in such cases, the children 
are said to be dipelihara or dibela 'cared for' by these adults; they 
are not said to be diangkat 'lifted' by them. The pejorative 
connotation of angkat may be illustrated by a case I encountered in 
Pangkil, where a man who openly declared that he did not like his own 
father, went about claiming to be the anak angkat of several different 
people in the community, even though he had not been brought up by 
them. Although nobody in the community took this claim seriously, his 
message was clearly understood: he was implying that he and hence his 
father were socially inferior to his supposed adaptors. 
As this example indicates, there are cases where the adoptees 
themselves want to be diangkat 'lifted'. Apart from the special 
situation of the Pangkil informant mentioned above, most of these are 
adults who voluntarily ask to be adopted so that they would belong 
more closely to the local community. Such people are usually orang 
lain who are already residents in the community -- perhaps members of 
the local Chinese shopkeeper's family. This has indeed happened to a 
few Chinese individuals living on Penyengat. One of them explained to 
me, half in Malay and half in Teochiu, that as a result of her 'social 
interaction' (pergaulan) with the Penyengat people, she had a 'desire' 
( niat) to 'enter and be one of them' ( A. -1.t, 1P~ v~ A... ) • She had 
felt that the situation would be 'more comfortable if beliefs were to 
be united' (lebih senang kalau kepercayaan dapat disatukan). 
Consequently she became the anak angkat of a Melayu family who then 
arranged for her conversion to Islam. 
This is how she described her conversion ceremony: She was first 
13 
disunat 'circumcised' by the local midwife, after which the people 
present 'recited a prayer of safekeeping' (baca doa selamat). There 
was a 'feast' (kenduri) with various kinds of kuih 'pastries' and with 
pulut kuning 'yellow glutinous rice' made into a nasi adab-adab 
'ceremonial rice-dish'. It was 'like a wedding' (macam kawin) but 
without the ritual of tepuk tepung tawar -- literally, 'dabbing on 
14 
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plain rice-flour'. A Muslim name was conferred on her by the ustaz 
'religious teacher'. He asked her whether she truly wanted to 'enter 
Islam' (masuk Islam); she replied 'yes' and signed a register. My 
informant also mentioned the names of some of the people who were 
present at the ceremony. It is quite clear that her concern was to 
join the community of people that she already knew; her interest was 
not in becoming a Muslim in an abstract sense. If Islam was a portal 
to Melayu-dom, then she would enter Islam in order to enter Melayu-dom 
as she knew it in the form of Penyengat. 
As Laing (1969:38) has noted, 
We are all prone to be drawn into social phantasy systems, 
with loss of one's 'own' identity in the process •••• 
That my informant had entered the social phantasy system is evident in 
the subsequent remarks she made in the same interview. Immediately 
after telling me about how she had had the desire to be integrated 
into the Penyengat community, she proceeded to discuss another Chinese 
person who had also 'entered Melayu-dom', but who had, according to 
her, been adopted by a Javanese man and his Bugis wife. Her 
implication was that he had not truly entered the community, because 
his adoptive father was himself of a non-Melayu keturunan. My 
informant then went on to talk about a man I had never met in a place 
I had not visited -- a certain G in a place called Tanjung Setengah, 
which seems to be located somewhere in Bulang Strait. (See Map 7.) 
What my informant found noteworthy about this man was that he had 
married a perempuan orang hutan 'a female of the forest people'. The 
orang hutan 'forest people' are generally so despised by my informants 
that even though they are recognised as Melayu asli, they do not 
qualify for even the lowest derajat of the hierarchy. By alluding to 
521 
these two cases of questionable keturunan and derajat, my informant 
seems to have been trying to affirm her own status within the phantasy 
of zaman sultan. 
The voluntary entry of non-Melayu 'others' to Melayu-dom is 
welcomed, indeed even expected, by my Melayu murni informants. As a 
Pangkil informant said: when orang lain such as the Chinese live in a 
Melayu community for some time, they will be 'pulled' (tertarik) by 
adat Melayu in their 'social interaction' (pergaulan). This informant 
stated explicitly that she expected the two Chinese brothers who had a 
local grocery store to 'enter Melayu-dom' sooner or latter. As it 
happened, the elder of these brothers had only recently eloped with a 
Pangkil Melayu woman to Tanjungpinang. This had caused a furor in the 
community because the couple did not marry properly, either in the 
civil registry, in the Islamic registry, or even according to Chinese 
rites. There was hence considerable pressure exerted by members of 
the Pangkil community on the couple to 'follow procedure' (ikut 
aturan) by choosing either to masuk Melayu or to ikut Cina 'follow the 
Chinese'. If the woman chose to ikut Cina, then she would be 
considered as 'departing from Melayu-dom' (keluar Melayu) and 
consequently ostracised. 
As far as I know, the couple have still remained in unmarried 
cohabitation. Some time after the elopement, which had occurred in 
1980, the younger brother, who was already married to a Chinese wife, 
quitted Pangkil and moved to Tanjungpinang. 
move to me thus: If one lives too long among 
one wi 11 become like them; one will 'enter 
as her brother-in-law was in danger of doing. 
His wife explained the 
the 'barbarians' <t-A.. ), 
barbarism' ( ~ ~ ), 
So she had begun to 
worry about her four children growing up in Pangkil, even though the 
family had already lived there for more than ten years. Although she 
was sad about leaving, she felt that they had to because 'what the 
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barbarians like best is to have our people become their people' 
But be that as it may, it is also clear that newcomers to Melayu-
dom are considered socially inferior, by virtue of not belonging by 
birth. This demonstrates the dual concern in the Penyengat phantasy 
-- that is, a desire to draw people in as social inferiors and a 
desire to keep people out as social equals. This is thus another 
manifestation of the 'Janus effect' discussed above, where an inward-
looking orientation co-exists with an outward-looking orientation. 
From the perspective of an orang lain, entry into such a Melayu-
dom can become a 'double-bind', where one is damned if one does, and 
damned if one does not. There are two conflicting injunctions. The 
first is: You are not one of us; you should become one of us. If the 
orang lain takes this message seriously and enters the community, the 
second injunction emerges: You are still not one of us; you'll never 
become one of us. If the confused recruit then wishes to withdraw, 
the first message then comes on again, and so on ad infinitum. The 
conflict between these two injunctions may be resolved by reading the 
higher-level meta-message which contains them: You can't win in 
either case, because you are who we say you are. In other words, the 
meta-message is about domination and submission. That is indeed what 
the phantasy is about. To enter such a Melayu-dom is thus to enter a 
social phantasy system, where the mutual identification of Self and 
Other has been constructed in terms of symbolic power. To enter as a 
social inferior is thus to submit to the definition of Self by a more 
powerful Other. In Chapter Seven, I asked why some people are willing 
to trade their self-respect for an Other-derived ideology in which 
they are evaluated as inferior. The answer, I suggest, is that the 
desire to belong to a larger whole is greater than the desire to keep 
one's self-respect by ignoring the definitions of Self by others. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT 
1. A comment on myth by Barthes (1956) is useful to our discussion: 
Motivation is necessary to the very duplicity of myth: 
myth plays on the analogy between meaning and form, there 
is no myth without motivated form •.•• Motivation is 
unavoidable. It is nonetheless very fragmentary. To 
start with, it is not "natural": it is history which 
supplies its analogies to the form. Then, the analogy 
between the meaning and the concept is never anything but 
partial: the form drops many analogous features and keeps 
only a few. 
(Quoted from Sontag 1982:112-113). 
2. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Pendatang lebih baik ekonominya daripada yang asli di 
sini, yang Melayu itu. Mereka meningkat, kita statis. 
Yang Flores, yang Sumba, yang Java, atau yang Bugis --
semuanya berani. Tapi sifat Melayu individu, kejam, 
hasad, dengki. 
3. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Pulau Karas itu pulau yang menarik orang ke sana. Macam 
Raja [X], dia ditarik ke sana, sampai dia kawin dengan 
orang Galang. 
4. See Embree (1973:91,133). I include the languages commonly 
referred to as 'Hokien' and 'Teochiu' under the rubric of 
southern Min. 
5. See note 11 in Chapter Two on Pancasila. 
6. There are eight or so birth-order names among my informants, 
usually used in the following order: 
long (sulong) for the eldest 
anjang (panjang) for the second 
ngah ( tengah) }.for the third and fourth 
lang (alan~) in whichever order 
~ (hitam }for the fifth and sixth 
teh (putih) in whichever order 
cik (kecik) for the second youngest 
ucu (bongsu) for the youngest. 
Whereas the birth-order names of the oldest and the youngest are 
generally fixed, there is variation in the usage of those in the 
middle. For example, in one family, tam may precede teh, and in 
another, vice-versa. Where there are-more than eight"'"Siblings, 
the additional siblings may have gelaran 'nicknames'. Where 
there are fewer than eight, some of the birth-order names in the 
middle may be dropped; but long (sulong) and ucu (bongsu) are 
nevertheless always kept. 
For a comparative example of the use of birth-order names, see 
Benjamin's (1968a)analysis of Temiar names. 
7. To use Freeman's (1973:109) explanation: 
Amity here refers to the 'mutual support' that kinsfolk 
habitually offer to one another, this being an expression 
of a 'rule of prescriptive altruism'. This kind of 
behaviour, according to Fortes, is intrinsic to the 
relations of close kin. 
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8. These place-names are presented in the way my informant uttered 
them. 'Bulang (including Pecom)' refers to the island-cluster of 
which the biggest island is Bulan island itself. His inclusion 
of Pecom on the west side of Bulan island was meant to illustrate 
that he was referring not just to Bulang Strait but to the whole 
island-cluster. (See Maps 3 and 7.) 'Setokok (including Galang 
Rempang)' refers to the islands in the area of Setokok and 
Rempang. 'Galang Kandap' refers to the islands in the area of 
Galang Baru, extending to Pengelap (or 'Pengalap' in my 
informant's pronunciation). 'Galang Kandap' is itself an 
alternative name for Galang Baru. 'Galang Besar' is an 
alternative name for Galang Senyantung; it thus refers to the 
islands in that area including Karas. 'Temiang' refers to the 
islands in the area of Temiang Strait. 'Daik' refers to the 
islands in the Lingga and Singkep area. And 'Senayang' refers to 
the Sebangka and Bakung area. (See Map 3.) 
9. See Andaya and Andaya (1982:60,79) on Kelang. 
10. As Freeman (1973:117) has pointed out: 
'Latent hostilities' are often 'as intrinsically built 
into' the bonds of kinship as is 'amity'. 
11. Lienhardt's (1951:317-318) comment on bewitchment is perhaps 
relevant in this context: 
A man who thinks himself bewitched is interpreting what 
he takes to be intentions of his neighbours towards him. 
If he thinks himself envied, hated or frustrated, then he 
readily thinks himself bewitched. 
12. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Kalau tak kawin, akan hilang. Kalau sampai lima pupu, 
sudah tak kira, sudah hilang. Orang Melayu tak mau 
hilangkan saudara, nak sambung-sambung lagi, baru boleh 
ingat. 
13. As Hughes (1896:8) has noted: 
Circumcision is not once alluded to in the Qur'an. The 
omission is remarkable and the Muslim writers do not 
attempt any explanation for it. It is held to be sunnah 
[optional], or founded upon the customs of the Prophet 
(Fatawa 'Alamgiri, vol.iv p.237), and dating its 
institution from the time of Abraham •••• It is 
recommended to be performed upon a boy between the ages 
of seven and twelve, but it is lawful to circumcise a 
child seven days after his birth. In the case of a 
convert to Islam from some other creed, to whom the 
operation may be an occasion of great suffering, it can 
be dispensed with, although it is considered expedient 
and proper for all new converts to be circumcised. In 
all cases, the adult is expected to circumcise himself, 
as it is a shame for an adult person to uncover himself 
to another. The circumcision of females is also allowed, 
and is commonly practised in Arabia. 
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In the case of my informant described in the text, she was 
circumcised by someone else, even though she is an adult. This 
is true also of some other converts I met, both male and female. 
Female circumcision in Riau evidently does not involve 
clitorodectomy. But it is not clear what is actually done; one 
opinion has it that a small cut is made in the labia majora. In 
most cases, this is done when the female is still an infant. 
Female circumcision in Riau seems to carry less risk than male 
circumcision. Whereas a few males have been known to die from 
post-circumcision infection, I have not come across any such case 
with regards to females. This suggests that no significant wound 
is made. 
14. In this ritual, a mixture of rice-flour water and leaves of the 
setawar plant is dabbed on the person. As Wilkinson (1959:1093) 
has explained setawar, it is a 'descriptive name (si-tawar [the 
flavourless one]) for plants like Costus speciosus that are 
regarded as spiritual antiseptics, i.e. that keeps off demons of 
disease'. This ritual is quite clearly animistic. In his 
analysis of 'Malay magic' in the Malay Peninsula, Endicott 
(1970:136-137) describes the tepung tawar 'rice-flour mixture' as 
a 'boundary weakener', which weakens boundaries between 
categories, thereby facilitating the passage of essences between 
them. 
CHAPTER NINE 
ISLAMISATION AND WITQICRAFf ACCUSATIONS: 
CONVERSION AND APOST.AS'i 
9. 1 The Local Umat 
9.2 Witchcraft Accusations 
9.3 Islamisation in Galang 
9.4 Epilogue: The Civilising Process 
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9.1 The Local Umat 
Islam is an important means for effecting the centripetal 
orientation of those in the periphery towards the centre. But if the 
Melayu people at the periphery are supposed to be centripetally 
orientated towards those at the centre, then are those at the centre 
also orientated towards some other higher authority? Yes; this is 
precisely why Islam is so important to the Melayu murni. 
The Arabic word islam literally means 'submission, resignation, 
recounciliation (to the will of God)' (Wehr 1976:426). The higher 
authority towards whom the Melayu murni see themselves as being 
centripetally orientated is thus none other than God himself. This 
implies that there are two distinct contexts of centripetal 
1 
orientation: One is the context of the world-wide Islamic umat 
'congregation of believers' or 'nation of Islam', where all are 
supposed to be centripetally orientated towards God. The other 
context is the local umat in the shape of the bygone sultanate, with 
Penyengat as its centre. 
As mentioned above, the sultanate constituted a regional 
congregation headed by the sultan who is the imam 'religious guide'. 
Ever since the institution of the caliphate after the Prophet's death, 
it has been an established principle of Islamic organisation that the 
Muslim ruler is also the religious leader of the congregation that 
2 
constitutes his polity. So the basis of political authority within 
an Islamic state is religious legitimation through God's sanction. 
As I have shown in Chapter Five, the significance of this was not lost 
on the Bugis rajas who did indeed legitimate themselves through Islam. 
Since Riau was under the yamtuan muda, not the yamtuan besar, it was 
the former who acted as the imam of the local umat. Indeed, from the 
time of Raja Haji onwards, all the yamtuan mudas seem to have been 
528 
particularly pious. (See Appendix 8.) 
At the present time, despite the absence of a yamtuan muda to act 
as imam, Penyengat nevertheless remains a religious centre for the 
area in at least two important respects -- as the location of a major 
3 
mosque and as a place where Muslims can get married. The mosque, 
painted in bright yellow, is a clearly visible landmark from the sea. 
(See Plates 21 and 22.) When I first began my fieldwork in 1979, it 
4 
was still white in colour; it was repainted yellow only in 1982. 
Perhaps an interpretation may be given of the colours used: My 
informants generally consider white as the colour of 'cleanliness, 
holiness', and yellow as the colour of 'royalty'. The shift from 
white to yellow may thus mark a greater emphasis on the royalty of the 
Penyengat mosque, particularly in relation to the other major mosque 
located in Tanjungpinang, which is, interestingly, in blue and white. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Penyengat is only fifteen minutes 
away from Tanjungpinang by motor-boat. Because of the proximity of 
the two places, their respective mosques are equally available to both 
populations. However, whereas there are Indonesian bureaucrats and 
other people from Tanjungpinang who regularly come to the Penyengat 
mosque to pray, especially on Fridays, there are very few, if any, 
Penyengat people who go to the Tanjungpinang mosque to pray. 
According to a canonical tradition, mosques are Allah's houses on 
5 
earth. Some mosques may thus be perceived as more favoured dwelling-
places of Allah, than are other mosques. Those where his presence is 
supposed to be more evident would be described as berkat 'blessed'. 
The Penyengat mosque seems to be so considered. 
One informant even used the word daulat 'divine kingship' to 
describe its aura. According to this informant, aeroplanes should not 
'cross over' (langkah) the Penyengat mosque; if they do, they would be 
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struck down by daulat. (As it happens, Penyengat does not lie in any 
aeronautical flight path.) 
However, although people from Tanjungpinang do go to the 
Penyengat mosque to pray, other islanders hardly ever do so. So as a 
focus of centripetal orientation, it seems to attract only the former. 
Where the latter are concerned, Penyengat is significant primarily as 
a centre for Muslim marriages. In the whole of Kecamatan Bintan 
Selatan, there are only three marriage specialists authorised to marry 
Muslims: two of them are on Penyengat; the other one is the head of 
the Department of Religion in Tanjungpinang. So anyone who wishes to 
be married in an Islamic manner has to make a pilgrimage to either 
Penyengat or Tanjungpinang. Such a situation seems to have been 
derived from zaman sultan. 
As a Penyengat raja explained to me: 
In the era of the sultan, wherever his deputy was, there 
would be a marriage specialist. The deputy could marry 
people, because he was the representative of the sultan. 
The sultan was the head of government, the head of culture, 
and the head of religion •••• The one who has the right to 
marry people is actually the woman's guardian. The sultan 
and his deputy also had to perform the marriage ceremony in 
the name of the guardian. According to religious law, 
people do not need to come to Penyengat to get married. The 
guardian of the woman can marry off his daughter in his own 
village. But according to state law, governmental law --
that is, kanun or adat -- marriage must take place in the 
presence of the marriage specialist, even if this specialist 
merely sits there saying nothing. State law was made by the 
sultan. 
6 (My translation). 
The 'sultan's deputy' (amir) that my raja informant was referring to 
was the yamtuan muda in Penyengat. So even though canonical law in 
Islam does not require Muslims to go to the political centre to get 
married, state law or governmental law required and still requires 
such a pilgrimage. Islam is thereby centralised such that the 
political capital is also the religious centre. Indeed I found that 
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most of my Muslim informants outside Penyengat have visited the island 
at least once in their lives -- that is, when they went there to get 
7 
married. Islam is thus an important means for effecting the 
centripetal orientation of those in the periphery towards the centre. 
9.2 Witchcraft Accusations 
As shown in Chapter Eight, from the Penyengat perspective, the 
inward orientation of the Galang people is interpreted as centrifugal, 
as a turning away from the proper directionality. As mentioned above, 
an impellent mode of morality is implied in centripetalism, such that 
it is right, good, and safe for those in the periphery to be 
orientated towards the centre. So according to this logic, the 
reverse orientation would be wrong, evil, and dangerous. Indeed my 
Melayu murni informants -- that is, those in Penyengat, Pangkil and 
Pengujan -- do explicitly regard the Galang people in such terms. The 
latter are said to pakai ilmu 'use witchcraft' and main racun 'play 
with poison'. Any visitor to Galang is thought liable to fall victim 
to witchcraft and poisoning. 
The term I have glossed as 'witchcraft' is ilmu, an Arabic-
8 
derived word which has the primary meaning of 'knowledge'. My Melayu 
!!!!!!..!!! informants in Penyengat and Pangkil differentiate between good 
'knowledge' and bad 'knowledge'. Good 'knowledge' is that revealed by 
Allah; bad 'knowledge' is that derived from hantu, spirits other than 
Allah. In between these moral poles is neutral 'knowledge' -- for 
example, ilmu pengetahuan 'scientific knowledge' that is derived from 
outsiders. 
Such being the case, it follows that only the Muslim Melayu can 
have good 'knowledge', whereas the non-Muslim Melayu would necessarily 
have bad 'knowledge'. Indeed, the evil of the Galang people and the 
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sea nomads is said to derive precisely from their 'lack of religion' 
(kurang ugama). In this connection, it is significant that the Karas 
community is said to be 'getting gradually better' (beransur baik). 
This improvement is indeed attributed to the increasing presence of 
Islam there -- sekarang ugama di sana lebih kuat 'now religion there 
is stronger'. In other words, a Muslim Melayu is regarded as 
intrinsically good, whereas a non-Muslim Melayu is regarded as 
intrinsically bad. As a consequence, only the good can have good 
'knowledge'; the bad would have access only to bad 'knowledge'. 
I have glossed this bad 'knowledge' as 'witchcraft' because the 
evil is attributed not to the act of knowing, but to the person who 
knows. In this usage I am following Evans-Pritchard (1937) 
differentiation between 'sorcery' where evil is attributed to the act, 
and 'witchcraft' where evil is attributed to the person. Such a 
differentiation is applicable to the situation in Riau. 
To illustrate this, let us consider the bomoh 'healer/sorceror' 
who exists even in the communities that are considered murni 'pure', 
indeed even in Penyengat itself. The kind of 'knowledge' that a bomoh 
has is generally referred to as ilmu sihir. (See Wilkinson 1959:421.) 
The 'knowledge' of such sorcerors is considered acceptable if these 
sorcerors are themselves acceptable as Muslims. For example, a raja 
from Penyengat who is a well-known bomoh, proudly announced to me that 
he had studied his ilmu sihir in Mecca; to prove it, he brought out 
Arabic books that were supposedly about ilmu sihir. (See Wee and 
Matheson forthcoming.) Another raja, also a bomoh, told me that he 
only uses Quranic verses in making his spells. Ilmu sihir is thus 
supposed to have an Islamic derivation, even though it is evidently 
9 
not part of Islam as such. 
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Because of this supposed Islamic derivation, a bomoh's ilmu sihir 
is not regarded as intrinsically evil; it is a matter that can be 
safely discussed in public. In contrast, the bad 'knowledge' of 
witchcraft is an evil mystery to which my murni informants feel they 
have no direct access. So whereas the bomoh's 'knowledge' is regarded 
as capable of curing illness, the bad 'knowledge' of witchcraft is 
regarded as only dangerously malevolent. So although I have 
informants who are very willing to acknowledge that they are bomohs, I 
have yet to meet a self-confessed 'witch'. 
However, my informants who are not themselves bomohs, do show 
some ambivalence towards the bomoh's 'knowledge'. Some of them even 
said that a bomoh may deliberately cause someone to fall ill, just so 
as to earn a fee by curing that person. Indeed it is generally held 
by my informants that the bomoh's ability to cure illness can be 
turned into an ability to cause illness. Such an opinion is quite 
openly expressed. 
For example, something was once stolen from one of my raja 
informants who is a bomoh. His friends urged him to 'fix' (bikin) the 
unknown thief by casting a spell. He refused, saying that what he had 
lost was not that valuable. But if he were to 'fix' the thief, the 
result would be an illness that would cost the thief a huge sum of 
money to cure. 
The way he expressed his reluctance is very interesting. He did 
not say that he was not able to 'fix' the thief; to do so would be to 
declare the limits of his power. However, if he had agreed to 'fix' 
the thief, that would imply that he could 'fix' others as well, and 
the next illness that occurred in the community could well be blamed 
on him. So the best strategy was indeed to refuse, ostensibly out of 
the kindness of his heart -- that is, by saying that he did not want 
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to cause the thief to squander a huge sum of money disproportionate to 
the cost of the article that had been stolen. 
This demonstrates the perceived difference between the bomoh's 
ilmu sihir as sorcery and the Galang people's ilmu as witchcraft. The 
difference lies in the perception of their respective intentionality. 
A bomoh may be powerful but he or she is not regarded as intrinsically 
evil. Even a bomoh who is said to cause illness just to earn a fee by 
curing the illness, is perceived as eventually curing it. So what my 
bomoh informant said about refraining from harming the thief, fits in 
nicely with the public perception of bomohs in general. To explain 
why bomohs are acceptable, an informant who is a haji -- that is, a 
returned pilgrim from Mecca -- said that bomohs are able to cure 
illness only because God allows them to do so: semua Tuhan punya kuasa 
'all is in God's power'. 
The logic of monotheism does indeed imply that if God has the 
monopoly on good, then anyone who does not submit to God is, by 
definition, evil. This was explicitly stated by a raja informant. He 
described the Galang people as orang liar 'wild people', who have no 
idea of dosa 'sin'. He said that they think they are Tuhan 'God': 
Dia sangka yang dia mau semua boleh jadi. 
(They think that whatever they want can be.) 
The implication is clear: It is a 'sin' to be Self-orientated; only a 
self-existent God has that right, it seems. So the way not to 'sin' 
is to be Other-orientated, specifically towards the one supreme Other 
God. 
Although the whole Galang area is considered by my Penyengat 
informants as dangerous, a few communities were mentioned as being 
particularly bad. The people of Pulau Melor were said to be the 
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worst, and the people of Pulau Panjang almost as bad. The witchcraft 
of the Karas people was said to have been so powerful that it could 
kill a visitor the moment he or she stepped on their shore; there and 
then he or she would vomit blood and die. As mentioned in Chapter 
Eight, my Karas informants have an alternative explanation for this 
supposed power, attributing it instead to the daulat 'divine kingship' 
of the island. 
According to my Penyengat informants, Karas is said to be 
'getting gradually better', but is still not wholly safe. Apparently, 
in such places, even if a visitor were to be given a show of welcome, 
he or she may still be poisoned by the food and drinks offered by the 
host. According to a raja informant, even if one's host were to slice 
a loaf of bread in one's presence and to partake of that same bread, 
one could still be poisoned, because the knife used for cutting would 
have a poisoned side and an Un-poisoned side. The slice on the 
poisoned side would be offered to the guest, while the un-poisoned 
slice would be taken by the host. 
This fear of being bewitched and poisoned by the Galang people 
does not, however, mean that the rajas themselves never visit the 
Galang area. As mentioned above, there is even a raja who lives in 
Karas, and who is still alive and well after more than ten years on 
the island. But this fact does not seem to deter the accusations of 
witchcraft and poisoning levelled against the Galang people by the 
Penyengat rajas. On the contrary, as I have indicated above, this 
particular raja is regarded by his peers as a turncoat of sorts; he is 
said to have been 'pulled' (ditarik). 
Still, my first visits to Karas, Nanga, and Pulau Panjang were 
all undertaken in the company of a Penyengat raja. (See Map 4.) 
Before we went, I was warned of the dangers of wi,tchcraf t and poison 
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that might be encountered in these places. I was instructed not to 
partake of the food and drinks offered to me there, unless I saw my 
raja guide eating and drinking first. In the case of Karas, he said 
that he knew the safe houses; these were the houses of the local 
'headman' and Raja X the headmaster. We made only a brief visit to 
Nanga, and did not eat or drink anything there. In the case of Pulau 
Panjang, the raja's wife prepared all the food and drinks in her own 
home the previous night, which we then took with us and ate on the 
boat while it was moored next to the jetty. Significantly, on these 
trips, we went 'in a crowd' (ramai-ramai). Apparently, there is 
strength in numbers. Apart from the raja and myself, the party to 
Karas and Pulau Nanga included some ten people from Pangkil. The 
party to Pulau Panjang was even more numerous, because we went with 
the soccer team from Pangkil that had gone to play against the Pulau 
Panjang team. Nor was the raja the only one wary of eating and 
drinking in these places; the other members in our party were also 
very cautious. 
I asked my informants from Penyengat and Pangkil what they 
thought would be the Galang people's motive in killing their visitors 
through witchcraft and poison. Would it be for monetary profit, for 
example? The consistent answer I received was that the Galang people 
'want to test their witchcraft' (nak cuba ilmunya). The purpose, it 
seems, is to measure their 'witchcraft' (ilmu) against the 'strength' 
(kekuatan) of the visitors. After trying their 'witchcraft' on a 
certain person, they will know whether that person is 'strong' (kuat) 
or 'weak' (lemah). If that person is 'strong' and is able to 
withstand their witchcraft, then the next time they would not be brave 
enough to try again. My informants stated categorically that material 
wealth was not the purpose of witchcraft. 
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No one in our party to Karas, Nanga, and Pulau Panjang succumbed 
to either witchcraft or poison. So everyone had evidently passed the 
test of 'strength'. However, it is not always the case that people 
can pass this test. The death of a young man in Pangkil, for example, 
was blamed on the witchcraft of the Galang people. He had been a 
member of the Pangkil soccer team and had gone to various places in 
the Galang area to play against their local teams. Apparently, after 
one of these matches, he had returned home ill. At the time I met 
him, he was already ailing. He never recovered; his death was 
consequently blamed on his opponents' soccer withcraft. 
My Penyengat and Pangkil informants are of the opinion that 
witchcraft is used against them at the soccer matches to which they 
send their local teams. The Pangkil people, in particular, mention 
this often, more so than do the Penyengat people; the former are 
keener on soccer than are the latter. (Since soccer involves the 
combat of equal opponents, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Penyengat rajas are less interested in playing the game. The 
Penyengat team consists mostly of commoners.) 
My Pangkil informants seem to blame every injury on the playing 
field or subsequent illness that befalls a Pangkil player on the other 
side's witchcraft. Such accusations seem to be made regardless of 
whether the Pangkil team has lost or won. If they have lost, their 
defeat may be blamed on soccer witchcraft. Even if they have won, and 
even if no one was injured on the playing field, there may still be 
talk of the opposing team's attempt to use witchcraft. For example, 
it may be said that a member of the other team was sighted muttering 
10 
an incantation over a lime in front of the goal, before the match 
began, in order to prevent the ball from entering. So even when the 
Pangkil side wins, their victory is construed as a triumph of 
'strength' (kekuatan) over 'witchcraft' (ilmu). 
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Indeed when I asked my Pangkil informants why they continue to 
have these soccer matches if they consider them so dangerous, they 
answered that the young men want to test their 'strength'. This 
'strength' does not seem to include the use of any counter-magic. To 
cite an informant: 
Kita tidak pakai ilmu, kita cuma ada kepandaian. 
(We do not use witchcraft, we only have skill.) 
Or as another informant said: 
Orang Pangkil tak pakai syarat-syarat. Kalau orang lain nak 
pakai ilmu, itu terserah kepada dialah. 
(The Pangkil people don't use protective amulets. If others 
wish to use witchcraft, that's up to them.) 
Such statements and others made by my informants express an almost 
cheerful willingness to assume an attitude of vulnerability, with 
regards to others, for better or for worse. Counter-attack is not 
even considered as a possibility, the implication being that good 
people do not use witchcraft; only bad people do. To claim 
vulnerability to other people's witchcraft is thus to announce that 
oneself is not a witch, hence not evil, hence good. 
Douglas' general characterisation of witchcraft (1970:xxvi) is 
relevant to our understanding of the situation in Riau: 
The witch is an attacker and deceiver. He uses what is 
impure and potent to harm what is pure and helpless. The 
symbols of what we recognise across the globe as witchcraft 
all build on the theme of vulnerable internal goodness 
attacked by external power. But these symbols vary 
according to local patterns of meaning and, above all, 
according to variation in the social structure. 
She goes on to differentiate between two types of witchcraft --
(i) where the witch is an outsider, and (ii) where the witch is an 
internal enemy. My Penyengat and Pangkil informants' perception of 
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witchcraft clearly fits into Douglas' second type. After all, they 
felt it necessary to warn me, a total outsider who is neither Melayu 
nor Muslim nor an inhabitant of Riau, of the witchcraft of the Galang 
people who are indeed acknowledged as Melayu asli, the indigenous 
inhabitants of Riau. 
Furthermore, in the course of my fieldwork, I did not hear a 
single accusation of witchcraft levelled against 'newcomers' 
(pendatang), such as the Javanese, Chinese, Indians, Europeans, and so 
on. I raised this matter with some of my Pangkil informants who said 
that what they had told me about witchcraft applied only to the 
Melayu: people of 'other stock' (lain bangsa) have their own different 
kinds of witchcraft. These people of 'other stock' are also said to 
be immune to the effects of Melayu witchcraft. For example, according 
to one informant, if a 'white person' (orang putih) or a Chinese 
person were to go to Karas, he or she would not vomit up blood on the 
beach and die; only a vulnerable Melayu person would suffer such 
effects. 
Since I am myself Chinese, how does this explain the dietary 
precautions I was told to observe, when I went to Karas, Nanga and 
Pulau Panjang with my informants from Penyengat and Pangkil? 
Apparently, Chinese people who are involved in Melayu 'social 
interaction' (pergaulan) become vulnerable, or are regarded as such. 
These include the Chinese families who have established groceries on 
the various islands. The implication is that Melayu-dom is a 
particular sphere of social interaction. So Melayu witchcraft affects 
only those who are involved within this sphere. 
Douglas (1970:xxvii) further differentiates internal witchcraft 
into three sub-types --
(i) where the witch is a member of a rival faction;. 
(ii) where the witch is a dangerous deviant; 
(iii) where the witch is an internal enemy with outside 
liaisons. 
I suggest that the kind of internal witchcraft that disturbs my 
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Penyengat and Pangkil informants is of the first sub-type. According 
to Douglas (ibid.), the function of this sub-type of internal 
witchcraft is 'to redefine faction boundaries or realign faction 
hierarchy or split community.' Such a characterisation seems 
particularly apt with regards to the situation in Riau, where we find 
a certain sector of Melayu-dom -- that is, the self-defined 'pure' 
ones -- trying to sustain the image of a hierarchy with themselves 
located at the top of that imagined hierarchy. 
In such a context, alternative forms of Melayu-ness would be 
perceived as threatening, because they offer alternative ways of being 
Melayu, without necessarily taking the route of becoming Melayu murni 
as defined in Penyengat terms. These alternatives are perceived by my 
Melayu murni informants as centrifugal because they focus attention 
away from Penyengat. Such a perception is expressed, for example, in 
the following accounts. 
According to my Melayu murni informants, the nomadic orang laut 
'sea people' also have powerful ilmu. So one should take care not to 
'insult' (menghina) them, because if they are offended, they would 
cast a spell, inducing to 'follow' (ikut) and become one of them. In 
a case cited by my informants, a man bought some 'prawn paste' from an 
orang laut woman, but he was hesitant about giving her the money, 
because her hands were dirty. The offended woman then cast a spell on 
him, inducing him to follow her and become an orang laut himself. The 
moral of this story is that one should avoid interacting with the 
orang laut for example, by buying 'prawn paste' from them; 
otherwise, one is liable to be inducted by them into an orang laut way 
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of life. 
Interestingly, this fear of being induced to join the nomadic 
orang laut is not unique to my Melayu murni informants, but is shared 
perhaps by all the Melayu sedentary villagers, including those who may 
be evaluated as 'impure'. It is quite clear that what is feared is 
nomadism as an alternative to sedentism. According to my village 
informants, the nomadic orang laut lack sufficient water with which to 
bathe; so they are 'smelly' (busuk). Moreover, they live on fish 
alone; so they smell fishy. However, if one meets an orang laut, one 
must pretend not to notice this smell, for if one shows one's disdain, 
then the orang laut would take out a bottle containing dugong's tears, 
sprinkle some tear drops on the disdainful one, and thereby induce 
that person to leave kith and kin to join the orang laut. This 
inducted recruit would consequently lose all memory of origins. 
According to my village informants, the orang laut collect the tears 
of the dugong expressly for such a purpose. 
I have found no evidence that this sort of induction actually 
happens. What is interesting is that my sedentary informants, 
particularly the 'pure' ones, should impute a desire on the part of 
the orang laut to recruit outsiders to their way of life. This may 
perhaps be understood as a projection of one's own desire onto others, 
for it is quite clear that my Melayu murni informants are the ones who 
desire to recruit others to their own supposedly 'pure' way of life. 
Apart from the nomadism represented by the orang laut, other 
alternative forms of Melayu-ness are also perceived as threatening. 
To illustrate this further, I cite below a story told by an informant, 
Raja H, to his friends: 
Once I brought a drama group to participate in a competition 
for the whole of Riau province. I was the leader of the 
troupe. The groups from Pekanbaru, Bengkalis, Kampar all 
brought their own magicians. Awe-inspiring indeed! I only 
brought ordinary people such as S.H. and S.T. When we 
arrived in Pekanbaru and were about to perform, there came 
Pak T.M. 
'Hey, Pak Raja H, is everything ready?' 
'Yes, ready.' 
'Are your amulets ready?' 
'What amulets?' 
[Raja H's listeners chuckled.] 
'Eh, are you not using any amulets?' 
'So, in this Pekanbaru competition, one has to use 
amulets.' 
'Of course,' he said, 'you have to use amulets.' 
'Wait, I'll find some.' 
I went to get some limes, only because I was forced to. I 
got the biggest I could find. I merely played with the 
limes, striking at them. In the afternoon, he came. 
'You are not behaving properly; I was not joking,' he 
said. 
'This is the case. I did not bring any amulets. But if 
you wish to help, then help me indeed. How would it be 
if we use the magician from Bengkalis? Please help.' 
'If we make a proper request, it is possible,' he said. 
That evening was the first evening of the competition; the 
Bengkalis people who performed that evening were safe. We 
were to perform the second evening. The Bengkalis magician 
helped us. He used all sorts of things. He helped us; we 
were grateful. We were merely trying to evade evil, because 
we had been warned. After completing the ritual to evade 
evil, the magician came and said to me, 'Pak, don't let 
anyone enter the room; I wish to help you, but I am not 
capable.' 'If that is the case, so be it,' I said. I told 
my troupe members, 'Don't let anyone enter, hear?' 
'Outsiders,' I said, 'Watch out for them.' About five 
minutes before we were to perform, there came a person. 
'Pak H called me just now. He asked me to bring something. 
I've brought it,' said the visitor. So my troupe members 
gave him admittance and went to look for me. 
'If Pak His not around, I'll see Pak S.T.,' said the 
man. 
'If you want to see Pak H, he's inside; go straight in.' 
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While the man was entering, he uncovered a tray. Thus and 
thus he sowed, like, you know, washing bananas. He 
uncovered and he scattered around -- well -- green beans. 
On everything he scattered green beans. Then it was time 
for us to begin our performance. The Bengkalis magician 
came; he opened the door and saw that everything was covered 
with green beans. 'You have been struck!' he said, 'Just be 
careful! There is nothing more I can do! Just perform with 
care I' 
I was feeling very uneasy, was I not? But we went on to 
perform. When the play had gone on for only ten minutes 
it so happened that we had brought the story 'Hang Jebat in 
Melaka' -- after only ten minutes, during the swordfighting 
scene, the actor's sword slipped, straightaway pierced his 
leg, and was stuck in it. The Provincial Governor mounted 
the stage. He did not know the whole story, did he now? 
The curtains were drawn. The Governor mounted. Thus. Ah, 
he was furious. 'What is this, no amulets! How long have 
you people been playing about like this! Now that you are 
struck like this, what is to be done? What kind of 
leadership does this troupe have?' 
In the beginning when the incident had happened, I had 
said to the troupe, 'Who is it who is wounded? Shut the 
door. Don't let anyone enter. Don't panic. Carry S.H. to 
one side,' I said, 'Ask Pak S.T. to help. Look for some 
medical people. We do not want to create confusion.' 
Somebody shut the door. Shut it was. From the front came 
two persons who wanted to enter. Well, the bleeding was not 
profuse; the wound was only minor. The door was being 
knocked from the outside. 
'Don't open it.' 
'Hey, open up.' 
I said, 'Hey, go away; no one is allowed to enter.' 
'Eh, this is the Governor.' 
'Eh, Pak Governor, please come in.' 
[The listeners chuckled.] 
He entered angrily. He called doctors of the province to 
give medical treatment, which they promptly did. 
After listening to Raja H's story, one of the listeners commented: 
So in Pekanbaru it is still like that; the witchcraft there 
is still strong. 
And Raja H replied: 
It's still like that. 
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I have presented Raja H's story in verbatim translation from a 
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taped transcription, in order to illustrate the following points. 
From a disinterested observer's point of view, the 'real' event that 
occurred was that an actor had accidentally stabbed himself in the leg 
during a swordfighting scene in a play, an accident which may be 
considered as no more than an occupational hazard. But in Raja H's 
telling of the tale, the accident is no accident, but almost an 
inevitability. Indeed, the focus of the story is not on an actor 
stabbing himself in the leg, but on the potency of other people's 
witchcraft. So according to the way that Raja H had built up his 
story, if the actor had not stabbed himself in the leg, some other 
disaster was bound to happen (the stage might have collapsed, for 
example). So incidental is the stabbing to the whole story, that at 
the end of it, a listener's comment concerns not the actor's 
misfortune, but the potency of witchcraft in Pekanbaru. 
The listeners were interested to know that in Pekanbaru 'it is 
still like that'. Pekanbaru is the capital of Riau Province, and as 
such symbolises for my Riau informants the modern ethos of the 
Indonesian nation-state. This symbolling is evident in Raja H's 
references to the Provincial Governor and 'doctors of the province'. 
Indeed the drama competition itself was organised by the provincial 
government; so the overall context of Raja H's story is unmistakably a 
modern Indonesian setting. 
Yet the people who are perceived as dangerous are not those who 
may be identified as non-Melayu Indonesian, but rather, those who may 
be identified as Melayu in one sense or another. The three places 
that were named -- Pekanbaru, Bengkalis, and Kampar -- all belonged to 
former sultanates, separate and different from the Riau-Lingga 
sultanate. As mentioned in Chapter One, Pekanbaru is located on Siak 
River and is hence within the territory of the former Siak sultanate. 
However, as pointed out above, it is the provincial capital and is 
hence regarded as more Indonesian than Melayu. Indeed its name 
literally means 'New Town'. Bengkalis, on the other hand, was an 
older part of the Siak sultanate, that was of some historical 
significance. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:23,48; Matheson and Andaya 
1982:325,359.) Kampar was a sultanate by itself. The indigenous 
inhabitants of these areas are thus referred to by my informants as, 
respectively, Melayu Siak and Melayu Kampar. 
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Raja H's choice of the Bengkalis magician to help him out 
suggests that the Melayu Siak are perceived as being closer to the 
Melayu Riau, and are hence safer. Bengkalis is indeed geographically 
closer to Riau than Kampar is. (See Map 2.) Geographical proximity 
may thus figure importantly in the determination of social 
familiarity. Whereas a few of my informants have been to Bengkalis, 
none that I know of has been to Kampar. So although my informants 
know that the people of Kampar are also Melayu, they are unfamiliar 
with this form of alternative Melayu-ness. 
Significantly, I have heard them say in some other contexts that 
Kampar is a very inaccessible place, because the Kampar river has 
violent currents and is almost impossible to navigate without a native 
guide. But, according to them, the people of Kampar are able to ride 
the turbulent waters of this river, by bobbing up and down in their 
sampans. One informant told me that there are three dangerous things 
in Kampar: the currents of the river, the crocodiles, and the 
inhabitants' ilmu 'witchcraft' which is said to be so powerful that 
spells can be 'sent' (kirim) at great distances. 
There seems to be some validity to my informants' perception of 
the dangers of the Kampar river. According to the description of the 
river in the Indonesia Pilot (1975:I,148): 
Owing to the tidal bore which takes place and the strong 
tidal streams, local knowledge is necessary. 
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In my informants' perception, however, geographical danger seems to be 
translated further into social terms, probably because geographical 
inaccessibility is a barrier which produces social strangeness. This 
strangeness is evidently construed as more than just tolerable 
difference. On the contrary, it is regarded as dangerous, because the 
strangers are not clearly defined outsiders such as the Javanese, 
Bataks and Chinese; they are, rather, strange Melayu. 
Douglas' (1970:xxv) statement about the relationship between 
community and witchcraft is relevant to our discussion at this point: 
People are trying to control one another, albeit with small 
success. The idea of the witch is used to whip their own 
consciences or those of their friends. The witch-image is 
as effective as the idea of the community is strong. 
Indeed, following Douglas, I would argue that among my informants, 
witchcraft accusations arise precisely because of the attempt to forge 
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a communally integrated Melayu-dom. As shown above, an impellent 
morality of centripetalism is put forward as the means of integrating 
the periphery with the centre. All alternative forms of Melayu-ness 
that do not refer to this designated centre are likely to be perceived 
as competing centres and are hence dangerous. The people who 
represent these alternative forms of Melayu-ness are likely to be 
accused of being witches and are hence to be avoided. Barriers to 
social interaction are thereby erected, symbolically sealing off one 
particular form of Melayu-ness as the only safe and proper Melayu-dom 
in Riau. 
According to Douglas (1970:xxxiii), 'where there is witchcraft 
there is usually witch-cleansing'. But I have not found this to be 
the case among my informants in Riau. Although witchcraft accusations 
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abound among them, there is evidently no such phenomenon as the 
cleansing and confession of witches. Apparently, no one has ever 
confessed to being a witch, no one has ever been brought to any kind 
of trial for witchcraft, and no one has ever been punished for being a 
witch. As mentioned above, not even counter-witchcraft is considered 
possible. 
To return to Raja H's story as an example, the implication is 
quite clearly that one can only suffer one's vulnerability to 
dangerous strangers. As Raja H had said to the Bengkalis magician, 
'If that is the case, so be it!' At no point in the story did Raja H 
express regret that he did not bring along a magician. Neither he nor 
his audience seemed to think that it was foolhardy not to have gone 
well-equipped with amulets. Moreover, there was no attempt after the 
actor's misfortune to trace the identity of the supposed evildoer. 
There was evidently no concern with retribution. Instead, the story 
seems to have been aimed at generating surprise at how much evil there 
still is in the world. At worst, one has to suffer it; at best, one 
can try to evade it -- for example, by not allowing dangerous 
strangers to enter one's private zone. 
When I asked my Melayu murni informants about what possible means 
there were for countering witchcraft, they said that one can merely 
ask Allah for protection for example, by reciting the doa selamat 
'prayer for safekeeping' in order to 'repel evil' (tolak bala). All 
else, they said, is in God's hands, including retribution. In other 
words, the perceived opposition of forces is not between one's own 
vulnerable self and the powerful witch, but between a good God and an 
evil witch. One is thus supposed to shield one's vulnerability to 
witchcraft not with protective amulets, but with an alternative 
vulnerability to God through voluntary submission. To put it another 
way, a centripetal orientation towards God is sufficient by itself as 
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protection against centrifugal evil, the assumption being that a 
person can only be orientated in one direction at any one time that 
is, either centripetally or centrifugally, but not both ways at the 
same time. 
In this context, we may look for comparison to Brown's (1970) 
analysis of witchcraft accusations in the Late Roman Period. Douglas 
(1970:xxvii) mentions this case as an example of the sub-type of 
internal witchcraft where the person accused of witchcraft is a member 
of a rival faction. According to Brown (1970:21-22): 
Late Roman society was dominated by the problem of the 
conflict between change and stability in a traditional 
society. It is here that we find a situation which has been 
observed both to foster sorcery accusations and to offer 
scope for resort to sorcery. This is when two systems of 
power are sensed to clash within the one society. On the 
one hand, there is articulate power, power defined and 
agreed upon by everyone (and especially by its holders: 
authority vested in precise persons; admiration and success 
gained by recognised channels. Running counter to this 
there may be other forms of influence less easy to pin down 
-- inarticulate power: the disturbing intangibles of social 
life; the imponderable advantages of certain groups; 
personal skills that succeed in a way that is unacceptable 
or difficult to understand. Where these two systems 
overlap, we may expect to find the sorcerer •••• In this 
situation, the accuser is actually the man with the Single 
Image. For him, there is one, single, recognised way of 
making one's way in the world ...• The sorcerer, by 
contrast, is seen as the man invested with the Double Image. 
There is more to him than meets the eye. He has brought in 
the unseen to redress the balance of the seen. His 
achievements may be admired, but they are, essentially, 
illegitimate. 
Although in this passage Brown refers only to sorcery, I shall 
generalise his remarks to include witchcraft. 
His description of the situation in the Late Roman empire 
(A.D.300-600) sounds peculiarly consonant with the situation I have 
found in twentieth-century Melayu-dom in Riau. Of course I am not 
suggesting that there is any direct historical connection between the 
two; what I am pointing out is a similarity of patterning. Indeed the 
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dominant problem confronting my informants is the conflict of change 
and stability. There are, however, more than just two systems of 
power clashing in this situation. First of all, there is the 
political structure of the Indonesian nation-state, within which the 
Suku Melayu constitutes one division of the total population. Second, 
within Riau, there is the Melayu murni view of Melayu-dom as a social 
preserve inherited from zaman sultan. Third, within and without Riau, 
there are alternative forms of Melayu-ness represented, for example, 
by the Galang people, the nomadic orang laut, and the Kampar people. 
Significantly, the accusers of witchcraft discussed above are 
those operating within the second system, with their accusations 
directed against those perceived as being in the third. The 
institutional power-holders in the Indonesian political structure are, 
however, left out of what I would term 'the circle of bewitchment'. 
Why is this so? In this regard, Laing's (1969:47) idea of 'elusion' 
is useful. I would argue that for my Melayu murni informants, the 
conflict between change and stability mentioned above may be 
understood as the inherent contradiction between the institutional 
presence of a modernising Indonesian nation-state and the ideological 
presence of a bygone, and hence unchanging, Riau-Lingga sultanate. 
Direct confrontation between these two contradictory social realities 
would be of no benefit whatsoever to my informants themselves, since 
they are in no position to translate ideology into political 
institution. So instead they elude this irresolvable conflict by 
shifting to another modality of experience. 
My informants' circle of bewitchment may thus be understood as a 
phenomenon that belongs to the realm of phantasy, a realm where the 
non-Melayu Indonesians are perceived only as incidental outsiders, as 
extras playing bit parts. So in this phantasy, the main dramatic 
interest is in the conflict between different forms of Melayu-ness, 
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with my Melayu murni informants regarding their own perspective as 
natural and hence good, in contrast to which the alternative forms are 
regarded as deviant and hence bad. 
In contrast to Late Roman society as described by Brown (see 
above), for my informants in Riau, the clash between the two systems 
of power occur not within institutionalised society, but in the realm 
of social phantasy. It is perhaps debatable whether these constitute 
systems of power. As mentioned in Chapter One, I follow Foucault 
(1980a:92-93) in arguing that power should be understood not only in 
terms of such terminal forms as 'the sovereignty of the state, the 
form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination': 
Power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in 
which they operate and which constitute their own 
organisation. 
(Ibid.) 
In their most rudimentary form, these force relations may be 
conceived of as the interaction of will, whether it is the will of 
Self for Self, or the imposition of Self's will upon Other, or the 
imposition of Other's will upon Self, or the interplay of will between 
both. So as a process of identifying Self and Other, Melayu-ness may 
be construed as an expression of will. The contradiction between 
alternative forms of Melayu-ness may therefore be seen as a conflict 
of will. It is in this processual sense that these alternative forms 
may be understood as systems of power. 
Brown (ibid.) argues that the accuser of sorcery and, I would 
add, witchcraft -- is usually one who adheres to what he terms 'the 
Single Image' of power, whereas the sorcerer -- and witch -- is one 
who is seen as being 'invested with the Double Image' of power. To 
apply Brown's terms, the Melayu murni are those who adhere to the 
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'Single Image', for they see only one valid way of being 'pure'; they 
accuse those 'invested with the Double Image' of exercising 
illegitimate power which bypasses this one route to 'purity'. There 
is thus a contradiction between the one 'pure' form of Melayu-ness and 
the many 'impure', and hence polluting, alternatives. The power of 
the latter to pollute the former is acknowledged: For example, an 
orang laut may sprinkle some dugong's tears on a Melayu murni and 
thereby contaminate him or her, hence transforming the 'pure' into the. 
'impure'. This power is feared by those who consider themselves murni 
(and fear is a kind of admiration), but it is condemned as evil and is 
hence illegitimate. 
Brown (1970) notes that the Late Roman period saw the rapid rise 
of Christianity; he further states that the more Christianised the 
Roman population became, the more were the remaining non-Christians 
condemned as evil. In such an advanced situation of conversion to 
monotheism, it becomes no longer acceptable as mere difference that 
some should be converts while others are not. By then, non-conversion 
is construed not just as ignorance or as choice, but as wilful 
apostasy, as volitional centrifugalism from the 'Single Image' of 
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legitimate power, as the abandonment of identity. 
This is particularly significant as a comparison with my 
informants' situation, for twentieth-century Melayu-dom in Riau is 
still undergoing Islamisation. As mentioned above, there are non-
Muslim Melayu people in Riau. Because the encompassing political 
context is Indonesia, which is essentially a secular nation-state, the 
Islamisation of Melayu-ness is not receiving the political fillip that 
could otherwise spur the process to full development. This contrasts 
with the situation in Malaysia where Islam is indeed the official 
state religion. In Riau, however, the Islamisation of Melayu-ness is 
not so far advanced that only the Muslim Melayu are recognised as 
Melayu, even though such a tendency is implied by the definition of 
Melayu-ness as 'purity'. 
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What is perhaps most significant in this comparison is that both 
Christianity and Islam are both monotheisms where God is the 
repository of all good. If God monopolises good, then all that is 
not-God must necessarily be evil. In a Christianising or Islamising 
situation, the application of this polarised morality to the 
population would divide people into good and evil, converts and non-
converts, sheep and goats. It is in such a situation that witchcraft 
accusations become plausible, for in this logic, those who would not 
convert cannot be good and are necessarily evil. The monotheistic 
character of Islam and Christianity contributes specifically to the 
'Single Image' that Brown speaks of. So witchcraft accusations 
directed against those 'invested with the Double Image' are just the 
other side of the monotheistic coin. The more fervently one adheres 
to the singularity of the 'Single Image', the more one fears the 
contamination of those 'invested with the Double Image'. In other 
words, it is the perception of good as being in only one particular 
form, that engenders the perception of evil in its multiple forms. 
Good is thus one small isolated island located, as it were, in a sea 
of evil. 
However, as pointed out above, a caveat must be added to the 
effect that among my Melayu murni informants, this logic is evidently 
applied only to those whose allegiance is claimed by Melayu-dom. For 
example, the existence of many non-Muslim non-Melayu Indonesians does 
not seem to disturb my informants to the extent of making witchcraft 
accusations. Even the presence of many Christian Bataks, Javanese and 
Florese in Riau seems quite acceptable; I have not heard any 
witchcraft accusation directed against these people. Furthermore, in 
almost every Melayu community, there is at least one non-Muslim 
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Chinese family, serving as the all-purpose economic intermediary. Not 
only that, most of the major towns in Riau have large non-Muslim 
Chinese populations. Again, there is quite clearly no witchcraft 
accusation against these people. 
My Melayu murni informants would even quite comfortably eat and 
drink at Chinese-owned coffee shops, so long as pork is not served to 
them. It is evident that they do not fear being bewitched or poisoned 
by these non-Melayu people. The people they fear are other Melayu who 
are perceived as being centrifugally orientated from all that is good 
and 'pure'. This is indicative of the relatively limited degree to 
which the 'Single Image' of monotheism imbues their worldview. It 
seems to be limited to the purview of Melayu-dom. So of the two 
Islamic contexts mentioned above -- the world-wide umat and the local 
umat in the shape of the bygone sultanate -- it is quite clear that 
the latter is of greater importance to my Melayu murni informants. As 
pointed out above, to them the significance of Islam lies in its 
capacity to serve as an ideology of legitimation. In the absence of 
an actual sultanate, what is being legitimated is not 
institutionalised authority but symbolic power within an elusive 
phantasy. 
The accusations of witchcraft and poison are significant in the 
context of phantasy. Laing (1969:39) notes: 
A person in an alienated false position within a social 
phantasy system, who begins partially to apperceive his 
position, may give 'psychotic' expression to his partial 
apperception of the actual phantasy state of affairs by 
saying that he is being subjected to poisons concealed in 
his food, that his brains have been taken from him, that his 
actions are controlled from outer space, etc. 
I suggest that the existence of alternative forms of Melayu-ness is 
sufficient to trigger off among the Melayu murni a partial 
apperception of 'purity' as actually a phantasy that is not rooted in 
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authentic experience. The defence of the realism of this phantasy is 
thus expressed through accusing those who adhere to the threatening 
alternatives, of being witches and poisoners. This defensive fear of 
bewitchment and poison is not, however, the 'psychotic' expression of 
a lone deviant, but the 'normal' expression of those who identify 
themselves as 'pure'. 
'Purity' is thus not just the phantasy of an individual but a 
social phantasy system. It is the sharing of the phantasy -- or to 
borrow another term from Laing (1969:108-124) -- it is 'collusion' 
that makes the accusations of witchcraft and poison seem real, normal, 
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and acceptable. Such collusion is more likely to arise when people 
interact in the same context. So the more people there are 
interacting within the same context, the more complete is the 
collusion, and the more real, normal and acceptable is their shared 
phantasy. 
9.3 Islamisation in Galang 
A local umat based on the shape of a defunct sultanate is not, 
however, the only context in which Islamisation can occur. Although 
my Galang informants quite clearly reject the vision of a Penyengat-
centred Melayu-dom, favouring instead a Galang-based indigeny, there 
is evidence that at least some of them aspire to belong to an imagined 
community larger than their immediate local community. The 
alternative imagined community to which they aspire is, interestingly, 
the cosmopolitan Islamic umat. So the perception of a need to belong 
to a larger, more powerful imagined community is evident even in 
Galang. Such a perceived need may be understood in terms of the 
civilising process, whereby people are supposed to justify their 
existence in terms of their membership in a supralocal imagined 
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community. 
No matter how proud a Galang person may be of Galang identity, 
when he or she travels out of Galang to, say, Tanjungpinang, Singapore 
or Palembang, such a territorially specific identity is not just 
irrelevant to outsiders; it even carries connotations of being tribal. 
Outside Galang, even a Galang indigene needs a supralocal identity 
that would serve as the emblem of being civilised. Outside the 
country -- say, in Singapore or Malaysia -- perhaps even an Indonesian 
identity would do, no matter how un-seriously one takes such an 
identity within Indonesia itself. Inside the country, however, if one 
rejects both a Jakarta-centred Indonesian-ness and a Penyengat-centred 
Melayu-dom, then another way of being civilised is to opt for a Mecca-
centred Islam. Such an alternative would be a strategic choice 
indeed, being compatible both with an Indonesian identity and a Melayu 
identity. 
As a prophylactic against Communism, Indonesian law requires 
every citizen to profess one of the recognised religions -- for 
example, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, or Hinduism. So 
a Galang person's adherence would be, in this sense, only an adherence 
to Indonesian law. In the context of Melayu identity, Islam is the 
first step towards becoming a Melayu murni in the Penyengat scale of 
values. So in this sense, a Galang person's adherence to Islam may be 
construed as an adherence to Melayu 'purity'. However, though 
Islamisation in Galang may be understood in both these senses, my 
Galang informants themselves evidently do not see their Islam as 
inspired by either Jakarta or Penyengat. Instead, they see it as 
directly transmitted from an Arab source in a cosmopolitan context. 
I have shown above that my Penyengat and Pangkil informants 
accuse the Galang people of witchcraft because they are said to lack 
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Islam and even to regard themselves as God. So persistently did the 
former express their fear of being bewitched and poisoned by the 
latter that I felt I had to go to Galang to find out whether there was 
any truth to these allegations. After my first visits to Karas, 
Nanga, and Pulau Panjang, undertaken in the company of my Penyengat 
and Pangkil informants, I subsequently managed to make my way to Karas 
alone by catching a ride from Tanjungpinang on board the boat of a 
Chinese fish-dealer who resides on that island. Since I was then 
acquainted only with the 'headman' and Raja X, I was still somewhat 
wary in case the allegations of poisoning might be true, even though I 
gave no credence to the witchcraft accusations. 
At one of the very first houses I visited, a glass of milk was 
offered to me. I was rather slow to drink it. My Karas host, whom I 
had only just met, noticed my hesitation and said: Jangan khuatir, tak 
ada racun 'Don't worry, there's no poison in it.' That broke the ice; 
I drank the milk. My host went on to assure me that in his 
experience, there is no truth whatsoever in the allegation that the 
Karas people poison visitors. He had never seen anyone do that. He 
said that when people happen to fall ill while visiting the island, 
they tend to blame their Karas hosts. He ventured to guarantee that 
from Tanjung Marau to Langkang on Karas island, nobody poisons 
visitors. But west of Tanjung Marau, he dared not guarantee because 
he seldom goes there himself. (See Map 4.) I mentioned that the 
Penyengat and Pangkil people also feared being poisoned by the people 
of Pulau Panjang. My Karas host replied that this fear was 
unwarranted, as he had himself visited Pulau Panjang many times 
without having been poisoned. I then asked him whether he thought 
that there were indeed communities who poison their visitors. He said 
that possibly in the small islands near Daik where there are orang 
laut, such things might happen. He mentioned Pulau Duyung and Pulau 
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Posik as possibilities. (See Map 3.) 
My subsequent field experience in Karas confirmed this point: 
Although the Karas people may be aware that the Penyengat and Pangkil 
people accuse them of being witches and poisoners, they do not counter 
with similar accusations directed against the latter. Instead, they 
tend to transfer those accusations to others who they perceive as 
being even less Islamic than they are themselves. As for the 
Penyengat and Pangkil people, while a Karas person may make fun of 
them for being qagang 'foreign', they are also acknowledged as being 
alim 'religiously tutored, learned'. Sometimes such an acknowledgment 
is voiced in a sarcastic tone: Sana memang lebih alim 'there it is 
undoubtedly more religious'. Nevertheless it is an acknowledgment. 
So from the Karas perspective, there is an Islamic sliding scale 
with the Penyengat and Pangkil people located at the more 'religious' 
end, the Karas people themselves located at the middle, and the orang 
laut located at the less 'religious' end. Indeed, in contrast to the 
relatively simple but Islamically correct method of conversion 
described in Chapter Seven, I found in the Galang area an elaborate 
sliding scale of more Islamism and less Islamism. There seem to be 
fourteen significant steps, presented below in order of increasing 
magnitude: 
1. circumcision 
2. observing the food taboo on pork 
3. burying the dead in an Islamic manner 
4. pronouncing the two statements of the testimonial creed 
5. getting married in an Islamic manner (nikah) 
6. to be ritually purified (tobat) 
7. learning how to pray 
8. living in a village which has a mosque 
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9. praying communally on the two major festivals of the 
Muslim calendar namely, Hari Raya Puasa and Hari 
Raya Haji 
10. praying communally every Friday 
11. observing the fasting month -- namely, Puasa/Ramadan 
12. giving zakat and fitrah, two types of alms 
13. praying privately five times a day 
14. going on the haj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
From a strictly Islamic perspective, those located on the first 
two steps would not be considered as Muslims at all; however, on this 
Galang sliding scale, they are Muslim, albeit minimally so. Indeed, 
many Islamising orang laut are precisely in this position. The 
question is: how does a non-literate non-Muslim orang laut begin to 
Islamise himself or herself? Even if he or she were desirous of 
becoming Muslim, how is this volitional transformation of Self to be 
achieved? It is significant that on the Galang sliding scale of 
Islamism, the least degree is marked by circumcision, for without 
access to the Arabic canon and hence without the means of a proper 
conversion, circumcision is surely the most apparent way of effecting 
a transformation of Self. 
The Islamic sliding scale found in Galang is reminiscent of the 
Penyengat view of hierarchy. Indeed, as pointed out above, my 
Penyengat and Pangkil informants said of the Karas community that it 
is 'gradually getting better' but is not wholly safe. There is an 
evident equation: 'getting better' = Islamising = adopting a view 
compatible with that of a Penyengat-led hierarchy. But why is Karas 
merely 'getting better'? Why is it still not wholly safe? 
The answer has to do with perspective. The Penyengat and Pangkil 
people locate themselves in the top ranks of the hierarachy. From 
such a vantage point, they look down from the top, and see a 'Single 
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Image'. In contrast, the Karas people are located in the middle of 
the Islamic sliding scale. From such a vantage point, they look both 
ways, both upwards and downwards, and see a 'Double Image'. What the 
'Double Image' offers is alternative -- that is, more than a single 
way of being Melayu. So the Karas people can look upwards and see the 
Penyengat and Pangkil people as models of religiosity, and they can 
also look downwards and see the orang laut as models of freedom. 
To illustrate this latter point, let us consider two opinions 
about the orang laut expressed, respectively, by a raja informant and 
by an Islamising informant located in the middle of the sliding scale. 
The raja informant said: 
The sea people's religion is uncertain -- they just imitate, 
especially the festivals. If they meet with Muslims, they 
profess to be Muslims. But they still keep pigs. If they 
are asked, they answer, 'This is not a babi; this is a 
celeng, nangoi'. 
15 (My translation). 
Babi is the standard bahasa word for 'pig', whereas celeng and nangoi 
16 
are non-bahasa words for the same animal. So the implication is 
that the orang laut try to evade the Islamic taboo against pork 
through word-substitution. 
The key phrase in the raja's statement above is tak tentu 
'uncertain': ambiguity disturbs the singularity of the 'Single Image'. 
This ambiguity was, however, evaluated quite differently by an 
Islamising informant who said: 
The sea people -- when the Chinese new year comes around, 
they celebrate the new year; when the Islamic festivals come 
around, they also celebrate them. They are free. 
17 (My translation). 
For those who adhere to a 'Single Image', ambiguity is disturbance; 
but for those who perceive a 'Double Image', ambiguity is freedom. 
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In the Galang area, this ambiguity in religious identity is 
manifest in practically every degree of the sliding scale, ranging 
from those whose Islamism consists only of circumcision, to those who 
have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the rest of this chapter, I 
shall illustrate the various manifestations of such ambiguity, by 
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comparing the four Galang communities I studied -- Karas, Sembur, 
Nanga, and Teluk Nipah. (See Map 4.) Of these four communities, 
Karas is generally acknowledged by the Galang people as the most 
Islamic. Nevertheless, my Karas informants can still remember the 
'coming of Islam' (kedatangan Islam) to the island. 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, according to them, in zaman sultan, 
the Galang 'warriors' (panglima) were already 'subservient towards 
Islam' (patuh kepada Islam). However, they 'did not know how to pray' 
(tak tahu sembahyang). So if during their piratical raids, they 
happened to capture someone who knew how to 'recite the Quran' 
(mengaji), that person would be spared from having to fight the other 
prisoners in one-to-one 'combat' (sabung), but would be brought 
straightaway to the village to teach Islam to the Galang people. 
Despite this story, however, my Karas informants admit that up to 
the end of zaman sultan in 1911, there was still no mosque on the 
island. Apparently, the mosque was not built until after the coming 
of a Singapore Arab by the name of Said Usman. (See Plate 23.) My 
informants said that he arrived in a fishing boat, sometime during the 
Dutch period, before the Second World War. Apart from Karas, he 
visited Penyengat -- only these two places, my informants stressed. 
According to them, he visited Karas about five times altogether, each 
time for four or five days. During his visits, 'he taught the rituals 
of prayer, and explained the stories of religion' (dia ngajar 
sembahyang dan terangkan kesah ugama). Said Usman pointed out to the 
people the un-Islamic things they were then doing, and substituted 
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more Islamic rituals in their stead. One of the un-Islamic rituals he 
did away with was 'the nurturing of the village' (bela kampung). 
Some of my informants can still remember this village ritual 
vividly. They said that it was performed twice every year, when the 
wind was about to change its direction, fron north to south, and from 
south to north. Forty-four wooden 'images' (patung) were carved for 
this ritual; these consisted of twenty-two male and twenty-two female 
images, paired to form twenty-two couples. Twenty-two were 'land 
spirits' (hantu darat) and twenty-two were 'sea spirits' (hantu laut). 
These images were depicted with painted faces but naked bodies. The 
male images were bald, but the female images had hair in the shape of 
a 'bun' (siput) drawn in by means of charcoal. The male images had 
penises, and the female images had breasts. The men of the village 
made the male images, while the women made the female images. A 
'dinghy' (jongkong) was also constructed, of the length of a depa 
'span from finger-tip to finger-tip of the outstretched arms'. 
Offerings were prepared; these included the following: 
seven kinds of 'pastries' (kuih); 
a chicken cut into half, with one half raw and the other 
half cooked; 
one raw egg and one cooked egg; 
rice in four colours -- green, red, yellow, and white; 
yellow glutinous rice; 
two candles. 
The images and the offerings were placed in the dinghy thus: 
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Figure 16 Hantu Darat and Hantu Laut 
By means of 'incantation' (jampi), a ritualist known as the 
pawang would take on the role of being tuan 'master' over the spirits 
of land and sea; he would summon them to eat the food and inhabit the 
images. The dinghy laden with images and food was then sent out to 
sea, thus banishing from the village those 'sickness-causing spirits' 
(hantu penyakit). After this, for three days, the whole village had 
to observe the following 'taboos' (pantang) -- no digging of holes, no 
cutting of wood, no plucking of leaves, no entry of outsiders into the 
village, no exit of villagers from the village, no going out to sea, 
no public socialising, no visiting of houses. Through this direct 
expression of boundary maintenance, the village as a whole was 
'nurtured' (dibela). 
According to my informants, Said Usman stopped the performance of 
this un-Islamic ritual on Karas and replaced it with what he 
considered a more Islamic form -- that is, tolak bala 'banishing evil' 
by means of a doa selamat 'prayer for safekeeping'. This new ritual 
was to be held every Friday at the mosque. The 'pastries' (kuih) were 
to be brought to the mosque; after 'reading' (baca) from the Quran, 
the blessed 'pastries' would be eaten by the men at the mosque. In 
this mediated way the village was to be protected -- that is, by some 
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male representatives of the 'Friday congregation' (jemaah) eating food 
imbued with Quranic power. This prophylactic ritual is ~till 
performed every Friday at the mosque. 
However, in some parts of the island, bela kampung is still being 
performed, though in a simplified manner without the use of images or 
dinghy. Instead, the food offerings are left on the ground near 
the foot of a big tree for the 'land spirits' and on the shore for the 
'sea spirits'. Since images are no longer used, the 'land spirits' 
are instead invited to inhabit the tree, usually one that is located 
some distance away from the cluster of houses. The 'sea spirits' are 
simply asked to eat the food and go away to the open waters. The 
three days of taboo are also observed, though to a milder degree, with 
people sometimes entering and leaving the village. In some other 
parts of Karas, where the members of a village can no longer agree 
about bela kampung, those who still want to keep the ritual have had 
to reduce it to the mere protection of their own houses; the 
'nurturing' of the village as a whole has thus been fragmented into 
the 'nurturing' of a few individual houses. 
What this indicates is that the people of Karas are not all 
Islamising at the same rate. Indeed my Karas informants are 
themselves aware of their differential rate of Islamisation. 
According to them, this is due to the fact that while certain of their 
members went to Singapore to continue their religious studies with 
Said Usman, others did not. Consequently, some were ahead of others. 
Since Singapore is a good distance away from Karas, I asked my 
informants why they had to go all the way there to study religion, 
when Penyengat which is such a well-known Islamic centre, is so much 
nearer. (See Map 3.) My informants replied that they did not know of 
a single person from Karas who went to Penyengat to study religion; 
people only went there to 'get married' (nikah). In any case, they 
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said, people from Penyengat also went to Singapore to learn from Said 
Usman. Although he died about ten years ago, Said Usman remains such 
an important figure to my Karas informants that even those who had 
never visited him in Singapore could reel off his former address 
Woo Mon Chew Road, Lorong Abu Talib, Siglap batu tujuh 'seventh 
milestone'. There is indeed such an address in Singapore. 
Prominent among Said Usman's Karas students was one Awang Cik, 
who travelled back and forth between Karas and Singapore for two 
years. He became the imam 'religious guide' of the first ~ 'small 
mosque' founded on Karas. Furthermore, he went to Sembur to 'teach 
Islam' (mengajar Islam). According to my Karas informants, at that 
time the Sembur people were already Muslim, but they did not 'carry 
out the stipulations [of Islam]' (kerjakan syarat-syarat). Only the 
taboo against pork was observed. My Sembur informants confirmed this. 
Awang Cik visited Sembur often, sometimes once a month, sometimes once 
in two or three months. Between his visits, his Sembur students went 
to Karas to learn from him, while staying in his house. 
Before Awang Cik went to Sembur, there was no one to teach 
religion orang sini belum tahu sembahyang 'the people here did not 
yet know how to pray'. Nobody could 'recite' (mengaji) the Quran --
ngaji mulai daripada dia 'the recitation commenced from him'. 
According to my informants, Awang Cik first went to Sembur about 1949; 
but it was not until 1962 that they built themselves a surau with 
their own funds and through their own effort. Before the mosque was 
built, those who had learnt to pray had to travel to Karas every 
Friday. My informants said that even before Awang Cik came, the 
Sembur people were already practicing sunat 'circumcision' and nikah 
'the Islamic form of marriage'. Everybody went to Penyengat for 
nikah, as they still do. 
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As in Karas, certain un-Islamic practices were Islamised. One of 
these was the feeding of the dead. Formerly, the Sembur people fed 
their dead by offering food at the graves. A Sembur informant 
explained: this was a 'sin' (dosa) because it was like having two 
'Gods' (Tuhan). Now, the 'feast' (kenduri) for the dead is held only 
at home. The food is eaten by those people who are invited to come. 
I asked my informants: if it is human beings who eat the food, how 
then can the dead be fed? They told me that this is done through the 
recitation of the doa arwah 'prayer for the dead', whereby the dead 
would receive rahmat 'mercy'. The taste of the food at the feast 
would be brought to the dead through the prayer, and when the people 
present eat the food after their prayer, it would no longer be tasty. 
My informants said that without the prayer, they would not know where 
to bring the food. The more people who join in the prayer, the better 
it is, because Tuhan 'God' is more likely to listen to the petition of 
many people lebih berkenangkan 'there would be more loving 
thoughts'. To coordinate the praying, a lebai 'prayer leader' is 
appointed. 
My informants then asked me how the Chinese feed the dead. I 
told them that we offer the food to a picture of the dead person, 
after which the food is just sisa 'remains' to be finished off by 
human beings. My informants said that in their case, the food also 
becomes sisa, the eating of which is a sedekah 'charity' for those who 
have come to pray. One of my informants commented that the food for 
kenduri arwah 'a feast for the dead' never tastes as good as the food 
for kenduri kawin 'a wedding feast'. They stressed that it is Tuhan 
who distributes the food to the dead -- Tuhan punya kuasa, dia yang 
kasi 'It is under God's control; it is he who gives out the food'. 
I asked my informants how often they feed the dead. They said it 
depends on their dreams. Apparently, the dead manifest themselves in 
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dreams to tell the living that they are hungry. But the dream is 
'authentic' (asli) only if it occurs between 12.00 a.m. and 1.00 a.m. 
At other times, such dreams are merely the 'games of sleep' (permainan 
tidur) brought about by the iblis 'evil spirits'. I asked my 
informants what would happen if a feast were to be held in response to 
a dream that had occurred at the wrong time. They said in that case, 
they would not know where the rahmat 'mercy' would go, but it is all 
under 'God's control'; possibly the 'evil spirits' might get the 
benefits of the feast. 
In Sembur, the village as a whole is 'nurtured' by a pawang 
through the ritual of bela kampung conducted without images. Unlike 
Karas, this ritual has not been replaced by the doa selamat 'prayer 
for safety', one possible reason being that despite the existence of 
the village mosque since 1962, Friday prayers are seldom held. 
Apparently, there has been some backsliding. When Awang Cik was still 
alive, his students used to travel to Karas every Friday for communal 
prayers. After his death in 1963/4, however, enthusiasm for the 
Friday prayers seems to have dropped. Now, the village mosque is used 
mainly for communal prayers on the two hari raya 'festivals' of the 
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year. 
Nevertheless the people of Sembur are still regarded, both by 
themselves and by others, as being more Islamic than the people of 
Nanga. My informants in Karas and Sembur are divided in their opinion 
about the Islamism of the Nanga people. One Karas informant said that 
since the Karas people would consent to marry only the Sembur people 
but not the Nanga people, this must indicate that the latter are not 
yet Muslim. Another Karas informant said that perhaps one or two 
among the Nanga people may have 'entered Islam' (masuk Islam), but the 
rest are still orang laut. A Sembur informant was the opinion that 
the Nanga people have not yet 'entered Islam' because although they 
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practise circumcision and they seem to refrain from eating pork, 
nevertheless they still hunt and sell pigs to the Chinese. Another 
Sembur informant described the Nanga people as being tengah-tengah 
'in-between', neither Muslim nor un-Muslim. However, a Sembur 
informant who was a former student of Awang Cik, stated that he thinks 
that the Nanga people have 'entered Islam' because they are 
circumcised, and they marry in an Islamic manner by going to 
Penyengat. He admits that they 'do not yet know how to pray' (belum 
tahu sembahyang lagi), but he is of the opinion that people who 
'follow the customs of religion' (ikut adat ugama) should be 
considered Muslim. 
Another Sembur informant disagrees. He said that although the 
Nanga people go to Penyengat to be married in an Islamic manner, they 
have not been 'ritually purified' (ditobat); they are therefore still 
unclean. He explained cara tobat 'the procedure of ritual 
purification' thus: First, one is washed with air tanah 'water mixed 
with clay'. Then the Quran is 'placed on one's head' (dijunjungkan 
kepala), because the Quran i~ the 'most important' (terbesar) thing in 
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the world. This informant said that he once brought a female orang 
laut from Pulau Buluh to Penyengat to 'enter Islam' through this 
method of ritual purification. This was done so as to enable her to 
marry a Muslim man in Lobam. (See Map 3.) 
Significantly, this informant is himself the pawang in charge of 
'nurturing' Sembur through the ritual of bela kampung. But he does 
not see any contradiction between his Islamism and his animism; 
instead he seems to have syncretised them neatly. For example, he 
chooses to conduct his bela kampung ritual at four or five o'clock on 
a Thursday afternoon. The significance of this is that in Muslim 
reckoning, malam Jumaat 'Friday night' begins on what would be 
Thursday night in the Western calendar. So to have bela kampung 
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taking place on a Thursday afternoon just before the Islamically 
important malam Jumaat is to symbolise the pre-Islamic nature of the 
'nurturing' ritual. 
It is perhaps fair to say that in Galang, what one person thinks 
of as Islamism may well be thought of by another as animism, and vice-
versa, depending on their relative perspective. Despite what their 
Karas and Sembur neighbours think of them, the Nanga people regard 
themselves as having 'entered Islam'. In their particular case, we 
can discern how the process of Islamisation is directly related to the 
process of sedentary settlement and village formation. I present 
below the story of the Nanga settlement as told by my informants. 
According to a Sembur informant, at the time he himself was born, 
the ancestors of the present-day Nanga people were still living on 
board their boats; they were 'boat people' (orang sampan). At the 
time when my informant was himself about fifty-five years old, these 
orang sampan came ashore to live, thereby building their present 
village on Nanga. This was after the Second World War, after the 
emergence of Indonesia, but before Confrontation -- that is, sometime 
between 1945 and 1963. The 'elder' (ketua) of these orang sampan was 
called Bubong; in his time they were still living on boats. After he 
had been dead for a long time, his son Apong, who was the next 
'elder', moved ashore to live. 
A significant incident occurred before the move to shore: Apong's 
older sister, Cahaya, married a Sembur man called Liku. Although the 
couple eventually divorced, the significance is that both the marriage 
and the divorce were carried out in Penyengat. Apparently, it was 
through this marriage and its subsequent divorce that these orang 
sampan first became involved with Islamism. Because of the importance 
of this event, both my Sembur and Nanga informants can still remember 
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where it was that Cahaya and Liku first met and began their romance, 
even though both of them are now long dead. It was when Cahaya was 
still married to Liku that her younger brother Apong moved ashore to 
live. 
Apong's son Bolong is the present 'elder' of Nanga. According to 
him, the other siblings of Apong and Cahaya did not move ashore; they 
went off to other places. As a result, Bolong himself does not even 
know them. The present Nanga population consists of eight of Apong's 
children and their families, with the addition of three Florese 
immigrants and their families. Another two of Apong's children have 
left the community. Where they have gone is interesting. 
One of them, Din, has rejected living on land, and has gone back 
to the sea to live on board a boat. He occasionally visits Nanga. 
The other sibling, Meri, left Nanga for Tanjung Wangkang, also known 
Tiang Wangkang, located on the southern coast of Batam. (See Map 3.) 
This is also a settlement formed by orang sampan who have moved to 
land. There is, however, an important different between the two 
communities: the Tanjung Wangkang community is not Islamising, it is 
Christianising. So out of Apong's ten children, eight are Islamising, 
one is Christianising, and another one has reverted to indigenous 
animism. (See Genealogical Chart 12.) 
As noted by my Karas and Sembur informants, the Islamisation of 
the Nanga community is still in its preliminary stages. Nevertheless, 
my Nanga informants are self-consciously Islamising. Circumcision is 
very important to them; this is done at a pre-pubertal age, always by 
an outsider who is a specialist at the job. The first mudim 
'circumciser' they had, which was during Apong's time, was from 
Mantang Besar. (See Map 3.) After this mudim died, they began going 
to Karas to be circumcised by the Tanjungpinang doctor who goes there 
for that purpose. Alternatively, wh~n the Sembur people call in a 
mudim, the·Nanga people can also make use of his services. 
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Another aspect of Islamisation may be discerned in the small 
cemetary on Nanga where Apong, his wife and some others are buried. 
The graves are aligned lengthwise on a north-south axis, which is 
indeed a properly Islamic position. The wooden gravestones also look 
Islamic -- that is, they are in the general shape of flat ones for 
females, rounded ones for males. However, the dead are still fed 
food-offerings at the grave sites. Since the Nanga people have 'not 
yet learnt to pray', they can hardly feed their dead through the 
recitation of prayer, as the Sembur people are doing. Moreover, my 
Nanga informants talk of each grave as having a tuan 'master'. 
Apparently, when the dead person in a particular grave is hungry, he 
or she appears in a dream to the tuan whose responsibility it is to 
feed that dead person. Bolong, the present 'elder', is the tuan of 
his father's grave, which, interestingly, has a small shed built to 
shelter it. (See Plate 24.) His younger brother Cen Con is the tuan 
of their mother's grave. Therefore, each dreams of his respective 
parent. My Nanga informants told me that even the nomadic orang 
sampan have to look after the graves of their dead; the tuan of a 
particular grave must remember the location of that grave and visit it 
regularly to feed the dead. 
The Nanga people's syncretism was commented on by the Sembur 
pawang mentioned above. He said: those people over there go to 
Penyengat to get married, yet they do not even have Muslim names. 
Despite my Sembur informants' own syncretism, they seem to be 
disturbed by the Nanga people's ambiguity. When I wanted to go from 
Sembur to Nanga, I was first of all discouraged from going; when I 
insisted, 'I was then warned by my Sembur informants not to spend the 
night on Nanga, and also not to eat or drink what the Nanga people 
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offered me for fear of poison. So the best I could do was to make day 
trips to Nanga. A Sembur informant rowed me over in his boat; he 
accompanied me to the house of the 'village elder' (ketua kampung), 
but did not partake of the drink that was served. He was also 
unwilling to step into the other houses there. The presence of a 
Sembur person naturally inhibited my interaction with the Nanga 
people. 
Ironically, the saving grace was his unwillingness to enter the 
other houses, apart from that of the village elder; this gave me a 
measure of privacy in conversing with my Nanga informants inside these 
houses. When it became known on Sembur that I entered these other 
houses in Nanga, I was said to be 'brave' (berani). When my Sembur 
i~formants further learnt that I actually partook of the refreshments 
offered by the Nanga people, they started calling me (in English) 
'Wonder Woman', after the American television character who is 
portrayed as having magical powers. The 'wonder' in this case was 
what my Sembur informants perceived as my ability to survive the 
supposed poison of Nanga. It was beginning to be difficult to do 
fieldwork on Nanga and still maintain my status as a neutral outsider 
among my Sembur informants. 
Not only was the Nanga people's Islamism perceived as ambiguous, 
their Melayu identity was also controversial. While it was not 
disputed by anyone that they were Melayu asli, it was unclear exactly 
what kind of Melayu they were in terms of suku identity. My Sembur 
informants said that the Nanga people were suku Mantang; my Nanga 
informants denied this, and asserted that they were suku Galang. When 
I asked my Sembur informants about this claim, they said that the 
Nanga people were lying. My Nanga informants, however, made a 
counter-suggestion about the Sembur people's identity, saying that the 
ancestors of both the Sembur and the Nanga people originated from the 
571 
same place -- namely, Petai in Galang Baru. (See Map 4.) 
A Sembur informant admitted that many of the Sembur people 
derived from Petai ancestry; he further informed me that the people in 
Petai were known as suku Limas. Significantly, this particular 
informant said that he himself has no connection with Petai or the 
suku Limas because his father had come to Sembur from Karas. Both my 
Nanga and Sembur informants said that Petai is no longer inhabited, 
and that the place has since reverted to jungle. 
The suku identity of the Nanga people was made a bit more certain 
when a Nanga informant dropped a heavy hint by telling me that I was 
not to use the word Barok to ref er to them. This hint was confirmed 
by my informants in Telok Nipah across the water where the Barok Sekak 
live. This is the community where I found the Melayu Budha and the 
Melayu Kong Hu Cu. (See Chapter Seven and Genealogical Chart 11.) I 
was told by these informants that the Nanga people and the Teluk Nipah 
people were of 'the same stock' (sebangsa), there being three sub-
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types of Barok people -- Barok Limas, Barok Kungki, and Barok Sekak. 
My Teluk Nipah informants acknowledged that the Barok people of Nanga 
were 'more Islamic' (lebih Islam). They could hardly have claimed 
otherwise, since they themselves were either Melayu Budha, Melayu Kong 
H~ Cu, or else were unaffiliated to any formal religion. 
Indeed, whereas my Karas and Sembur informants were at least 
willing to consider the Islamism of the Nanga people, they 
categorically dismissed the Teluk Nipah community as being completely 
un-Islamic. The Sembur guide who had rowed me to Nanga was even more 
cautious on Teluk Nipah. He did not enter a single house in Teluk 
Nipah. As another Sembur informant explained, the Teluk Nipah people 
are still orang laut who 'have no religion, except to worship the 
capes and bays' (tak ada ugama, cuma sembah tanjung teluk). I asked 
him what he meant by 'capes and bays' (tanjung teluk). He answered: 
puaka itu 'the puaka'. I asked him what he meant by puaka. He 
answered: keramatlah 'the keramat of course'. 
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As I have mentioned in Chapter Six, the term puaka refers to a 
site inhabited by a genius loci, the jembalang puaka. For the orang 
laut, many of these puakas are apparently located at particular capes 
and bays, where food offerings are given by the orang laut passing by 
that way. It is interesting that in order to clarify the meaning of 
the term puaka, my Sembur informant translated it into the Islamic 
term keramat. In so doing, he demonstrated the feasibility of a 
syncretism that is both an Islamised animism, as well as an 
animistised Islamism. (See Chapter Six.) 
I suggest that this syncretism is bonded by an inverse 
relationship between Islamism and animism, a relationship which may be 
illustrated thus: 
a 1 and a 2 represent 
bl and b2 
c represents 
d 
Karas 
Sembur 
Nang a 
Teluk Nipah 
573 
goingonthet------------------------------------------11w 
flaj to Mecca 
giving alms t---------------------------------------:r 
~~~ 
tasting t--------------------------------,~S~ 
.._c...'\,,~ praying ~ 
everyday t---------------------------------
praying 
on Friday------------------------------
pronouncing t-----------__,, 
the creed 
Islamic- type t--------__,, 
graves 
d .. ~....._~_.,~~'--~-"-~....._~_._~__.,,__~--~'"""-~--~--'..._~..__~....._~--
sembah bela bela bela kampung 
tan,·ung kampung kampung replaced by 
te uk without reduced doa selamat 
images to the at friday 
bela kampung protection prayers 
with wooden feeding of individual 
images the dead houses 
through ----
feeding the doa arwah replacing 
dead at puaka sites 
grave-sites with keramat 
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DECREASING 
ANIMISM 
Figure 17 Increasing Islamism and Decreasing Animism 
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In Figure 17 above, both Karas and Sembur are marked, 
respectively, at two points of the line representing Islamisation. 
This is to indicate the differential rates of Islamisation within 
these two communities. The gap between al and a2 is much greater than 
the gap between bl and b2. This suggests a greater dissonance between 
Islamism and animism within the Karas community than there is within 
the Sembur community. 
The Karas gap widened to its present span in 1982, when the 
'headman' became the first person from Karas to complete the haj to 
Mecca, thereby breaking the seven-generation curse. But at the same 
time, some people on Karas are still continuing to 'nurture' their 
respective villages through bela kampung. Even in 1980 when I first 
visited Karas, there was already a long-standing antagonism between 
the more Islamised 'headman' and the various less Islamised pawang. 
Significantly, the more Islamised people of Karas are those who set 
forth most frequently on trading expeditions to Singapore and Batara in 
the north and to Jambi in the south. The Islamising 'headman', for 
example, is one of the most active traders on the island, with a 
trading expedition almost every other week. 
In contrast, the gap between Islamism and animism is not as wide 
in the Sembur community. On the contrary, as we have seen above, the 
Sembur pawang seems to be also one of the more Islamised individuals 
in the community, perhaps even more so than Awang Cik's former 
students. Because the differential rate of Islamisation in Sembur is 
relatively small, the contradiction between Islamism and animism is 
not so acutely felt as it is in Karas. 
If we may generalise from this -- the greater the degree of 
Islamisation a community attains through some of its members, the more 
likely are we to find religious differences within the community. For 
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example, while it is possible for some people to pursue religious 
studies, it is impossible, or at least improbable, that a whole 
community can attain exactly the same standard of religious education. 
Again for example, while it is possible for a few people to save 
enough money to go to Mecca, it is quite impossible for a whole 
community to become hajis at exactly the same moment. Therefore, 
increasing Islamisation is likely to produce a pattern of dualism, 
whereby the more Islamised sector of the community would adhere to the 
'Single Image' of Islam, while the less Islamised sector would be 
'invested with the Double Image' of syncretism. In such a situation, 
we would be likely to find witchcraft accusations within the 
community, with the more Islamised accusing the less Islamised of 
being witches, at least potentially. This was indeed the tendency I 
found in Karas. 
It is only at this point of the discussion that we can understand 
the import of what my first Karas host had said when he urged me to 
drink the glass of milk: He ventured to guarantee that from Tanjung 
Marau to Langkang on Karas island, nobody poisons visitors. But west 
of Tanjung Marau, he dared not guarantee because he seldom goes there 
himself. On an island that one can walk around in a day, it is very 
odd for someone to say that he seldom goes to a part that is no more 
than half an hour's walk away. My host was implying, although I did 
not realise it at the time, that the people living from Tanjung Marau 
to Langkang are more Islamised than those living to the west of 
Tanjung Marau. The more Islamised and the less Islamised sectors of 
the Karas population are thus socially estranged, with the former 
suspecting the latter of possibly being poisoners and witches. 
Indeed, my Karas informants did comment on the way I walked all 
over the island, criss-crossing all the various 'villages' (kampung). 
One of my less Islamised pawang informants said to me: obviously you 
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also have ilmu 'magical knowledge'; otherwise you couldn't have 
travelled so far and survived. So that I could defend myself even 
better, he gave me a belantan 'truncheon' made of a hardwood called 
kayu mentigi (Pemphia acidula) and taught me the proper way of killing 
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a human being. 
The differential rate of Islamisation can also lead to 
hierarchisation, as the more Islamised sector would tend to identify 
themselves as superior to their less Islamised fellows. Although the 
Sembur community is internally quite homogeneous in its rate of 
Islamisation, it is externally quite differentiated from its two 
neighbouring communities -- namely, Nanga and Teluk Nipah. It is 
significant that these three communities are located so near each 
other in the same island-cluster, practically within hailing distance. 
(See Map 4.) It is also significant that, as mentioned above, claims 
are made, at least by some informants, that all three communities 
originated from the 'same stock'. 
It is perhaps not impossible that what we now see as three 
separate communities resulted from the hierarchical fission of one 
original community. Both my Sembur and Nanga informants identified 
Petai as the place from which their two communities derived. A Sembur 
informant said: 
Petai was the first •••• Petai had a lot of boat people; but 
many of their descendants converted to Islam, and refused to 
do bad things -- stealing, eating dirtily. Because it was 
crowded, those who were already Muslim moved to Batu Licin; 
later they moved to Nguan, Sembur, and Air Lingka 
Those who were in Petai were suku Limas, the boat people of 
Limas. 
23 (My translation). 
According to my Nanga informants, Petai formerly had a 'crowded 
village' (kampung ramai), which dispersed sometime during the Dutch 
period before the Second World War. The people from Petai moved to 
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Tanjung Malang, Nguan, Petung, and Nanga. 
This information suggests that there were two patterns of 
dispersal: The former pattern, mentioned by my Sembur informant (see 
above) was apparently followed by the more Islamised sector of Petai. 
The latter pattern, mentioned by my Nanga informants (see above) was 
apparently followed by its less Islamised sector. The name 'Nguan' 
appears in both lists of places, implying that the community there is 
relatively mixed. Air Lingka also seems to have drawn members from 
both sectors of Petai. Although my Nanga informants did not mention 
Air Lingka as a place to which the Petai people went, nevertheless 
there have been one or two marriages between the Nanga people and the 
Air Lingka people, which suggest a certain commonality between the two 
communities. There are also some connections that can be traced 
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between the Teluk Nipah community and the long abandoned Petai. 
If it is indeed the case that the Sembur, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah 
communities all share the same Barak stock, it is significant that 
they are not all equally willing to own up to such an identity. The 
people most willing to identify themselves as Barok were my informants 
in Teluk Nipah; in contrast, the Nanga people and the Sembur people 
were ashamed to identify themselves as anything else but Melayu in a 
general sense and suku Galang in a more specific sense. 
According to my Karas informants, the only true suku Galang are 
those whose ancestors had lived in Galang Tua located on the banks of 
Sungai Galang Batang. (See Map 4.) That was the original hideout of 
the Galang pirates, they said. Whereas I did find genealogical links 
between my Karas informants and Galang Tua, I could find no such links 
for my Sembur and Nanga informants. It is perhaps due entirely to 
Awang Cik's proselytisation among the Sembur people, that the Karas 
people are now willing to accept them as Muslims, to the extent of 
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inter-marrying with them. By my Sembur informants' own account, 
before Awang Cik came, their state of Islamism was about the same as 
the present Nanga people's Islamism, extending only as far as nikah in 
Penyengat. 
It is a fundamental tenet of Islam that within the umat 
'congregation of believers' all are equal in the sight of God. Such 
being the case, how is it possible that Islamisation can give rise to 
hierarchisation? I suggest that this can occur through the control of 
admission to the umat. After all, someone has to answer the question: 
who is to be included as a believer, as an equal member of the 
congregation? The process of Islamisation may thus be understood as 
the attempt made by people who are outside, to enter and join the 
congregation. In such a situation, the advantage lies with those who 
are already inside the congregation, for they can decide who belongs 
and who does not. It is this question of deciding membership that 
enables hierarchisation to arise from Islamisation. In this case, the 
ones who are hierarchised are not those who already belong, but 
rather, those who do not yet belong and who are trying to belong. In 
other words, while there is equality in belonging, there is also a 
hierarchisation of not-belonging: one can not-belong in various 
degrees of proximity. The Islamic sliding scale in Galang that we 
have discussed above seems to express precisely the various degrees of 
not-belonging to the congregation of equal believers. 
9.4 Epilogue: The Civilising Process 
Finally, we must ask the question why people should be motivated 
to Islamise. As I have shown in the examples discussed above, 
Islamisation involves a radical shift in consciousness, which may be 
illustrated in the following way: 
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from the literal 
-----------------
to the metaphorical 
from the material 
----------------
to the abstract 
from what is direct 
--------------
to what is mediated 
from the inward-orientated ------- to the outward-orientated 
from the self as tuan ------------ to Other as Tuhan 
from the particularism of to the universalism of 
a bounded community -------------- the 'nation of Islam' 
Figure 18 A Radical Shift in Consciousness 
In pre-Islamised animism, one feeds the dead in a literal manner 
by bringing food to the graves. Through Islamisation, however, one 
feeds the dead through the metaphor of prayer; the taste of the food 
is now referred to as rahmat 'mercy'. In pre-Islamised animism, one 
literally banishes the 'sickness-causing spirits' by means of trapping 
them materially in wooden images. Through Islamisation, however, one 
'banishes evil' in a general sense through abstract prayer. In pre-
Islamised animism, one feeds the dead directly and one banishes the 
spirits directly. Through Islamisation, however, all such actions 
have to be mediated through Tuhan. In pre-Islamised animism, one 
communicates with the spirits when they manifest themselves through 
dreams in the privacy of sleep. Through Islamisation, however, one 
communicates with Tuhan through a set prayer chanted aloud in public. 
In pre-Islamised animism, one can become the tuan 'master' of spirits. 
Through Islamisation, however, one submits to Tuhan, the sole 
spiritual Other. In pre-Islamised animism, the particularism of a 
community is bounded by the ritual of bela kampung. Through 
Islamisation, however, one is immersed in the universalism of the umat 
'the congregation of believers', 'the nation of Islam'. 
As I have noted above, there are differential rates of 
Islamisation within a community, for example, in Karas where the 
'headman' is more Islamised than the various pawangs who still 
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maintain the ritual of bela kampung. Interestingly, in Nanga, it is 
also the ketua 'elder' who seems to be keener on Islamisation than are 
the others. He is the one who decides when the children are to be 
circumcised. He is the one who deals with the circumcisers who are 
hired. He is the one whose house my Sembur guide considered safe to 
enter. His younger siblings seem less keen on Islamising. 
n n One day, while I was in Nanga, the younger brother Ce Co 
called me to his house, saying that he wanted me to meet a visitor. 
This turned out to be Meri (the Christianising sibling) who had come 
visiting from Tanjung Wangkang. Bolong the 'elder' was not present. 
Cen Con and Meri then told me the story of Tanjung Wangkang. There 
was a Chinese man called Ce Ha who was a charcoal-burner at Tanjung 
Wangkang; because of his charcoal works, the place is known as Dapur 
Baru 'New Kiln'. One day, Ce Ha adopted an orang laut boy called 
Atong, and brought him up as his son. Atong's own father, Dengkis, 
often visited Tanjung Wangkang. When Ce Ha died, Atong inherited his 
Chinese father's charcoal works. He thus became a tauke 'merchant'. 
Because he could speak Chinese, the orang laut in the area regarded 
him as both Melayu and Chinese. His presence began to attract those 
orang laut who were looking for a place to settle. That was how the 
settlement on Tanjung Wangkang was formed. Later on, in 1973, a ship 
called 'Hosanna' came calling from Tanjung Uban. This was sent by the 
Majelis Jemaat Gereja Protestan di Indonesia 'Parish Committee of 
Protestant Churches in Indonesia'. The people at Tanjung Wangkang 
decided to become Christian, because they could thus become 
'civilised' (maju) without becoming Muslim. And that was how the 
Tanjung Wangkang community became Christian. 
That day on Nanga, by calling me to his house so that he could 
tell me about Tanjung Wangkang, Cen Con seemed to want to make a 
certain point -- that it is possible to become 'civilised' without 
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becoming Muslim. Yet after telling the story of Tanjung Wangkang, 
both Cen Con and Meri said of themselves that they had 'entered' 
(masuk) their respective religions only because of marriage. CJl 
Con's wife is a woman from Air Lingka where the people are 'more 
Muslim' (lebih Islam). Meri's husband is a Christian convert at 
Tanjung Wangkang. So Cen Ccf and Meri 'followed' (ikut) their 
respective spouses' religion, because if they did not, it would have 
been 'difficult' (payah). However, what would be best, they said, was 
to be 'free' (bebas): masing-masing sendiri pilih yang dia mau 'each 
choosing what each wants.' 
Thus, to convert to Christianity or Islam is to become 
'civilised', or so it seems to some. Both religions are exogenously 
transmitted by outsiders. To convert to such a religion is to declare 
a willingness to join the outside world through membership in a 
supralocal community of believers. The cost of such membership seems 
to be the 'freedom' that one had hithereto enjoyed in one's own 
particular territory. To be 'free' or to be 'civilised' -- that is 
the question. The choice is whether it is better to be the tuan of 
one's own small world, or to belong as a part of a larger, more 
powerful Other-given world. 
Such a choice is by no means unique to my informants. It is 
found in all areas of the world where 'civilisation' is in process, 
where some form of supralocal system claims the allegiance of 
otherwise 'free' people. Such a system would perhaps seem most 
relevant to the people concerned when their consciousness of the 
outside world is heightened -- for example, when outsiders encroach 
upon their territory, or when they themselves travel out of their own 
particular territory to other places beyond. The meeting of two 
worlds -- inside and outside -- tends to make one feel the inadequacy 
of being merely the lllim of one's own small world, when it is 
perceived that the outside Other-given world is larger and more 
powerful. 
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There is a further material dimension to this perception. As 
indicated above, conversion to a world religion seems to follow a 
shift from boat-dwelling nomadism to house-dwelling sedentism. And as 
noted in Chapter Two, such a shift implies a greater involvement in 
the cash nexus, a greater degree of other-dependence. It is this 
material change, I suggest, that gives plausibility to the symbolic 
dominance of Other over Self. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE 
1. The Arabic umma means 'nation, people; generation' (Wehr 
1976:25). 
2. To quote Farah (1970:154): 
The caliph was not only ruler but also amir al-mu'minin 
(commander of the faithful) and the imam (guide) of the 
community. 
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The Seljuk Turks who first bore the title of sultan also adopted 
this role, as have most, if not all, Muslim rulers after them. 
3. The Penyengat mosque is described thus in a book written by an 
informant Raja Hamzah (n.d.(b):9): 
Misjid yang layak dibanggakan sebagai cermin keagungan 
agama Islam - dengan kubah-kubah, menara dan mimbar yang 
serba indah - didirikan pada tanggal 1 Syawal tahun 1249H 
(1832 M) atas prakarsa Yangdipertuan Muda ke VII, Raja 
Abdul Rahman (Marhum Kampung Bulang). 
Misjid yang panjangnya 19.80 M, lebar 18 M didalamnya 
ditopang oleh 4 buah tiang beton. Pada tiap-tiap penjuru 
dibangun menara tempat bilal menyeru azan. 
Selain menara terdapat pula 13 buah kubah. Ada yang 
empat persegi, enam persegi dan delapan persegi. 
Seluruhnya berjumlah 17 buah menara dan kubah, sebanyak 
raka'at sembahyang wajib umat Islam sehari semalam. 
(The Penyengat mosque that is rightly proud of being the 
mirror of the greatness of Islam -- with its beautiful 
domes, minarets and lectern -- was built on the first day 
of the month Syawal in Hijrah year 1249 (1832 A.D.), at 
the order of the seventh Yang Dipertuan Muda, Raja Abdul 
Rahman (posthumously known as 'He Who Departed at Kampung 
Bulang'). 
The mosque, which is 19.8 metres long and 18 metres wide, 
is supported by four concrete pillars. In each corner of 
the mosque is built a minaret where the muezzin can call 
for prayers. 
Apart from the minarets, there are thirteen domes. They 
are variously square, hexagonal, and octagonal. 
Altogether they number seventeen minarets and domes, 
equivalent to the number of times obeisance is made in 
obligatory prayer by the Muslim congregation during the 
span of a day and a night.) 
(My translation). 
4. According to the Tuhfat, the mosque was not yet finished when 
Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Abdul Rahman died in 1844; it was 
completed by his successor Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali. (See 
Raja Ali Haji 1982:283.) Nineteenth-century accounts by 
Europeans described it as white in colour. (See, for example, de 
Bruyn Kops 1855:96,98; Thomson 1847:71ff .) 
5. As noted in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1936:III,325), mosques 
are generally known as Bait Allah 'house of God'. 
As places for divine service, the mosques are primarily 
'houses of which God has permitted that they be erected 
and that His name be mentioned in them' (Sura, xxiv. 36). 
(Ibid.:327). 
According to Moulavi (1973:146) 
The Prophet ••• said: 'Allah the Lofty sayeth, Verily 
the Mosques are my Houses on earth and verily those 
who frequent are my visitors.' 
6. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Masa sultan, dimana ada amir, ada tukang nikah. 
Amir boleh nikahkan orang, kerana wakil sultan. 
Sultan kepala pemerintahan, kepala adat istiadat, 
kepala agama •••• Yang ada hak nikahkan orang 
sebenarnya wali perempuan. Sultan dan amir pun 
nikahkan atas nama wali. Kalau menurut hukum agama, 
orang tak usah datang ke Penyengat nikah. Wali si 
perempuan boleh nikahkan anaknya di kampungnya. 
Tapi menurut hukum negara, hukum kerajaan -- kanun 
atau adat -- nikah harus di muka tukang nikah, biar 
si tukang nikah itu cuma duduk aja, tak cakap. 
Hukum negara itu di bikin sultan. 
7. The weddings of my informants are generally divided into two 
parts -- namely, nikah and bersanding. As explained in the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam (1936:III,912-914), the Arabic word 
nikah means 'marriage (properly: sexual intercourse, but 
already in the Kur'an exclusively of the contract)'. In the 
context of Riau, nikah is indeed the Islamic part of the 
wedding, when thelii'ii'rriage contract is established between 
the groom and the bride (the latter represented by an older 
relative); this is usually held in the evening. It is on 
this occasion that mas kawin is given and accepted. 
Bersanding is usually held on the following day. As 
Wilkinson (1959:1014) has explained the word, it means 'to 
sit side by side ••• but limited in use to the ceremonial 
'enthronement' of the bride and bridegroom at the wedding 
reception after the actual religious marriage (nikah)'. 
Among my informants, this is the occasion when adat is 
displayed. (See Chapter Seven and Plate 19.) --
8. Wilkinson's (1959:421) explanation is relevant, because he 
provides a list of the different kinds of 'knowledge' that 
the word ilmu refers to: · 
Knowledge; solid learning; science; magic; any 
branch of knowledge or magic. 
(i) Etymologically, ilmu ='to know; knowledge'. 
In this way it may be used of any branch of 
knowledge; cf. ilmu chochok tanam: 'the art of 
planting; agriculture'. 
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(ii) By early Moslem writers it was specialized in 
the sense of 'solid knowledge', in contrast to mere 
worldly accomplishments (adab, q.v.). Such 'solid 
knowledge' was based on Divine Revelation and on the 
Arabic language in which the Revelation was given to 
humanity. Ilmu includes: Arabic grammar (ilmu 
nahu); word-building (ilmu saraf); dialectics (ilmu 
bahas); logical exposition (ilmu mantik); letter-
writing (ilmu terasul); Canon Law (ilmu fakeh, iimu 
pikah); theology (ilmu tauhid) and mysticism (ilmu 
batin, ilmu salek, ilmu sufi, ilmu suluk, ilmu 
tarekat, ilmu tasawufi). It covers also psuedo-
sciences such as alchemy (ilmu kimia), astrology 
(ilmu nujum), prosopology (ilmu firasat), the 
interpretation of dreams (ilmu tabir mimpi), 
spiritualism (ilmu ghaib, ilmu rohani, ilmu wasitah) 
and the Moslem Black Art (ilmu seher). 
(iii) Through European influence the word has now 
been applied to our own sciences: anatomy (ilmu 
tashrikh); astronomy (ilmu bintang); chemistry (ilmu 
kemi, ilmu kimia, ilmu cherai); geography (ilmu 
dunia); mathematics (ilmu kira-kira); etc. 
(iv) In popular speech ilmu is used with a special 
suggestion of magic; cf: ilmu panas (black magic); 
membacha ilmu (to recite magical formulae); membuat 
ilmu (to use sorcery). Branches of this ilmu are 
very numerous. 
9. The Arabic word sihr does indeed mean 'bewitchment, 
beguilement, enchantment, fascination; ••• sorcery, 
witchcraft, magic, charm (of a woman)' (Wehr 1976:400). 
10. Lime is considered by my informants as a fruit of magical 
significance. This is similar to the situation in the Malay 
Peninsula described by Skeat (1900). Such a perception 
seems to be of historical derivation. For example, 
Wilkinson (1959:692) cites from the Hikayat Mashhudu'l-hakk 
the usage of the term 'mandi berlimau (to rub oneself down 
with split limes in ceremonial ablutions)'. 
11. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Sekali saya bawa sandiwara untuk pertandingan seluruh 
Riau. Pimpinannya ke saya. Yang dari Pekanbaru, yang 
dari Bengkalis, yang dari Kampar ini bawa-bawa dukun 
semua. Hebat-hebat agaknya. Saya bawa biasa aja. Saya 
cuma bawa S.H. dengan S.T. Jadi tiba di Pekanbaru, waktu 
kami mau bertanding, datang Pak T.M. 
'Ano, Pak Raja H., sudah sia~-siap semua?' 
'Sudahlah.' 
'Sarat-sarat awak sudah?' 
'Sarat-sarat apa?' 
'Eh 2 awak ini tidak pakai apa-apa ini?' 
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'Jadi pertandingan di Pekanbaru ini nak pakai 
sarat-sarat?' 
'Ya lah,' katanya. 
'Nak pakai sarat, nanti saya carilah.' 
Saya cari limau, terpaksa aja, saya cari sebesar-
sebesarnya. Saya pukul aja, main-main. Jadi petang dia 
datang. 
'Awak itu tak betul. Saya tak cakap main-main,' katanya. 
'Begini aja. Saya ini tak bawa sarat-sarat itu. 
Tetapi kalau Bapak nak tolong, tolonglah saya. 
Bagaimana kami pakai dukun dari Bengkalis aja. 
Tolonglah.' 
'Kalau minta betul, boleh,' katanya. 
Malara itu, nak main, dia malam pertama, kalau pertama, 
selamat dia. Malara kedua, itu kami. Dia tolonglah. 
Pakai macam-macamlah! Dia menolong kita, kita terima 
kasih; cuma kita tolak bala aja, karena sudah ada 
peringatan-peringatan ini tolak bala. Sudah selesai kami 
tolak bala, jadi dukun dia datang. Sama saya dia bilang, 
'Pak, jangan kasi orang luar masuk; saya nak tolong, 
tetapi tak mampu saya.' 'Kalau begitu, baiklah,' kata 
saya. Saya kasi tahu anak-anak buah, 1Jangan nanti satu 
orang pun masuk, nanti uh?' 'Orang luar, 1 saya bilang, 
'Jagalah orang itu. 1 
Jaga lepas kira-kira lima minit kami nak main, mari satu 
orang. 
'Pak H il sa a tadi. Suruh antarkan baran • 
Ini kata orang itu yang mai. 
Jadi, oleh anak-anak buah kita itu, kan, kasi masok, kan, 
nak cari saya. 
'Kalau Pak H tak ada, saya cari Pak S.T.,' kata 
orang itu. 
'Jika cari Pak H, dia ada dalam; masuklah. 1 
Sambil masuk, dia buka dulang - begitu begitu sibar 
itu. Basuh basuh, kan, pisang. Dia buka, dia kasi 
tabur -- ano -- kacang hijau. Semua itu dia kasi 
tabur kacang hijau. Jadi waktu kita mau mulai, 
dukun Bengkalis itu datang. Sekali dia buka pintu, 
dah penuh kacang hijau. 
'Awak kena aja,' katanya, 
'Hati-hati ajalah. Saya tak boleh buat apa-apa 
lagi. Main hati-hati ajalah. 1 
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Saya tak sedap hati ku itu, kan? Mainlah kami. 
Main baru sepuluh menit kami main, kebetulan kami 
bawa cerita 'Hang Jebat di Melaka' itu. Baru 
sepuluh menit main, waktu silat, kerisnya terlepas, 
langsung masuk kaki, macit dalam tu. Naiklah 
Gubenor. Tak tahu semua, kan. Tutup layar. 
Gubenur naik. Begitu. Wah, dingamuk-ngamuk ini. 
1Apa ini, tak ada sarat, sudah lama macam main-main 
ini Apa kena begini, bagaimana? Bagaisiapa pimpinan 
pertunjukan malam ini?' 
Mula-mula, sudah itu terjadi, saya bilang, 'Luka itu 
siapa? Tutup pintu. Jangan orang pun masuk. 
Jangan ribut-ribut. S.H. ditepikan, 1 saya bilang, 
1Panggil Pak S.T. tolong. Cari orang kesehatan. 
Kita tak mau bising-bising. 1 Ada orang tutup pintu. 
Tutup. Dari depan ada dua orang yang mau masuk. 
Jadi, tak banyak, luka sikit aja. Jadi pintu 
diketung. 
'Jangan buka. ' 
'Oi, bukalah.' 
Saya bilang, 'Oi, keluar. Tak ada yang bisa 
masuk sini!' 
'Eh, Pak Gubenor itu.' 
'Eh, Pak Gubenor masuklah.' 
[The listeners chuckled.] 
Dia masuk marah-marah. Dia panggil itu dokter 
propinsi itu, suruh merawat sikijab itu. 
[After listening to the story, one of the listeners 
commented:] 
'Jadi di Pekanbaru itu masih; ilmunya masih 
kuat itu.' 
'Masih,' [replied Raja H]. 
12. As Douglas has argued (1966:113), 'pollution is a type of 
danger which is not likely to occur except where the lines 
of structure, cosmic or social, are clearly defined'. 
13. As Brown (1970:35-36) describes the situation in the 
Christianising Roman Empire: 
Most important of all, perhaps, a man's conscious 
identity was now deeply linked with his 
Christianity. In Christian popular opinion, the 
sorcerer could no longer be tolerated in the 
community on condition that he recanted his art: for 
he was now considered to have abandoned his 
identity; he had denied his Christian baptism •••• 
Significantly, the Jew plays a part ••• , not only 
because he is an outsider, but, more particularly, 
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because he had always denied Christ -- he was the 
'apostate' par excellence. 
14. In other words, I am suggesting that 'psychosis' derives 
from isolation, from the failure to find enough people to 
collude in the same phantasy. 
15. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Agama orang laut tak tentu -- ikut-ikut saja, 
terutama hari raya. Kalau dia jumpa dengan orang 
Islam, dia mengakui diri sebagai orang Islam. Tapi 
dia pelihara babi. Kalau ditanya, jawabnya, 'Ini 
bukan babi, ini celeng, nangoi.' 
16. The word celeng seems to be of Javanese derivation. (See, 
for example, Horne 1974:634). According to Dahl (1981), 
*±angui is a Proto-Austronesian word meaning 'to swim'. 
According to my informants, the type of pig known as nangoi 
usually swims in a herd from island to island. 
17. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Orang laut -- kalau tahun baru Cina, dia tahun baru 
juga; kalau hari raya Islam, dia ikut juga. Dia 
be bas. 
18. Sembur Darat and Sembur Laut are connected by a sandbar 
which is covered by the sea at high tide. At low tide, one 
can thus walk across. My informants said that the village 
was originally on Sembur Darat; later on it was moved to 
Sembur Laut. Sembur Darat is now uninhabited. I shall thus 
refer to Sembur Laut simply as 'Sembur'. 
19. The word hari raja literally means 'big day'. Hari Raya 
Puasa is the celebration of the end of Ramadan, the fasting 
month. Hari Raya Haji takes place during the period of the 
haj, and is supposed to be an expression of the spirit of 
sacrifice. During this occasion, people kill goats to 
distribute the meat to the other villagers as charity. 
20. The word tobat or taubat means 'repentance; abjuring; 
forswearing; abstaining from' (Wilkinson 1959:1176). 
According to my Penyengat informants, this is related to 
sertu 'ablution (after touching a pig or a dog)', these 
animals being considered polluting in Islam. They said the 
only reason why tobat should be performed for a new convert 
to Islam is that this person would have previously had 
contact with these ritual pollutants, and hence would need 
to be purified. 
21. It may be the case that the Barok Limas and the Mantang 
Limas are one, particularly since the name Mantang is often 
used as a generic label for all orang laut. (See Chapter 
Five.) 
22. According to this informant, the proper way of killing a 
person is in accordance with the location of the roh 'soul' 
and the location of the sun. The roh of a woman is in the 
left side of her body; the roh of a man is in the right side 
of his body. When the sun is high, one hits the victim at 
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the back of the neck just below the hairline -- on the left 
side, if it is a woman, on the right side, if it is a man. 
When the sun is going down, one hits the victim at the 
waist, just below the rib-cage -- again on the right or the 
left, depending on gender. These are the positions of the 
roh at these times. My informant said that when one holds 
the belantan 'truncheon', one becomes kebal 'invincible' and 
can withstand even a cannon-ball. (See Plate 25.) 
23. The original quotation in Malay is as follows: 
Petai terlebih dulu •••• Petai banyak orang sampan; 
tapi keturunannya sudah banyak masuk Islam, tak mau 
kerja lagi yang buruk -- mencuri, makan kotor. 
Kerana ramai, sebahagian yang sudah Islam itu pindah 
ke Batu Licin; kemudian ke Nguank Sembur dan Air 
Lingka •••• Yang di Petai itu su u Limas, orang 
sampan Limas. 
24. For example, Arifin's wife's father's mother is said to 
have lived in Petai; her own mother died in Tanjung 
Malang. (See Genealogical Chart 11.) 
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Plate 19. This scene is typical of a bersanding -- that is, the 
ceremonial enthronement of bride and bridegroom. The wedding depicted 
above took place on Penyengat. While the newlyweds, Taufik and Zauyah, 
sit shyly on their pelamin 'bridal thrones' with downcast eyes, 
Raja Dara (dressed in purple) and another woman prepare for the ritual 
known as suap-suap -- literally, 'mouthful by mouthful'. During this 
ritual the bride and groom feed each other symbolically with small 
mouthful~ of rice. First the groom brings a small rice-ball to the 
bride's mouth; then the bride does the same to him o This reciprocal 
action is repeated three times. They do not actually eat the rice but 
merely bring it to each other's mouth in a symbolic gesture. The rice 
comes from the nasi adab-adab 'ceremonial rice-dish' placed on the low 
table in front of the couple. Yellow glutinous rice is used for this 
dish. Hard-boiled eggs dyed in red are stuck on the rice to signify 
fertility. (The other woman on the left side of the picture is the 
Mak Andam 'Mother Dresser' that is, the ritual specialist in charge 
of the ceremonial dressing of the bride.) 
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Plate 20. This is part of a kebun pusaka 'inherited plantation' in 
Sebauk. The first time I went to such a 'plantation' with my informants, 
I could not even see 'it'. I had to ask them. 'But where's the kebun 
you speak of?' They answered by saying, 'Well, there's the rambutan 
tree, and there's the durian tree, and there's the jackfruit tree', and 
so on. (Rambutan is 'a fruit with a hairy integument', known in Latin 
as Nephelium lappaceum (Coope 1976:223). Durian is the pungent fruit 
known in Latin as Durio zibethinus.) 
A kebun pusaka is thus not a neatly bounded parcel of land with 
orderly rows of trees. On the contrary, it consists of the specific 
fruit trees that had been planted by one's predecessors. So to keep a 
kebun pusaka going, one must plant new fruit trees for future 
generations. The end of the fruit trees would be the end of the kebun 
pusaka itself, since all that would be there would be uncultivated 
forest. 
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Plates 21 and 22. These 
two views -- front and 
back -- give an idea of 
the size of the Penyengat 
mosque. Indeed the words 
on the front arch proudly 
proclaim: 
The Great Mosque 
of the 
Riau Sultan 
of 
Penyengat. 
The colours of the mosque 
-- yellow and green --
signify the two important 
themes of royalty and 
Islam. 
593 
Plate 23. In contrast to the great royal mosque of Penyengat, there 
are numerous village mosques of humbler proportions. The picture above 
depicts the recently renovated Karas mosque. The well in front is used 
specifically for ritual ablutions before prayer. 
• 
• 
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Plate 24. Apong's grave on Nanga is sited on a hillock overlooking the 
house of his son Bolong. A few fruit trees have been specially planted 
near the grave for the deceased. (Unfortunately, I do not have a 
better print of this grave.) 
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Plate 25. Abubakar -- more popularly known as Pak Andak Abuk -- strikes 
a pose to show how he used to fight as a Galang pirate in his younger 
days. The belantan 'truncheon' in the picture was subsequently given to 
me for my protection. 
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NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 1 
I have derived this genealogical chart from Raja Ali Haji (1982), 
Matheson and Andaya (1982), and Tengku Ahmad (1972). The two patri-
lines -- namely, keturunan tengku and keturunan raja -- are descended 
from the two founding ancestors -- respectively, Sultan Abd al-Jalil 
and Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga. These two keturunan constitute, 
respectively, the pre-1722 faction and the post-1722 faction. Several 
strategic marriages occurred between the two factions: 
between Tengku Mandak and Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak; 
between Tengku Tengah and Opu Daeng Parani; 
between Raja di-Baruh Abd al-Jalil and Tengku Putih; 
between Temenggung Tun Abd al-Jamal and Tengku Maimunah; 
between Sultan Mahmud III and Raja Hamidah Engku Puteri; 
between Sultan Mahmud IV and Raja Maimunah; 
between 'Sultan' Embung Fatimah and Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad 
Yusuf. 
As we have seen in the discussion above, the descendants from these 
particular marriages played very significant roles in zaman sultan. 
Compare this chart with Genealogical Chart 2. 
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NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 2 
This is a photocopy of a genealogical chart drawn up by my informant 
Raja Haji Abdul Rahim for the purpose of general distribution. It is 
noteworthy that he has affixed his signature at the bottom of the 
chart, even though he himself does not figure directly in this 
genealogy. Significantly, the relevant relationships highlighted in 
this genealogy are those linking the Riau rajas with two extant 
sultanates in alam Melayu -- namely, Johor and Selangor. So even 
though no living Riau raja figures in this chart, the implication is 
that they are related to the current royal houses of Johor and 
Selangor. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the reigning sultan of 
Selangor Raja Abdul Aziz is mentioned. This is indeed the informant 
mentioned in Chapter Four, who was able to gain admittance to the 
palace of the Selangor sultan, apparently through the demonstration of 
genealogical connections. 
The linkage between the Riau rajas and the Selangor sultans is 
patrilineal, since they share a common ancestor in Yamtuan Muda Opu 
Daeng Cellak ('D. Celak' in the chart). The linkage between the Riau 
rajas and the Johor sultans is matrifiliative, since the latter are 
descended from the marriage between Tengku Maimunah, the daughter of 
Opu Daeng Parani, and Tun Abd al-Jamal, grandson of Sultan Abd al-
Jalil ('T. Maimunah' and 'T.A.Jamal Bulang' in the chart). 
Interestingly, Tun Abd al-Jamal's patrilineal descent from Sultan Abd 
al-Jalil is ignored; only his father, Tun Abbas, is mentioned. 
Moreover, it is not mentioned that he was the temenggung 'local 
minister' at the time. So the implication is that his descendants who 
became Johor sultans derived their royalty from their matrifiliative 
Bugis ascendants. 
Certain other strategic marriages are noted in this chart, for 
example: 
between Raja Fatimah ('R. Fatimah') and Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng 
Kemboja ('D. Kemboja'); 
between Raja Hamidah ('R. Hamidah') and Sultan Mahmud III 
('Sultan Mahmud Lingga'). 
As discussed above, Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Marewah evidently has no 
patrilineal descendants in present-day Riau. In this chart, his 
daughter Raja Fatimah is mentioned; furthermore, her marriage to Opu 
Daeng Kemboja is highlighted, thereby linking his descendants to Opu 
Daeng Marewah matrifiliatively. As for the significance of Raja 
Hamidah's marriage, that has been discussed in Chapter Four. 
Daeng Ralaga 
~---- I r----
Daeng Daeng Daeng Daeng Daeng 
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I I -- ---1· ---
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I I I I I I I I 
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R. 
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NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 3 
I copied this from my informants' own genealogical chart hanging 
on the wall of their living room. They are, namely, Raja Jantan and 
his children. The spelling of the names follows their usage. 
As the chart indicates, they are patrilineal descendants of 
Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak ('Daeng Celak') and Yamtuan Muda Raja 
Haji ('Raja Haji 1 ). Their next ancestor, Raja Haji Ahmad ('R.H. 
Ahmad'), was the first author of the Tuhfat al- Nafis. The brother of 
Raja Haji Abdullah ('R.H. Abdullah) was Raja Ali Haji ('R. Ali Haji 1 ) 
who completed the Tuhfat. This is the Raja Haji Abdullah who may have 
'held' Pangkil, after Engku Besar Raja Sitti. (See Chapter Six.) He 
apparently went off to the Karimun area; his son Raja Ishak also went 
with him. According to my informants, Raja Ishak left some tanah 
pusaka 'inherited land' at Meral near Tanjungbalai on Karimun Besar; 
Several siblings of my informant, Raja Jantan, have therefore gone to 
the Karimun area to live. Raja Jantan's father's brother, Raja 
Mohamad Som, is also living in that area, in Tanjung Batu in Kundur, 
'where he has a plantation' (dia berkebun di sana). 
Interestingly, Raja Jantan's father, Raja Haji Ali, also known as 
Engku Haji, had two wives, both of whom bore the honorific encik. 
Raja Jantan's mother was the senior wife; she was from Igalmanda in 
Sumatra. His siblings are all born of the junior wife, who was the 
daughter of a court retainer. They are thus all anak gundik. But 
Raja Jantan himself married a raja, Raja Jamilah; so his own children 
are anak gahara. These marital connections are not, however, 
displayed on the chart itself, even though they are evidently still 
known to my informants. 
GENEALOGICAL CHART 4 
Bendahara Sri Maharaja 
Abdul Majid Tan Habab 
Padang Saujana Johor ?-1697 
Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah 
Johor 1699-1719 
2 Sultan Suleiman Badrul Alam Syah 
Rieu, lingga, Johor, Pahang 
Dilantik 1722 Mangkat 1761 
(Installed 1722 Died 1761) 
3 Sultan Abdul Jalil Muadzam Syah 
Raja di Baroh Rieu 
Mangkat.1761 
(Died 1761) 
4 Sul tan Ahmad Riayat Syah 
Rieu, Mangkat 1761 5 
Sultan Mahmud Riayat Syah 
lingga 
(Died 1761) Dilantik 1761 Mangkat 1812 
Pindah Lingga 1807 
Makam di belakang Mesjid Daik 
(Installed 1761 Died 1812 
Moved to Lingga 1807 
Tomb behind the Daik mosque) 
6 Sultan Abdurrahman Muadzam Syah 
lingga, Dilantik 1818 (Installed 1818) 
Mangkat 1832, Bukit Cengkeh, Daik 
(Died 1823) 
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7 
Sultan Muhamad Muadzam Syah 
lingga 1830-1841 
Sultan Suleiman Badrul Alam Syah 
9 lingga Riau 1857-1883 
Makam Bukit Cengkeh Makam Bukit Cengkeh, Daik 
(Tomb at Bukit Cengkeh) 
Tengku Usman a Sultan Mahmud Muadzam Syah 
lingga 1835-1857 
Tengku Hussin 
Tengku Abubakar 
Tengku Ahmad 
(EGO) 
Tengku Muhd Saleh 
1901-1960 
Dipecat 23 September 1857 
Mangkat 1864 di Pahang 
(Deposed 23 September 1857 
Died 1864 in Pahang) 
Tengku Fatimah 
Raja Abdurrahman 
Sultan lingga Riau 1885-1911 
Dipecat 3 Feb 1911 Mangkat 
1930 Singapura 
(Deposed 13 Feb 1911 
Died 1930 Singapore) 
Raja Muhd. Yusuf 
Yang Dipertuan Muda Rieu X 
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NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 4 
This is excerpted from a large and extensive genealogical chart 
drawn by my informant Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abubakar. The entire 
chart includes not just this portion showing Tengku Ahmad's 
patrilineal descent, but also connections linking him with the 
descendants of the sultan of Singapore, the sultan of Indragiri, and 
the sultan of Siak, and more importantly, also with the current 
sultans of Selangor, Trengganu, Pahang and Johar. Significantly, the 
entire genealogy has a title: 'Djadual Salasilah Pertalian Antara 
Radja-Radja Yang Mendjadi Sultan-Sultan' (Genealogical Chart of 
Connections between Rajas Who Have Become Sultans). Whereas Tengku 
Ahmad's connections with the sultans of Trengganu, Pahang, and Johar 
are patrilineal, his connection with the sultan of Selangor is 
matrifiliative, being made through the marriage of Tengku Mandak, the 
sister of Sultan Sulaiman I, to Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak. 
As this excerpted portion of the genealogy indicates, Tengku 
Ahmad is patrilineally descended from Sultan Muhammad ('Sultan Muhamad 
Muadzam Syah'), the father of Sultan Mahmud IV who was deposed by the 
Dutch. Sultan Sulaiman II, the brother of Sultan Muhammad, succeeded 
his deposed nephew. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Sultan Sulaiman 
died childless, and was succeeded by Sultan Mahmud IV's daughter, 
Tengku Fatimah, who then passed the throne to her son 
matrifiliatively. My informant Tengku Ahmad contends that Tengku 
Husain ('Tengku Hussin') should have been the rightful heir, not 
Tengku Fatimah who was a woman. The implication is that if that had 
happened and if there were still an extant sultanate, then my 
informant would now be 'Sultan Ahmad', equal in status to the reigning 
sultans of Selangor, Trengganu, Pahang, and Johor. 
· D. Perani' 
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• R.Ali Haji' 
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Tandera Burung' X"\ 7 
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Engku Haji Tua Gaung) 7 
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? ~Raia Endut 
R.lsahak 
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Haii Umdr) 
'R. Ali' 
.I Raja Haji Ali 
Sulong) 
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• R. Hajj { R. Api ) • 
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'R.Jaafar' 
6 7 
'R.Ali' 
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·R.H. Mohd. Nor' 
• R.Mansor' 
R.Jantan 
'A.Abdul Rahim' (Raja Haji Abdul Rahim) 
EGO 
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· D. Menambon ' 
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• R.Abd. 
Rahman' 
7 
R.Utih Khalijah 
S. Mahmud Lingga' 
( Hulubalang 
from Gaung who 
was sent to Pangkil 
_Rebu 
Mak Dayang 
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NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 5 
This is derived from a chart that was drawn by my informant, Raja 
Haji Abdul Rahim, for the purpose of showing me his precise 
genealogical location. The numerals indicate the succession order of 
the various yamtuan mudas. So on his father's side, he is descended 
from two yamtuan mudas -- namely, Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak and 
Yamtuan Muda Raja Haji. His mother, however, is descended from four 
yamtuan mudas; in addition to the abovementioned, her ancestors 
included also Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar ('R. Jaafar') and Yamtuan Muda 
Raja Abdullah ('R. Abdullah'). 
In this chart, I make a differentiation between the names that my 
informant had written down himself and those that I subsequently 
obtained from him as additional information. The former is enclosed 
in inverted commas; the latter is not. It is significant that whereas 
he had written down the names of his mother's illustrious patrilineal 
ancestors, he had omitted her humbler matrifiliative ascendants --
namely, the hulubalang 'military officer' from Gaung in Sumatra who 
was sent to take over Pangkil, and his wife who was the bidan raja 
'rajas' midwife' also from Gaung. As mentioned in note 3 in Chapter 
Two, Gaung was formerly part of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. (See 
Appendix 12.) 
Another piece of oral information included in this genealogical 
chart is the connection between Raja Haji Abdul Rahim and Raja Jantan. 
(See Genealogical Chart 3.) 
GENEALOGICAL CHART 6 
ASAL USUL ORANG KAYA 
(DATOK KAYA) MEPAR-LINGGA 
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I. Megat Mata Merah berasal dari Kota Kandis - Pangkalan Lama 
(Jambi-Sumatra). Dari Jambi pindah ke Limbung - Lingga, dari 
Limbung pindah ke Tembok - Jelutong (Lingga) dari Tembok -
Jemutong ke Sungai Lingga (Lingga). 
II. Megat Raden Kuning kuburnya di Bukit Mur - Bukit Kerawat -
Lingga. 
III. Datok Kaya Inn kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga). 
IV. Datok Kaya Djamalu'ddin - kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga). Bergelar 
Temenggung pada kala itu ketibaan Sultan Mahmud I dari Johore 
(Malaysia) pada tahun 1215 (H). 
V. Datok Kaya Montel kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga). 
VI. Datok Kaya Awang kuburnya di Pulau Penyengat 
Pinang). 
(Tandjung 
VII. Datok Kaya Moehammad Seman kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga). 
VIII. Datok Kaya Abdul Kahar (E. Hitam) kuburnya di Senayang. 
IX. Datok Kaya Mohamad Isa (E. Awang) 
Daik, 16 Desember 1979 
Yang membuatkannya 
[Signature] 
.? 
(Mepar) 
Encik 
Monti! ? 
(Mepar-+ Penyengat) 
Encik 
A1Uang 
? 
? 
? 
(Daik) 
Encik 
' 
'? 
aji Yusuf 
? 
(Mepar -4 Sena yang) (Lanjut, Singkep ~ 
Daik) (Daik) Encik Haji 
Usman 
Encik 
Abd al-Kahar Encik Satdiah 
(Senayang~ Daik) 
Encik 
Muhammad ('Mohamad') 
EGO 
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(Daik) 
Encik 
Halimah 
Hajjah 
Mariam 
? 
O'I 
0 
00 
609 
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 6 
This is copied from Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa's own genealogical 
chart. (Compare with Genealogical Chart 7.) The title may be 
translated as 'Origins of the Orang Kaya (Datuk Kaya) of Mepar-
Lingga'. As discussed in Chapter Five, the orang kaya/datuk kaya 
literally, 'wealthy people'/'wealthy grandparent' -- were local chiefs 
who mediated between the rulers at the political centre and the 
subject people at the periphery. This genealogical chart is thus of 
the local chiefs who commanded the subject people of Mepar in Lingga. 
The genealogy begins with one 'Megat Mata Merah' who 'originated 
from' (berasal dari) a place known as 'Kota Kandis - Pangkalan Lama' 
in Jambi, Sumatra. He was thus not a native of Lingga. Indeed, the 
stages whereby he 'moved' (pindah) from Jambi to 'Sungai Lingga' 
(Lingga River) is recounted in detail. He moved first to Limbung in 
Lingga, then to Tembuk Jelutong, and finally to Lingga River. 
The second Datuk Kaya of Mepar was 'Megat Raden Kuning'. All 
that is said of him is that his grave is at 'Bukit Mur - Bukit 
Kerawat' in Lingga. According to Wilkinson (1959:754), megat is a 
hereditary title derived from the Sanskritic magadha, meaning 'son of 
a Vaisya father and a Kshatriya mother'. Coope (1976:181) also 
explains it as 'a hereditary title borne by men of royal descent on 
the mother's side'. 
According to this genealogical chart, the title datuk kaya was 
not used until the third generation with 'Datuk Kaya Inn', whose grave 
is at Mepar. This is also the very first mention of Mepar. So the 
implication is that the position of the Datuk Kaya of Mepar was 
established only at that time. The title megat was, however, dropped. 
'Datuk Kaya Djamalu'ddin' succeeded to the position. He obtained 
the additional title temenggung 'local minister', for it was during 
his time that 'Sultan Mahmud I' arrived from 'Johore (Malaysia)' in 
the Islamic year 1215 -- that is, 1800/1. What is significant about 
this date is that it is mentioned in the Tuhfat as the year when 
Sultan Mahmud III invited the Illanun pirates to attack the Dutch at 
Tanjungpinang. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:372), however, 
the attack had actually occurred in 1787. Following this, Sultan 
Mahmud and his court then moved to Lingga, in anticipation of Dutch 
retaliation. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:185-186.) So the 'Sultan Mahmud 
I' that is mentioned in the genealogical chart is evidently the 
'Sultan Mahmud III' in our discussion. And 'Johore (Malaysia)' is 
evidently 'Riau' in the sense of the Riau River, for that was where 
Sultan Mahmud had his capital. (See Chapter Four.) 
The next successor to the position was 'Datuk Kaya Mentel'. 
According to the genealogical chart, his grave is in Mepar in Lingga. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, my Ladi informants give contrary 
information, saying that his grave is on Penyengat, because he had led 
his followers there. 
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According to this genealogical chart, however, it is the next 
datuk kaya 'Datuk Kaya Awang' whose grave is on 'Pulau Penyengat 
(Tandjung Pinang)'. His successor 'Datok Kaya Moehammad Seman' 
evidently then returned to Mepar, for his grave is said to be in 
Mepar. However, 'Datuk Kaya Abdul Kahar' who succeeded to the 
position died in Senayang, for his grave is there. This datuk kaya 
was also known as Encik Hitam ('E. Hitam'). It was probably during 
his time that the last sultan of Riau abdicated. The last datuk kaya 
named in the genealogical chart is my informant himself 'Datuk Kaya 
Mohamad Isa', also known as Encik Awang ('E. Awang'). He is living in 
Daik, Lingga, where this chart was drawn on 16 December 1979. 
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 7 
This is an oral genealogy that I obtained from the same informant 
Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa. It is noteworthy that in this oral genealogy, 
he has omitted several ancestors whose names appeared in Genealogical 
Chart 6. First, he could not remember beyond 'Encik Montil' ('Datok 
Kaya Montel' in Chart 6.) So the four ancestors preceding Datuk Kaya 
Montil are omitted. Second, 'Datok Kaya Moehammad Seman', who is 
mentioned in Chart 6, is also omitted. Instead, there is a 
telescoping of the generations, such that 'Encik Awang' ('Datok Kaya 
Awang' in Chart 6) is named as my informant's father's father. 
In the oral genealogy, my informant names his mother, who is 
omitted from his written genealogy. He was also able to give some 
information about his wife's ancestors, who were encik in Daik. The 
implication is that 'Encik Muhammad' has himself moved from Senayang 
to Daik, due to the rule of uxorilocality. There is a further 
implication in the oral genealogy: his wife's ancestors seem to have 
been more Islamic than his own ancestors, for both her parents, as 
well as her father's father, had been on the pilgrimage to Mecca. My 
informant also told me that her father's father, Encik Haji Yusuf, was 
of Bugis descent, and that he was the datuk laksamana 'admiral' in 
Sultan Abd al-Rahman's time. According to Matheson and Andaya 
(1982:442), this sultan's reign occurred between 1812 and 1'831. My 
informant and his wife, Encik Halimah, are now perhaps in their 
sixties. There seem to be too few generations spanning from 1812-1831 
to 1983-1984. Perhaps even in his wife's case, Encik Muhammad was 
telescoping the generations. He himself hinted at this by saying that 
during the time of Encik Haji Usman, members of the family no longer 
held the position of datuk laksamana, thereby implying that there had 
been more than one holder of the office. 
'Keturunan 
?sugis' l'\:)? 
(Penyengat) 
Yusuf t.<V? 
(Penyer:igat~? 
Karim 
'Keturunan 'Keturunan 
? Bugis' t.<V? ? ? 
.? Gel am ' I':>? 
(Penyengat) 
Ahmad 
(Penyengat) 
Ro'onah 
(Penyengat) 
Anip 
(Penyengat) 'Keturunan 
Basilah A? Gelam • '0? Ola 
5 other 1Uives 
(Dompak-+ Pangkil) 
Saharom 
(Penyengat) 
Sall eh 
( Penyengat ~ Pangkil) 
Yusuf 
(Karas -+ Pangkil) 
Salimah 
(Pangkil) 
Jamaluddin EGO 
(Pangkil) 
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(Penyengat) 
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Ribut 
(Pangkil~Penyengat) 
.Buncai 
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NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 8 
This is an oral genealogy obtained from a Pangkil informant 
Jamaluddin. Even though he is not an aristocrat, his genealogy is 
patrilineally skewed. He identified himself as being of pangkat 
encik, bangsa encik 'of encik status, encik stock'. He said that in 
zaman sultan, the people of encik stock did not have to work; they 
just sat down and ate. He claims to be keturunan Bugis 'of Bugis 
descent', although he does not know the name of the first ancestor who 
came to Riau from Sulawesi. His genealogical memory of names begins 
with Yusuf I of Penyengat. But he does not know anything else about 
Yusuf I. About Karim, however, my informant knows that he was the 
bilal in Penyengat; the bilal is the muezzin who calls the faithful to 
prayer. Karim's son, Ahmad, was also the bilal. Salleh, however, had 
a different job: he was a court musician who played the violin and 
performed in mendu 'a theatrical performance of Bornean (Pontianak) 
origin' and joget 'a two-person dance'. (See Wilkinson 1959:475 and 
761 for an explication of these terms.) My informant said, 'therefore 
he had many wives', implying that musical and theatrical performance 
was associated with sexual promiscuity. According to the genealogy, 
he had a total of seven wives. My informant said that sometimes, he 
changed wives after only three months. Apparently, Salleh also smoked 
opium. 
About his own father, Yusuf II, Jamaluddin did not have a great 
deal to say, except that he moved from Penyengat to Pangkil and 
married a Pangkil woman Lesot. According to Jamaluddin, Lesot's 
mother's father Ola and her father Ribut were among the early 
inhabitants of Pangkil. Ribut was apparently the~ 'guardian' of 
the keramat grave. It was after his death that the grave moved to the 
sea. (See Chapter Six.) 
Jamaluddin then said something rather significant about Ola and 
Ribut: they 'did not use bin' (tak pakai bin). Bin is an Arabic word 
meaning 'son of' (see Coope 1976:34). As noted in Chapter Four, my 
Muslim informants arrange their names in the following order: personal 
name + bin + father's name. First of all, the names Ola and Ribut are 
clearly not Muslim names, and second, they were not affixed to 
patronyms in an Islamic manner. My informant hastened to add that 
Bilal Ahmad, Bilal Karim and Anip (his father's mother's father) all 
used bin. There is thus a very strong hint that Ola and Ribut were 
not quite Islamic. But when I asked Jamaluddin whether they knew how 
to pray, he said: 'Ola was very good at praying; he died whilst 
praying' (Ola pandai sembahyang; dia mati tengah sembahyang). Even if 
that were so, the implication is that they were first-generation 
Muslims, perhaps about the Islamic level of the present-day Sembur 
inhabitants. 
Both Ola and Ribut were said to be keturunan Gelam 'of Gelam 
descent'. So Jamaluddin may be patrilineally Bugis, but he is 
matrifiliatively indigenous. Interestingly, although his first wife 
was a Pangkil woman, his two subsequent wives were from Karas and 
Dompak, both of which are areas identified with the derajat of hamba 
raja. So his two later marriages were hypogamous for him. 
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NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 9 
This is an oral genealogy obtained from my informant the penghulu 
'headman' of Bintan. Penghulu Abidin identified himself as keturunan 
Palembang 'of Palembang descent', but he was not able to name any 
ancestor from Palembang in his genealogy. (See Chapter Seven.) 
Penghulu Abidin was born in Nau village in Bintan; he moved to Buyu 
only after his marriage to a Buyu woman, Dayang. He then succeeded 
his father-in-law as penghulu 'headman'. He owns a plantation of 
rubber trees and fruit trees. He is also the pawang 'village 
magician' • 
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 10 
This is an oral genealogy I obtained from my informant Awang Sah 
of Bukit Batu, Bintan. He identified himself and is identified by 
others as an orang Bintan asli 'indigenous Bintan person'. This 
informant has been discussed in Chapter Seven. He was quite careful 
to specify who on this genealogy was an orang Bintan asli and who was 
not. Thus whereas Mat Arsad and his ancestors were described as orang 
Bintan asli, Konah was described as bukan orang Bintan asli, keturunan 
dari tempat lain 'not an indigenous Bintan person, of descent from 
elsewhere'. Her ancestors were thus not indigenous to Bintan. 
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 11 
This is an oral genealogy obtained from my informant Arifin/ Suan 
Tin/A Keng of Teluk Nipah. He identified himself as Melayu Kong Hu Cu 
'Confucianist Melayu', because his father is Chinese and his mother is 
Melayu, suku Barak. Through matrifiliation he belongs to the derajat 
of hamba raja. 'Suan Tin' is his formal Chinese name; but he does not 
know his Chinese surname. 'A Keng' is his informal Chinese name. 
'Arifin' is his Melayu name. It is quite clear that he knows much 
more about his mother's kin than about his father's kin. This 
informant has been discussed in Chapter Seven. 
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 12 
This is an oral genealogy obtained from my informant Bolong of 
Nanga. He identified himself as suku Galang, though there are other 
suggestions that he and his siblings are really suku Barok. In either 
case, he would belong to the derajat of hamba raja. This informant 
and his siblings have been discussed in Chapter Nine. It is 
noteworthy that this genealogy indicates another marriage between a 
Chinese man Kim Lai and an orang laut woman Nen. The name of the 
place where they live -- Dapur Enam 'Sixth Kiln' -- suggests that it 
is the site of charcoal works, for there are many such places known as 
dapur in that area of Riau. 
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APPENDIX 2 
ALAM MELAYU AS A TRADE AREA 
As long ago as the second and third centuries A.D., Chinese 
traders were aware of this area. They referred to it as Nanhai 
'Southern Sea'. Indeed the Chinese sources provide one of the 
earliest textual references of the word ~elayu. (See Wang 1958.) 
Apart from the China trade, alam Melayu was also visited by other 
historically important traders, such as the Indians and the Arabs. 
(See Wolters 1970.) What these foreign traders seem to have wanted 
were indigenous products such as gharu wood, ebony, ivory, rhino 
horns, tortoise shells, cowries, laka wood, pandan matting, cardamon, 
rattan, coconut, benzoin, damar, camphor, betel nut, kingfisher 
feathers, pearls, and so on. (For a full list, see Dunn 1975: 111-
112.) The significance of these products is that they were not 
manufactured artefacts, but natural commodities that had to be 
gathered either from land or from sea. In return for these, certain 
manufactured goods such as Chinese pottery and Indian textiles were 
traded. These manufactured goods constituted an economic resourc~ for 
the indigenes of the area, but not, however, equally available to all. 
There was unequal access to the traffic of trade due to the 
location of the different territories. As a rule, those were 
downstream had greater access than those who were upstream. 
Similarly, those who lived on the coast had more access than those who 
lived in the forest. And those whose territory was located along the 
major shipping routes were more involved in foreign trade than others 
located some distance away from such routes. Between those who had 
greater access and those who had less, there was established an 
exchange economy, such that the former became middlepeople mediating 
between the foreign traders on the one hand, and the more remote 
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indigenes on the other. The indigenes who had less access to trade 
became the suppliers of the natural commodities desired by the foreign 
traders, while those who became the mediators had no need to supply 
through their own efforts, either natural commodities or manufactured 
goods. (See Dunn 1975, Bronson 1977, and Benjamin 1983.) 
This led to a pattern of economic differentiation among the 
various indigenous communities~ as a result of which, an inter-
communal hierarchy developed, with the mediating community becoming 
the elite. The ideological legitimation for such a hierarchy was 
provided by the Indianised kingship system, possibly with caste as a 
model for such hierarchisation. (See Coedes 1968:22-27.) The 
mediating elite community now became a relatively stable court, 
fringed by relatively mobile subjects in the periphery. However, 
there seem to have been more than one such mediating community that 
could potentially develop into a court. As noted by my Medan 
informant, Tengku Lockman Sinar: in former times, every kuala 'river 
mouth' had a raja 'ruler'; the strongest of them became the maharaja 
'great ruler'. 
A raja had to attract the indigenous collectors bringing in their 
supply of natural commodities, thereby attracting in turn more 
manufactured goods from the foreign traders. Thus the more indigenous 
collectors and the more foreign traders a chief or ruler could 
attract, the richer that chief or ruler would have been. There were 
thus several competing centres of trade, each trying to attract the 
indigenous collectors and the foreign traders. 
APPENDIX 3 
TIME AND LANGUAGE 
What is this Time? What is the evidence for a Time that is 
not mortal as a leaf in autumn, then the answer is, That 
which asks the question is out of the world's time .••• 
(Lessing 1971:58). 
My informants are aware that they are living in the twentieth 
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century, in the 1980s. But they are also aware that such a temporal 
description is but one way of talking about time. In their 
vocabulary, there are certain words used specifically for referring to 
time in a way that is radically different from mere calendrical 
computation. There is one word in particular that is of relevance to 
this study -- namely, zaman 'era'. 
To explicate its significance, I shall compare it with four other 
words for time -- namely, saat, ketika, waktu, and ~· The 
connotations of these words vary in such a gradated manner that it is 
possible to plot them thus: 
sociocentric 
THE 
AXIS r 
u 
OF m 
u 
HUMAN 
EXISTENCE 
saat ketika waktu masa zaman 
egocentric ..... ---------------------------------------short long 
THE AXIS OF TIME 
Figure 19 Time and Human Existence 
I have derived the opposition between 'egocentricity' and 
'sociocentricity' from Benjamin's analysis (1979:13,19) of the 
situation in the Malay Peninsula: 
•.. The Malay cosmos is in no sense a projection of ego-
centred conceptions; rather it has a quality of givenness 
which ..• I shall refer to as sociocentric •... Malay 
cosmology views the individual as sharply differentiated 
from, and acted upon by, the rest of society, and it views 
man as sharply differentiated from the rest of creation. 
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Among my informants in Riau, however, this differentiation between the 
individual and the cosmos is not as sharp and abrupt as characterised 
by Benjamin for the Malays of the Malay Peninsula. Instead, as Figure 
19 above indicates, there is a gradual progression outwards from 
egocentric time to sociocentric time. However, what is consonant with 
Benjamin's argument is that for my informants, it is evidently 
sociocentric time that encompasses egocentric time. We shall see 
below how the usages listed above express this notion. 
The word~ may be translated as 'moment'; saat ini is thus 
'this very moment'. This word refers to precise points in time where 
person and event are located; so saat is a short duration of time that 
1 
is egocentrically defined. The word ketika refers to time that is 
somewhat longer than saat. It may be translated as 'a while'; so 
seketika lagi is 'in a while'. The word implies that time has a 
certain momentum of its own; it thus refers to a less egocentric 
2 
definition and hence a longer duration of time. 
The word waktu may be translated as 'interval'. It refers 
specifically to lima waktu sembahyang 'the five prayer-intervals' in a 
3 
Muslim day. Since these 'prayer-intervals' are fixed, waktu refers 
to a sociocentric definition of time. However, an element of 
egocentricity is still implied, since the individual must choose 
whether or not to pray, and when exactly to do so. The word may be 
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applied in extended usage to refer to the location of individual 
action in a sociocentrically fixed interval of time. For example, 
someone who is unpunctual is said to be tidak menurut waktu 'not 
keeping to the fixed interval of time'. 
4 
The word masa may be translated as 'period'. Like waktu, ~ 
refers to time that is sociocentrically defined. But unlike waktu, it 
refers to time not divided into regular intervals, but marked by 
certain social events, for example, war. Masa Perang Dunia Kedua is 
thus 'the period of the Second World War'. Such periods provide the 
context for individual experiences. For instance, one can say: 
Masa Perang Dunia Kedua saya masih kecil. 
(During the period of the Second World War, I was still 
young.) 
5 
The word Y!!!!!r may be translated as 'the duration of one's life'. 
For example, it is used by my informants when saying farewell: 
Kalau saya ada umur, kita dapat berjumpa lagi. 
(If I continue to live, we may meet again.) 
This usage carries the connotation that one's life is of uncertain 
duration. It refers not to time as such, but to one's existence in 
time. Other usages make this clear: seumur hidup is 'the duration of 
one's life', and panjang umur is 'the length of one's life'. One's 
umur includes many saat, ketika, and waktu, but is encompassed by 
.!lli!§. 
6 
The word zaman is perhaps in diametrical contrast to !:!!!!!!!• 
Whereas umur refers to one's personal experience of time, zaman refers 
to time as a long, continuous flow that is totally transcendent over 
an individual's life-span. For example, the word is used in the 
phrase akhir zaman 'the end of time'; this usage implies infinity 
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because the end of time itself is an event far removed from the 
present. The word zaman may thus be used to express a relation of 
temporal remoteness from the personal experience of the individual. 
For example, the phrase zaman dahulu kala 'aeons of long ago' refers 
to a very distant past. So when the term ~ is applied to certain 
social events, it implies that these events are removed from immediate 
experience. Such usage may be translated as 'era'. One can even 
speak of zaman sekarang 'the current era'; this usage implies that the 
speaker is taking the stance of a disinterested observer and not that 
of an interested participant. 
Of the six words discussed above, zaman is the one that denotes 
the most sociocentric relationship between time and human existence. 
A zaman is Other-given, not Self-derived. What McKinley (1979:313) 
says about zaman and masa in the context of his research is relevant 
to our discussion: 
If, in everyday understanding, a masa is a way of knowing, 
lifted out from the events and structures of political life, 
then a zaman, or religious age, is a way of knowing which 
can encompass these same events and structures. Since it 
refers directly to the religious views predominant at a 
given time, the ~ starts as a way of knowing and is 
imposed on the rest of history. It is the epistemological 
age par excellence. Though less immediate than the 
political masa, the religious or philosophical ~ has 
greater magnitude. 
Unlike McKinley's informants in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, my 
informants in Riau, Indonesia, do not use the word ~ to denote a 
religious age, while reserving the word masa to denote a political 
epoch. However, the contrast that McKinley draws between greater 
immediacy in the case of masa and greater magnitude in the case of 
zaman does seem to apply. To my informants, zaman seems to be a more 
objectively marked era, whereas masa seems to be a more subjectively 
experienced period. 
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So if an informant were to say, masa sultan masih ada di Riau 
'when the sultan was still in Riau', she or he would be referring to 
an event that occurred within immediate experience. On the other 
hand, if she or he were to mention zaman sultan 'the era of the 
sultan', the reference would be to an era that extends backward in 
time, beyond one's immediate span of experience. It is even possible 
for my younger informants to speak of masa sultan from the point of 
view of, say, their grandparents. Through projection, they can extend 
the usage of the term ~ beyond their own immediate experience. 
Nevertheless, there is a discernible difference between a more 
sociocentrically given zaman sultan on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, a more egocentrically experienced masa sultan, even if the 
experiencing ego is not the speaker's own self, but the projected self 
of a temporal predecessor. 
So in my informants' usage, the words zaman and ~ can be 
attached to the same phenomena -- for example, sultan, Belanda, 
Jepang. The difference lies in the relationship between these 
temporal events and the experiencing ego in the way described above. 
There is, however, one notable exception: While my informants do talk 
of a zaman Indonesia, they do not seem ever to refer to a ~ 
Indonesia. Instead, there are only masa Revolusi 'during the period 
of the Revolution', masa Konfrontasi 'during the period of the 
Confrontation', masa 'G30S' 'during the period of the attempted coup 
of 30th September 1965', and so on. These particular~ refer to 
events that were experienced by my informants themselves. 
Their omission of a masa Indonesia may be explained in terms of 
the semantics of zaman and masa. As stated above, ~ seems to 
denote the sociocentric marking off of eras of time, whereas ~ 
seems to denote the egocentric locating of oneself in a period of 
time. This aspect of my informants' usage seems to agree with that of 
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McKinley's informants. As he notes (1979:309,313), ~are 
'intersections of biography and history', whereas zamans 'are only 
indirectly linked with the individual's place in history'. He regards 
both as epistemological ages: 
My point ••• is that the different eras and periods ••• are not 
strictly a matter of historical time in a linear sense. 
Rather, like the eras of myths and like religious beliefs 
themselves, these historic ages represent different ways of 
knowing what is possible in human affairs. They are 
epistemological ages. Moreover, the assumptions they 
contain regarding human knowing and acting are part of the 
present. They remain permanently available and access to 
them is conditioned by current contexts of religion, social 
relations, and art. 
(Ibid.:306). 
I would agree that what is at issue is not merely the calendrical 
computation of time, but rather, ways of 'knowing what is possible in 
human affairs'. Hence to talk of the present as a zaman, like the 
other zamans of the past, is to articulate a particular way of knowing 
the present. Since zaman denotes sociocentric time that is remote 
from immediate experience, the implication is that zaman Indonesia is 
as remote from one's immediate experience as the other bygone zamans. 
One thus distances oneself from the present by relativing it vis-a-vis 
the not-present. The present is thereby contextualised and hence 
defined by the past. 
NOTES TO APPENDIX 3 
1. According to Wilkinson (1959:993) the word ~ is of Arabic 
derivation, and is used 
with special reference to auspicious or inauspicious 
times: al-saat (the Fateful Hour; the hour of judgement); 
saat yang nahas (inauspicious time); saat yang sempurna 
(most favourable hour), •••. 
Saat thus refers to time as a collection of brief moments, some 
auspicious, others inauspicious, from which to pick and choose. 
This further implies an egocentric relation between human 
existence and time, such that the individual is interested in 
time merely for the purpose of the moment. 
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2. According to Wilkinson (1959:587), the word ketika is of 
Sanskritic derivation. Like saat, ketika also carries connotation 
of time as auspicious or inauspicious. But it refers to lucky or 
unlucky phases, which are perhaps comparable to English notions of 
'a winning streak' or 'a run of bad luck'. The term ketika seems 
to be used especially in divination. Technical terms in 
divination include ketika lima 'the phase of five', ketika tujuh 
'the phase of seven', ketika langkah 'the phase of approach' 
(ibid.). The implication is that through divination, individual 
purpose can fit the momentum of time. Ketika is thus less 
egocentrically defined than saat. 
3. According to Wilkinson (1959:1277), the word waktu is of Arabic 
derivation, with the meaning of 'appointed ti;;;-:- See note 20 to 
Chapter Six on the appointed prayer times. 
4. According to Wilkinson (1959:745) the word masa is of Arabic 
derivation, with the root meaning of 'month-,-.~ 
5. · According to Wilkinson (1959:1256), the word umur is of Arabic 
derivation, with the meaning of 'age' or 'duration of life'. 
6. According to Wilkinson (1959:1290), the word zaman is of Arabic 
derivation, with the root meaning of 'space of time, long or 
short'. 
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APPENDIX 4 
ZAMAN BATIN: PREHISTORIC CONDITIONS 
In my informants' discourse, the term zaman batin may be 
understood as ref erring to an era of uncentralised power that preceded 
the formation of kingdoms. Indeed archaeological evidence indicates 
that Indianised principalities did not emerge in Southeast Asia until 
the second century. (See Mabbett1977b:l43.) Prior to that, there 
were evidently only local groups living in self-sufficient units with 
minimal political organisation. (See Mabbett1977a:3.) For the 
Sumatran region, archaeological evidence indicates that the seventh 
century A.D. is the earliest dating for the emergence of a centralised 
polity -- namely, the kingdom of Srivijaya, with its political centre 
located in south-eastern Sumatra in the Palembang area. (See Bronson 
1979:398-402.) Riau was possibly one part of this Srivijayan empire. 
(See Wolters 1970:9.) 
So prior to the seventh century A.D., the social situation in 
Riau was possibly characterised by the existence of local groups 
living in self-sufficient units with minimal political organisation. 
If the term zaman batin carries the connotation of being the inward-
looking era, then we may perhaps use it to label this prior situation 
of indigenous localism. To construct a plausible description of this 
earlier era, we shall have to draw on more general research done in 
the Malay Peninsula, in Sumatra and island Southeast Asia as a whole, 
there being a paucity of archaeological research on the prehistory of 
the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands. 
Benjamin (1983:19-20) characterises the prehistoric situation on 
the Malay Peninsula thus: 
The picture that thus emerges of early Malayan society, is 
of a series of demographically relatively stable populations 
having available to them a variety of subsistence modes, 
each of which could be followed integrally or partially 
without in any way disturbing the subsistence activities of 
neighbouring populations. Moreover, with no pressure to 
develop trade-based complementarity between populations nor 
occupation-based complementarity (such as between herdsman 
and farmer) within populations, the degree of social 
complexity -- the division of labour -- would have remained 
virtually unchanged from what it had been in Paleolithic 
times, when the only subsistence mode was hunting and 
gathering. 
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As pointed out in Chapter Two, in the Riau archipelago, there are 
only a few islands large enough to have substantial forests. In the 
case of the smaller islands which constitute the majority, the greater 
part of their land-area is coastal. In other words, the smaller 
islands are very largely strand. So for the Paleolithic hunters-
gatherers in this archipelago, marine resources would have been more 
important than land resources. 
Such ecological conditions would have supported only a sparsely 
scattered, non-sedentary population. This would have consisted of 
small communities, each specialised in the utilisation of particular 
local resources in what Sopher (1977:46) terms 'an extensive and 
1 
diversified world of islands'. I use the term 'non-sedentary' rather 
than 'nomadic', because the kind of population movement involved may 
have been more of island-hopping in a cluster of small islands, rather 
than long-distance sea voyages. This would have been the case 
particularly during the earlier Paleolithic when seafaring technology 
was limited. 
But how did the island populations get there in the first place? 
In this context, the conjectural prehistory outlined by Dunn and Dunn 
(1984:264-267) is of relevance. Between 22,000 and 18,000 BP, the sea 
level was low and the land masses were merged into one large 
Sundaland. At this time, seafaring technology was limited at best, 
629 
including perhaps rafting only. Open sea or coastwise travel was 
infrequent. And navigational skills were very little developed. The 
coastal subsistence zones were relatively small, defined by the limits 
of foot travel rather than travel by water. The exploitation of 
marine resources was probably limited to intertidal and shallow 
subtidal waters, involving primarily techniques of food-gathering. 
Marine fishing technology and skills were simple and limited. 
At about 9,000 BP, the sea levels rose to within 10 - 15 metres 
of the modern level, thereby submerging most of the shelf, and 
reducing the Sundaic land surface area. Under these ecological 
conditions, the population density perhaps doubled, because a slightly 
enlarged population now occupied a land mass only 57 per cent as large 
as that of the earlier period. The subsistence zones were not as 
widely dispersed as before, and a substantial proportion of the 
population subsisted in the coastal areas, as a consequence of the 
disappearance of vast areas of non-coastal lowland, together with a 
near-doubling of coastline length. Seafaring became more developed, 
including probably boats as well as rafts. Some coastwise travel and 
reef exploration became possible, as well as visits to mangrove, 
swampy, and riverine habitats with the aid of small craft. But open 
sea voyaging was probably still limited, both by technology and by 
lack of navigational skills. 
In a broad cultural evolutionary sense the terminal 
Pleistocene adaptive threshold associated with flooding of 
the Sunda shelf, contraction and dissection of the land 
masses, and lengthening of the coast-lines may have served 
as a stimulus (although certainly not the only one) to the 
development of more effective seafaring. 
(Ibid.:266). 
The exploitation of marine resources now included bolder exploration 
of off-shore reefs and neritic waters. Many subsistence zones were 
probably enlarged by coastwise boat travel. And marine fishing skills 
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improved as boating skills opened new habitats to exploitation. 
At about 5,000 BP, the sea level reached the modern level, and 
the Sundaic land surf ace areas and coastlines were roughly the same as 
those of today. Population conditions remained stable. The major 
difference with the earlier period was the development of truly 
'effective' and 'competent' seafaring, with advances in boat 
technology and navigational arts permitting controlled (rather than 
'accidental') open sea voyaging. 
An important consequence of more effective seafaring was the 
extension of marine exploitation out to sea. Undoubtedly 
this outreach served to stimulate further improvement in 
marine fishing technology and in techniques for exploitation 
of deep benthic and nektobenthic species, and of pelagic 
species in deep neritic and oceanic waters. 
(Ibid.:267). 
In the context of such a scenario, it would seem plausible to 
suggest that the various small island communities did not migrate from 
some unchanging mainland, but rather, that they were the descendants 
of former lowland populations who were stranded as a result of the 
dissection of the land masses by rising sea levels. This implies that 
the predominantly maritime way of life, characteristic of an island 
population, was an adaptation that evolved in response to the profound 
environmental changes which had engendered the emergence of these very 
islands themselves. 
Interestingly, my informants say that the nomadic land-dwelling 
orang hutan 'forest people' are the most asli 'indigenous' of the 
inhabitants in Riau, apparently even more so than the boat-dwelling 
orang laut. In the light of the discussion above, this statement may 
be interpreted to mean that boat-dwelling nomadism was a secondary 
development out of an original land-dwelling nomadism. Based on the 
dates proposed by Dunn and Dunn, one can speculate that boat-dwelling 
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nomadism did not emerge as a feasible way of life until 5,000 B.P., 
with the development of effective and competent seafaring. 
The date.of 5,000 B.P. is significant indeed, for it tallies with 
other sources of information on the prehistory of the region. Based 
on glottochronological calculations of linguistic change in the Mon-
Khmer languages of the Malay Peninsula, Benjamin (1976b:83; 1985:18) 
suggests a date of between 4,900 BP and 4,470 BP for 'the advent of 
Austronesian(?) mariners from the south' to the Malay Peninsula. What 
is significant in the context of our discussion is that the area 
immediately south of the Malay Peninsula is none other than the Riau-
Lingga archipelago. 
So the implication we may draw is that the advancement of 
maritime technology on the part of the islanders at about 5,000 BP 
enabled them to extend their subsistence zone beyond their immediate 
locality to include the Malay Peninsula. I would further suggest that 
as a result, the islanders became even more specialised towards 
maritime adaptation, to the extent of totally abandoning the marginal 
land resources of the small islands. One may thus speculate whether 
it was at this time that a nomadic boat-dwelling way of life first 
became viable and sufficiently attractive, and that from then on until 
the rise of centralised polities, this became the dominant way of life 
in the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands. 
NOTE TO APPENDIX 4 
1. Sopher's characterisation (1977:45-46) of this situation is 
relevant to our discussion: 
In evaluating the strand as a habitat of primitive man, 
the special characteristics of small islands should be 
considered. These small islands are different from the 
coastal areas of large islands and the continental 
mainland in several ways that are significant for people 
of simple cultures. 
The terrestrial fauna and flora of such islands are 
characterised by very much less variety than is the case 
within an area of comparable size on the mainland, the 
number of animal species, in particular, usually 
decreasing with greater distance between island and 
mainland coast. The biotic strand forms!of the mainland, 
adapted to their special environment and of ten depending 
on the sea for transport, would, on the other hand, be 
well represented, depending on the particular geomorphic 
character of the island and its shores •••• 
Secondly, depending in part on the lithology of the 
particular island and the seasonal distribution of 
rainfall, the small surface area might often be 
inadequate to collect and retain enough rainwater, so 
that people would find it difficult to remain there for 
long periods •••• 
Finally, the small island or the archipelagic cluster of 
small islands, accessible only by sea, will usually 
constitute the Lebensraum of a single group, undisturbed 
by conflicting cultural attitudes and economic interests, 
and separated by the sea from other groups •••• 
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APPENDIX 5 
THE DUTCH PRESENCE IN RIAU (1784-1857) 
To date earlier Dutch presence, 1641 would seem to be a 
significant year, for it was then that the Dutch conquered Melaka from 
the Portuguese. During the time the Dutch were in Melaka, they 
considered Riau a trade rival. Matters came to a head in 1784, when 
war broke out between the Dutch in Melaka and the Bugis rajas in Riau. 
The Dutch attacked Riau but were beaten back. In retaliation, the 
Riau forces attacked Melaka, under the leadership of the Bugis yamtuan 
muda Raja Haji, who subsequently died in battle. The Riau forces 
retreated, pursued by a Dutch squadron. In the ensuing battle, the 
Bugis were driven away from Riau, leaving only the sultan and his 
followers. (For further details of these historical events, see 
Matheson and Andaya 1982:365-370, Netscher 1870:179ff, Papendracht 
1924.) 
The Dutch took possession of Tanjung Pinang on 1 November 
1784 and Sultan Mahmud [III] then signed an eight-clause 
treaty of capitulation. The following day a twenty-six 
clause contrast was signed with the VOC. Its main points 
were that the Sultan held his territory as a fief of the 
voe, that he could not make decisions without consulting his 
four Malay ministers, that a Dutch garrison be established 
at Tanjung Pinang and that never again would a Bugis be 
appointed as Yang Dipertuan Muda. 
(Matheson and Andaya 1982:370; also see Surat-Surat 1970:3-
31.) 
On 19 June 1785, the first Dutch Resident took up office. So by 
the late eighteenth century, the kingdom was effectively colonised. 
However, certain events occurred, which allowed the colonial yoke to 
be thrown off. In May 1787, the sultan called in Ilanun pirates from 
the Philippines to attack the Dutch at Tanjung Pinang. The Dutch were 
defeated; so they retreated to Melaka. (See Netscher 1870:212-215.) 
Fearing Dutch retaliation, the sultan and his entire court then moved 
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from Riau to Lingga. Indeed, by December 1787, the Dutch were back in 
Riau. But they found the place deserted and was faced with 'the task 
of repopulating the area, encouraging Chinese settlement, and re-
establishing trade' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:373). 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Dutch held held on to Riau only 
until 1795, when all their Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia were 
handed over to the British for safekeeping, to prevent them from 
falling under the control of Napoleonic France which had conquered the 
Netherlands. The British then gave Riau back to Sultan Mahmud III who 
was still in Lingga. In 1815, after the Napoleonic Wars, the 
Netherlands became independent of the French. In 1818, the Dutch re-
negotiated a new contract with the sultan: 
The main points were that Riau-Lingga would be protected by 
Batavia; that there would be a Dutch Resident and garrison; 
all Riau-Lingga ships would carry passes to be issued by the 
Resident; Riau and Lingga were to be the only 'free ports' 
in the area; the only European ships allowed elsewhere were 
to be Dutch •••• 
(Matheson and Andaya 1982:386). 
This contract made the British anxious about their position in 
Southeast Asia and precipitated their establishment of a trading 
factory on Singapore island in 1819, which was then under the control 
of the Riau-Lingga temenggung 'local minister'. By supporting and 
installing one of the two brothers who were then contending for the 
throne of sultan, the British were able to sign a treaty with an 
indigenous government of their own making. The rivalry between the 
Dutch and the British in Southeast Asia was on. 
From this point the Dutch assumed greater control over 
Riau's government, not only building a fort at Tanjung 
Pinang but also taking over the distribution of Riau 
revenues, claiming that the Raja Muda was oppressing the 
people. 
(Ibid.:387; also see Netscher 1870:259-262). 
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This evidently caused so much bad feeling between the Dutch and 
the Bugis, that in December 1819 and January 1820, fighting broke out 
between the two factions in Tanjungpinang. (See Raja Ali Haji 
1982:230-231; Matheson and Andaya 1982:387.) The Bugis were defeated; 
the survivors of the battle fled to Singapore. Apparently, most of 
the Bugis aristocrats who were then living on the island of Penyengat 
were also prepared to flee to Singapore. Among them was Engku Puteri 
Raja Hamidah, wife of Sultan Mahmud III: 
She was at this time in possession of the Johor regalia, 
necessary for the installation of a legitimate successor to 
Sultan Mahmud. It was in the interests of both Dutch and 
Bugis leaders that she did not leave Riau. According to 
Engku Sayid's own account, not only Engku Puteri but all the 
Bugis inhabitants of Penyengat had made ready to sail to 
Singapore, fearing reprisals for Arung Belawah's rebellion. 
Engku Sayid informed the Dutch and it was later he and Raja 
Ahmad, using an unloaded pistol, who was responsible for 
persuading Engku Puteri and the other Bugis to return. 
(Matheson and Andaya 1982:387; also see Surat-Surat 1970: 
310-312). 
The rivalry between British and Dutch thus became tied to the 
rivalry between two factions within the sultanate -- that is, 
respectively, the temenggung's faction on the one hand, and the Bugis 
yamtuan muda's faction on the other. At the crucial moment, when the 
conflict between Bugis and Dutch in Riau threatened to throw the 
advantage over to the temenggung's faction in Singapore, by giving 
them the royal regalia necessary for legitimate succession, some 
members of the yamtuan muda's faction chose to side with the Dutch, 
their erstwhile enemy. 
Subsequently, in 1824, in order to control their escalating 
rivalry, the British and the Dutch agreed between themselves to 
demarcate their respective spheres of influence. As pointed out in 
Chapter Two, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty that was signed in London had a 
significant effect on the political reality of Riau. The yamtuan 
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muda's faction was evidently in favour of this treaty, for it 
transferred the southern part of the temenggung's dominion to Bugis 
control. 
The collusion between Dutch and Bugis interests was expressed 
most clearly in 1857, when they jointly decided to depose the then 
reigning Sultan Mahmud IV, and install his father's brother, Sulaiman, 
in his stead. (See Appendix 7.) 
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APPENDIX 6 
MAS KAWIN IN PERAK, NEGRI SEMBILAN AND MELAKA 
Hooker's (1976:30) description of the Malaysian practice of mas 
kawin shows that the situation in Riau is not unique: 
Mas kahwin ••• is ••• either paid to the bride herself or 
deferred and paid on divorce or on the death of the husband. 
The mas kahwin is ordinarily paid by the husband or his 
representative to the wife or her representative in the 
presence of the person solemnising the marriage and at least 
two witnesses. This is an express enactment of the law of 
Islam, for the mahr is an essential part of the marriage 
contract •••• Although the mahr in Islamic law may be 
anything that may legally be sold, Malay custom has fixed 
this mahr or mas kawin in the form of money. It is only 
with the wife's consent that a husband may substitute 
articles for money. If articles are given they cannot be 
regarded as part of the mas kahwin in the absence of proof 
of such consent, and the burden of proof is on the husband. 
Under the Shafi'i school of law there is no fixed legal 
minimum for the mahr. However, under Malay adat the amount 
of the mas kahwin is fixed. The amount varies in each state 
of West Malaysia, and normally depends on the rank of the 
bride's father. In Negri Sembilan the traditional amount of 
the mas kahwin is 20 dollars. In Perak the amount varies 
with the status of the father of the bride, ranging from 50 
dollars for the daughter of a commoner to 1,000 dollars for 
the daughter of the ruler. In Naning and Alor Gajah in 
Melaka the mas kahwin is fixed at 60 dollars for an 
unmarried woman and 40 dollars for a previously married 
woman. 
Hooker mentions three examples of Malaysian states with different 
specified amounts of mas kawin -- Perak, Negri Sembilan, and Melaka. 
Let us consider those three examples in the light of our discussion on 
mas kawin in Riau. Of the three, only Perak is a sultanate 
historically derived from the old Melaka sultanate which fell to the 
Portuguese in 1511. The Perak sultanate and the Johor-Riau sultanate 
thus have a common antecedent. Indeed, it seems that the first rulers 
1 
of Perak and Johor were both sons of the last sultan of Melaka. 
Historical evidence indicates that the establishment of an 
administrative hierarchy was one of the major achievements of the 
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Melaka sultanate. (See Zainal Abidin 1983; Muhammad Yusoff Hashim 
1983.) So by implication, the linkage between derajat and mas kawin 
2 
-- was first instituted in the old Melaka sultanate. It is thus 
significant that in Perak, there seems to be an institutionalised 
linkage between derajat and mas kawin, as there is in Riau. However, 
the amounts specified are different: for example, in Riau, the largest 
amount is 400 ringgit for a raja or tengku, whereas in Perak, the 
largest amount is 1000; and in Riau, the amount for a commoner ranges 
from 101 to 22 ringgit, whereas in Perak, the amount seems to be fixed 
at 50. Nevertheless, within the specific context of each, the amount 
specified does depend on the bride's rank in the hierarchy. 
The linkage between derajat and mas kawin does not seem to be 
found in Negri Sembilan or in present-day Melaka. This absence is 
significant. The Negri Sembilan confederacy was established in 1773, 
and comprised the Minangkabau rantau 'areas of migrant settlement' on 
the Malay Peninsula. As is well-known, the Minangkabau in Sumatra 
have a matrilineal kinship system; so indeed do the people of Negri 
3 
Sembilan. (See, for example, de Jong 1951.) In such a matrilineally 
organised society, there would be no need to contract the bride into 
not transmitting derajat to her child. In fact, quite the contrary 
would be desired. Moreover, there is a Minangkabau insistence on 
negari 'democracy', there being no ranking in the Minangkabau 
highlands, and only a rudimentary hierarchy in the Padang lowlands. 
(See ibid.) Therefore, it is not surprising that in Negri Sembilan, 
there is no linkage between derajat and mas kawin, and a flat rate of 
20 dollars is specified for everyone. That the mas kawin is still 
paid at all may be explained simply as a fulfilment of the 
requirements of Islamic law. 
As for present-day Melaka, the situation may be understood as the 
result of historical discontinuities brought about by the Portuguese 
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conquest in 1511, the Dutch conquest in 1641, the British take-over 
from 1795 to 1815, reversion to the Dutch from 1815 to 1824, then the 
British re-take-over from 1824 until the Second World War. In other 
words, there has not been a sultanate at Melaka since 1511. Perhaps 
because of its long history of European control, particularly under 
the Roman Catholic Portuguese, the relevant issue in mas kawin seems 
to be the virginity of the female. Consequently, the mas kawin for an 
unmarried woman is 60 dollars, whereas for a previously married woman 
it is only 40 dollars. 
These examples thus provide circumstantial evidence confirming 
that in Riau, the mas kawin should indeed be understood in terms of 
its linkage to derajat. 
1. 
NOTE TO APPENDIX 6 
Sultan Muzaffar Syah, the first ruler of ••• Perak, was a 
son of Sultan Mahmud Syah, the last ruler of Melaka. 
Muzaffar had been designated Raja Muda, or Heir Apparent, 
by his father in Melaka, but in later years the latter 
had favoured a younger son of another wife whom he 
accorded the title Sultan Muda. This Sultan Muda then 
succeeded his father and became Sultan Alauddin Riayat 
Syah, the first ruler of Johor •••• The reign of Sultan 
Muzaffar Syah (1528?-1549?) brought to Perak not only 
members of the Melaka court, but also its customs and 
traditions •••• And Sultan Muzaffar and his son Mansur 
are credited with creating a hierarchy of chiefs of 
varying ranks of the whole kingdom, generally reflecting 
that which had existed in Melaka. 
(Andaya and Andaya 1982:59-60). 
2. Dating the hierarchy back to the old Melaka Sultanate (c.1400-
1511) would fit in quite well with the dating of the Spanish 
silver dollars. There is a description of the Melaka hierarchy 
in the Penurunan. 
3. Benjamin (1980:26-27) has argued that the overseas Minangkabau 
were able to 'form a segmentary matrilineal society only in Negri 
Sembilan', and not in other rantau areas, because the male 
Minangkabau settlers met with and married the already 
matrifiliatively biased indigenes of Negri Sembilan -- the 
Temuan, as they are called today. 
The earliest Minangkabau settlers ••• , by marrying 
'Biduanda' (i.e. Temuan) women, were enabled not only to 
lay claim to land but also to set up a matrilineal system 
of land ownership (which would otherwise have been 
meaningless). 
(Benjamin 1980:27). 
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APPENDIX 7 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON THE DEPOSITION OF SULTAN MAHMUD IV 
According to Tengku Ahmad (1972:22), Sultan Mahmud IV was deposed 
of by the Dutch for the following reasons: 
THE SULTAN WHO WAS DETHRONED BY THE DUTCH. Sultan Mahmud 
Muzaf far Syah who was installed when his father was still 
alive was a sultan who was considered as an enfant terrible 
for the government of the Dutch Indies. He would always 
leave the country without notifying the Resident and he had 
no respect for the representatives of the Dutch government. 
This was reported to the highest authorities in Batavia. 
Probably the sultan was attracted to the British form of 
administration as he displayed great interest in this 
administrative form in Singapore which was then under 
British influence. The Dutch Indies certainly could not 
allow this. On 23 September 1857 (18 Syafar 1274), the 
Dutch Commissioner in Singapore read the official notice of 
dethronement to Sultan Mahmud Muzafar Syah. The Dutch also 
intended to send the sultan to Batavia. Because of this, 
the deposed sultan secretly went to Lingga to gather all the 
treasures he could and took them to Singapore with him. 
From there, he travelled to Pahang, Trengganu and Siam. In 
Siam, one of his sisters by the name of Tengku Syaf iah 
married the Siamese king. 
Although this tie between Riau-Lingga and Siam was a 
personal one, it opened up new opportunities for 
establishing other links. For example, one of the royal 
kinsmen, Tengku Putera (T. Muhammad), received the Star of 
the 'Knight of the White Elephant and the Crown of Siam', 
which he was given permission to wear by the Queen of the 
Netherlands in a letter dated 6 July 1903. 
1 
(My translation). 
In this interpretation, Sultan Mahmud is portrayed as a good 
ruler who was keen on administrative affairs, who did not want to 
submit to the Dutch, and who was consequently dethroned by them. 
A different interpretation of the deposition is given in Raja Ali 
Haji in the Tuhfat (1982:287-288), where Sultan Mahmud is described as 
being un-Islamic: 
••. He joined a Christian religious society called Freemasons 
and became friendly with a Parsee called Cursetjee who was 
not a Muslim ...• He built a residence which was just like 
the home of a white man. He also kept several large 
dogs there and cared for them as would a white man. [One of 
the manuscripts of the Tuhfat adds: 'There is nothing wrong 
with having a European house as long as this does not entail 
a change in religion.' (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:405.)] 
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But the reasons for Sultan Mahmud's deposition seem to lie deeper 
than his suppposedly un-Islamic behaviour. According to Matheson and 
Andaya (1982:401): 
In 1857 the [Penyengat] nobles listed three reasons for 
their opposition to Sultan Mahmud; he had defied the Dutch 
government and ignored Article 3 of the 1830 treaty, which 
made Riau a vassal state within the Netherlands Indies; he 
had consistently refused to take advice and had failed to 
observe the Malay-Bugis oath of loyalty; he ignored all 
Islamic injunctions, going so far as to marry a wife of his 
deceased father (i.e., his stepmother) in 1842. This had 
never been reported to the Government because, the nobles 
said, they were afraid of trouble •••. However, his attempt 
to have the position of Yang Dipertuan Muda abolished ••• was 
probably the deciding issue. 
After his deposition, Sultan Mahmud wandered about the Malay 
Peninsula, trying to look for another throne. As Matheson (1972:125) 
has put it, 
Deprived of the Sultanate, he was forced to find a niche for 
his royal authority elsewhere. Mahmud did not cease to 
exist as a Sultan merely because the Dutch had withdrawn 
their recognition of his position. In Malay tradition 
nothing could rob him of a social status which was his by 
birth and he remained a powerful figure. Despite extreme 
Dutch, and later British, opposition, this Sultan of an 
isolated and dismembered kingdom managed to extend his 
influence and activities throughout the east coast of Malaya 
and ultimately to Bangkok. 
1. 
NOTE TO APPENDIX 7 
SULTAN YANG DIPECAT BELANDA. Sultan Mahmud Muzaffar Syah 
yang pengangkatannya dilakukan ketika ayahnya masih hidup 
ialah seorang Sultan kerajaan Lingga Riau yang merupakan 
seorang enfant terrible bagi pemerintah Hindia Belanda. 
Beliau selalu bepergian tanpa memberitahu lebih dahulu 
kepada Resident dan sangat kurang_menghormati wakil 
pemerintah Belanda itu. Hal tersebut dilaporkan kepada 
penguasa tertinggi Belanda di Betawi (Batavia). Mungkin 
sekali Sultan ini tertarik kepada tata-cara pentabiran 
yang berada di bawah pengaruh ~_nggeris sebab di Singapura 
beliau memperlihatkan minat yang besar kepada tata-cara 
tersebut. Ini tentu saja tidak boleh dibiarkan oleh 
pemerintah Hindia Belanda. Dan pada tanggal 23 September 
1857 (18 Syafar 1274) hari naas itupun tiba bagi Sultan 
Mahmud Muzafar Syah dibacakan oleh Komisaris Belanda di 
Singapura resmilah pemcatan Sultan itu. Belanda juga 
bermaksud mengirim Sultan itu ke Betawi. Karena itulah 
Sultan yang sudah dipecat itu secara sembunyi-sembunyi 
kembali ke Lingga mengambil harta kekayaanya yang dapat 
diselamatkan dan membawanya ke Singapura. Dari situ 
beliau pergi ke Pahang, Terengganu dan Siam. Dinegeri 
Siam itulah seorang saudara perempuannya yang bernama 
Tengku Syafiah kawin dengan raja negeri itu. 
Hubungan yang sudah ada antara kerajaan Riau-Lingga 
dengan kerajaan Siam inilah - walaupun secara peribadi -
yang membuka jalan untuk hubungan-hubungan lainnya 
sehingga salah seorang kerabat diraja iaitu Tengku Putera 
(T. Muhammad) menerima bintang "Knight of the White 
Elephant and de Crown of Si?m" yang izin pemakaiannya 
diberikan oleh Ratu Nederland dalam suratnya bertanggal 6 
Julai 1903. 
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APPENDIX 8 
THE RELIGIOSITY OF THE POST-1804 YAMTUAN MUDAS, 
AS DESCRIBED IN THE TUHFAT AL-NAFIS 
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The fifth yamtuan muda, Raja Ali (re-installed 1804, died 1805) 
studied religion and fulfilled devotional obligations. 'His teacher 
was a man from Madura, named Sheikh, Abd al-Ghafut, of the 
Khalwatiyyah order (that is, the Sammaniyyah) ••• ' (Raja Ali Haji 
1982:212; also see Matheson and Andaya 1982:382.) 
The sixth yamtuan muda, Raja Jafar (installed 1805, died 1831), 
was ••• very fond of the Lord Sayids, both those from Arabia 
and those born locally •••• He liked religious scholars and 
was dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. He read books in 
Malay like .the Fundamentals of Religion and the Mir 'at al-
Tullab with his teacher, Haji Abd al-Wahab, a prominent 
religious scholar of the time. He also enjoyed listening to 
the Lord Sayids relating stories of kings of olden times ••• , 
and he welcomed people who excelled in the recitation of the 
Koran. If a skilled Koran reader came to Riau he was 
invited to stay for two or three months to recite, and the 
Yang Dipertuan Muda ordered his sons and officials to study 
with him. When the recitation had been completed, the Koran 
reader would be given hundreds of dollars. Furthermore, the 
Yang Dipertuan was not above asking for things from those 
who were below him, or from the young. He even questioned 
children about the law, what was invalid, what was 
permissible, what was forbidden. 
(Raja Ali Haji 1982:221). 
The seventh yamtuan muda, Raja Abd al-Rahaman (installed 1831, 
died 1844), had a brother Raja Abdullah, who went on the haj. The 
yamtuan muda himself pursued 
doctrinal studies with learned men, such as those he had 
made his teachers. He enjoyed the company of scholars and 
Lord Sayids like Habib Sheikh Syakaf, Sayid Hasan al-Hadad, 
and hajis such as Lord Kiai Beranjang, Haji Syahab al-Din, 
the Bugis Haji Abu Bakar, Sheikh Ahmad Jibrati, and others, 
particularly his relative Raja Ali Haji. He was inseparable 
from them day and night, questioning them about those laws 
which had been classified as religious laws, as well as 
other matters. He helped each of them with as much money as 
he could, and as was appropriate. 
(Ibid.:279). 
The eighth yamtuan muda, Raja Ali (installed 1845, died 
1857), 
met a learned man from Banjar, Haji Ramin, whom ••• he now 
brought back with him and to whom he paid an allowance. The 
Yang Dipertuan Muda revered the wise Lord Haji and would not 
walk in front of him. He never missed the Friday prayers, 
remaining humble before Muslim scholars •••• In the same 
spirit he was not comfortable sitting on a chair ..• if Lord 
Sayids were present ..•• During his reign he upheld the 
Islamic faith, attending the mosque on Fridays and ordering 
women to be veiled. He completed the construction of the 
mosque, left unfinished because of the death of Yang 
Dipertuan Muda Raja Abd al-Rahman and later had a bridge 
constructed of wood and stone, so that the faithful could 
walk there in comfort when the tide was out. 
In the time of Yang Dipertuan Raja Ali, many religious 
scholars came •.•• He paid their expenses and order all 
state officials to study religion, recite religious books, 
and improve their recitation of the glorious Koran. He 
himself loved the quest for knowledge. His cousin, Raja Ali 
Haji, selected several learned men, like Sayid Abdullah of 
Bahrain and others, to settle on Penyengat and teach for a 
year. When they left they were given 400 to 500 dollars. 
Yang Dipertuan Muda Ali prohibited the wearing of gold or 
silk; he exiled all miscreants and would no longer tolerate 
pastimes like gambling or cock fighting which were 
forbidden •..• Furthermore, Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali 
abhorred those who indulged in pleasures which led to loose 
behaviour between men and women .... All this was done 
because he benefited from the company of learned men, liked 
to hear their moral instruction and advice, and took 
pleasure in listening to moralising work •••• The Yang 
Dipertuan Muda entered the Naksyabandiyyah brotherhod and 
all the princes of Penyengat studied mysticism. They 
recited the Khatam tawajuh each Friday and Tuesday, and 
daily prayed as a community. 
(Ibid.: 283-284). 
According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:403), 
the Dutch mentioned the strict manner in which 
behaviour between the sexes was controlled. A women 
who had allowed a youth into her home in her husband's 
absence was summarily found guilty of adultery and put 
to death by strangulation the following day, despite 
appeals from her husband and family. 
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The ninth yamtuan muda, Raja Abdullah (installed 1857, died 
1858), went on the haj. In Riau he 
performed all the devotions and recitations of the 
Naksyabandiyyah, and it was he who became leader of the 
brotherhood on Riau. 
(Raj Ali Haji 1982:285). 
Every Tuesday and Friday he said the weekly liturgy, and 
pursued his studies in the audience hall ..•• The books he 
used were about law, concerning what was proven, not proven, 
permitted or forbidden, and from the book The Revitalisation 
of the Religious Sciences he read the three sections which 
deal with social customs, social behaviour and those human 
qualities which lead to perdition. He upheld the Friday 
prayers, sometimes reading the sermon himself and sometimes 
acting as a leader for the congregation. 
(Ibid.:297-298). 
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The tenth yamtuan muda, Raja Muhamad Yusuf (installed 1857, died 
1899) is not described in the Tuhfat, because his reign occurred after 
the book was almost completed. My informants said that he succeeded 
his predecessor as the Al-Ahmadi Master of the Nashbandiyyah in Riau. 
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APPENDIX 9 
MELAYU MURNI IN RIAU = CONSTITUTIONAL MALAY IN MALAYSIA 
It is significant that the three criteria of 'purity' discussed 
in Chapter Seven are also found in Article 160(2) of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia which states: 
Malay means a person who professes the Muslim religion, 
habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay 
custom and --
(a) was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or born of 
parents one of whom was born in the Federation or is on 
that day domiciled in the Federation; or 
(b) is the issue of such a person. 
The original wording is in English as given above. This 
constitutional definition quite evidently accords with the Riau 
definition of Melayu murni: 
'the Muslim religion' = Islam 
'the Malay language' = bahasa 
'Malay custom' = adat. 
As pointed out by Siddique (1981:77): 
The most striking feature of this constitutional definition 
of Malay is the fact that it makes no mention of race or 
ethnic origin •••• Another feature ••• is the fact that it 
sets a territorial boundary to the definition of Malay 
hence an Indonesian who is Muslim, speaks Malay, and 
observes Malay customs would not be Malay under the 
constitutional definition unless he fulfils the residence 
requirement stipulated in (a) and (b). 
This residence requirement is significantly similar to the toponymic 
identification of Melayu-ness in Riau. 
However, as pointed out by Siddique, ethnic origin is left out of 
the constitutional definition. Thus according to Mohammed Suf f ian 
(1972:247): 
An Indian is a Malay if he professes the Muslim religion, 
habitually speaks Malays and conforms to Malay custom. 
Conversely even a genuine Malay is not a Malay for the 
purpose of the constitution if for instance he does not 
profess the Muslim religion. 
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So the Malaysian constitutional definition of 'Malay' does not include 
those wno my murni informants in Riau might describe as 'Melayu by 
origin but not pure Melayu' (Melayu asli tapi bukan Melayu murni). In 
other words, if the Riau definition of Suku Melayu were to be applied 
in Malaysia, then all those indigenes who neither 'profess Islam', nor 
'speak the Malay language', nor 'conform to Malay custom', would also 
be considered Melayu, albeit 'impure'. In terms of the Malaysian 
constitutional definition, however, the non-'Malay' indigenes of the 
Malay Peninsula are known officially as Orang Asli 'Aborigines'. 
(See, for example, Benjamin 1979 and 1980 on the Orang Asli.) 
Conversely, if the Malaysian constitutional definition of 'Malay' 
were to be applied in Riau, then all the bukan Melayu murni, such as 
the Bintan people and the Galang people, would be excluded from 
'Malay-dom'. Such a definition would convert the gradation of Melayu-
ness ranging from 'impure' to 'pure', as shown in the Guttman 
scalogram in Chapter Seven, to a clear-cut either-or proposition of 
inclusion versus exclusion. In other words, the Malaysian 
constitutional definition has no room for the 'impure Melayu'; only 
the Melayu murni would qualify as 'Malay'. 
The Malaysian constitutional definition of 'Malayness' is hence 
not gradated but disjunctive. Disjunction is called for when there is 
an attempt to mark out a certain domain from the rest of the world, so 
as to keep the insiders in and the outsiders out. But such 
disjunction is not necessarily initiated only by the insiders; it may 
also be imposed by outsiders who wish to contain the insiders. A 
comment by Benjamin (1980:47) is relevant to our discussion: 
Professor Wang Gungwu has suggested to me that the addition 
of Islam to the defining features of Malayness resulted from 
the Treaty of Pangkor, drawn up between the Sultan of Perak 
and the British in 1874. This rather one-sided 'agreement', 
which effectively stripped the Sultan of all his powers 
except that of administering Islam in his state, led to the 
definition of the Malays -- the Sultan's subjects -- as 
those people who followed Malay custom, spoke the Malay 
language, and acknowledged themselves to be Muslims. Other 
Peninsular state constitutions later took this definition of 
'Malay' as a model, as eventually did the Malaysian 
Constitution. The new element was Islam. Previously there 
would have been no legal necessity to define 'Malay' at all, 
and many of the non-Muslim populations of the time were as 
'Malay' as the Muslims. The post-1874 notion of Malayness, 
however, had the effect of converting those populations, 
virtually overnight, into the 'Aborigines' they are 
considered to be today. 
649 
It thus appears that the nineteenth-century British colonisers 
imposed a legal disjunction between 'Malay' and 'non-Malay' in order 
to contain the powers of the Sultan of Perak. If our understanding of 
the present situation in Riau may be applied as a clue to the past, it 
would seem that by dis-enfranchising the peripheral sector of the 
indigenous population from 'Malay-dom', the British colonisers 
effectively cut off the power base of the Sultan. The centripetal 
orientation of those at the periphery is essential to centrality as 
such: without the periphery, there is no centre. The British thus de-
centralised the indigenous rulers by isolating them from their 
periphery. 
While we may understand why the British colonisers should use 
this means of containment, it may seem strange, at first sight, that 
the Malaysian government should want to maintain a colonially derived 
disjunction in the constitutional definition of 'Malayness'. The 
answer to this puzzle is suggested by Siddique and Suryadinata 
(1982:668-669): 
Malay nationalism in prewar British Malaya ••• served as a 
rallying point for Malay indigenes who felt threatened by 
the increasing numbers of non-indigenous (Chinese and 
Indian) immigrants to the country •.•• Because the 
Malays ••. considered themselves to be a homogeneous, 
indigenous group, the term 'Orang Melayu' (The Malay people) 
was used to reinforce the position of the Malays as the 
indigenes of Tanah Melayu (the Land of the Malays). 
As I have pointed out in Chapter Eight, disjunction indicates an 
attempt to mark out a certain domain from the rest of the world, 
keeping the insiders in and the outsiders out. While the British 
colonisers had wanted to contain the 'Malays', the Malaysian 
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government, it would seem, wants to keep certain 'non-Malay' outsiders 
out. 
In the case of Riau, however, if my Melayu murni informants were 
to adopt such a disjunctive definition of identity, they would find 
themselves numerically even more outnumbered than they are at present. 
As I have shown above, there are very few communities in Riau that 
would meet the criteria of 'purity'. So if the Melayu murni were to 
be considered the only kind of Melayu there is, my aristocrat 
informants would find themselves in the position of being moral 
exemplers to a very limited audience indeed. In Riau, the Melayu 
murni do not constitute a sufficiently large population who can 
thereby be internally differentiated into centre and periphery. It is 
thus not to their advantage to define the 'impure' indigenes as non-
Melayu and thereby cut off their own power base. After all, without 
the bottom, there is no top; without the periphery, there is no 
centre. 
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APPENDIX 10 
On the following page is a photocopy of the certificate of conversion 
to Islam, that was given to me by the Head of the Department of 
Religious Affairs at Tanjungpinang. This certificate illustrates 
clearly how bur,eaucratic such a conversion is, involving standardised 
beliefs and promises, to which all converts are supposed to adhere. A 
translation of it would be as follows: 
CERTIFICATE OF CONVERSION TO ISLAM 
I, the undersigned, a male/female Indonesian: 
Name 
Age/date of birth 
Place of birth 
Occupation 
Address 
hereby declare that I possess understanding/belief to a greater or 
lesser extent about the religion of Islam, and that it is from my own 
desire, in the presence of two witnesses and a few others, that 
henceforth, from this very moment and the date of this certificate, I 
leave my former religion -- namely, the religion of •••• -- and move 
to embrace the religion of Islam, by reciting the KALIMAH TAUHID which 
is as follows. 
"Bismillahirrahmanirrahiim" 
"Asyhaduallaailaahaillallaahu Waasyhaduannamuhammadarrasuulullahi 
(I give testimony that there is no God to be worshipped but Allah and 
I give testimony that the Prophet Muhammad is Allah's Messenger). 
I consequently promise to Allah the following: 
A. I BELIEVE AND ACCEPT: 
1. That there is but one Allah and Muhammad (may he 
rest in peace) is His last Prophet and Apostle. 
2. That all His Prophets and Apostles are true. 
3. That the Holy Book that was bestowed by Allah upon 
His Apostle, which is the last Holy Book, is the 
Quran of the Prophet Muhammad (may he rest in 
peace). 
4. That I believe in His Angels. 
5. That the day of judgement is definitely coming. 
6. That I believe in the teachings of the Liturgy of 
Islam and their power. 
B. I PROMISE THAT: 
1. I declare openly the KALIMAH LAAILAAHAAILLALLAAHU 
MUHAMMADARRAASUULULLAHI. 
2. I will observe the five prayer times that are 
obligatory for me. 
3. I will observe and pay the tithe. 
4. I will observe the obligatory fast during the month 
of Ramadhan. 
s. I will observe the pilgrimage to Mecca when I am 
able to do so. 
C. I WILL SUBMIT TO ALLAH AND HIS APOSTLE by carrying out 
His commands and teachings, and renouncing all that He 
has forbidden. 
Thus I utter this holy confession in sincerity and truth, 
as well as full awareness and realisation, in the hope that 
the One Great God will bless and assure my faith. AMEN!!! 
This declaration was witnessed by: 
1. . . . . . . . . . ( .......... ) 
2. • • • • . . • . . ( •.......•• ) 
KNOWN: 
HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, 
SUB-DISTRICT OF SOUTH BINTAN 
( .......................... ) 
Made in Tanjung Pinang 
on the day ...•.•...•.. 
date . ................ . 
I who gave this declaration: 
( . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ) 
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SURAT PERNYATAAN MASUK. AGAMA ISLAM 
Saya yang bertanda tangan dlbawah dlbawah lnl, seorang lakll/perempuan bangsa 
Indonesia : 
Nam a 
Umur/t&I. lahlr 
Tempat lahlr 
Peker)aan 
Alam at 
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dengan lnl menyatakan bahwa saya mempunyal sedlklt sebanyaknya pengertlan/kepercayaan ten 
tang >.gama Islam dan menyatakan dengan kemauan saya sendlrl dlhadapan dua orang saksl 
dan beberapa orang lalnnya, bahwa mulal darl sa'at sekarang dan tanggal surat lnl dlperbuat 
,menlnggi.lkan Agama saya yang lama yaltu Agama dan berplndah memeluk 
Agama Islam, dengan mengucapbn KALIMAH TAUHID sebagal berlkut • 
.. Bismillahirrahmanirrahiim .. 
,, Asyhaduallaailaahaillallaahu Waasyhaduannamuhammadarrasuulullahi ,, 
('11.1• tdtl ••• '·'·· ,.,.,. ,.., •• , .. , ,,,,.,.,, •d11.id .. .All.I. l .. 11.11. ,.111 .1. '·'··· 11.11 
m.1 •••• , .,.,., u,., •• .A11.1.J. 
dan kemudlan saya berjanJI kepada Allah sebagal berlkut : 
A. SAYA PERCAYA DAN YAQIN : 
I. Bahwa Allah ltu satu dan Muhammad s.a.w. adalah Nabl dan Rasul-Nya yang akhlr. 
2. Bahwa segala Nabl-Nabl dan Rasul-Nya adalah benar. 
3. Bahwa Klub Sucl darl Allah yang dlturunkan kepada Rasul-Nya yang terakhlr Kltab 
Sud adalah Al-qur'an kepada Nabl Muhammad s.a.w. 
of. Bahwa saya percaya kepada Malalkat-Malalkat-Nya. 
5. Bahwa harl · qlamat pasta' akan datang. 
6. Bahwa. saya percaya kepada ajaran-aJaran Syarl'at Agama Islam dan qidar llahl. 
B. SAYA BERJANJI BAHWA : 
I. Saya menyatakan dengan terus terang akan KALIMAH LAAILAAHAAILLALLAAHU 
MUHAMMADARRAASUULULLAHI. 
2. Saya akan mengerjakan Sembahyang llma waktu yang dlwajlbkan kepada saya 
3. Saya akan mengerjakan dan membayar zakat. 
of. Saya akan mengerjakan puasa wajlb pada bulan Ramadhan. 
5. Saya akan mengerjakan Hajl ke-Mekah blla kuasa. 
C. SAYA AKAN TAAT KEPADA ALLAH DAN RASULNYA dengan Jalan melaksanakan pe-
rlntah dan aJaran-ajaranNya serta menlnggalkan semua larangan-laranganNya 
Oemlklanlah pengakuan iucl lnl saya ucapkan dengan lurus dan benar serta penuh rasa 
kesadara11 dan ke-lnsyafan, semoga Tuhan Yang Maha Esa memberkahl dan menetapkan 
ke-lmanan saya. AM IN 111 
i'ernyataan lnl dlsakslkan Oiperbuat di TanJung Plnang, 
pada harl - .. ----·-------· 
2. 
MENGETAHUI: 
KEPALA KANTOR URUSAN AGAMA 
KEOAMATAN BINTAN SELUAN 
' ( ···---·-----.. ··-·--) 
tanggal 
Saya yang member! pernyataan 
<----· -·-----> 
654 
APPENDIX 11 
BIRO PUSAT STATISTIK 
'CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS' 
REGISTRASI PENDUDUK TAHUN 1977 
'POPULATION REGISTRATION FOR THE YEAR 1977' 
PROPINSI : Riau 
KABUPATEN: Kepulauan Riau 
KECAMATAN: Bintan Selatan 
Banyaknya B A N Y A K N Y A P E N 0 U D U K 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D E s A Dewasa Anak-anak Dewasa + Anak-anak 
'Household' 'Adult' 'Children' 'Adults and Children' 
'V I L L A G E' 'Area' Rumah 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------(km2) Tangga Laki-Laki Perempuan Laki-Laki Peremeuan Laki-Laki Perempuan Jllnlah 
'1Ylale 1 'Female' 11Ylale 1 'Female' 11Ylale 1 'Female' 'Total' 
------------------------------------------------------------------~---------------------------------------------------------
Tanjung Pinang Kata 16.00 3158 6352 6379 3977 4111 10329 10490 20819 
Tanjung Pinang Barat 31.00 3029 5314 4624 4348 3896 9662 8520 18182 
Tanjung Pinang Timur 25.00 2311 2926 2930 1939 1941 4865 4871 9736 
Bata Senbilan 81.00 775 809 717 478 513 1287 1230 2517 
Penyengat 23.30 253 462 459 359 363 821 822 1643 
Kampung Bugis 93.85 706 1316 921 720 693 2036 1614 3650 
Dompak 68.00 439 550 460 480 434 1030 894 1924 
Bintan 75.00 254 331 262 304 263 635 525 1160 
P e n a g a 38.00 158 247 217 179 151 426 368 794 
Pengujan 25.50 154 189 193 171 187 360 380 740 
Pangkil 150.00 215 269 279 266 207 535 486 1021 
K a r a s 787.00 712 870 874 757 810 1627 1684 3311 
Sembulang 154.00 193 398 259 199 207 597 466 1063 
Tembeling 46.38 420 732 801 533 400 1265 1201 2466 
Rempang/Cate 296.00 242 357 249 258 302 615 551 1166 
Pulau Abang 935.00 189 456 331 126 100 582 431 1013 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jl.llllah 'Total' 2845.03 13208 21578 19955 15094 14578 36672 34533 71205 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tanjung Pinang 30 Jun, 1977 
Bintan Selatan 
[Signature] 
IYlantri Statistik Kacamatan: ••••••••••••••• 
'The Sub-district Official in Charge of Statistics' 
-----------------------------
--=--=c------o=-~---==---------====-c==---==--=-~-
----- ------------------
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APPENDIX 12 
LIST OF THE HARBOURS OF THE LINGGA-RIAU KINGDOM 1905 
When I asked my informant, Raja Hamzah, about the territorial 
extent of the former sultanate, he referred me to a 1905 treaty, a 
copy of which is in his possession. This is the Contract onder nadere 
goedkeuring der Regeering van Nederlandsch-Indie gesloten tusschen den 
Resident van Riouw en Onderhoorigheden en het Zelfbestuur van Lingga-
Riouw en Onderhoorigheden 'Contract subject to the approval of the 
Government of the Netherlands-Indies drawn between the Residency of 
Riau and its dependencies and the Autonomous Administration of Lingga-
Riau and its dependencies'. This contract lists the harbours of the 
sultanate under the following title: 
List of the Harbours of the Lingga-Riau Kingdom, ref erred to 
in Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the political contract of 18 
May nineteen hundred and five. 
A copy of this list is on the following page. Article 21, Paragraph 2 
referred to in the title gives permission to traders to stay in these 
harbours without prior warning or permission, for as long as three 
months, on condition that they do not disturb the peace. 
656 
0 PG AV B YID de hama JU hd Lemyk Lin~ra-RiHW, 
Woeld i1 arfikel 21 alinra 2 van hd poliliek 
cealnct na dea uhltlenden Aid negenli' hondcrd 
el 1gt • 
Penjiugal 
Koeala Segantoeng 
Koeala Kandab 
Koeala lgal 
Koeala Gaoeng 
Suengei Goeotoeng 
Puelau Kidjang 
T11111lj1111g Daiei 
Jleral 
Ta11djo11g Batoe 
Bojn11 
Boelooh 
Penare (lloro) 
Terong· 
Selat Paael 
SoeJit 
I>aoo 
Batoo Hadjie 
Samboe 
T111djong Boeton 
Daik 
Penueba 
Dabo 
Soengei Raja 
Dakong 
Koeala (Maras) 
Letuug . 
J{ramnl 
Terau1pa 
Geuleng 
Ta11djong 
Ranei 
Soengci ~oe 
Dual 
Stgintjil 
Ajer . Sekain 
Batoe Lepob 
eila11d Jlenjingal. 
Galang. 
l111d11cha11 Mamlah 
op den ns1e11 wal van Sumatra. 
lamlschal' lgal 
op den vasten wal van Suma Ira. 
la111h1cbap Gaoeug 
op den vaste11 wal van Sun11tra. 
land11clu111 Kate111an 
op den n•ten wal van Sumatra. 
l1111l11cl1ap Retcla 
op den vastcn wal van Suwatra. 
eiland Groot Kariwou. 
• Groot Kariu11111. 
• KOJKd,icr. 
• Bitla. 
• Buelueh. 
• S1w.gi Bawah. 
• Tero11g. 
• Suegi. 
• 8uelil. 
• l'aue. 
• Bataw. 
• Gniot Sawboe. 
• Lingga. 
• Lingga. 
• Sulnjar. 
• Si11gke11. 
• Siugkep. 
• Siugkep. 
·• Djemadja 
• Dje0111lja Auambas 
• Kramal eiLindcn. 
• Siant111 
• Sedanau Groot 
• Boengoeran Natoena 
• Boe11goeran groep. 
• Boengoeran 
• .Midai. 
• Pandjang J Zuid Natoe-
• Serasan na groep. 
• Tambelan. 
W. A. PE KANTER. 
Radja ABDUL RACUllAN. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
BKI Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van 
het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde. 
JIA Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern 
Asia. 
JMBRAS 
JSBRAS 
JSEAH 
JSEAS 
MB RAS 
TITLV 
Journal of the Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the 
Royal Asiatic Society. 
Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society. 
Journal of Southeast Asian History. 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society. 
Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde. 
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